Refusals to deal and orders to supply in competitive markets

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 399-417

  Chen, Zhiqi ^a   Ross, Thomas W ^b  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Aftermarkets; K21; L41; L42; Refusals to deal; Tying; Warranties

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033476630     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00032-5     Document Type: Article

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