Political transition in Mauritania: Problems and prospects

Middle East Journal

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 40-58

  Pazzanita, Anthony G ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033482812     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (81)

1. In 1998, Afghanistan, the Comoros, Iran, Mauritania, and Pakistan used the word "Islamic" in one form or another to describe their states. Although widely thought of as being of Islamist orientation. Sudan evidently did not formally describe itself as such. United States Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1997 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997).
2. Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture and Political Development," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 7.
3. A highly detailed description of Mauritanian tribal and ethnic life is found in Alfred G. Gerteiny, Mauritania (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 46-56 (for the Arab/Moorish population), and pp. 88-101 (for the non-Arab Black Africans).
4. For useful, although dated, information on the Mauritanian economy in the 1960-70 period, see ibid. pp. 163-97; and Richard M. Westebbe, The Economy of Mauritania (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). More recent data covering the 1970s and early 1980s is found in Robert E. Handloff, ed., Mauritania: A Country Study (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 79-117.
5. For useful, although dated, information on the Mauritanian economy in the 1960-70 period, see ibid. pp. 163-97; and Richard M. Westebbe, The Economy of Mauritania (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). More recent data covering the 1970s and early 1980s is found in Robert E. Handloff, ed., Mauritania: A Country Study (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 79-117.
6. For useful, although dated, information on the Mauritanian economy in the 1960-70 period, see ibid. pp. 163-97; and Richard M. Westebbe, The Economy of Mauritania (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). More recent data covering the 1970s and early 1980s is found in Robert E. Handloff, ed., Mauritania: A Country Study (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 79-117.
7. See Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill Publishers, 1983), pp. 85-99; and Gerteiny, Mauritania, pp. 196-99. Morocco's claim to Mauritania was set forth at the time of Mauritanian independence by Jamal Sa'd in The Problem of Mauritania (New York: Arab Information Center, November 1960).
8. See Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill Publishers, 1983), pp. 85-99; and Gerteiny, Mauritania, pp. 196-99. Morocco's claim to Mauritania was set forth at the time of Mauritanian independence by Jamal Sa'd in The Problem of Mauritania (New York: Arab Information Center, November 1960).
9. See Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill Publishers, 1983), pp. 85-99; and Gerteiny, Mauritania, pp. 196-99. Morocco's claim to Mauritania was set forth at the time of Mauritanian independence by Jamal Sa'd in The Problem of Mauritania (New York: Arab Information Center, November 1960).
10. For a readable account of this period in early post-World War II Mauritanian history, see Gerteiny, Mauritania, pp. 116-35 (for events from 1946 to 1960), and pp. 147-62 (for President Ould Daddah's post-independence consolidation of authority).
11. Handloff, Mauritania: A Country Study, pp. 90-96.
12. "Polisario" is an acronym that stands for the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y Río de Oro.
13. Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War, pp. 210-40.
14. Ibid., pp. 241-56.
15. Ibid., pp. 257-66. The CMRN existed for less than one year, when, on 6 April 1979, it was replaced by a new and somewhat larger Comité Militaire de Salut National (CMSN), which served as Mauritania's supreme governing body until 18 April 1992, the day elected civilian rule was introduced.
16. President Ould Daddah himself was a member of the Oulad Berri tribe, an important zawaya grouping centered around the town of Boutilimit, southeast of Nouakchott. For a brief discussion of the tribal factor, along with a listing and description of tribes and social classes, see Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, Societal Transition to Democracy in Mauritania (Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies and Dar Al-Ameen Publishing, 1995), pp. 88-89, 109-17.
17. In the words of one scholar, ". . ..personal status (familial, ethnic, religious, tribal, confessional, professional) continues to define the Maghrebi citizen." Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, "Political Transformation and Democratization: New Patterns of Interaction Between Public Administration and Civil Society in North Africa," in The International Review of Administrative Sciences 64, (1998), p. 75.
18. Virtually the sole use of armed force to attempt to change the government (other than the initial army seizure of power on 10 July 1978 by Colonel Ould Salek) came on 16 March 1981, when a Moroccan-inspired coup attempt against CMSN chairman Ould Heydallah claimed the lives of several persons in the center of Nouakchott. See Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XIV (1981-1982), pp. B474-75. See also Africa Confidential 22, no. 8 (8 April 1981), pp. 6-7.
19. Virtually the sole use of armed force to attempt to change the government (other than the initial army seizure of power on 10 July 1978 by Colonel Ould Salek) came on 16 March 1981, when a Moroccan-inspired coup attempt against CMSN chairman Ould Heydallah claimed the lives of several persons in the center of Nouakchott. See Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XIV (1981-1982), pp. B474-75. See also Africa Confidential 22, no. 8 (8 April 1981), pp. 6-7.
20. See Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XV (1982-1983), pp. B512-14, and vol. XVI (1983-1984), pp. B493-96. See also Africa Confidential 25, no. 6 (14 March 1984), pp. 5-7.
21. See Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XV (1982-1983), pp. B512-14, and vol. XVI (1983-1984), pp. B493-96. See also Africa Confidential 25, no. 6 (14 March 1984), pp. 5-7.
22. See Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XV (1982-1983), pp. B512-14, and vol. XVI (1983-1984), pp. B493-96. See also Africa Confidential 25, no. 6 (14 March 1984), pp. 5-7.
23. West Africa, 19 January 1987, pp. 110-11; and Handloff, Mauritania: A Country Study, pp. 135-36.
24. West Africa, 19 January 1987, pp. 110-11; and Handloff, Mauritania: A Country Study, pp. 135-36.
25. Founded in March 1983, the Dakar- and Paris-based FLAM claimed that Moor-dominated governments throughout Mauritania's history had systematically discriminated against Black Africans and haratin. It made this argument in its Manifesto du Négro-Mauritanien Opprimé (Manifesto of the Oppressed Black Mauritanian) issued in April 1986. After the end of the group's largely ineffectual attacks on the Nouakchott regime in the early 1990s, many FLAM militants took advantage of a general amnesty to return to Mauritania, and its activities after that time were thought to be minimal.
26. Africa Research Bulletin: Political Social and Cultural Series (hereafter ARB). vol. 24, no. 12(15 December 1987), p. 8732; West Africa, 19 January 1987. pp. 110-11; and West Africa, 24-30 October 1988, pp. 1984-85.
27. Africa Research Bulletin: Political Social and Cultural Series (hereafter ARB). vol. 24, no. 12(15 December 1987), p. 8732; West Africa, 19 January 1987. pp. 110-11; and West Africa, 24-30 October 1988, pp. 1984-85.
28. Africa Research Bulletin: Political Social and Cultural Series (hereafter ARB). vol. 24, no. 12(15 December 1987), p. 8732; West Africa, 19 January 1987. pp. 110-11; and West Africa, 24-30 October 1988, pp. 1984-85.
29. Such a characterization is often used by knowledgeable Western and Mauritanian informants. Philippe Marchesin, in his chapter on Mauritania in Africa Contemporary Record, vol. XXIII (1990-1992), pp. B99-B101, also emphasizes this growing isolation.
30. Africa Confidential 32, no. 3 (8 February 1991), pp. 6-7. For coverage of the human rights abuses allegedly committed by the Ould Taya regime against the Ba'th Party (as well as others), see Amnesty International, Mauritania 1986-1989: Background to a Crisis: Three Years of Political Imprisonment, Torture and Unfair Trials (New York and London: Amnesty International, November 1989), pp. 22-23.
31. Africa Confidential 32, no. 3 (8 February 1991), pp. 6-7. For coverage of the human rights abuses allegedly committed by the Ould Taya regime against the Ba'th Party (as well as others), see Amnesty International, Mauritania 1986-1989: Background to a Crisis: Three Years of Political Imprisonment, Torture and Unfair Trials (New York and London: Amnesty International, November 1989), pp. 22-23.
32. See ibid.; and Amnesty International, Human Rights Violations in the Senegal River Valley (New York and London: Amnesty International, October 1990). A separate organization, Human Rights Watch, issued a controversial report entitled Mauritania's Campaign of Terror: State-Sponsored Repression of Black Africans (New York: Human Rights Watch/Africa, April 1994).
33. See ibid.; and Amnesty International, Human Rights Violations in the Senegal River Valley (New York and London: Amnesty International, October 1990). A separate organization, Human Rights Watch, issued a controversial report entitled Mauritania's Campaign of Terror: State-Sponsored Repression of Black Africans (New York: Human Rights Watch/Africa, April 1994).
34. See ibid.; and Amnesty International, Human Rights Violations in the Senegal River Valley (New York and London: Amnesty International, October 1990). A separate organization, Human Rights Watch, issued a controversial report entitled Mauritania's Campaign of Terror: State-Sponsored Repression of Black Africans (New York: Human Rights Watch/Africa, April 1994).
35. Africa Confidential 31, no. 13 (29 June 1990), p. 4.
36. A summary of the Senegal-Mauritania dispute is contained in Jonathan Derrick, "Mauritania: Damaging Crisis with Senegal Makes Bad State Worse," in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XXII (1989-1990), pp. B88-90. Also helpful are two articles by British journalist Mark Doyle: "Blood Brothers," in Africa Report 34, no. 4 (July-August 1989), pp. 13-16, and "Nouakchott's New Nationalism," also in Africa Report 34, no. 5 (September-October 1989), pp. 37-40. Accounts of events related to the crisis are also found in ARB 26, no. 4 (15 May 1989), pp. 9240-42; ARB 26, no. 5 (15 June 1989), pp. 9273-76; and ARB 26, no. 11 (15 December 1989), pp. 9477-79.
37. A summary of the Senegal-Mauritania dispute is contained in Jonathan Derrick, "Mauritania: Damaging Crisis with Senegal Makes Bad State Worse," in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XXII (1989-1990), pp. B88-90. Also helpful are two articles by British journalist Mark Doyle: "Blood Brothers," in Africa Report 34, no. 4 (July-August 1989), pp. 13-16, and "Nouakchott's New Nationalism," also in Africa Report 34, no. 5 (September-October 1989), pp. 37-40. Accounts of events related to the crisis are also found in ARB 26, no. 4 (15 May 1989), pp. 9240-42; ARB 26, no. 5 (15 June 1989), pp. 9273-76; and ARB 26, no. 11 (15 December 1989), pp. 9477-79.
38. A summary of the Senegal-Mauritania dispute is contained in Jonathan Derrick, "Mauritania: Damaging Crisis with Senegal Makes Bad State Worse," in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XXII (1989-1990), pp. B88-90. Also helpful are two articles by British journalist Mark Doyle: "Blood Brothers," in Africa Report 34, no. 4 (July-August 1989), pp. 13-16, and "Nouakchott's New Nationalism," also in Africa Report 34, no. 5 (September-October 1989), pp. 37-40. Accounts of events related to the crisis are also found in ARB 26, no. 4 (15 May 1989), pp. 9240-42; ARB 26, no. 5 (15 June 1989), pp. 9273-76; and ARB 26, no. 11 (15 December 1989), pp. 9477-79.
39. A summary of the Senegal-Mauritania dispute is contained in Jonathan Derrick, "Mauritania: Damaging Crisis with Senegal Makes Bad State Worse," in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XXII (1989-1990), pp. B88-90. Also helpful are two articles by British journalist Mark Doyle: "Blood Brothers," in Africa Report 34, no. 4 (July-August 1989), pp. 13-16, and "Nouakchott's New Nationalism," also in Africa Report 34, no. 5 (September-October 1989), pp. 37-40. Accounts of events related to the crisis are also found in ARB 26, no. 4 (15 May 1989), pp. 9240-42; ARB 26, no. 5 (15 June 1989), pp. 9273-76; and ARB 26, no. 11 (15 December 1989), pp. 9477-79.
40. A summary of the Senegal-Mauritania dispute is contained in Jonathan Derrick, "Mauritania: Damaging Crisis with Senegal Makes Bad State Worse," in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XXII (1989-1990), pp. B88-90. Also helpful are two articles by British journalist Mark Doyle: "Blood Brothers," in Africa Report 34, no. 4 (July-August 1989), pp. 13-16, and "Nouakchott's New Nationalism," also in Africa Report 34, no. 5 (September-October 1989), pp. 37-40. Accounts of events related to the crisis are also found in ARB 26, no. 4 (15 May 1989), pp. 9240-42; ARB 26, no. 5 (15 June 1989), pp. 9273-76; and ARB 26, no. 11 (15 December 1989), pp. 9477-79.
41. A summary of the Senegal-Mauritania dispute is contained in Jonathan Derrick, "Mauritania: Damaging Crisis with Senegal Makes Bad State Worse," in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XXII (1989-1990), pp. B88-90. Also helpful are two articles by British journalist Mark Doyle: "Blood Brothers," in Africa Report 34, no. 4 (July-August 1989), pp. 13-16, and "Nouakchott's New Nationalism," also in Africa Report 34, no. 5 (September-October 1989), pp. 37-40. Accounts of events related to the crisis are also found in ARB 26, no. 4 (15 May 1989), pp. 9240-42; ARB 26, no. 5 (15 June 1989), pp. 9273-76; and ARB 26, no. 11 (15 December 1989), pp. 9477-79.
42. For a reasonably accurate summary of the political effects of the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis on Mauritania, see Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Report no. 1, Mauritania (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991) (hereafter EIU Report), pp. 38-39. See also ARB 27, no. 8 (15 September 1990), p. 9808. For a description of the severe economic ramifications which the Gulf Crisis had on Mauritania, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports: Near East and South Asia (hereafter FBIS-NES), 17 October 1990, p. 14.
43. For a reasonably accurate summary of the political effects of the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis on Mauritania, see Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Report no. 1, Mauritania (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991) (hereafter EIU Report), pp. 38-39. See also ARB 27, no. 8 (15 September 1990), p. 9808. For a description of the severe economic ramifications which the Gulf Crisis had on Mauritania, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports: Near East and South Asia (hereafter FBIS-NES), 17 October 1990, p. 14.
44. For a reasonably accurate summary of the political effects of the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis on Mauritania, see Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Report no. 1, Mauritania (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991) (hereafter EIU Report), pp. 38-39. See also ARB 27, no. 8 (15 September 1990), p. 9808. For a description of the severe economic ramifications which the Gulf Crisis had on Mauritania, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports: Near East and South Asia (hereafter FBIS-NES), 17 October 1990, p. 14.
45. Mohameden Ould-Mey, "Structural Adjustment Programs and Democratization in Africa: the Case of Mauritania," in John Mukum Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere, eds., Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratization in Africa (Aldershot, England and Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998), p. 49.
46. ARB 28, no. 8 (1-31 August 1991), p. 10230. The English text of the 1991 Mauritanian Constitution is contained in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publishers, 1993).
47. ARB 28, no. 8 (1-31 August 1991), p. 10230. The English text of the 1991 Mauritanian Constitution is contained in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publishers, 1993).
48. President Ould Taya's comments on his country's ongoing democratization are contained in "Ould Taya: 'La Mauritanie ne sera pas le Libéria!'" (Ould Taya: 'Mauritania will not be Liberia') in Jeune Afrique, no. 1605 (2-8 October 1991), pp. 28-31.
49. The voting statistics for each of the four presidential candidates were as follows: President Ould Taya, 62.65 percent (345,593 votes); Ahmed Ould Daddah, 32.75 percent (180,658 votes); ex-Nouakchott mayor Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mah, 1.36 percent (7,506 votes), and former CMRN chairman Mustapha Ould Mohammed Salek, 2.85 percent (15.735 votes). An analysis of the results and a summary of the reactions of various commentators is contained in ARB 29, no. 1 (1-31 January 1992), pp. 10414-15.
50. Ahmed Ould Daddah (born 1942) is the brother of former President Mokhtar Ould Daddah. Other opposition parties taking part, to one degree or another, in the 1992 balloting for the legislative branch were the Parti Mauritanien pour Renouvellement (PMR), the Union Populaire Socialiste et Démocratique (UPSD), led by Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mah, and the generally pro-government Rassemblement Pour la Démocratie et l'Unité (RDU).
51. A listing of the Second Republic's first set of government ministers, along with a brief analysis, is contained in ARB 29, no. 4 (1-30 April 1992), pp. 10530-31.
52. EIU Report, Mauritania, 2nd Quarter 1994, p. 30.
53. EIU Report, Mauritania, 2nd Quarter 1993, p. 32; and ARB 30, no. 6 (1-30 June 1993), p. 11044.
54. EIU Report, Mauritania, 2nd Quarter 1993, p. 32; and ARB 30, no. 6 (1-30 June 1993), p. 11044.
55. The Mauritanian Senate operates on the same system found in the United States, in which one-third of the membership stands for re-election every two years.
56. ARB 32, no. 8 (1-31 August 1995), p. 11950.
57. For background on the ostensible reasons for the change in the date of the presidential election from January 1998 to 12 December 1997, see EIU Report, Mauritania, 3rd Quarter 1997, p. 32.
58. For election results, see ARB 34, no. 12 (1-31 December 1997), p. 12928. See also EIU Report, Mauritania, 1st Quarter 1998, pp. 34-35. Other candidates in addition to President Ould Taya and Ould Cheikh Melanine were Moulay El-Haçen Ould Jeyd, Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mah, and Kane Amadou Mokhtar, the latter being the first Black African Mauritanian to seek the country's highest office; he ran under the aegis of the small Parti de la Liberté, de l'Egalité, et de la Justice (PLEJ).
59. For election results, see ARB 34, no. 12 (1-31 December 1997), p. 12928. See also EIU Report, Mauritania, 1st Quarter 1998, pp. 34-35. Other candidates in addition to President Ould Taya and Ould Cheikh Melanine were Moulay El-Haçen Ould Jeyd, Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mah, and Kane Amadou Mokhtar, the latter being the first Black African Mauritanian to seek the country's highest office; he ran under the aegis of the small Parti de la Liberté, de l'Egalité, et de la Justice (PLEJ).
60. In contrast to President Ould Taya's less-than-overwhelming showing in the more educated regions of Mauritania, one of Mauritania's poorest and most remote provinces, Hodh ech-Chargui in the far east, registered one of the highest percentages of votes for the incumbent. For coverage of the 1997 elections, see EIU Report, Mauritania, 1st Quarter 1998. pp. 34-35. and 2nd Quarter 1998, pp. 34-35.
61. In contrast to President Ould Taya's less-than-overwhelming showing in the more educated regions of Mauritania, one of Mauritania's poorest and most remote provinces, Hodh ech-Chargui in the far east, registered one of the highest percentages of votes for the incumbent. For coverage of the 1997 elections, see EIU Report, Mauritania, 1st Quarter 1998. pp. 34-35. and 2nd Quarter 1998, pp. 34-35.
62. This habit of identification, in the opinion of one author, extended throughout Mauritanian society, to the point where "with the exception of high governmental positions. . .. the political sphere is rarely regarded as a place in which to invest." Mohamedou, Societal Transition to Democracy in Mauritania, p. 123.
63. The BED was replaced in the early 1990s by a still-influential secret service, the Direction d'Etudes et de la Documentation (DED). The newspaper in question, Al-Sha'b (The People), was published weekly in Arabic and French editions. A French language magazine, Horizons, along with a few other irregular publications, also appeared under government sponsorship before 1991.
64. The problems of Mauritania's private businesses (in particular those engaged in manufacturing) and the related factors of infrastructure and political economy, are dealt with in exhaustive fashion by Eliza Mohamedou, The Interaction Between Supply and Demand of Infrastructure Regarding Private Manufacturing Companies: The Case of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (Saarbrucken, Germany: Verlag fur Entwicklungspolitik, 1997).
65. See the US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) on Mauritania for the years 1992 through 1997.
66. EIU Report, Mauritania, 1st Quarter 1995, p. 30.
67. EIU Report, Mauritania, 4th Quarter 1994, p. 27. When compared to the three "core" states of the Arab Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), Mauritania showed a vanishingly low level of Islamist activity, with the number of violent incidents smaller still. A politician of the older generation, ex-Foreign Minister Hamdi Ould Mouknass, stated in a 1993 interview that "Islam is part of our everyday lives here in Mauritania. It is like the air we breathe and any extremism is out of the question." The Courier (Brussels), no. 137 (January-February 1993), p. 35. For Ahmed Ould Daddah's comments on the September 1994 arrests of alleged Islamists, see FBIS-NES, 5 October 1994, p. 17.
68. EIU Report, Mauritania, 4th Quarter 1994, p. 27. When compared to the three "core" states of the Arab Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), Mauritania showed a vanishingly low level of Islamist activity, with the number of violent incidents smaller still. A politician of the older generation, ex-Foreign Minister Hamdi Ould Mouknass, stated in a 1993 interview that "Islam is part of our everyday lives here in Mauritania. It is like the air we breathe and any extremism is out of the question." The Courier (Brussels), no. 137 (January-February 1993), p. 35. For Ahmed Ould Daddah's comments on the September 1994 arrests of alleged Islamists, see FBIS-NES, 5 October 1994, p. 17.
69. EIU Report, Mauritania, 4th Quarter 1994, p. 27. When compared to the three "core" states of the Arab Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), Mauritania showed a vanishingly low level of Islamist activity, with the number of violent incidents smaller still. A politician of the older generation, ex-Foreign Minister Hamdi Ould Mouknass, stated in a 1993 interview that "Islam is part of our everyday lives here in Mauritania. It is like the air we breathe and any extremism is out of the question." The Courier (Brussels), no. 137 (January-February 1993), p. 35. For Ahmed Ould Daddah's comments on the September 1994 arrests of alleged Islamists, see FBIS-NES, 5 October 1994, p. 17.
70. Regarding the restrictions on the print media in Mauritania, the best source in the 1990s remained the Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Reports.
71. Private information.
72. The October 1996 elections for the Assemblée Nationale were marred by persistent allegations of irregularity, which even the regime was forced to admit. Al-Akhbar, a French-language Nouakchott weekly, in its 21-27 October 1996 issue (no. 46. p. 5). published a detailed table of districts in which vote totals were distorted or inflated, allegedly by several hundred percent in some cases.
73. The 1992-98 economic situation in Mauritania, characterized mainly by high levels of growth and increasing amounts of foreign aid partly inspired by the confidence of foreign governments and (to a lesser extent) investors, is described on a quarterly basis by the Economist Intelligence Unit. In particular, see EIU Report, Mauritania, 2nd Quarter 1997, pp. 33-37, and 3rd Quarter 1997, pp. 36-40. Additional data (background and otherwise) is contained in Africa Research Bulletin: Economic and Financial Series 34, no. 9 (15 September - 15 October 1997). p. 13180.
74. The 1992-98 economic situation in Mauritania, characterized mainly by high levels of growth and increasing amounts of foreign aid partly inspired by the confidence of foreign governments and (to a lesser extent) investors, is described on a quarterly basis by the Economist Intelligence Unit. In particular, see EIU Report, Mauritania, 2nd Quarter 1997, pp. 33-37, and 3rd Quarter 1997, pp. 36-40. Additional data (background and otherwise) is contained in Africa Research Bulletin: Economic and Financial Series 34, no. 9 (15 September - 15 October 1997). p. 13180.
75. The 1992-98 economic situation in Mauritania, characterized mainly by high levels of growth and increasing amounts of foreign aid partly inspired by the confidence of foreign governments and (to a lesser extent) investors, is described on a quarterly basis by the Economist Intelligence Unit. In particular, see EIU Report, Mauritania, 2nd Quarter 1997, pp. 33-37, and 3rd Quarter 1997, pp. 36-40. Additional data (background and otherwise) is contained in Africa Research Bulletin: Economic and Financial Series 34, no. 9 (15 September - 15 October 1997). p. 13180.
76. For an examination of the tribal factor in Mauritania as it impacted upon the allocation of governmental posts and patterns of influence since independence, see Philippe Marchesin, "Mauritania: The Impact of Democratization on Ethnicity and Tribalism," in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XXIII (1990-1992), pp. B104-05. This essay is a highly abbreviated treatment of a subject addressed by the same author in his Tribus, ethnies, et pouvoir en Mauritanie (Tribes, Ethnicities, and Power in Mauritania) (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1992).
77. For an examination of the tribal factor in Mauritania as it impacted upon the allocation of governmental posts and patterns of influence since independence, see Philippe Marchesin, "Mauritania: The Impact of Democratization on Ethnicity and Tribalism," in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, vol. XXIII (1990-1992), pp. B104-05. This essay is a highly abbreviated treatment of a subject addressed by the same author in his Tribus, ethnies, et pouvoir en Mauritanie (Tribes, Ethnicities, and Power in Mauritania) (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1992).
78. See EIU Report, Mauritania, 2nd Quarter 1997, p. 31; and Hamid Berrada and François Soudan, "Pourquoi l'opposition Mauritanienne a échoué," (Why the Mauritanian Opposition Failed) in Jeune Afrique, no. 1885 (19-25 February 1997), pp. 24-29.
79. See EIU Report, Mauritania, 2nd Quarter 1997, p. 31; and Hamid Berrada and François Soudan, "Pourquoi l'opposition Mauritanienne a échoué," (Why the Mauritanian Opposition Failed) in Jeune Afrique, no. 1885 (19-25 February 1997), pp. 24-29.
80. Mohamedou, Societal Transition to Democracy in Mauritania, p. 111.
81. But see Jean-Pierre Turquoi, "Mauritania Fights to Keep Aid Lifeline," in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, 20 September 1998, p. 14.