Why do tax and expenditure limitations pass in state elections?

Public Finance Review

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 481-510

  Alm, James ^b   Skidmore, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WHITEWATER   (United States)

^b University of Wisconsin ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033470393     PISSN: 10911421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/109114219902700502     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. Becker, Gary S. 1983. A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3):371-400.
2. Bell, Michael E., and Ronald C. Fisher. 1978. State limitations on local taxing and spending powers: Comment and re-evaluation. National Tax Journal 31 (4):391-95.
3. Bergstrom, Ted. 1979. Do governments spend too much? National Tax Journal 32 (suppl. 2): 81-86.
4. Bergstrom, Theodore C., and Robert P. Goodman. 1973. Private demands for public goods. American Economic Review 63 (3):280-96.
5. Black, Duncan. 1948. On the rationale of group decision making. Journal of Political Economy 56 (1): 133-46.
6. Borcherding, Thomas E. 1979. Comments: Session on bureaucracy. National Tax Journal 32 (suppl. 2): 211-14.
7. Borcherding, Thomas E., and Robert T. Deacon. 1972. The demand for the services of non-federal governments. American Economic Review 64 (5):891-901.
8. Bowen, Howard R. 1943. The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58 (1): 27-48.
9. Brennan, Geoffrey, and James Buchanan. 1980. The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Citrin, Jack. 1979. Do people want something for nothing: Public opinion on taxes and government spending. National Tax Journal 32 (suppl. 2): 113-29.
11. Courant, Paul N., Edward M. Gramlich, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 1980. Why voters support tax limitation amendments: The Michigan case. National Tax Journal 33 (1): 1-20.
12. Denzau, Arthur, and Robert Mackay. 1979. A model of benefit and tax share discrimination by monopoly bureaus. Empirical Economics 13 (3):341-68.
13. Fisher, Ronald C. 1996. State and local public economics. Chicago: Richard D. Irwin.
14. Gramlich, Edward M., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 1982. Micro estimates of public spending demand functions and tests of the Tiebout and median-voter hypotheses. Journal of Political Economy 90(3):536-60.
15. Gramlich, Edward M., Daniel L. Rubinfeld, and Deborah A. Swift. 1981. Who voters turn out for tax limitation votes. National Tax Journal 34 (1): 115-24.
16. Joyce, Phillip G., and Daniel R. Mullins. 1991. The changing fiscal structure of the state and local public sector: The impact of tax and expenditure limitations. Public Administration Review 51 (3):242-52.
17. Ladd, Helen F. 1978. An economic evaluation of state limitations on local taxing and spending powers. National Tax Journal 31 (1): 1-18.
18. Ladd, Helen F., and Julie Boatright Wilson. 1982. Why voters support tax limitations: Evidence from Massachusetts' Proposition 2-1/2, National Tax Journal 35 (2):121-48.
19. _. 1983. Who supports tax limitations: Evidence from Massachusetts' Proposition 2-1/2. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 2:256-79.
20. Levy, Mickey. 1975. Voting on California's tax and expenditure limitation initiative. National Tax Journal 28 (4):426-36.
21. Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited dependent and qualitative variables in economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
22. Mariotti, Steve. 1978. An economic analysis of the voting on Michigan's tax and expenditure limitation. Public Choice 33 (3): 15-26.
23. Mueller, Dennis C. 1989. Public choice II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24. Mullins, Daniel R., and Phillip G. Joyce. 1996. Tax and expenditure limitations and local fiscal structure: An empirical assessment. Public Budgeting and Finance 16 (1): 20-37.
25. National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America. 1979. Proceedings of a Conference on Tax and Expenditure Limitations. National Tax Journal 32 (suppl. 2): 1-393.
26. Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton Press.
27. Pechman, Joseph A. 1985. Who paid the taxes, 1966-1985? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
28. Plott, Charles R. 1967. A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule. American Economic Review 57 (2):787-806.
29. Preston, E. Anne, and Casey Ichniowski. 1991. A national perspective on the nature and effects of the local property tax revolt, 1976-1986. National Tax Journal 44 (2):123-45.
30. Reynolds, Morgan, and Eugene Smolensky. 1977. Public expenditures, taxes, and the distribution of income. New York: Academic Press.
31. Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1979. Bureaucrats versus voters: On the political economy of resource allocation by direct democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 93 (4):563-87.
32. _. 1982. The elusive median voter. Journal of Public Economics 12 (2):143-70.
33. Rueben, Kim. 1997. Tax limitation and government growth: The effect of state tax and expenditure limits on state and local government. Mimeo.
34. Skidmore, Mark L. 1999. Tax and expenditure limitations and the fiscal relationships between state and local governments. Public Choice 99 (1): 77-102.
35. Stein, Robert M., Keith E. Hamm, and Patricia K. Freeman. 1983. An analysis of support for tax limitation referenda. Public Choice 40 (2):187-94.
36. Stigler, George J. 1972. Economic competition and political competition. Public Choice 13 (1): 91-106.
37. Tullock, Gordon. 1959. Some problems with majority voting. Journal of Political Economy 67 (4):571-79.