Asymmetric information, delegation, and the structure of policy-making

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 37-56

  Epstein, David ^a   O'Halloran, Sharyn ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Delegation; Hierarchies; Institutional analysis; Separation of powers; Transaction cost economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033476002     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011001002     Document Type: Article

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