Inefficiency in public organizations

International Public Management Journal

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-24

  Vining, Aidan R ^a,c   Weimer, David L ^b  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^c Faculty of Business Administration   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033480449     PISSN: 10967494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1096-7494(00)87429-2     Document Type: Article

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