On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games

Economics Letters

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 29-34

  Stanford, William ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

C72; Finite common payoffs; Nash equilibria

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033483393     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00219-5     Document Type: Article

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