Harmful thoughts

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 379-405

  Dan Cohen, Meir ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 0033483707     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3505231     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. "Punishment for Thoughts," in Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 1-29.
2. For some further reflections on this theme see Douglas Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 99-97, 103-105.
3. For an explicit statement of this assumption, see, e.g., R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1996), pp. 313-314: "even practical thought [deliberation, intention-formation, choices] does not, by itself, impinge on the world: it must be translated into action; and we can say that it is by action (as distinct from mere thought) that agents impinge on or make a difference to the world."
4. See, for example, Joseph Tussman, Government and the Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 88.
5. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 23-24; D. Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra, note 2, at p. 105; R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts, supra, note 3, at p. 314.
6. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 23-24; D. Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra, note 2, at p. 105; R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts, supra, note 3, at p. 314.
7. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 23-24; D. Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra, note 2, at p. 105; R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts, supra, note 3, at p. 314.
8. Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960), chs. 1-2.
9. Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner Press, 1948), p. 1.
10. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 42-45.
11. 352 U.S. 432 (1956).
12. 204 Cal. App. 2nd 832; 23 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1962).
13. The example is discussed by George Pitcher in "The Misfortunes of the Dead," American Philosophical Quarterly 21, pp. 183-188 and by Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 90-91.
14. The example is discussed by George Pitcher in "The Misfortunes of the Dead," American Philosophical Quarterly 21, pp. 183-188 and by Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 90-91.
15. Pitcher, ibid., diagnoses the problem this case poses in similar terms. I propose a different solution from his, though the two, I think, are consistent. Mine, however, leads more directly to the claim I seek to establish concerning the extra-personal effects of thoughts.
16. For a discussion of "vicarious harms" along such lines see Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra, note 11, at pp. 70-79.
17. Cf. Feinberg, ibid.
18. Guy de Maupassant famously stated that the tower was his favorite lunch place in Paris, being the one place from which the tower could not be seen; he is also said to have left Paris permanently to avoid looking at the tower.
19. I don't mean to raise the separate question whether there is a useful logical or ontological sense that would admit the "properties" ordinary speech implicitly excludes, or, for that matter, exclude "properties" that the latter takes for granted.
20. This example is actually somewhat out of date: the external floodlighting was replaced in 1986 by a system of illumination that is within the tower's structure. The change corroborates my main point: the significant property of the tower in this case is its being illuminated at night; it doesn't seem to matter much, relative to this property, whether the light comes from within, making it an intrinsic property, or from without, thus rendering it relational.
21. Feinberg considers a similar case, and reaches a similar conclusion: the wife's sinking into a depression can all by itself count as a harm to her loving husband. The reason for Feinberg lies simply in the intensity and duration of the husband's love, which give him a vicarious interest in his wife's well-being. But here again the account seems to leave a conceptual gap: no matter how intense and enduring my love or admiration for, say, Queen Elizabeth, her mood swings, of which I know not, will hardly be said to affect me. See Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra, note 11, at p. 71.
22. Cases of this kind are also sometimes discussed in connection with the concept of happiness. See, for example, Richard Kraut, "Two Conceptions of Happiness," Philosophical Review 88 (1979), pp. 167-197.
23. These two categories are not exhaustive: physical objects, such as geographic locations, can also play the part of a relational term. They are however irrelevant to our present concerns.
24. Indeed, strictly speaking, the second belief may suffice to establish L as the leader, and it need not even be a true belief. L may possess a salient characteristic, an imposing appearance perhaps, which on close inspection is not charisma, but resembles it sufficiently to lead most members of the group to believe that the others are bound to be misled by that characteristic into believing that L is charismatic, and hence view her as the leader. Notice that for such mental bootstrapping to successfully establish L as the leader requires the absence of any communication among the members. In the terminology I propose, what we witness here is a situation in which the convergent thoughts of a group of people, uncommunicated and unexpressed, serve as a collective relational property of L, by constituting her as the group's leader.
25. Cf. David Hume, "Of the Dignity and Meanness of Human Nature," in Political Essays, Charles Hendel, (ed.) (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953).
26. I have distinguished relational properties from comparative ones, but some properties are a composite of both. Being a popular member of the class is, as we saw earlier, a relational property that depends on what the other members of the class think of one. But being the most popular member is also comparative. One can accordingly lose this accolade in three different ways: through a change in the person herself, becoming, say, mean and nasty; through a change in the others' attitudes - they simply grew tired of her; or by the fact that a new member, more attractive than the heretofore favorite, joined the group.
27. Hence, the examples recently adduced by Thomas Nagel to demonstrate the perils of excessive candor in social interactions fall outside the purview of my argument. See his "Concealment and Exposure," Philosophy and Public Affairs 27(3) (1998), pp. 10-17.
28. The main papers are, Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in Philosophical Papers 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 215; Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979), pp. 73-121, and "Other Bodies," in Andrew Woodfield, ed., Thought and Object (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 97.
29. The main papers are, Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in Philosophical Papers 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 215; Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979), pp. 73-121, and "Other Bodies," in Andrew Woodfield, ed., Thought and Object (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 97.
30. The main papers are, Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in Philosophical Papers 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 215; Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979), pp. 73-121, and "Other Bodies," in Andrew Woodfield, ed., Thought and Object (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 97.