Monopoly pricing with network externalities

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 199-214

  Cabral, Luis M B ^a   Salant, David J ^b   Woroch, Glenn A ^c  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b Law and Economics Consulting Group   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033479656     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00028-3     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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