Political oratory and conversation: Cicero versus deliberative democracy

Political Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 39-64

  Remer, Gary ^a  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033483577     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591799027001003     Document Type: Review

References (206)

1. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
2. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
3. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
4. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
5. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
6. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
7. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
8. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
9. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
10. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
11. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
12. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
13. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
14. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67-94; Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 95-119; John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 133-45; and James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reforms (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). For other elaborations of deliberative democracy, see Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) - this edited volume contains both of Joshua Cohen's previously listed essays; Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Joseph M. Besserte, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Bernard Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation," Political Theory 15 (August 1987): 338-68.
15. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 131.
16. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 27.
17. Ibid., 28.
18. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, chap. 3; Cicero, De inventione 1.5.7 (all citations from Cicero, unless otherwise indicated, are from the Loeb Classical Library editions [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]); Quintilian, Institutio oratorio 3.4.12-15 (all citations from Quintilian, unless otherwise indicated, are from the Loeb Classical Library editions [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]). For a general discussion of the three genres of oratory, see Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 53-62.
19. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, chap. 3; Cicero, De inventione 1.5.7 (all citations from Cicero, unless otherwise indicated, are from the Loeb Classical Library editions [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]); Quintilian, Institutio oratorio 3.4.12-15 (all citations from Quintilian, unless otherwise indicated, are from the Loeb Classical Library editions [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]). For a general discussion of the three genres of oratory, see Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 53-62.
20. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, chap. 3; Cicero, De inventione 1.5.7 (all citations from Cicero, unless otherwise indicated, are from the Loeb Classical Library editions [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]); Quintilian, Institutio oratorio 3.4.12-15 (all citations from Quintilian, unless otherwise indicated, are from the Loeb Classical Library editions [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]). For a general discussion of the three genres of oratory, see Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 53-62.
21. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, chap. 3; Cicero, De inventione 1.5.7 (all citations from Cicero, unless otherwise indicated, are from the Loeb Classical Library editions [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]); Quintilian, Institutio oratorio 3.4.12-15 (all citations from Quintilian, unless otherwise indicated, are from the Loeb Classical Library editions [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]). For a general discussion of the three genres of oratory, see Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 53-62.
22. Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 53-4.
23. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. I only list those characteristics relevant to my argument.
24. Institutio oratorio 2.18.2-5. This relationship between rhetoric and action is explicit in the traditional three officia oratoris, or duties of an orator: to prove (probare) or instruct (docere), to please (delectare), and to stir (movere). Of the three officia, it is the last duty, focused on action, that receives Cicero's highest praise: "it is the one thing of all that avails most in winning verdicts," and in it "is summed up the entire virtue of the orator." See Cicero, Orator 21.69-70.
25. Institutio oratorio 2.18.2-5. This relationship between rhetoric and action is explicit in the traditional three officia oratoris, or duties of an orator: to prove (probare) or instruct (docere), to please (delectare), and to stir (movere). Of the three officia, it is the last duty, focused on action, that receives Cicero's highest praise: "it is the one thing of all that avails most in winning verdicts," and in it "is summed up the entire virtue of the orator." See Cicero, Orator 21.69-70.
26. Cicero, De officiis 1.43.153.
27. John O'Malley, Praise and Blame in Renaissance Rome: Rhetoric, Doctrine and Reform in the Sacred Orators of the Papal Court, c. 1450-1521 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), 41.
28. Institutio oratorio 3.5.5-7.
29. De inventione 1.6.8.
30. Orator 14.45-46; De oratore 3.30.120-121. Quintilian notes Cicero's change of heart in Institutio oratoria 3.5.14-15.
31. Orator 14.45-46; De oratore 3.30.120-121. Quintilian notes Cicero's change of heart in Institutio oratoria 3.5.14-15.
32. Orator 14.45-46; De oratore 3.30.120-121. Quintilian notes Cicero's change of heart in Institutio oratoria 3.5.14-15.
33. An exception is the deliberative oratory appropriate to a smaller audience, like the senate.
34. De oratore 1.3.12. See also Rhetoric 1355a 25-30.
35. De oratore 1.3.12. See also Rhetoric 1355a 25-30.
36. Institutio oratoria 3.4.15. See Peter France, Rhetoric and Truth in France: Descartes and Diderot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 28-32.
37. Institutio oratoria 3.4.15. See Peter France, Rhetoric and Truth in France: Descartes and Diderot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 28-32.
38. Institutio oratoria 5.14.29.
39. And, as Quintilian argues, a prudent use of emotions will not only benefit the orator personally, but, if he is a good orator (a vir bonus dicendi peritus), truth and justice too. Institutio oratoria 12.1.1.
40. Rhetoric 1356a 1-4. Ethos persuades when "the speech is so spoken as to make us think [the speaker] more credible, [since] we believe good men more fully and more readily than others" (1358a 3-13). Pathos succeeds "when the speech stirs the emotions," for "our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile" (1356a 13-19). Logical explanation works "through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question" (1356a 19-21). The original Aristotelian sense of ethos, however, changes under the Romans, and it comes to mean a gentler form of the emotions roused by pathos. See Orator 36.128; Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 74.
41. Rhetoric 1356a 1-4. Ethos persuades when "the speech is so spoken as to make us think [the speaker] more credible, [since] we believe good men more fully and more readily than others" (1358a 3-13). Pathos succeeds "when the speech stirs the emotions," for "our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile" (1356a 13-19). Logical explanation works "through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question" (1356a 19-21). The original Aristotelian sense of ethos, however, changes under the Romans, and it comes to mean a gentler form of the emotions roused by pathos. See Orator 36.128; Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 74.
42. Rhetoric 1356a 1-4. Ethos persuades when "the speech is so spoken as to make us think [the speaker] more credible, [since] we believe good men more fully and more readily than others" (1358a 3-13). Pathos succeeds "when the speech stirs the emotions," for "our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile" (1356a 13-19). Logical explanation works "through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question" (1356a 19-21). The original Aristotelian sense of ethos, however, changes under the Romans, and it comes to mean a gentler form of the emotions roused by pathos. See Orator 36.128; Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 74.
43. Institutio oratoria 6.2.8.
44. Cicero, Brutus 80.279. See also ibid. 93.22; Orator 36.127.
45. Cicero, Brutus 80.279. See also ibid. 93.22; Orator 36.127.
46. Cicero, Brutus 80.279. See also ibid. 93.22; Orator 36.127.
47. De oratore 2.42.178.
48. St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), 4.27.
49. Orator 25.122. Although epideictic oratory is mainly celebratory, not contentious, it has also been used agonistically in both legal and political settings, Institutio oratoria 3.7.2.
50. Orator 25.122. Although epideictic oratory is mainly celebratory, not contentious, it has also been used agonistically in both legal and political settings, Institutio oratoria 3.7.2.
51. Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 43.
52. Rhetoric 1354a 5-6. See George Kennedy's translation, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 29.
53. Rhetoric 1354a 5-6. See George Kennedy's translation, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 29.
54. See, for example, Isocrates, Panegyricus 45-46.
55. George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 189.
56. De oratore 1.24.157, 2.20.84;
57. Orator 13.42;
58. and Institutio oratoria 10.5.17-20.
59. See Debora K. Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 21-3.
60. Institutio oratoria 11.3.26-27.
61. De officiis 1.37.132. Translation from Cicero, On Duties, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 51. See also ibid. 2.14.48-49.
62. De officiis 1.37.132. Translation from Cicero, On Duties, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 51. See also ibid. 2.14.48-49.
63. De officiis 1.37.132. Translation from Cicero, On Duties, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 51. See also ibid. 2.14.48-49.
64. De officiis 1.37.132. Translation from Cicero, On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 51.
65. De officiis 1.37.132. Translation from Cicero, On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 51.
66. Cicero's rhetorical dialogues include De oratore, De partitione oratoria, and Brutus; and his philosophical dialogues include De republica, De legibus, Academica, Definibus, Tusculan Disputations, De natura deorum, De senectute, De amicitia, and De divinatione.
67. Cicero De finibus 2.6.17; Tusculan Disputations 1.47.112.
68. Cicero De finibus 2.6.17; Tusculan Disputations 1.47.112.
69. Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato 3.48, 1:319, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). See also David Marsh, The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 2; Rudolf Hirzel, Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch, 2 vols. (1895; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 1:2-7; Introduction to Loeb Classical Library Edition of Cicero's Brutus, trans. G. L. Hendrickson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 8-9.
70. Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato 3.48, 1:319, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). See also David Marsh, The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 2; Rudolf Hirzel, Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch, 2 vols. (1895; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 1:2-7; Introduction to Loeb Classical Library Edition of Cicero's Brutus, trans. G. L. Hendrickson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 8-9.
71. Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato 3.48, 1:319, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). See also David Marsh, The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 2; Rudolf Hirzel, Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch, 2 vols. (1895; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 1:2-7; Introduction to Loeb Classical Library Edition of Cicero's Brutus, trans. G. L. Hendrickson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 8-9.
72. Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato 3.48, 1:319, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). See also David Marsh, The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 2; Rudolf Hirzel, Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch, 2 vols. (1895; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 1:2-7; Introduction to Loeb Classical Library Edition of Cicero's Brutus, trans. G. L. Hendrickson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 8-9.
73. Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato 3.48, 1:319, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). See also David Marsh, The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 2; Rudolf Hirzel, Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch, 2 vols. (1895; reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 1:2-7; Introduction to Loeb Classical Library Edition of Cicero's Brutus, trans. G. L. Hendrickson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 8-9.
74. De oratore 1.7.27, 1.8.29.
75. De oratore 1.6.23. Disputatio does not mean dispute or disputation. By not equating dialogue with sermo, Cicero is presumably alluding to the artificial, mimetic character of his dialogues that stands in contrast to the naturalness and lack of artifice of genuine conversations. I would like to thank Professor Elaine Fantham for this observation.
76. Samuel Ijsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict: An Historical Survey (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 35; France, Rhetoric and Truth in France, 32.
77. Samuel Ijsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict: An Historical Survey (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 35; France, Rhetoric and Truth in France, 32.
78. Orator 35.123.
79. De officiis 1.37.134-135. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 52. See also De oratore 2.4.17-2.5.20, where Cicero's interlocutors recognize the need to adhere to "the demands of the occasion" in sermo. Those who fail to speak or act with decorum are labeled ineptus.
80. De officiis 1.37.134-135. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 52. See also De oratore 2.4.17-2.5.20, where Cicero's interlocutors recognize the need to adhere to "the demands of the occasion" in sermo. Those who fail to speak or act with decorum are labeled ineptus.
81. De officiis 1.37.134-135. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 52. See also De oratore 2.4.17-2.5.20, where Cicero's interlocutors recognize the need to adhere to "the demands of the occasion" in sermo. Those who fail to speak or act with decorum are labeled ineptus.
82. This linking of ideas to actual people and their circumstances is what, most fundamentally, separates conversation from dialectic. Although both are investigative arts in which opposing views are considered, dialectic deals with ideas without regard to the emotional state of those involved; from the dialectician's perspective, a valid syllogism is all the proof that is necessary. In conversation, by contrast, there is the recognition that even the best proofs do not persuade, unless they are accompanied by rhetorical propriety; each speaker must first accommodate himself to the conditions of the other speakers. See Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato 3.48, 1:319, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers.
83. This linking of ideas to actual people and their circumstances is what, most fundamentally, separates conversation from dialectic. Although both are investigative arts in which opposing views are considered, dialectic deals with ideas without regard to the emotional state of those involved; from the dialectician's perspective, a valid syllogism is all the proof that is necessary. In conversation, by contrast, there is the recognition that even the best proofs do not persuade, unless they are accompanied by rhetorical propriety; each speaker must first accommodate himself to the conditions of the other speakers. See Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato 3.48, 1:319, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers.
84. De officiis 1.37.135. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 52.
85. De officiis 1.37.135. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 52.
86. De finibus 4.19.52.
87. De oratore 2.15.65-16.68. See also ibid. 2.10.41-43, 3.28.109; and Alain Michel, Rhétorique et Philosophie chez Cicéron: Essai sur les fondements philosophique de l'art persuader (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), 219.
88. De oratore 2.15.65-16.68. See also ibid. 2.10.41-43, 3.28.109; and Alain Michel, Rhétorique et Philosophie chez Cicéron: Essai sur les fondements philosophique de l'art persuader (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), 219.
89. De oratore 2.15.65-16.68. See also ibid. 2.10.41-43, 3.28.109; and Alain Michel, Rhétorique et Philosophie chez Cicéron: Essai sur les fondements philosophique de l'art persuader (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), 219.
90. Although Cicero structured his philosophical work De officiis as a letter from the elder Cicero to his son, the letter was often categorized, classically, as a form of dialogue in which one of the participants is absent. See G.M.A. Grube, A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 111; Libanius, Libanii opera, ed. Richard Foerster (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1903-27), 9:27; Desiderius Erasmus, De conscribendis epistolis, in Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 25:20.
91. Although Cicero structured his philosophical work De officiis as a letter from the elder Cicero to his son, the letter was often categorized, classically, as a form of dialogue in which one of the participants is absent. See G.M.A. Grube, A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 111; Libanius, Libanii opera, ed. Richard Foerster (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1903-27), 9:27; Desiderius Erasmus, De conscribendis epistolis, in Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 25:20.
92. Although Cicero structured his philosophical work De officiis as a letter from the elder Cicero to his son, the letter was often categorized, classically, as a form of dialogue in which one of the participants is absent. See G.M.A. Grube, A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 111; Libanius, Libanii opera, ed. Richard Foerster (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1903-27), 9:27; Desiderius Erasmus, De conscribendis epistolis, in Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 25:20.
93. De oratore 3.16.59-61. See also Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 163-4.
94. De oratore 3.16.59-61. See also Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 163-4.
95. De finibus 2.6.17.
96. De natura deorum 2.1.3; De officiis 1.4.13; De oratore 2.5.19; John F. Tinkler, "Renaissance Humanism and the genera eloquentiae," Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 5 (1987): 287-8;
97. De natura deorum 2.1.3; De officiis 1.4.13; De oratore 2.5.19; John F. Tinkler, "Renaissance Humanism and the genera eloquentiae," Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 5 (1987): 287-8;
98. De natura deorum 2.1.3; De officiis 1.4.13; De oratore 2.5.19; John F. Tinkler, "Renaissance Humanism and the genera eloquentiae," Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 5 (1987): 287-8;
99. De natura deorum 2.1.3; De officiis 1.4.13; De oratore 2.5.19; John F. Tinkler, "Renaissance Humanism and the genera eloquentiae," Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 5 (1987): 287-8;
100. Michel, Rhétorique et Philosophie chez Cicéron, 365;
101. Michel Ruch, Le Préamble Dans Les Oeuvres Philosophiques De Cicéron: Essai sur la Genèse et Part du Dialogue (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1958), 83-5.
102. De republica and De legibus were his only philosophical dialogues written earlier.
103. Cicero's otium was not sought; it came as a consequence of his forced political retirement, his being "released from taking part in the government of the country." Academica 1.3.11. Cicero still preferred the life of the statesman to that of the philosopher, and it was his reentry into political life in 44, with his attack on Mark Antony, that led to his proscription and death in December 43.
104. De officiis 2.10.35; De finibus 2.6.17, 2.25.80-81.
105. De officiis 2.10.35; De finibus 2.6.17, 2.25.80-81.
106. Tusculan Disputations 2.1.4; Plato, Republic 494a.
107. Tusculan Disputations 2.1.4; Plato, Republic 494a.
108. Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 92, 127, 165-8.
109. Lily Ross Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), 15-19. See also Chaim Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 18-19, n. 2: "The plain fact, from a political point of view, is that the Roman People went to the Assemblies to listen and to vote, not to speak. Magistrates, leading senators and barristers enjoyed freedom of speech and made the most of it; but they cannot be identified with the Roman People."
110. Lily Ross Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), 15-19. See also Chaim Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 18-19, n. 2: "The plain fact, from a political point of view, is that the Roman People went to the Assemblies to listen and to vote, not to speak. Magistrates, leading senators and barristers enjoyed freedom of speech and made the most of it; but they cannot be identified with the Roman People."
111. De officiis 1.134. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 52; Tusculan Disputations 4.4.8.
112. De officiis 1.134. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 52; Tusculan Disputations 4.4.8.
113. De officiis 1.134. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins, 52; Tusculan Disputations 4.4.8.
114. Tusculan Disputations 4.4.7, 2.26.63, 5.29.83; De natura deorum 1.7.17, 3.40.95; De finibus 5.26.76.
115. Tusculan Disputations 4.4.7, 2.26.63, 5.29.83; De natura deorum 1.7.17, 3.40.95; De finibus 5.26.76.
116. Tusculan Disputations 4.4.7, 2.26.63, 5.29.83; De natura deorum 1.7.17, 3.40.95; De finibus 5.26.76.
117. Tusculan Disputations 4.25.55.
118. De oratore 1.59.255; De officiis 1.1.3.
119. De oratore 1.59.255; De officiis 1.1.3.
120. De natura deorum 1.5.10. See also Tusculan Disputations 2.26.63.
121. De natura deorum 1.5.10. See also Tusculan Disputations 2.26.63.
122. Tusculan Disputations 5.15.43.
123. De officiis 1.38.136. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins. In Tusculan Disputations (4.23.52) Cicero asks the question, "is there anything more like unsoundness of mind than anger?"
124. De officiis 1.38.136. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins. In Tusculan Disputations (4.23.52) Cicero asks the question, "is there anything more like unsoundness of mind than anger?"
125. De officiis 1.38.136. Translation from On Duties, ed. Griffin and Atkins. In Tusculan Disputations (4.23.52) Cicero asks the question, "is there anything more like unsoundness of mind than anger?"
126. De oratore 2.44.185, 189-190. Quintilian states (6.2.20) that "pathos is almost entirely concerned with anger, dislike, fear, hatred, and pity."
127. Tusculan Disputations 3.6.12-13.
128. De officiis 1.38.136.
129. Tusculan Disputations 4.25.55; De officiis 1.4.13.
130. Tusculan Disputations 4.25.55; De officiis 1.4.13.
131. De officiis 1.16.50-17.56.
132. Ibid. 1.17.58.
133. De finibus 1.5.13. See also Tusculan Disputations 4.21.47. Aristotle, in Topics (159a 27-38), distinguishes between "those engaged in competition" and "those who discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry." The interlocutors in Ciceronian sermo belong to the latter.
134. De finibus 1.5.13. See also Tusculan Disputations 4.21.47. Aristotle, in Topics (159a 27-38), distinguishes between "those engaged in competition" and "those who discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry." The interlocutors in Ciceronian sermo belong to the latter.
135. De finibus 1.5.13. See also Tusculan Disputations 4.21.47. Aristotle, in Topics (159a 27-38), distinguishes between "those engaged in competition" and "those who discuss things together in the spirit of inquiry." The interlocutors in Ciceronian sermo belong to the latter.
136. Plato Letters, VII 344b. See also Gorgias 487a; Klosko, "Rational Persuasion in Plato's Political Theory," History of Political Thought 7 (1986): 18-19; and Martha C. Nussbaum's review of Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, by Gregory Vlastos, The New Republic, 16 and 23 September 1991, 34-40.
137. Plato Letters, VII 344b. See also Gorgias 487a; Klosko, "Rational Persuasion in Plato's Political Theory," History of Political Thought 7 (1986): 18-19; and Martha C. Nussbaum's review of Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, by Gregory Vlastos, The New Republic, 16 and 23 September 1991, 34-40.
138. Plato Letters, VII 344b. See also Gorgias 487a; Klosko, "Rational Persuasion in Plato's Political Theory," History of Political Thought 7 (1986): 18-19; and Martha C. Nussbaum's review of Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, by Gregory Vlastos, The New Republic, 16 and 23 September 1991, 34-40.
139. Plato Letters, VII 344b. See also Gorgias 487a; Klosko, "Rational Persuasion in Plato's Political Theory," History of Political Thought 7 (1986): 18-19; and Martha C. Nussbaum's review of Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, by Gregory Vlastos, The New Republic, 16 and 23 September 1991, 34-40.
140. Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model," 83-4.
141. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 12; Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 76.
142. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 12; Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 76.
143. See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980).
144. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 12. See also ibid., 40.
145. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 12. See also ibid., 40.
146. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 179. See also ibid., 196.
147. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 179. See also ibid., 196.
148. Habermas, Structural Transformation, 27-31.
149. Ibid., 31-73.
150. Jürgen Habermas, "Three Normative Models of Democracy," in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 27, 29-30.
151. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, 40.
152. Seyla Benhabib, "The Democratic Moment and the Problem of Difference," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Benhabib, 7.
153. Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model," 73-4.
154. Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," 22-3; Bohman, Public Deliberation, 16. See also Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," 99.
155. Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," 22-3; Bohman, Public Deliberation, 16. See also Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," 99.
156. Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," 22-3; Bohman, Public Deliberation, 16. See also Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," 99.
157. Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model," 78; see also 69-70.
158. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 197-8.
159. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 37.
160. Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model," 69.
161. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 99.
162. Ibid., 151.
163. Ibid. 187, n. 30.
164. Ibid., 162.
165. Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992), 90-5; Benhabib, "The Democratic Moment," 7.
166. Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992), 90-5; Benhabib, "The Democratic Moment," 7.
167. See, for example, Academica 2.48.147-48.
168. See Jürgen Habermas, Communcation and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), 1; Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 156-7.
169. See Jürgen Habermas, Communcation and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), 1; Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 156-7.
170. "A discursive approach to the dilemmas, conflicts, and tensions of modern society stands somewhere between the view that all problems are amenable to rational solutions (it is only a matter of time) and an approach that accentuates the intractability of the dilemmas, conflicts, and tensions of collective life. Discourse ethics offers no theoretical guarantee that discourse will be successful or somehow always could be successful if only we were all of goodwill. . . . Nevertheless, we cannot draw the conclusion that all the problems we face are tragic, insoluble, unbridgeable, or irreconcilable." Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 158.
171. See, for example, Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 73-91.
172. De legibus 3.18.40.
173. De oratore 1.5.20-21.
174. De officiis 1.43.153.
175. Aristotle Politics 1325b 14-33; De republica 1.2.2; Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought, 122-3.
176. Aristotle Politics 1325b 14-33; De republica 1.2.2; Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought, 122-3.
177. Aristotle Politics 1325b 14-33; De republica 1.2.2; Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought, 122-3.
178. De officiis 1.21.70.
179. Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought, 178.
180. De oratore 1.8-30-31.
181. De oratore 1.8.33-34. Cicero offers a mythical account, in De inventione 1.2.2-3, of the creation of civilization. Initially, human beings lived in a brutish state of nature. They were led out of this primitive condition, however, by a great orator who persuaded his neighbors to abandon their lowly existence. It was this earliest of rhetoricians, Cicero posits, that transformed men "from wild savages into a kind and gentle folk."
182. De oratore 1.8.33-34. Cicero offers a mythical account, in De inventione 1.2.2-3, of the creation of civilization. Initially, human beings lived in a brutish state of nature. They were led out of this primitive condition, however, by a great orator who persuaded his neighbors to abandon their lowly existence. It was this earliest of rhetoricians, Cicero posits, that transformed men "from wild savages into a kind and gentle folk."
183. See Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 35-7.
184. Amélie Rorty contends that the emotions involve evaluation and appraisal and are not, as such, either rational or irrational. Similarly, Nussbaum maintains that the emotions can be rational or irrational and that they are appropriate in deliberation. See Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "Varieties of Rationality, Varieties of Emotion," Social Science Information 24 (1985): 343-53; Martha C. Nussbaum, "Emotions and Women's Capabilities," in Women, Culture, and Development, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 360-95.
185. Amélie Rorty contends that the emotions involve evaluation and appraisal and are not, as such, either rational or irrational. Similarly, Nussbaum maintains that the emotions can be rational or irrational and that they are appropriate in deliberation. See Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "Varieties of Rationality, Varieties of Emotion," Social Science Information 24 (1985): 343-53; Martha C. Nussbaum, "Emotions and Women's Capabilities," in Women, Culture, and Development, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 360-95.
186. Nussbaum, "Emotions and Women's Capabilities," 381-2.
187. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 99.
188. Benhabib criticizes Rawls for eliminating "all contestatory, rhetorical, affective, impassioned elements of public discourse, with all their excesses and virtues.See Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model," 76. She does not, however, explain how rhetoric fits in her own model of discourse. Bohman also acknowledges the need for rhetoric in public deliberation. See Bohman, Public Deliberation, 7.
189. Benhabib criticizes Rawls for eliminating "all contestatory, rhetorical, affective, impassioned elements of public discourse, with all their excesses and virtues.See Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model," 76. She does not, however, explain how rhetoric fits in her own model of discourse. Bohman also acknowledges the need for rhetoric in public deliberation. See Bohman, Public Deliberation, 7.
190. Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model," 83. See also Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 206. Habermas discusses rhetoric as display, but not as a part of deliberation. Structural Transformation, 8.
191. Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model," 83. See also Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 206. Habermas discusses rhetoric as display, but not as a part of deliberation. Structural Transformation, 8.
192. Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model," 83. See also Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 206. Habermas discusses rhetoric as display, but not as a part of deliberation. Structural Transformation, 8.
193. Rhetoric 1354a 15-20, 1377b 21-25; Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 72-3.
194. Rhetoric 1354a 15-20, 1377b 21-25; Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, 72-3.
195. Thus, I am not arguing, as does Lynn Sanders, against rationalist deliberation per se, but against deliberative democracy's conception of discourse as solely rationalist. See Lynn M. Sanders, "Against Deliberation," Political Theory 25 (June 1997): 347-76.
196. De finibus 2.6.17.
197. See Chambers's discussion in Reasonable Democracy, 5-6, 232; Danns Villa, "Post-modernism and the Public Sphere," American Political Science Review 86 (September 1992): 712-21.
198. See Chambers's discussion in Reasonable Democracy, 5-6, 232; Danns Villa, "Post-modernism and the Public Sphere," American Political Science Review 86 (September 1992): 712-21.
199. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 230, 234.
200. Chambers acknowledges that "the major barrier to discursive resolution in liberal democracies usually comes in the form of political apathy, not conscious suppression. People have little interest in the decisions that affect them and are willing to allow others to debate the issues and find solutions." Reasonable Democracy, 198.
201. "Disadvantaged groups have usually found representatives from within their own ranks who could speak for them, and who could articulate their interests and ideals, at least as reasonably and effectively as representatives of established groups. Martin Luther King, Jr., exemplifies this kind of representation at its best." Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, 132-3.
202. Cicero Ad familiares 10.12.5, 2.15.3.
203. My emphasis. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 184. Deliberative democracy has a "Kantian component [valuing individual autonomy] that is not usually found in republican models of democracy." Nevertheless, while it does "not require as high a level of civic virtue as republican models," it certainly requires "a higher level of civic virtue than is presently evident in the practice of democracy." Chambers, Reasonable Democracy.
204. My emphasis. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, 184. Deliberative democracy has a "Kantian component [valuing individual autonomy] that is not usually found in republican models of democracy." Nevertheless, while it does "not require as high a level of civic virtue as republican models," it certainly requires "a higher level of civic virtue than is presently evident in the practice of democracy." Chambers, Reasonable Democracy.
205. "Discourse theory invests the democratic process with normative connotaions stronger than those found in the liberal model but weaker than those of the republican model. . . . it takes elements from both and fits them together in a new way." Habermas, "Three Normative Models," 27; see also 23.
206. See Michael Walzer, "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation," The Philosophical Forum 21 (fall-winter 1989-90): 189-91.