The resolution of bankruptcy by auction: Allocating the residual right of design*

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 269-294

  Bhattacharyya, Sugato ^a   Singh, Rajdeep ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Bankruptcy; Residual rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033474486     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00038-0     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Aghion, P., Hart, O., Moore, J., 1992. The economics of bankruptcy reform. Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 8, 523-546.
2. Baird, D., 1986. The uneasy case of corporate reorganizations. Journal of Legal Studies 15, 127-147.
3. Baldwin, C., Bhattacharyya, S., 1991. Choosing the method of sale: A clinical study of conrail. Journal of Financial Economics 30, 69-98.
4. Bebchuk, L.A., 1988. A new approach to corporate reorganizations. Harvard Law Review 101, 775-804.
5. Bergman, Y., Callen, J., 1991. Opportunistic underinvestment in debt renegotiation and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 29, 137-171.
6. Berkovitch, E., Israel, R., Zender, J., 1994. The Design of Bankruptcy Law: A Case for Management Bias in Bankruptcy Reorganizations. Unpublished Working Paper, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
7. Bhattacharyya, S., Singh, R., 1995. The Allocation of Residual Rights. Unpublished Working Paper, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
8. Black, F., Scholes, M.S., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy 7, 637-654.
9. Bradley, M., Rosenzweig, M., 1992. The untenable case for chapter 11. Yale Law Journal 101, 1043-1095.
10. Bradley, M., Rosenzweig, M., 1995. In Defense of Abolishing Chapter 11. Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
11. Bulow, J., Klemperer, P., 1996. Auctions versus negotiations. American Economic Review 86, 180-194.
12. Bulow, J.I., Shoven, J.B., 1978. The bankruptcy decision. Bell Journal of Economics 9, 437-456.
13. Burkart, M., 1995. Initial shareholdings and overbidding in takeover contests. Journal of Finance 50, 1491-1515.
14. Cornelli, F., Felli, L., 1996. Ex-ante efficiency of bankruptcy procedures. European Economic Review 41, 475-485.
15. Cramton, P., Schwartz, A., 1991. Using auction theory to inform takeover regulation. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 7, 27-53.
16. Easterbrook, F.H., 1990. Is corporate bankruptcy efficient?. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 411-417.
17. Grossman, S.J., Hart, O., 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94, 691-719.
18. Haugen, R.A., Senbet, L.W., 1978. The insignificance of bankruptcy costs to the theory of optimal capital structure. Journal of Finance 33, 383-393.
19. Jackson, T., 1986. The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
20. Jensen, M.C., 1991. Corporate control and the politics of finance. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 4, 13-33.
21. Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
22. John, K., 1993. Managing financial distress and valuing distressed securities: A survey and a research agenda. Financial Management 22, 60-78.
23. Maskin, E., Riley, J., 1984. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers. Econometrica 52, 1473-1518.
24. Myerson, R., 1981. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 58-73.
25. Roe, M.J., 1983. Bankruptcy and debt: A new model for corporate reorganization. Columbia Law Review 83, 527-602.
26. Schwartz, A., 1997. Contracting about bankruptcy. Journal of Law. Economics and Organizations 13, 127-146.
27. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1992. Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance 47, 1343-1366.
28. Singh, R., 1998. Takeover bidding with toeholds: The case of the owner's curse. Review of Financial Studies 11, 679-704.
29. Stromberg, P., 1996. Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests. Unpublished Working Paper, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA.
30. Weiss, L.A., 1990. Bankruptcy resolution: Direct costs and violation of priority of claims. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 285-314.
31. Weiss, L.A., Wruck, K., 1998. Information problems, conflicts of interest, and asset stripping: Chapter 11's failure in the case of eastern airlines. Journal of Financial Economics 48, 55-97.
32. White, M.J., 1980. Public policy toward bankruptcy: Me-first and other priority rules. Bell Journal of Economics 11, 550-564.
33. White, M.J., 1994. The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.-European Comparison. Unpublished Working Paper, Law and Economics Series, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
34. Wolfstetter, E., 1996. Auctions: An introduction. Journal of Economic Surveys 10, 367-420.