An empirical oligopoly model of a regulated market

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 25-57

  Pazó, Ma Consuelo ^a   Jaumandreu, Jordi ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIGO   (Spain)

^b 28006   (Spain)

Author keywords

Cournot; L13; L51; L65; Market sharing arrangements; Oligopoly; Price regulation; Stackelberg

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033477072     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00020-9     Document Type: Article

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