Institutions and environmental performance in seventeen Western democracies

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-31

  Scruggs, Lyle A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033476003     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123499000010     Document Type: Article

References (106)

1. Manfred Schmidt, 'Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s', in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policymaking (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 237-58; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interests', in John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; J. Pekkarinen, M. Pohjola and B. Rowthorn, eds, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Markus Crepaz, 'Corporatism in Decline? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 25 (1992), 139-68; A. Henley and E. Tsakalotos, Corporatism and Economic Performance: A Comparative Analysis of Market Economies (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar, 1993).
2. Manfred Schmidt, 'Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s', in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policymaking (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 237-58; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interests', in John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; J. Pekkarinen, M. Pohjola and B. Rowthorn, eds, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Markus Crepaz, 'Corporatism in Decline? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 25 (1992), 139-68; A. Henley and E. Tsakalotos, Corporatism and Economic Performance: A Comparative Analysis of Market Economies (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar, 1993).
3. Manfred Schmidt, 'Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s', in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policymaking (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 237-58; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interests', in John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; J. Pekkarinen, M. Pohjola and B. Rowthorn, eds, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Markus Crepaz, 'Corporatism in Decline? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 25 (1992), 139-68; A. Henley and E. Tsakalotos, Corporatism and Economic Performance: A Comparative Analysis of Market Economies (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar, 1993).
4. Manfred Schmidt, 'Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s', in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policymaking (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 237-58; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interests', in John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; J. Pekkarinen, M. Pohjola and B. Rowthorn, eds, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Markus Crepaz, 'Corporatism in Decline? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 25 (1992), 139-68; A. Henley and E. Tsakalotos, Corporatism and Economic Performance: A Comparative Analysis of Market Economies (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar, 1993).
5. Manfred Schmidt, 'Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s', in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policymaking (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 237-58; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interests', in John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; J. Pekkarinen, M. Pohjola and B. Rowthorn, eds, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Markus Crepaz, 'Corporatism in Decline? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 25 (1992), 139-68; A. Henley and E. Tsakalotos, Corporatism and Economic Performance: A Comparative Analysis of Market Economies (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar, 1993).
6. Manfred Schmidt, 'Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s', in Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policymaking (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 237-58; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interests', in John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 143-78; Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies', Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 792-827; J. Pekkarinen, M. Pohjola and B. Rowthorn, eds, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Markus Crepaz, 'Corporatism in Decline? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 25 (1992), 139-68; A. Henley and E. Tsakalotos, Corporatism and Economic Performance: A Comparative Analysis of Market Economies (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vt.: E. Elgar, 1993).
7. Janne Hukkinen, 'Corporatism as an Impediment to Ecological Sustenance: The Case of Finnish Waste Management', Ecological Economics, 15 (1995), 59-75. Also see R. Guy Peters, European Politics Reconsidered (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1991), chap. 6; H. Opschoor and J. van der Straaten, 'Sustainable Development: An Institutional Approach', Ecological Economics, 7 (1993), 203-22.
8. Janne Hukkinen, 'Corporatism as an Impediment to Ecological Sustenance: The Case of Finnish Waste Management', Ecological Economics, 15 (1995), 59-75. Also see R. Guy Peters, European Politics Reconsidered (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1991), chap. 6; H. Opschoor and J. van der Straaten, 'Sustainable Development: An Institutional Approach', Ecological Economics, 7 (1993), 203-22.
9. Janne Hukkinen, 'Corporatism as an Impediment to Ecological Sustenance: The Case of Finnish Waste Management', Ecological Economics, 15 (1995), 59-75. Also see R. Guy Peters, European Politics Reconsidered (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1991), chap. 6; H. Opschoor and J. van der Straaten, 'Sustainable Development: An Institutional Approach', Ecological Economics, 7 (1993), 203-22.
10. Lennart Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Health and Safety Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); G. Hoberg, 'Technology, Political Structure and Social Regulation: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Politics, 18 (1986), 357-76; S. Kelman, 'Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 11 (1992), 178-206. Other work exploring policy outcomes using quantitative pollution indicators is Martin Jänicke et al., 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success', in M. Jachtenfuchs and M. Strübel, eds, Environmental Policy in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1992), pp. 71-97; and Markus Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variations of Air Pollution Levels: Political Institutions and their Impact on Environmental Policy-Making', Environmental Politics, 4 (1995), 391-144.
11. Lennart Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Health and Safety Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); G. Hoberg, 'Technology, Political Structure and Social Regulation: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Politics, 18 (1986), 357-76; S. Kelman, 'Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 11 (1992), 178-206. Other work exploring policy outcomes using quantitative pollution indicators is Martin Jänicke et al., 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success', in M. Jachtenfuchs and M. Strübel, eds, Environmental Policy in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1992), pp. 71-97; and Markus Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variations of Air Pollution Levels: Political Institutions and their Impact on Environmental Policy-Making', Environmental Politics, 4 (1995), 391-144.
12. Lennart Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Health and Safety Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); G. Hoberg, 'Technology, Political Structure and Social Regulation: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Politics, 18 (1986), 357-76; S. Kelman, 'Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 11 (1992), 178-206. Other work exploring policy outcomes using quantitative pollution indicators is Martin Jänicke et al., 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success', in M. Jachtenfuchs and M. Strübel, eds, Environmental Policy in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1992), pp. 71-97; and Markus Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variations of Air Pollution Levels: Political Institutions and their Impact on Environmental Policy-Making', Environmental Politics, 4 (1995), 391-144.
13. Lennart Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Health and Safety Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); G. Hoberg, 'Technology, Political Structure and Social Regulation: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Politics, 18 (1986), 357-76; S. Kelman, 'Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 11 (1992), 178-206. Other work exploring policy outcomes using quantitative pollution indicators is Martin Jänicke et al., 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success', in M. Jachtenfuchs and M. Strübel, eds, Environmental Policy in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1992), pp. 71-97; and Markus Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variations of Air Pollution Levels: Political Institutions and their Impact on Environmental Policy-Making', Environmental Politics, 4 (1995), 391-144.
14. Lennart Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Health and Safety Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); G. Hoberg, 'Technology, Political Structure and Social Regulation: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Politics, 18 (1986), 357-76; S. Kelman, 'Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 11 (1992), 178-206. Other work exploring policy outcomes using quantitative pollution indicators is Martin Jänicke et al., 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success', in M. Jachtenfuchs and M. Strübel, eds, Environmental Policy in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1992), pp. 71-97; and Markus Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variations of Air Pollution Levels: Political Institutions and their Impact on Environmental Policy-Making', Environmental Politics, 4 (1995), 391-144.
15. Lennart Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Health and Safety Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); G. Hoberg, 'Technology, Political Structure and Social Regulation: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Politics, 18 (1986), 357-76; S. Kelman, 'Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 11 (1992), 178-206. Other work exploring policy outcomes using quantitative pollution indicators is Martin Jänicke et al., 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success', in M. Jachtenfuchs and M. Strübel, eds, Environmental Policy in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1992), pp. 71-97; and Markus Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variations of Air Pollution Levels: Political Institutions and their Impact on Environmental Policy-Making', Environmental Politics, 4 (1995), 391-144.
16. Lennart Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Health and Safety Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); G. Hoberg, 'Technology, Political Structure and Social Regulation: A Cross-National Analysis', Comparative Politics, 18 (1986), 357-76; S. Kelman, 'Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policymaking', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 11 (1992), 178-206. Other work exploring policy outcomes using quantitative pollution indicators is Martin Jänicke et al., 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success', in M. Jachtenfuchs and M. Strübel, eds, Environmental Policy in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1992), pp. 71-97; and Markus Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variations of Air Pollution Levels: Political Institutions and their Impact on Environmental Policy-Making', Environmental Politics, 4 (1995), 391-414.
17. For a review of the corporatist literature, see P. Williamson, Corporatism in Perspective: An Introductory Guide to Corporatist Theory (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1989).
18. Austria and Sweden, among others, are often characterized as high corporatist countries, while the United States Canada and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain, are characterized as pluralist countries.
19. OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Austria (Paris: OECD, 1995); Martin Jänicke and Helmut Weidner, eds, National Environmental Policies: A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1997), chaps. 3 (Sweden), 6 (the Netherlands), and 8 (Denmark).
20. OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Austria (Paris: OECD, 1995); Martin Jänicke and Helmut Weidner, eds, National Environmental Policies: A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1997), chaps. 3 (Sweden), 6 (the Netherlands), and 8 (Denmark).
21. For a critical review, see David Vogel and Veronica Kun, 'The Comparative Study of Environmental Policy: A Review of the Literature', in M. Dierkes et al., eds. Comparative Policy Research: Learning from Experience (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 99-169.
22. Crepaz, 'Corporatism in Decline?', p. 163, fn. 3 (emphasis added).
23. One critic states this perspective clearly: 'There is nothing inherently incompatible between labour, capital and nature that could not be resolved through negotiations. In practice, however, this is impossible due to the very logic of corporatism. Even the most inclusive corporatist societies ... effectively prevent ecological sustenance from ever entering as a party in corporatist negotiations because decision makers themselves conceptualize environmental issues in terms of non-problematic operating assumptions' (Hukkinen, 'Corporatism as an Impediment to Ecological Sustenance', p. 69.)
24. Jenny Stewart, 'Corporatism, Pluralism and Political Learning: A Systems Approach', Journal of Public Policy, 12 (1992), 243-55; Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise, and Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variation', stress similar themes.
25. Jenny Stewart, 'Corporatism, Pluralism and Political Learning: A Systems Approach', Journal of Public Policy, 12 (1992), 243-55; Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise, and Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variation', stress similar themes.
26. Jenny Stewart, 'Corporatism, Pluralism and Political Learning: A Systems Approach', Journal of Public Policy, 12 (1992), 243-55; Lundqvist, The Hare and the Tortoise, and Crepaz, 'Explaining National Variation', stress similar themes.
27. See fn. 1, and Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 89-92.
28. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
29. Eckart Hildebrandt, Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities/European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1994); Gert Spaargaren and Arthur Mol, 'Sociology, Environment and Modernity: Ecological Modernization as a Theory of Social Change', Society and Natural Resources, 5 (1992), 323-44.
30. Eckart Hildebrandt, Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities/European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1994); Gert Spaargaren and Arthur Mol, 'Sociology, Environment and Modernity: Ecological Modernization as a Theory of Social Change', Society and Natural Resources, 5 (1992), 323-44.
31. OECD, Employment and Environment (Paris: OECD, 1978); Raymond Kopp, Paul Portney and Diane DeWitt, 'International Comparisons of Environmental Regulation', Resources for the Future Discussion Paper QE90-22-REV (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1990); Michael Porter, The Comparative Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990); Eban Goodstein, 'Jobs and the Environment: The Myth of a National Tradeoff' (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1994), mimeo; A. Jaffe et al. 'Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of US Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?' Journal of Economic Literature, 33 (1995), 132-63; Curtis Moore and Alan Miller, Green Gold: Japan, Germany, the United States, and the Race for Environmental Technology (Boston, Mass.: Beacon, 1994).
32. OECD, Employment and Environment (Paris: OECD, 1978); Raymond Kopp, Paul Portney and Diane DeWitt, 'International Comparisons of Environmental Regulation', Resources for the Future Discussion Paper QE90-22-REV (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1990); Michael Porter, The Comparative Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990); Eban Goodstein, 'Jobs and the Environment: The Myth of a National Tradeoff' (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1994), mimeo; A. Jaffe et al. 'Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of US Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?' Journal of Economic Literature, 33 (1995), 132-63; Curtis Moore and Alan Miller, Green Gold: Japan, Germany, the United States, and the Race for Environmental Technology (Boston, Mass.: Beacon, 1994).
33. OECD, Employment and Environment (Paris: OECD, 1978); Raymond Kopp, Paul Portney and Diane DeWitt, 'International Comparisons of Environmental Regulation', Resources for the Future Discussion Paper QE90-22-REV (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1990); Michael Porter, The Comparative Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990); Eban Goodstein, 'Jobs and the Environment: The Myth of a National Tradeoff' (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1994), mimeo; A. Jaffe et al. 'Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of US Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?' Journal of Economic Literature, 33 (1995), 132-63; Curtis Moore and Alan Miller, Green Gold: Japan, Germany, the United States, and the Race for Environmental Technology (Boston, Mass.: Beacon, 1994).
34. OECD, Employment and Environment (Paris: OECD, 1978); Raymond Kopp, Paul Portney and Diane DeWitt, 'International Comparisons of Environmental Regulation', Resources for the Future Discussion Paper QE90-22-REV (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1990); Michael Porter, The Comparative Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990); Eban Goodstein, 'Jobs and the Environment: The Myth of a National Tradeoff' (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1994), mimeo; A. Jaffe et al. 'Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of US Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?' Journal of Economic Literature, 33 (1995), 132-63; Curtis Moore and Alan Miller, Green Gold: Japan, Germany, the United States, and the Race for Environmental Technology (Boston, Mass.: Beacon, 1994).
35. OECD, Employment and Environment (Paris: OECD, 1978); Raymond Kopp, Paul Portney and Diane DeWitt, 'International Comparisons of Environmental Regulation', Resources for the Future Discussion Paper QE90-22-REV (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1990); Michael Porter, The Comparative Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990); Eban Goodstein, 'Jobs and the Environment: The Myth of a National Tradeoff' (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1994), mimeo; A. Jaffe et al. 'Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of US Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?' Journal of Economic Literature, 33 (1995), 132-63; Curtis Moore and Alan Miller, Green Gold: Japan, Germany, the United States, and the Race for Environmental Technology (Boston, Mass.: Beacon, 1994).
36. OECD, Employment and Environment (Paris: OECD, 1978); Raymond Kopp, Paul Portney and Diane DeWitt, 'International Comparisons of Environmental Regulation', Resources for the Future Discussion Paper QE90-22-REV (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1990); Michael Porter, The Comparative Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990); Eban Goodstein, 'Jobs and the Environment: The Myth of a National Tradeoff' (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1994), mimeo; A. Jaffe et al. 'Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of US Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?' Journal of Economic Literature, 33 (1995), 132-63; Curtis Moore and Alan Miller, Green Gold: Japan, Germany, the United States, and the Race for Environmental Technology (Boston, Mass.: Beacon, 1994).
37. TUC, 'Trade Unions and the Environment: A Multi-Stakeholder Initiative', Background Report for the TUC Environment Symposium (Chatham House, London, November 1996) mimeo; interview with Danish Government Environmental Counselor, Brussels, December 1996; OECD, Environmental Performance Review: Sweden (Paris: OECD, 1996), Conclusion; Jänicke and Weidner, chap. 8 (Denmark). Hildebrandt, Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe, chap. 5, reports that employers and unions tended to accept environmental responsibility earlier in countries with more corporatist institutions. His conclusions also suggest that the level of 'environmental corporatism' is highest in the traditionally more corporatist countries in the European Union (EU).
38. TUC, 'Trade Unions and the Environment: A Multi-Stakeholder Initiative', Background Report for the TUC Environment Symposium (Chatham House, London, November 1996) mimeo; interview with Danish Government Environmental Counselor, Brussels, December 1996; OECD, Environmental Performance Review: Sweden (Paris: OECD, 1996), Conclusion; Jänicke and Weidner, chap. 8 (Denmark). Hildebrandt, Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe, chap. 5, reports that employers and unions tended to accept environmental responsibility earlier in countries with more corporatist institutions. His conclusions also suggest that the level of 'environmental corporatism' is highest in the traditionally more corporatist countries in the European Union (EU).
39. TUC, 'Trade Unions and the Environment: A Multi-Stakeholder Initiative', Background Report for the TUC Environment Symposium (Chatham House, London, November 1996) mimeo; interview with Danish Government Environmental Counselor, Brussels, December 1996; OECD, Environmental Performance Review: Sweden (Paris: OECD, 1996), Conclusion; Jänicke and Weidner, chap. 8 (Denmark). Hildebrandt, Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe, chap. 5, reports that employers and unions tended to accept environmental responsibility earlier in countries with more corporatist institutions. His conclusions also suggest that the level of 'environmental corporatism' is highest in the traditionally more corporatist countries in the European Union (EU).
40. TUC, 'Trade Unions and the Environment: A Multi-Stakeholder Initiative', Background Report for the TUC Environment Symposium (Chatham House, London, November 1996) mimeo; interview with Danish Government Environmental Counselor, Brussels, December 1996; OECD, Environmental Performance Review: Sweden (Paris: OECD, 1996), Conclusion; Jänicke and Weidner, chap. 8 (Denmark). Hildebrandt, Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe, chap. 5, reports that employers and unions tended to accept environmental responsibility earlier in countries with more corporatist institutions. His conclusions also suggest that the level of 'environmental corporatism' is highest in the traditionally more corporatist countries in the European Union (EU).
41. See fn. 7; Herbert Kitschelt, 'Left Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems', World Politics, 40 (1988), 194-234, especially pp. 212-15; Michael Micheletti, 'Toward Interest Inarticulation: A Major Consequence of Corporatism in Interest Organisions', Scandinavian Political Studies, 13 (1990), 255-76.
42. See fn. 7; Herbert Kitschelt, 'Left Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems', World Politics, 40 (1988), 194-234, especially pp. 212-15; Michael Micheletti, 'Toward Interest Inarticulation: A Major Consequence of Corporatism in Interest Organisions', Scandinavian Political Studies, 13 (1990), 255-76.
43. Hildebrandt Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe, p. 75; Philippe Schmitter, 'Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going', in Lehmbruch and Schmitter, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, pp. 259-80; Andrei Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
44. Hildebrandt Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe, p. 75; Philippe Schmitter, 'Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going', in Lehmbruch and Schmitter, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, pp. 259-80; Andrei Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
45. Hildebrandt Industrial Relations and Environmental Protection in Europe, p. 75; Philippe Schmitter, 'Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going', in Lehmbruch and Schmitter, eds, Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, pp. 259-80; Andrei Markovits, The Politics of West German Trade Unions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
46. Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, 'Community Market State - and Association? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order', in Schmitter and Streeck, eds, Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1985); Peter Lange and Marino Regini, 'Introduction: Interests and Institutions - Forms of Social Regulation and Public Policy-Making', in Lange and Regini, eds, State, Market and Social Regulation: New Perspectives on Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 1-25.
47. Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, 'Community Market State - and Association? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order', in Schmitter and Streeck, eds, Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1985); Peter Lange and Marino Regini, 'Introduction: Interests and Institutions - Forms of Social Regulation and Public Policy-Making', in Lange and Regini, eds, State, Market and Social Regulation: New Perspectives on Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 1-25.
48. Lange and Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth'; Douglas Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
49. Lange and Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth'; Douglas Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
50. Hanspeter Kriesi, 'The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on their Mobilization', in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds, The Politics of Social Protest (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 179-80.
51. These variations are also highlighted by other authors examining the effects of institutions on environmental policy. See Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success'; Kaare Strom and Steve Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform', University of California Centre for German and European Studies Working Paper 2.17, May 1993. On politics and economic performance, see Markus Crepaz, 'Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 20 (1996), 4-26. On regime stability, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). On general policy impacts, see Douglas Rae, The Political Impact of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Francis Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982); Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139 (1983), 377-404; Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1993).
52. These variations are also highlighted by other authors examining the effects of institutions on environmental policy. See Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success'; Kaare Strom and Steve Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform', University of California Centre for German and European Studies Working Paper 2.17, May 1993. On politics and economic performance, see Markus Crepaz, 'Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 20 (1996), 4-26. On regime stability, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). On general policy impacts, see Douglas Rae, The Political Impact of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Francis Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982); Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139 (1983), 377-404; Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1993).
53. These variations are also highlighted by other authors examining the effects of institutions on environmental policy. See Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success'; Kaare Strom and Steve Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform', University of California Centre for German and European Studies Working Paper 2.17, May 1993. On politics and economic performance, see Markus Crepaz, 'Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 20 (1996), 4-26. On regime stability, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). On general policy impacts, see Douglas Rae, The Political Impact of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Francis Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982); Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139 (1983), 377-404; Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1993).
54. These variations are also highlighted by other authors examining the effects of institutions on environmental policy. See Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success'; Kaare Strom and Steve Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform', University of California Centre for German and European Studies Working Paper 2.17, May 1993. On politics and economic performance, see Markus Crepaz, 'Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 20 (1996), 4-26. On regime stability, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). On general policy impacts, see Douglas Rae, The Political Impact of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Francis Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982); Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139 (1983), 377-404; Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1993).
55. These variations are also highlighted by other authors examining the effects of institutions on environmental policy. See Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success'; Kaare Strom and Steve Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform', University of California Centre for German and European Studies Working Paper 2.17, May 1993. On politics and economic performance, see Markus Crepaz, 'Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 20 (1996), 4-26. On regime stability, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). On general policy impacts, see Douglas Rae, The Political Impact of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Francis Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982); Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139 (1983), 377-404; Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1993).
56. These variations are also highlighted by other authors examining the effects of institutions on environmental policy. See Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success'; Kaare Strom and Steve Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform', University of California Centre for German and European Studies Working Paper 2.17, May 1993. On politics and economic performance, see Markus Crepaz, 'Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 20 (1996), 4-26. On regime stability, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). On general policy impacts, see Douglas Rae, The Political Impact of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Francis Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982); Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139 (1983), 377-404; Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1993).
57. These variations are also highlighted by other authors examining the effects of institutions on environmental policy. See Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success'; Kaare Strom and Steve Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform', University of California Centre for German and European Studies Working Paper 2.17, May 1993. On politics and economic performance, see Markus Crepaz, 'Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 20 (1996), 4-26. On regime stability, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). On general policy impacts, see Douglas Rae, The Political Impact of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Francis Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982); Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139 (1983), 377-404; Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1993).
58. These variations are also highlighted by other authors examining the effects of institutions on environmental policy. See Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success'; Kaare Strom and Steve Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform', University of California Centre for German and European Studies Working Paper 2.17, May 1993. On politics and economic performance, see Markus Crepaz, 'Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 20 (1996), 4-26. On regime stability, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). On general policy impacts, see Douglas Rae, The Political Impact of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Francis Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982); Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139 (1983), 377-404; Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1993).
59. These variations are also highlighted by other authors examining the effects of institutions on environmental policy. See Jänicke, 'Conditions for Environmental Policy Success'; Kaare Strom and Steve Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform', University of California Centre for German and European Studies Working Paper 2.17, May 1993. On politics and economic performance, see Markus Crepaz, 'Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance', Comparative Political Studies, 20 (1996), 4-26. On regime stability, see G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). On general policy impacts, see Douglas Rae, The Political Impact of Electoral Laws (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967); Francis Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States (London: Sage, 1982); Roger Noll, 'The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139 (1983), 377-404; Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1993).
60. Larger electoral districts, especially multi-member districts, encourage more policies with relatively diffuse benefits. Proportional representation (PR) is also likely to encourage greater success in environmental protection, because it is linked to the size of districts, and encourages the representation of diffuse benefits. Parties under PR may gain policy influence through the process of party competition and compel larger parties to accommodate those interests.
61. Multi-party government is 'divided' in so far as there is no party that can be electorally punished for bad performance. However, they may tend to maintain a unified legislative-administrative structure, enhancing policy continuity and increasing accountability.
62. Lijphart, Democracies; Peter Mair, 'The Correlates of Consensus Democracy and the Puzzle of Dutch Politics', West European Politics, 17 (1994), 97-123. Lijphart's work has been extended to suggest an association with neo-corporatism, though this association has been disputed, and I tend to agree with critics of this association. Moreover, my calculations of consensus democracies from the late 1960s to 1990 are not closely associated with neo-corporatism. See Hans Keman and Paul Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict in Democracies: Do Consensus and Corporatism Matter?' British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1995), 268-80; and Markus Crepaz and Arendt Lijphart, 'Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts and Evidence', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1995), 281-8.
63. Lijphart, Democracies; Peter Mair, 'The Correlates of Consensus Democracy and the Puzzle of Dutch Politics', West European Politics, 17 (1994), 97-123. Lijphart's work has been extended to suggest an association with neo-corporatism, though this association has been disputed, and I tend to agree with critics of this association. Moreover, my calculations of consensus democracies from the late 1960s to 1990 are not closely associated with neo-corporatism. See Hans Keman and Paul Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict in Democracies: Do Consensus and Corporatism Matter?' British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1995), 268-80; and Markus Crepaz and Arendt Lijphart, 'Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts and Evidence', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1995), 281-8.
64. Lijphart, Democracies; Peter Mair, 'The Correlates of Consensus Democracy and the Puzzle of Dutch Politics', West European Politics, 17 (1994), 97-123. Lijphart's work has been extended to suggest an association with neo-corporatism, though this association has been disputed, and I tend to agree with critics of this association. Moreover, my calculations of consensus democracies from the late 1960s to 1990 are not closely associated with neo-corporatism. See Hans Keman and Paul Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict in Democracies: Do Consensus and Corporatism Matter?' British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1995), 268-80; and Markus Crepaz and Arendt Lijphart, 'Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts and Evidence', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1995), 281-8.
65. Lijphart, Democracies; Peter Mair, 'The Correlates of Consensus Democracy and the Puzzle of Dutch Politics', West European Politics, 17 (1994), 97-123. Lijphart's work has been extended to suggest an association with neo-corporatism, though this association has been disputed, and I tend to agree with critics of this association. Moreover, my calculations of consensus democracies from the late 1960s to 1990 are not closely associated with neo-corporatism. See Hans Keman and Paul Pennings, 'Managing Political and Societal Conflict in Democracies: Do Consensus and Corporatism Matter?' British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1995), 268-80; and Markus Crepaz and Arendt Lijphart, 'Linking and Integrating Corporatism and Consensus Democracy: Theory, Concepts and Evidence', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1995), 281-8.
66. Because they are based on percentage changes over time, the measures imply increasing marginal costs of abatement - a reasonable assumption.
67. Data for environmental indicators are in the OECD's 1993 Environmental Data Compendium. In several cases, where an endpoint value is missing, I computed the average five-year period change for the other countries, and used that average to estimate the missing country value. For example,if country X is missing the 1970 value, I derive it by dividing X's 1975 score by 1 plus the average change 1970-75 for the other countries. If it is missing 1970 and 1975, I filled in 1975 first. Missing values were given the mean score of the other countries. Sample averages were substituted for missing values for Belgium, Great Britain and Ireland for water treatment and for Canada and Norway for glass recycling.
68. Albert Weale, The New Politics of Pollution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Lynton Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: From the Twentieth to the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edn (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996).
69. Albert Weale, The New Politics of Pollution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Lynton Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: From the Twentieth to the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edn (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996).
70. The full dataset is available from the author.
71. Arend Lijphart and Markus Crepaz, 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages, British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 235-56. I assign Spain a value of zero. I could find no scoring method that gives it better than an average ranking, which is where it is shown in the figure, though some studies suggest a lower ranking. See Susana Aguilar, 'Corporatist and Statist Designs in Environmental Policy: The Contrasting Roles of Germany and Spain in the European Community Scenario', Environmental Politics, 2 (1993), 223-47; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence', p. 165.
72. Arend Lijphart and Markus Crepaz, 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages, British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 235-56. I assign Spain a value of zero. I could find no scoring method that gives it better than an average ranking, which is where it is shown in the figure, though some studies suggest a lower ranking. See Susana Aguilar, 'Corporatist and Statist Designs in Environmental Policy: The Contrasting Roles of Germany and Spain in the European Community Scenario', Environmental Politics, 2 (1993), 223-47; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence', p. 165.
73. Arend Lijphart and Markus Crepaz, 'Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages, British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 235-56. I assign Spain a value of zero. I could find no scoring method that gives it better than an average ranking, which is where it is shown in the figure, though some studies suggest a lower ranking. See Susana Aguilar, 'Corporatist and Statist Designs in Environmental Policy: The Contrasting Roles of Germany and Spain in the European Community Scenario', Environmental Politics, 2 (1993), 223-47; Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence', p. 165.
74. Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence', p. 165; David Soskice, 'Divergent Production Regimes: Co-ordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980's and 1990's,' in Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds, Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Soskice's classification does suggest a close correlation between the continued incorporation of labour among the countries he considers 'Coordinated'. He also excludes France and Spain, though he presents data to suggest that France be coded as Coordinated.
75. Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence', p. 165; David Soskice, 'Divergent Production Regimes: Co-ordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980's and 1990's,' in Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds, Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Soskice's classification does suggest a close correlation between the continued incorporation of labour among the countries he considers 'Coordinated'. He also excludes France and Spain, though he presents data to suggest that France be coded as Coordinated.
76. G. Lehmbruch, 'Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks', in J. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 60-80.
77. Moderate concertation is probably the best way to categorize these countries with regard to environmental policy for two reasons. First, concerted environmental regulation generally emphasizes industry and government negotiation more than anything else. Thus, the fact that there is extensive consultation with industry in Japan and France justifies a higher coding. Secondly, the crucial point that organization and repeated interaction permits a more rational and consensual regulatory process suggested that these countries were more properly ranked higher rather than lower.
78. Peter Lange and Lyle Scruggs, 'Where Have All the Members Gone: Union Density in the Era of Globalization', presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Washington, DC; Michael Wallerstein and Miriam Golden, 'The Fragmentation of the Bargaining Society: Changes in the Centralization of Wage-Setting in the Nordic Countries, 1950-1992', Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming.
79. Peter Lange and Lyle Scruggs, 'Where Have All the Members Gone: Union Density in the Era of Globalization', presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Washington, DC; Michael Wallerstein and Miriam Golden, 'The Fragmentation of the Bargaining Society: Changes in the Centralization of Wage-Setting in the Nordic Countries, 1950-1992', Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming.
80. Lijphart, Democracies, chap. 13.
81. Jan-Erik Lane and S. Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1991); Jan-Erik Lane, D. McKay and K. Newton, Political Data Handbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
82. Jan-Erik Lane and S. Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1991); Jan-Erik Lane, D. McKay and K. Newton, Political Data Handbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
83. This data was provided by Geoffrey Garrett, and is based on the share of cabinet seats held by left centre and right parties as classified in Duane Swank, '18 Nation Pooled Time Series Dataset' (mimeo, n.d); Also see Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank, 'Politics, Institutions and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-1982', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 658-74.
84. This data was provided by Geoffrey Garrett, and is based on the share of cabinet seats held by left centre and right parties as classified in Duane Swank, '18 Nation Pooled Time Series Dataset' (mimeo, n.d); Also see Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank, 'Politics, Institutions and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-1982', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 658-74.
85. Martin Jänicke, H. Mönch and U. Simonis, 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Martin Jänicke, H. Mönch and M. Binder, 'Ecological Aspects of Structural Change', Intereconomics, July/August (1993), 159-69; Strom and Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform'.
86. Martin Jänicke, H. Mönch and U. Simonis, 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Martin Jänicke, H. Mönch and M. Binder, 'Ecological Aspects of Structural Change', Intereconomics, July/August (1993), 159-69; Strom and Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform'.
87. Martin Jänicke, H. Mönch and U. Simonis, 'Structural Change and Environmental Impact', Intereconomics, January/February (1989), 24-35; Martin Jänicke, H. Mönch and M. Binder, 'Ecological Aspects of Structural Change', Intereconomics, July/August (1993), 159-69; Strom and Swindell, 'Political Parties, Institutions and Environmental Reform'.
88. OECD, Economic Outlook: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 1990); International Energy Agency, Energy Balances (Paris: IEA, various years); Robert Summers and Alan Heston, 'The Penn World Tables: Mark 5', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (1991), 327-68.
89. OECD, Economic Outlook: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 1990); International Energy Agency, Energy Balances (Paris: IEA, various years); Robert Summers and Alan Heston, 'The Penn World Tables: Mark 5', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (1991), 327-68.
90. OECD, Economic Outlook: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 1990); International Energy Agency, Energy Balances (Paris: IEA, various years); Robert Summers and Alan Heston, 'The Penn World Tables: Mark 5', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (1991), 327-68.
91. Green party and left-libertarian vote shares taken from Lane, McKay and Newton, Political Data Handbook, 122-48; Jaques-Renée Rabier et al. Eurobarometer 17 (1982); Ronald Inglehart and Paul Abramson, 'Economic Security and Value Change', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 336-54.
92. Green party and left-libertarian vote shares taken from Lane, McKay and Newton, Political Data Handbook, 122-48; Jaques-Renée Rabier et al. Eurobarometer 17 (1982); Ronald Inglehart and Paul Abramson, 'Economic Security and Value Change', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 336-54.
93. Green party and left-libertarian vote shares taken from Lane, McKay and Newton, Political Data Handbook, 122-48; Jaques-Renée Rabier et al. Eurobarometer 17 (1982); Ronald Inglehart and Paul Abramson, 'Economic Security and Value Change', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 336-54.
94. Strictly speaking this approach is not an entirely valid way to 'eliminate' variables. However, the multiple specifications tested (as well as the use of multiple indicators) do serve as robustness checks of the effect of corporitism indicators, which are considered increasing important to validate statistical results (Edward Learner, 'Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics', American Economic Review, 73 (1983), 31-43).
95. David Stern, Michael Common and Edward Barbier, 'Economic Growth and Environmental Degradation: The Environmental Kuznets Curve and Sustainable Development', World Development, 24 (1996), 1151-60.
96. Corporatist countries also tend to have the more active conservation and renewable energy policies See Elisabeth Ruijgrok and Frans Oosterhuis, Energy Subsidies in Western Europe: How Governments Use Taxpayers' Money to Promote Climate Change and Nuclear Risk (Amsterdam: Greenpeace, 1997).
97. Recoding France and Japan from a 2 to a 1 on Lehmbruch's measure reduces its regression coefficient to 51.2 (p<0.01). Recoding them to 0 reduces the coefficient to 38.7 (p<0.02). Thus, even if France and Japan completely lack a truly consensual policy regime (which is not consistent with the bulk of the literature), concertation is still a significant predictor of environmental performance. To test the robustness of the results further, models were estimated excluding each country, one at a time. The corporatism coefficient fluctuates by about 20 per cent, but remains substantively and statistically significant in all cases. The same is true for each of the other measures of corporatist institutions, though the range of estimates is somewhat wider.
98. Estimates of models including other political factors - i.e., those not highly correlated with environmental performance in Table 2 - were made but are not reported.
99. Checks using alternative measures and deletion of individual observations confirm that the corporatism results are robust.
100. The reason for preferring left-libertarian, rather than green party support is that many non-green, left-socialist parties took up environmental issues early, thus pre-empting the emergence of green parties, as such (see Kitschelt, 'Left-Libertarian Parties').
101. If there is a bias in the two-party support measures, it is probably against neo-corporatism as an explanation. All neo-corporatist countries have electoral systems that encourage smaller parties, while more pluralist countries have electoral systems that discourage small parties. Thus, green and left-libertarian parties should be stronger in neo-corporatist countries even if concern across the countries were equal.
102. Since multivariate results for green party vote are weak, and greens are subsumed by a 'pro-environment' left-libertarian party variable, the green vote variable is not discussed further.
103. The significant results for left-libertarian parties are influenced tremendously by Sweden. If it is removed from the sample, the estimate for left-libertarian party support is not significantly different from zero.
104. Russell Dalton, The Green Rainbow: Environmental Groups in Western Europe (New Haven, Conn.: Yale, 1994).
105. There are two further problems with using these more recent data, which are often based on membership rolls. First, it is quite likely that individuals belong to more than one group, creating a large amount of double counting. The Eurobarometer survey I use asks people if they are members of ecology or nature protection groups; and up to 75 per cent of respondents in some countries say they are members of an organization in both categories. Secondly, leaving aside the problems of double counting, it is unlikely to be true that national mobilization in the 1990s is highly correlated with membership in the early 1980s.
106. The results indicate that environmental movement strength is negatively associated (though not statistically significant) with performance once we control for the level of corporatism. There is also a negative univariate correlation (-0.40) for these eight countries between ecology group support - which suggests more radical support for environmental issues - and performance (based on the same Eurobarometer survey). Both results are consistent with the idea that the effective policy (of pre-existing corporatist institutions) reduces the need for extensive environmental mobilization.