Information sharing, information free-riding and capital structure in oligopolies

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 109-135

  Dasgupta, Sudipto ^a   Shin, Jhinyoung ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033481295     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00022-2     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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