Exclusive vs. independent agents: A separating equilibrium approach

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 443-456

  Venezia, Itzhak ^a   Galai, Dan ^a   Shapira, Zur ^a,b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric and private information; ; Firm behavior; Insurance markets; Separating equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033478780     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00064-5     Document Type: Article

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