A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 367-371

  Hehenkamp, Burkhard ^a   Leininger, Wolfgang ^a  

^a TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bertrand; Evolution; Evolutionary stability; Oligopoly

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033471661     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001910050087     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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3. Hehenkamp B (1999) On asymmetry, imitation and the evolution of behavior. University of Dortmund, Discussion-Paper No. 01-99
4. Hellwig M, Leininger W, Reny P, Robson A (1990) Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: an elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games. Journal of Economic Theory 52: 406-422
5. Palm G (1984) Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics for n-person games. Journal of Mathematical Biology 19: 329-334
6. Qin C-Z, Stuart C (1997) Are Cournot and Bertrand equilibria evolutionary stable strategies? Journal of Evolutionary Economics 7: 41-47
7. Weibull J (1995) Evolutionary game theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA