Statistical analysis of corruption data and using the internet to reduce corruption

Journal of Asian Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 591-603

  Vinod, H D ^a  

^a FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

AIC; Cp; Efficient judiciary; Income inequality; Red tape; Schooling; Trimmed correlation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033475212     PISSN: 10490078     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1049-0078(00)00034-8     Document Type: Article

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