The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-14

  Einy, Ezra ^a   Moreno, Diego ^b   Shitovitz, Benjamin ^c  

^a BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

Author keywords

Coalitional game; Core; Non atomic games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033478329     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050094     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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