The uses of absurdity: The staged war theory and the Romanian revolution of December 1989

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 501-541

  Hall, Richard Andrew ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033468419     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325499013003003     Document Type: Article

References (141)

1. My use of the word "authoritarian" here is designed to cover a variety of non-democratic regime types, including totalitarian, post-totalitarian, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and military. Though the forces that can undermine the accuracy of historiography may be more developed in certain types of post-authoritarian societies, for example post-totalitarian societies, I believe the factors themselves to be relatively generic to post-authoritarian rule.
2. The definition of revisionism I use here is outcome-based, rather than process-based. Whether an individual consciously sets out to contradict the original understanding of the December events, or simply comes to a different understanding as a result of investigating them, the resulting accounts are revisionist in terms of their conclusions - that is, they dispute the original understanding.
3. The key here is not how the staged war theory could hypothetically be argued (i.e., continuing to maintain the Securitate's substantial institutional culpability for the bloodshed), but how in fact it has been argued in practice in Romania (i.e., substantially reducing the Securitate's institutional culpability).
4. The seeming clarity of the December events as they occurred is well-captured in Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman's discussion of "What we thought we saw" in Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu: Post-Communist Communism?" in Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 117-47. The unity of interpretation of these events while they were taking place also comes through in newspaper accounts from the time. See, for example, coverage in the New York Times and the Washington Post for the period 16-31 December 1989.
5. Over 900 of those who died during the December events - almost 90 percent of the total - lost their lives after 22 December, thus in the terrorist violence.
6. For a discussion by western analysts of such arguments - embraced to varying degrees depending upon the author(s) in question - see the following: Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1991); Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 117-47; Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (1991): 42-59; Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 163-67; Radu Portocala, Autopsie du coup d'état Roumain: Au pays du mensonge triomphant (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1990); Michel Castex, Un mensonge gros comme le siècle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution: Rumanien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Munich: Serie-Piper, 1990).
7. For a discussion by western analysts of such arguments - embraced to varying degrees depending upon the author(s) in question - see the following: Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1991); Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 117-47; Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (1991): 42-59; Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 163-67; Radu Portocala, Autopsie du coup d'état Roumain: Au pays du mensonge triomphant (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1990); Michel Castex, Un mensonge gros comme le siècle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution: Rumanien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Munich: Serie-Piper, 1990).
8. For a discussion by western analysts of such arguments - embraced to varying degrees depending upon the author(s) in question - see the following: Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1991); Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 117-47; Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (1991): 42-59; Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 163-67; Radu Portocala, Autopsie du coup d'état Roumain: Au pays du mensonge triomphant (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1990); Michel Castex, Un mensonge gros comme le siècle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution: Rumanien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Munich: Serie-Piper, 1990).
9. For a discussion by western analysts of such arguments - embraced to varying degrees depending upon the author(s) in question - see the following: Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1991); Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 117-47; Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (1991): 42-59; Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 163-67; Radu Portocala, Autopsie du coup d'état Roumain: Au pays du mensonge triomphant (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1990); Michel Castex, Un mensonge gros comme le siècle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution: Rumanien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Munich: Serie-Piper, 1990).
10. For a discussion by western analysts of such arguments - embraced to varying degrees depending upon the author(s) in question - see the following: Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1991); Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 117-47; Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (1991): 42-59; Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 163-67; Radu Portocala, Autopsie du coup d'état Roumain: Au pays du mensonge triomphant (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1990); Michel Castex, Un mensonge gros comme le siècle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution: Rumanien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Munich: Serie-Piper, 1990).
11. For a discussion by western analysts of such arguments - embraced to varying degrees depending upon the author(s) in question - see the following: Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1991); Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 117-47; Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (1991): 42-59; Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 163-67; Radu Portocala, Autopsie du coup d'état Roumain: Au pays du mensonge triomphant (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1990); Michel Castex, Un mensonge gros comme le siècle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution: Rumanien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Munich: Serie-Piper, 1990).
12. For a discussion by western analysts of such arguments - embraced to varying degrees depending upon the author(s) in question - see the following: Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1991); Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 117-47; Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (1991): 42-59; Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 163-67; Radu Portocala, Autopsie du coup d'état Roumain: Au pays du mensonge triomphant (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1990); Michel Castex, Un mensonge gros comme le siècle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution: Rumanien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Munich: Serie-Piper, 1990).
13. For a discussion by western analysts of such arguments - embraced to varying degrees depending upon the author(s) in question - see the following: Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1991); Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 117-47; Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future," Problems of Communism 40:1 (1991): 42-59; Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 163-67; Radu Portocala, Autopsie du coup d'état Roumain: Au pays du mensonge triomphant (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1990); Michel Castex, Un mensonge gros comme le siècle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990); Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Die Unvollendete Revolution: Rumanien zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Munich: Serie-Piper, 1990).
14. Indeed, I do not contest any of these points, with the exception of the terrorist question. I do not deny the pedigree of the Front leaders or the fact that the Iliescu regime manifested authoritarian tendencies and failed to make a complete break with the past. Nor do I even deny that senior Front leaders knew each other quite well before 22 December and had made plans for the ouster of Ceauşescu. I contend, however, that the terrorist question is logically prior to the question of whether or not senior Front leaders conspired to overthrow Ceauşescu. Their prior organization matters only insofar as it can be demonstrated that they invented the terrorists or deliberately exaggerated the terrorist threat for their own political gain. Otherwise, their ability to seize power is far less mysterious and can be explained by the neopatrimonial character of Ceauşescu's regime (see, for example, Richard Snyder "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," Comparative Politics 24 (July 1992): 379-99), or perhaps even more effectively, by its combination of sultanist and totalitarian features (the latter explaining the complete lack of capacity for society to mount a credible challenge for power against representatives of the rump party-state bureaucracy, i.e., those who took power had an overwhelming advantage because of their prior organization) (see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1996), 344-65.
15. Indeed, I do not contest any of these points, with the exception of the terrorist question. I do not deny the pedigree of the Front leaders or the fact that the Iliescu regime manifested authoritarian tendencies and failed to make a complete break with the past. Nor do I even deny that senior Front leaders knew each other quite well before 22 December and had made plans for the ouster of Ceauşescu. I contend, however, that the terrorist question is logically prior to the question of whether or not senior Front leaders conspired to overthrow Ceauşescu. Their prior organization matters only insofar as it can be demonstrated that they invented the terrorists or deliberately exaggerated the terrorist threat for their own political gain. Otherwise, their ability to seize power is far less mysterious and can be explained by the neopatrimonial character of Ceauşescu's regime (see, for example, Richard Snyder "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," Comparative Politics 24 (July 1992): 379-99), or perhaps even more effectively, by its combination of sultanist and totalitarian features (the latter explaining the complete lack of capacity for society to mount a credible challenge for power against representatives of the rump party-state bureaucracy, i.e., those who took power had an overwhelming advantage because of their prior organization) (see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1996), 344-65.
16. This is Sorin Roşca Stǎnescu's description. Reprinted from Ziua as Valentin Gabrielescu, interview by Sorin Roşca Stǎnescu, "Şeful comisiei decembrie '89 face dezvǎluiri," Lumea Liberǎ (New York), no. 377 (23 December 1995), 9.
17. Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 62.
18. Versions of the staged war theory differ over the responsibility of the Securitate for the bloodshed prior to 22 December, and over who - if anybody - actually carried out the terrorist violence. What unites staged war theory accounts, however, is their denial that the terrorist violence was the work of Securitate officers still loyal to Ceauşescu.
19. Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 62. Opposition expressions of the staged war theory are so commonplace that I will not go into an extended exposition of them here. Two examples from the well-known journalist Petre Mihai Bǎcanu should suffice: "Because now we have all the elements [at our disposal] to realize that the story with the terrorists was an invention. The unleashing of a fight between invisible terrorists and the army created support for the later declarations of those who had to legitimize their power: 'We fought under the hail of bullets'" (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Direcţia a V-a acuzatǎ de trǎdare?" România Liberǎ, 25 July 1990, 1); and "It was very important for the new Power [i.e., the Front] . . . to appear as a revolutionary force, with the aura of a conqueror, and for the Army to fight against someone. Thus were invented the terrorists whom president Iliescu described as 'firing from any position,' leaving it to be understood that they belonged to the Securitate . . . After 21 December, the Securitate, the most well-informed [institution in the country], did not get involved. They destroyed files, but they did not lay their hands on weapons" (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Rol dublu: ŞI TERORIŞTI ŞI ÎNVINGǍTORI," România Liberǎ, 20 May 1992, 1).
20. Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 62. Opposition expressions of the staged war theory are so commonplace that I will not go into an extended exposition of them here. Two examples from the well-known journalist Petre Mihai Bǎcanu should suffice: "Because now we have all the elements [at our disposal] to realize that the story with the terrorists was an invention. The unleashing of a fight between invisible terrorists and the army created support for the later declarations of those who had to legitimize their power: 'We fought under the hail of bullets'" (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Direcţia a V-a acuzatǎ de trǎdare?" România Liberǎ, 25 July 1990, 1); and "It was very important for the new Power [i.e., the Front] . . . to appear as a revolutionary force, with the aura of a conqueror, and for the Army to fight against someone. Thus were invented the terrorists whom president Iliescu described as 'firing from any position,' leaving it to be understood that they belonged to the Securitate . . . After 21 December, the Securitate, the most well-informed [institution in the country], did not get involved. They destroyed files, but they did not lay their hands on weapons" (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Rol dublu: ŞI TERORIŞTI ŞI ÎNVINGǍTORI," România Liberǎ, 20 May 1992, 1).
21. Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 62. Opposition expressions of the staged war theory are so commonplace that I will not go into an extended exposition of them here. Two examples from the well-known journalist Petre Mihai Bǎcanu should suffice: "Because now we have all the elements [at our disposal] to realize that the story with the terrorists was an invention. The unleashing of a fight between invisible terrorists and the army created support for the later declarations of those who had to legitimize their power: 'We fought under the hail of bullets'" (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Direcţia a V-a acuzatǎ de trǎdare?" România Liberǎ, 25 July 1990, 1); and "It was very important for the new Power [i.e., the Front] . . . to appear as a revolutionary force, with the aura of a conqueror, and for the Army to fight against someone. Thus were invented the terrorists whom president Iliescu described as 'firing from any position,' leaving it to be understood that they belonged to the Securitate . . . After 21 December, the Securitate, the most well-informed [institution in the country], did not get involved. They destroyed files, but they did not lay their hands on weapons" (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Rol dublu: ŞI TERORIŞTI ŞI ÎNVINGǍTORI," România Liberǎ, 20 May 1992, 1).
22. Adrian Pǎunescu, "Diversiunea cu teroriştii," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 96 (16-23 July 1992), 1A. These are core elements of the revisionist canon: see, for example, the discussion of similar arguments in Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 121; Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, espec., 44-60; Calinescu and Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution," 45; and Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 165.
23. Adrian Pǎunescu, "Diversiunea cu teroriştii," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 96 (16-23 July 1992), 1A. These are core elements of the revisionist canon: see, for example, the discussion of similar arguments in Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 121; Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, espec., 44-60; Calinescu and Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution," 45; and Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 165.
24. Adrian Pǎunescu, "Diversiunea cu teroriştii," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 96 (16-23 July 1992), 1A. These are core elements of the revisionist canon: see, for example, the discussion of similar arguments in Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 121; Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, espec., 44-60; Calinescu and Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution," 45; and Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 165.
25. Adrian Pǎunescu, "Diversiunea cu teroriştii," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 96 (16-23 July 1992), 1A. These are core elements of the revisionist canon: see, for example, the discussion of similar arguments in Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 121; Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, espec., 44-60; Calinescu and Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution," 45; and Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 165.
26. Adrian Pǎunescu, "Diversiunea cu teroriştii," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 96 (16-23 July 1992), 1A. These are core elements of the revisionist canon: see, for example, the discussion of similar arguments in Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 121; Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, espec., 44-60; Calinescu and Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution," 45; and Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 165.
27. For some background on Pǎunescu both pre- and post-1989, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents: Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania," East European Politics and Societies 7:2 (1993): 311, 319.
28. Indeed, the ties of Pǎunescu's "Socialist Labor Party" to the former Securitate have been identified. See Claudiu Hârceagǎ, "PSM: 'Cuibuşorul de nebunii' al foştilor securişti. Cuplul Verdeţ-Pǎunescu este condus, din umbrǎ, de fostul şef al Securitǎtii, loan Stǎnescu," România Liberǎ, 31 May 1995, 3.
29. See, for example, Marin Lungu (former colonel), interview by Angela Bǎcescu, "Interviu cu Marin Lungu," Europa, no. 17 (February 1991), 7; Committee for the Initiative to Save General Iulian Vlad (signed by four former officers), "Cazul Dreyfus al României," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 32 (August 1991), 12a; Gârz Romulus (former officer of the "Special Unit for Anti-terrorist Warfare," or USLA for short) in Angela Bǎcescu, Din Nou în Calea Nǎvǎlirilor Barbare (Cluj-Napoca: Editura 'Zalmoxis,' 1994), 156.
30. See, for example, Marin Lungu (former colonel), interview by Angela Bǎcescu, "Interviu cu Marin Lungu," Europa, no. 17 (February 1991), 7; Committee for the Initiative to Save General Iulian Vlad (signed by four former officers), "Cazul Dreyfus al României," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 32 (August 1991), 12a; Gârz Romulus (former officer of the "Special Unit for Anti-terrorist Warfare," or USLA for short) in Angela Bǎcescu, Din Nou în Calea Nǎvǎlirilor Barbare (Cluj-Napoca: Editura 'Zalmoxis,' 1994), 156.
31. See, for example, Marin Lungu (former colonel), interview by Angela Bǎcescu, "Interviu cu Marin Lungu," Europa, no. 17 (February 1991), 7; Committee for the Initiative to Save General Iulian Vlad (signed by four former officers), "Cazul Dreyfus al României," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 32 (August 1991), 12a; Gârz Romulus (former officer of the "Special Unit for Anti-terrorist Warfare," or USLA for short) in Angela Bǎcescu, Din Nou în Calea Nǎvǎlirilor Barbare (Cluj-Napoca: Editura 'Zalmoxis,' 1994), 156.
32. Pavel Coruţ, Cântecul Nemuririi (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1994), 170, 172.
33. Elsewhere, Coruţ alleges that Iliescu purposely targeted as terrorists those Securitate units (in particular, the "Special Unit for Anti-terrorist Warfare," or USLA) "necessary for finding and annihilating the real terrorists" and that this "anti-Securitate disinformation campaign" was designed to "allow the [real] terrorists and foreign interventionists to escape" (see idem., Floarea de Argint (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1993), 194-195, 197). For background on Coruţ, see Michael Shafir, "Best Selling Spy Novels Seek to Rehabilitate Romanian Securitate," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, 12 November 1993, 14-18.
34. Elsewhere, Coruţ alleges that Iliescu purposely targeted as terrorists those Securitate units (in particular, the "Special Unit for Anti-terrorist Warfare," or USLA) "necessary for finding and annihilating the real terrorists" and that this "anti-Securitate disinformation campaign" was designed to "allow the [real] terrorists and foreign interventionists to escape" (see idem., Floarea de Argint (Bucharest: Editura Miracol, 1993), 194-195, 197). For background on Coruţ, see Michael Shafir, "Best Selling Spy Novels Seek to Rehabilitate Romanian Securitate," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, 12 November 1993, 14-18.
35. Bǎcescu, Din Nou în Calea, 182.
36. That, on the contrary, Securitate units such as the "Special Unit for Anti-Terrorist Warfare" (the USLA) did in fact participate in the repression of demonstrators during the week of 16-22 December is clear. See, for example, Emilian David, "Dreptate şi adevǎr pentru ziua întîi," Libertatea, 12 January 1990, 1-2, and the testimony of witnesses in the charges drawn up against the members of Ceausesçu's cabinet, "Rechizitoriu, 4 June 1990," in Mircea Bunea, Praf în Ochi. Procesul celor 24-1-2 (Bucharest: Editura Scripta, 1994), 84-88. Significantly, Petre Mihai Bǎcanu initially accepted claims that the USLA had not taken part in the repression of demonstrators (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Intercontinental 21/22," România Liberǎ, 16 March 1990, 3; 17 March 1990, 1), but later reversed himself (idem., "Au evacuat 'materialele.' Stropite cu sânge," România Liberǎ, 28 December 1993, 10).
37. That, on the contrary, Securitate units such as the "Special Unit for Anti-Terrorist Warfare" (the USLA) did in fact participate in the repression of demonstrators during the week of 16-22 December is clear. See, for example, Emilian David, "Dreptate şi adevǎr pentru ziua întîi," Libertatea, 12 January 1990, 1-2, and the testimony of witnesses in the charges drawn up against the members of Ceausesçu's cabinet, "Rechizitoriu, 4 June 1990," in Mircea Bunea, Praf în Ochi. Procesul celor 24-1-2 (Bucharest: Editura Scripta, 1994), 84-88. Significantly, Petre Mihai Bǎcanu initially accepted claims that the USLA had not taken part in the repression of demonstrators (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Intercontinental 21/22," România Liberǎ, 16 March 1990, 3; 17 March 1990, 1), but later reversed himself (idem., "Au evacuat 'materialele.' Stropite cu sânge," România Liberǎ, 28 December 1993, 10).
38. That, on the contrary, Securitate units such as the "Special Unit for Anti-Terrorist Warfare" (the USLA) did in fact participate in the repression of demonstrators during the week of 16-22 December is clear. See, for example, Emilian David, "Dreptate şi adevǎr pentru ziua întîi," Libertatea, 12 January 1990, 1-2, and the testimony of witnesses in the charges drawn up against the members of Ceausesçu's cabinet, "Rechizitoriu, 4 June 1990," in Mircea Bunea, Praf în Ochi. Procesul celor 24-1-2 (Bucharest: Editura Scripta, 1994), 84-88. Significantly, Petre Mihai Bǎcanu initially accepted claims that the USLA had not taken part in the repression of demonstrators (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Intercontinental 21/22," România Liberǎ, 16 March 1990, 3; 17 March 1990, 1), but later reversed himself (idem., "Au evacuat 'materialele.' Stropite cu sânge," România Liberǎ, 28 December 1993, 10).
39. That, on the contrary, Securitate units such as the "Special Unit for Anti-Terrorist Warfare" (the USLA) did in fact participate in the repression of demonstrators during the week of 16-22 December is clear. See, for example, Emilian David, "Dreptate şi adevǎr pentru ziua întîi," Libertatea, 12 January 1990, 1-2, and the testimony of witnesses in the charges drawn up against the members of Ceausesçu's cabinet, "Rechizitoriu, 4 June 1990," in Mircea Bunea, Praf în Ochi. Procesul celor 24-1-2 (Bucharest: Editura Scripta, 1994), 84-88. Significantly, Petre Mihai Bǎcanu initially accepted claims that the USLA had not taken part in the repression of demonstrators (Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Intercontinental 21/22," România Liberǎ, 16 March 1990, 3; 17 March 1990, 1), but later reversed himself (idem., "Au evacuat 'materialele.' Stropite cu sânge," România Liberǎ, 28 December 1993, 10).
40. My use of the term "opposition" in this article refers to its static pre-November 1996 connotation: those who opposed the Iliescu regime (1990-96) and called for faster and deeper political and economic reform.
41. Stokes has merely been more explicit than others who have written on the December events in cautioning us against accepting the original understanding of the events. See Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 166.
42. See, for example, Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 62-63; and Shafir, "Bestselling Spy Novel," 15. Ratesh relates that in June 1990 "a highly placed Romanian official" told him a version of the staged war theory which attributed the terrorist violence to the Army. He passes this off as part of "a campaign to discredit the army, in which the government was said at the time to be engaged." He also expresses surprise at Petre Mihai Bǎcanu's unexpected July 1990 article clearing the Securitate's Fifth Directorate of responsibility for the "terrorist" violence (see n. 11 above), since "[o]ther journalists (of less credibility, however) investigated the charges brought against other parts of the security forces and found similar exonerating circumstances."
43. See, for example, Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution, 62-63; and Shafir, "Bestselling Spy Novel," 15. Ratesh relates that in June 1990 "a highly placed Romanian official" told him a version of the staged war theory which attributed the terrorist violence to the Army. He passes this off as part of "a campaign to discredit the army, in which the government was said at the time to be engaged." He also expresses surprise at Petre Mihai Bǎcanu's unexpected July 1990 article clearing the Securitate's Fifth Directorate of responsibility for the "terrorist" violence (see n. 11 above), since "[o]ther journalists (of less credibility, however) investigated the charges brought against other parts of the security forces and found similar exonerating circumstances."
44. See Jowitt's use of this term in Kenneth Jowitt, "The Leninist Legacy," in Banac, ed., 209.
45. This pro-Securitate press includes such publications as Europa (the closest thing to a mouthpiece of the former Securitate's old guard), Spionaj-Contraspionaj, Totuşi Iubirea, Democraţia, Timpul (edited by Raoul Şorban), România, Mare, Românul, Politica, and Vremea. References to România Mare and Totuşi Iubirea occasionally make their way into western scholarship but almost never in regard to the December events.
46. It must be pointed out that although unexpected and odd, there is nothing inherently wrong about the coincidence of opposition and Securitate accounts - that is, provided the former Securitate are indeed telling the truth about their role in December 1989.
47. For the assumptions of the model, see Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed., rev. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), espec. 22; 31-81; 172-82; 205-18. Indeed, the view was positively trinitarian in this regard.
48. Jowitt astutely noted that neo-patrimonial patterns of leadership damaged the corporate integrity of the Communist Party and strengthened the institutional weight of particular state bureaucracies (especially the secret police) during the initial totalitarian period. For Jowitt's insights on the initial totalitarian period, see Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 68-69; 149. For his discussion of the creation of regime identity see idem, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 156-57.
49. Jowitt astutely noted that neo-patrimonial patterns of leadership damaged the corporate integrity of the Communist Party and strengthened the institutional weight of particular state bureaucracies (especially the secret police) during the initial totalitarian period. For Jowitt's insights on the initial totalitarian period, see Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 68-69; 149. For his discussion of the creation of regime identity see idem, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 156-57.
50. This is appropriately ironic for at the very time that a collective regime identity has been able to triumph over the fractiousness of particular bureaucratic identities within the regime, the collective regime identity has been corrupted by the particularistic personal interests of its members. On this latter point see Jowitt's essay on "Neotraditionalism" in Jowitt, New World Disorder, 121-58.
51. It is this that explains Iliescu's continued insistence that the terrorists existed, and that at the time Front leaders considered them a genuine threat to the success of revolution, but that the Securitate's USLA and Fifth Directorate were mistakenly blamed for the terrorist violence when they were in fact not the terrorists. See Ion Iliescu, Revoluţie şi Reformǎ (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedicǎ, 1994), 11-85. This also suggests that Pǎunescu's behavior was not so completely at odds with regime policy as it may first appear (though it is still far more damaging to Iliescu's interests than Iliescu's own argument).
52. This is also Dennis Deletant's interpretation of the Iliescu leadership's behavior. Deletant appears to be the lone scholar to accept the initial understanding of the events and the Securitate's responsibility for the terrorism. Like other analysts, however, he fails to investigate the pro-Securitate press and literature, and thus does not address the issue of why the convergence of Securitate and opposition accounts exists, or why the vast majority of opposition accounts appear to contradict his conclusion. See Dennis Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), espec. 388-89; 360-72. Martyn Rady partially accepts the initial understanding in Martyn Rady, Romania In Turmoil: A Contemporary History, (New York: IB Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1992), 104-111.
53. This is also Dennis Deletant's interpretation of the Iliescu leadership's behavior. Deletant appears to be the lone scholar to accept the initial understanding of the events and the Securitate's responsibility for the terrorism. Like other analysts, however, he fails to investigate the pro-Securitate press and literature, and thus does not address the issue of why the convergence of Securitate and opposition accounts exists, or why the vast majority of opposition accounts appear to contradict his conclusion. See Dennis Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), espec. 388-89; 360-72. Martyn Rady partially accepts the initial understanding in Martyn Rady, Romania In Turmoil: A Contemporary History, (New York: IB Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1992), 104-111.
54. Ion Iliescu, interview by Nicolae Manolescu, România Literarǎ, 5 July 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-146, 30 July 1990, 55.
55. "Ion Iliescu Announces Capture of Ceausescu," Bucharest Domestic Service, 1616 GMT 23 December 1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-246, 23 December 1989, 61. The phrase "they shoot from any position" is an oft-quoted, famous piece of the revolutionary folklore. Emphasis added.
56. Quoted in Teodor Brateş, Explozia unei clips (Bucharest: Editura Scripta, 1992), 112-13. Emphasis added.
57. Blaine Harden, "Doors Unlocked on Romania's Secret Police: Elite Underground Unit of Ceausescu's Securitate Forces Seen as Deadly, Defiant," Washington Post, 30 December 1989, Al; A14.
58. See, for example, Sergiu Tǎnǎsescu, interview by Ion K. Ion, "Dincǎ şi Postelnicu au fost prinşi pe pantera roz!" Cuvîntul, no. 8-9 (28 March 1990), 15, and N. F. (pensioner), letter to the editor, "Voi aţi tras în noi, noi vǎ salvǎm viaţa!" 22, no.5 (16 February 1990), 10.
59. See, for example, the comments of an anonymous former USLA member to the A.M. Press Agency (Dolj County) in December 1994. The press release appeared without comment as "Dezvǎluiri despre implicarea USLA in evenimentele din decembrie '89," România Liberǎ, 28 December 1994, 3. The individual requests that his name not be published since as he declares, "I fear for myself and for my parents." Some details of the story also emerge from the revelations of a former USLA member who initially only went by his initials (see Dan Badea, "U.S.L.A în stare de hipnozǎ," Expres, no. 62 (9-15 April 1991)) and was later revealed to be former USLA Captain Marian Romanescu (see idem., "USLA, Bula Moise, teroriştii şi 'Fraţii Musulmani'," Expres, no. 75 (2-8 July 1991), 9). Other relevant articles by the same author include idem, "Gloanţe speciale sau ce s-a mai gǎsit în clǎdirea Direcţiei a V-a," Exprès, no. 63 (16-22 April 1991), and idem, "Cine au fost teroriştii?" Expres, no. 90 (15-21 October 1991), 10; 15.
60. See, for example, former Securitate Colonel Ion Lemnaru's vicious denunciation of a former Timişoara Securitate officer named Roland Vasilevici, in Col. (r) Ion Lemnaru, "Piramida de minciuni a lui Roland Vasilevici din Timişoara," Spionaj-Contraspionaj, no. 24 (March 1992), 7a. Using the pseudonym of Romeo Vasiliu, Vasilevici apparently wrote a pamphlet in 1990, entitled Piramida Umbrelor [Pyramid of shadows], which described the USLA's role in the repression and terrorism in Timişoara in December 1989. It is clear from this article that it is Vasilevici's allegations regarding the USLA which are the focus of the officer's anger. Vasilevici may have been the source for a series of detailed articles on the role of the USLA in the December events which appeared under the name "Püspöki F." in early 1990. See the strikingly similar descriptions in Püspöki F., "Piramida umbrelor," Orizont (Timişoara), no. 9 (2 March 1990), no. 10 (9 March 1990), and no. 11 (16 March 1990).
61. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Corina Ileana Popa, "Dupǎ 7 ani," Sfera Politicii (Bucharest) 5:44 (December 1996): 60-63. A much shorter and less-detailed version of this article appeared as Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Adriana Bobeicǎ, "Ce demonstreazǎ probele balistice dupǎ şapte ani?" 22, 7:51 (17-23 December 1996), 10 . During the events, the terrorists used the standard 7.62 mm bullets the army also used, but in addition they used bullets of other calibers (5.6 and 9 mm, for example) which were not found in the arsenal of the army. The fact that these alternative caliber bullets show up in diverse locations across the country is important: versions of the staged war theory rarely get out of Bucharest in their discussion of the December events. The tactics of the terrorists, the character of the destruction left by the confrontations, and the source and purpose of disinformation during the events have frequently been misinterpreted: see my discussion in Richard Andrew Hall, "Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1997). Not surprisingly, the references in many accounts on the December events - even accounts that deny that the USLA were the terrorists - to the khaki outfits worn by the terrorists match the description of the so-called A1 and A2 winter outfits in the USLA's arsenal, outfits that Securitate accounts maintain were stolen by army soldiers and demonstrators in Timişoara and elsewhere during the December events (on the latter, see for example, "Scrisori din temniţǎ," România Mare, no. 17 [28 September 1990], 5, and Angela Bǎcescu, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 [January 1991], 3.) The sophisticated weaponry used by the terrorists was detailed in articles that appeared in the army press in early 1990. See, for example, "Cum ocheau teroriştii?" Armata Poporului, 17 January 1990, 6; Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3; Lt. Col. Ing. Cristian Crǎmpiţǎ, "Breviar: Din recuzita teroriştilor," Armata Poporului, 18 April 1990, 6.
62. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Corina Ileana Popa, "Dupǎ 7 ani," Sfera Politicii (Bucharest) 5:44 (December 1996): 60-63. A much shorter and less-detailed version of this article appeared as Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Adriana Bobeicǎ, "Ce demonstreazǎ probele balistice dupǎ şapte ani?" 22, 7:51 (17-23 December 1996), 10 . During the events, the terrorists used the standard 7.62 mm bullets the army also used, but in addition they used bullets of other calibers (5.6 and 9 mm, for example) which were not found in the arsenal of the army. The fact that these alternative caliber bullets show up in diverse locations across the country is important: versions of the staged war theory rarely get out of Bucharest in their discussion of the December events. The tactics of the terrorists, the character of the destruction left by the confrontations, and the source and purpose of disinformation during the events have frequently been misinterpreted: see my discussion in Richard Andrew Hall, "Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1997). Not surprisingly, the references in many accounts on the December events - even accounts that deny that the USLA were the terrorists - to the khaki outfits worn by the terrorists match the description of the so-called A1 and A2 winter outfits in the USLA's arsenal, outfits that Securitate accounts maintain were stolen by army soldiers and demonstrators in Timişoara and elsewhere during the December events (on the latter, see for example, "Scrisori din temniţǎ," România Mare, no. 17 [28 September 1990], 5, and Angela Bǎcescu, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 [January 1991], 3.) The sophisticated weaponry used by the terrorists was detailed in articles that appeared in the army press in early 1990. See, for example, "Cum ocheau teroriştii?" Armata Poporului, 17 January 1990, 6; Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3; Lt. Col. Ing. Cristian Crǎmpiţǎ, "Breviar: Din recuzita teroriştilor," Armata Poporului, 18 April 1990, 6.
63. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Corina Ileana Popa, "Dupǎ 7 ani," Sfera Politicii (Bucharest) 5:44 (December 1996): 60-63. A much shorter and less-detailed version of this article appeared as Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Adriana Bobeicǎ, "Ce demonstreazǎ probele balistice dupǎ şapte ani?" 22, 7:51 (17-23 December 1996), 10 . During the events, the terrorists used the standard 7.62 mm bullets the army also used, but in addition they used bullets of other calibers (5.6 and 9 mm, for example) which were not found in the arsenal of the army. The fact that these alternative caliber bullets show up in diverse locations across the country is important: versions of the staged war theory rarely get out of Bucharest in their discussion of the December events. The tactics of the terrorists, the character of the destruction left by the confrontations, and the source and purpose of disinformation during the events have frequently been misinterpreted: see my discussion in Richard Andrew Hall, "Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1997). Not surprisingly, the references in many accounts on the December events - even accounts that deny that the USLA were the terrorists - to the khaki outfits worn by the terrorists match the description of the so-called A1 and A2 winter outfits in the USLA's arsenal, outfits that Securitate accounts maintain were stolen by army soldiers and demonstrators in Timişoara and elsewhere during the December events (on the latter, see for example, "Scrisori din temniţǎ," România Mare, no. 17 [28 September 1990], 5, and Angela Bǎcescu, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 [January 1991], 3.) The sophisticated weaponry used by the terrorists was detailed in articles that appeared in the army press in early 1990. See, for example, "Cum ocheau teroriştii?" Armata Poporului, 17 January 1990, 6; Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3; Lt. Col. Ing. Cristian Crǎmpiţǎ, "Breviar: Din recuzita teroriştilor," Armata Poporului, 18 April 1990, 6.
64. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Corina Ileana Popa, "Dupǎ 7 ani," Sfera Politicii (Bucharest) 5:44 (December 1996): 60-63. A much shorter and less-detailed version of this article appeared as Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Adriana Bobeicǎ, "Ce demonstreazǎ probele balistice dupǎ şapte ani?" 22, 7:51 (17-23 December 1996), 10 . During the events, the terrorists used the standard 7.62 mm bullets the army also used, but in addition they used bullets of other calibers (5.6 and 9 mm, for example) which were not found in the arsenal of the army. The fact that these alternative caliber bullets show up in diverse locations across the country is important: versions of the staged war theory rarely get out of Bucharest in their discussion of the December events. The tactics of the terrorists, the character of the destruction left by the confrontations, and the source and purpose of disinformation during the events have frequently been misinterpreted: see my discussion in Richard Andrew Hall, "Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1997). Not surprisingly, the references in many accounts on the December events - even accounts that deny that the USLA were the terrorists - to the khaki outfits worn by the terrorists match the description of the so-called A1 and A2 winter outfits in the USLA's arsenal, outfits that Securitate accounts maintain were stolen by army soldiers and demonstrators in Timişoara and elsewhere during the December events (on the latter, see for example, "Scrisori din temniţǎ," România Mare, no. 17 [28 September 1990], 5, and Angela Bǎcescu, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 [January 1991], 3.) The sophisticated weaponry used by the terrorists was detailed in articles that appeared in the army press in early 1990. See, for example, "Cum ocheau teroriştii?" Armata Poporului, 17 January 1990, 6; Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3; Lt. Col. Ing. Cristian Crǎmpiţǎ, "Breviar: Din recuzita teroriştilor," Armata Poporului, 18 April 1990, 6.
65. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Corina Ileana Popa, "Dupǎ 7 ani," Sfera Politicii (Bucharest) 5:44 (December 1996): 60-63. A much shorter and less-detailed version of this article appeared as Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Adriana Bobeicǎ, "Ce demonstreazǎ probele balistice dupǎ şapte ani?" 22, 7:51 (17-23 December 1996), 10 . During the events, the terrorists used the standard 7.62 mm bullets the army also used, but in addition they used bullets of other calibers (5.6 and 9 mm, for example) which were not found in the arsenal of the army. The fact that these alternative caliber bullets show up in diverse locations across the country is important: versions of the staged war theory rarely get out of Bucharest in their discussion of the December events. The tactics of the terrorists, the character of the destruction left by the confrontations, and the source and purpose of disinformation during the events have frequently been misinterpreted: see my discussion in Richard Andrew Hall, "Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1997). Not surprisingly, the references in many accounts on the December events - even accounts that deny that the USLA were the terrorists - to the khaki outfits worn by the terrorists match the description of the so-called A1 and A2 winter outfits in the USLA's arsenal, outfits that Securitate accounts maintain were stolen by army soldiers and demonstrators in Timişoara and elsewhere during the December events (on the latter, see for example, "Scrisori din temniţǎ," România Mare, no. 17 [28 September 1990], 5, and Angela Bǎcescu, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 [January 1991], 3.) The sophisticated weaponry used by the terrorists was detailed in articles that appeared in the army press in early 1990. See, for example, "Cum ocheau teroriştii?" Armata Poporului, 17 January 1990, 6; Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3; Lt. Col. Ing. Cristian Crǎmpiţǎ, "Breviar: Din recuzita teroriştilor," Armata Poporului, 18 April 1990, 6.
66. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Corina Ileana Popa, "Dupǎ 7 ani," Sfera Politicii (Bucharest) 5:44 (December 1996): 60-63. A much shorter and less-detailed version of this article appeared as Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Adriana Bobeicǎ, "Ce demonstreazǎ probele balistice dupǎ şapte ani?" 22, 7:51 (17-23 December 1996), 10 . During the events, the terrorists used the standard 7.62 mm bullets the army also used, but in addition they used bullets of other calibers (5.6 and 9 mm, for example) which were not found in the arsenal of the army. The fact that these alternative caliber bullets show up in diverse locations across the country is important: versions of the staged war theory rarely get out of Bucharest in their discussion of the December events. The tactics of the terrorists, the character of the destruction left by the confrontations, and the source and purpose of disinformation during the events have frequently been misinterpreted: see my discussion in Richard Andrew Hall, "Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1997). Not surprisingly, the references in many accounts on the December events - even accounts that deny that the USLA were the terrorists - to the khaki outfits worn by the terrorists match the description of the so-called A1 and A2 winter outfits in the USLA's arsenal, outfits that Securitate accounts maintain were stolen by army soldiers and demonstrators in Timişoara and elsewhere during the December events (on the latter, see for example, "Scrisori din temniţǎ," România Mare, no. 17 [28 September 1990], 5, and Angela Bǎcescu, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 [January 1991], 3.) The sophisticated weaponry used by the terrorists was detailed in articles that appeared in the army press in early 1990. See, for example, "Cum ocheau teroriştii?" Armata Poporului, 17 January 1990, 6; Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3; Lt. Col. Ing. Cristian Crǎmpiţǎ, "Breviar: Din recuzita teroriştilor," Armata Poporului, 18 April 1990, 6.
67. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Corina Ileana Popa, "Dupǎ 7 ani," Sfera Politicii (Bucharest) 5:44 (December 1996): 60-63. A much shorter and less-detailed version of this article appeared as Richard Andrew Hall, trans. Adriana Bobeicǎ, "Ce demonstreazǎ probele balistice dupǎ şapte ani?" 22, 7:51 (17-23 December 1996), 10 . During the events, the terrorists used the standard 7.62 mm bullets the army also used, but in addition they used bullets of other calibers (5.6 and 9 mm, for example) which were not found in the arsenal of the army. The fact that these alternative caliber bullets show up in diverse locations across the country is important: versions of the staged war theory rarely get out of Bucharest in their discussion of the December events. The tactics of the terrorists, the character of the destruction left by the confrontations, and the source and purpose of disinformation during the events have frequently been misinterpreted: see my discussion in Richard Andrew Hall, "Rewriting the Revolution: Authoritarian Regime-State Relations and the Triumph of Securitate Revisionism in Post-Ceauşescu Romania" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1997). Not surprisingly, the references in many accounts on the December events - even accounts that deny that the USLA were the terrorists - to the khaki outfits worn by the terrorists match the description of the so-called A1 and A2 winter outfits in the USLA's arsenal, outfits that Securitate accounts maintain were stolen by army soldiers and demonstrators in Timişoara and elsewhere during the December events (on the latter, see for example, "Scrisori din temniţǎ," România Mare, no. 17 [28 September 1990], 5, and Angela Bǎcescu, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 [January 1991], 3.) The sophisticated weaponry used by the terrorists was detailed in articles that appeared in the army press in early 1990. See, for example, "Cum ocheau teroriştii?" Armata Poporului, 17 January 1990, 6; Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3; Lt. Col. Ing. Cristian Crǎmpiţǎ, "Breviar: Din recuzita teroriştilor," Armata Poporului, 18 April 1990, 6.
68. Şerban Sǎndulescu, Decembrie '89 Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat Revoluţia Românǎ (Bucharest: Editura Omega Press Investment, 1996).
69. The National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNŢCD) was
70. Sǎndulescu admits that "some Securitate cadres in conjunction with members of the party nomenklatura executed terrorist actions in support of Ceauşescu" (page 42), but it is clear that he considers this relatively inconsequential and not associated with the terrorist phenomenon.
71. Stoian summarizes his ideas in Ilie Stoian, "Planul Z-Z a existat," Expres, no. 100 (24-31 December 1991), 3-4. For a full discussion of his ideas, see his book, Ilie Stoian, Decembrie '89: Arta Diversiunii (Bucharest: Editura Colaj, 1993).
72. Stoian summarizes his ideas in Ilie Stoian, "Planul Z-Z a existat," Expres, no. 100 (24-31 December 1991), 3-4. For a full discussion of his ideas, see his book, Ilie Stoian, Decembrie '89: Arta Diversiunii (Bucharest: Editura Colaj, 1993).
73. Ioan Itu, "Armata trage în propriul minister," Tinerama, no. 110 (8-14 January 1993), 7. The arguments of the article are related in detail in Deletant, Ceauşescu and thé Securitate, 360-362. Itu identified those who intentionally attacked the Defense Ministry as members of Battalion 404 Buzǎu (in other words, the DIA) in Ioan Itu, interview by Emil I. Pop, "În România a fost sau nu a fost o Revoluţie? (II)," Mesagerul Transilvan (Cluj), 30 December 1993, 1.
74. Ioan Itu, "Armata trage în propriul minister," Tinerama, no. 110 (8-14 January 1993), 7. The arguments of the article are related in detail in Deletant, Ceauşescu and thé Securitate, 360-362. Itu identified those who intentionally attacked the Defense Ministry as members of Battalion 404 Buzǎu (in other words, the DIA) in Ioan Itu, interview by Emil I. Pop, "În România a fost sau nu a fost o Revoluţie? (II)," Mesagerul Transilvan (Cluj), 30 December 1993, 1.
75. Ioan Itu, "Armata trage în propriul minister," Tinerama, no. 110 (8-14 January 1993), 7. The arguments of the article are related in detail in Deletant, Ceauşescu and thé Securitate, 360-362. Itu identified those who intentionally attacked the Defense Ministry as members of Battalion 404 Buzǎu (in other words, the DIA) in Ioan Itu, interview by Emil I. Pop, "În România a fost sau nu a fost o Revoluţie? (II)," Mesagerul Transilvan (Cluj), 30 December 1993, 1.
76. Itu, "În România a fost (II)."
77. Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Şi totuşi, represiunea a continuat," România Liberǎ, 24 December 1993, 16.
78. See, for example, Valentin Raiha, interview by Dan Costescu, "Ne-a vizitat la redacţie, un fost ofiţer de contrainformaţii: Valentin Raiha," Lumea Liberǎ. (New York), no. 371 (11 November 1995), 23-25. In Romania, he has argued his views in Evenimentul Zilei and Ziua.
79. See, for example, Valentin Raiha, interview by Dan Costescu, "Ne-a vizitat la redacţie, un fost ofiţer de contrainformaţii: Valentin Raiha," Lumea Liberǎ. (New York), no. 371 (11 November 1995), 23-25. In Romania, he has argued his views in Evenimentul Zilei and Ziua.
80. Valentin Raiha, Revoluţia Românǎ si Jocul Serviciilor Secrete (Baia Mare: Euxinus-Impex, 1994).
81. Magdalena Amancei, "În România nu a fost nici un terorist - declarǎ colonelul Gheorghe Raţiu, fost sefal Direcţiei I a Securitǎţii," Exprès Magazin, no. 75 (9 January 1992), 30.
82. See, for example, his comments in Dan Badea, "Secretele Revoluţiei," Expres, no. 22 (7-13 June 1994), 9,
83. and (before the Gabrielescu commission) in Cornel Dumitrescu, "Dezvǎluiri senzaţionale despre decembrie "89," Lumen Liberǎ. (New York), (11 March 1995), 20.
84. Dumitrescu, "Dezvǎluiri."
85. The interview began in 1994 and at last check (1997) was still going strong!
86. Colonel Gheorghe Raţiu, interview by Ilie Neacşu, épisode no. 17, Europa, (20 February-6 March 1995), 5.
87. Beverley Crawford and Arend Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures," Comparative Political Studies 28:2 (July 1995): 171-99.
88. Katherine Verdery has captured this dynamic well in her discussion of nationalism in postcommunist Romania. While the content of postcommunist nationalism may be a product of communist rule, the dynamics (both specific and general) of privatization and democratic political and electoral competition in post-Ceauşescu Romania have had their own independent effects in reinvigorating the nationalist argument and making it a politically salient instrument in the post-communist era. See Katherine Verdery, "Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania," Slavic Review 52:2 (1993): 179-203.
89. Ironically, however, it is not at all clear whether the societal value attached to rumor undermined regime control or may actually have served as an (intentional or unintentional) sort of safety valve, a means by which potential dissidence was channeled into a more benign form. This is indeed the corrosive and potentially counterproductive and manipulable quality of rumor. Those who engage in it frequently feel empowered by it, in possession of the secret counter-truth. Its practice may actually lead to tremendous self-deception.
90. But it also points up an enduring criticism of relying primarily upon political culture arguments to explain outcomes: that they are invoked selectively and on an ad hoc basis.
91. See Jowitt, "The Leninist Legacy," 209-15.
92. Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag, 231-32.
93. Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 122.
94. The Iliescu leadership's frequently abominable behavior has been abundantly documented. See, for example, Calinescu and Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future"; Tismaneanu, "The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents"; and Henry F. Carey, "From Big Lie to Small Lies: State Mass Media Dominance in Post-Communist Romania," East European Politics and Societies 10:1 (1996): 16-45.
95. The Iliescu leadership's frequently abominable behavior has been abundantly documented. See, for example, Calinescu and Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future"; Tismaneanu, "The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents"; and Henry F. Carey, "From Big Lie to Small Lies: State Mass Media Dominance in Post-Communist Romania," East European Politics and Societies 10:1 (1996): 16-45.
96. The Iliescu leadership's frequently abominable behavior has been abundantly documented. See, for example, Calinescu and Tismaneanu, "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future"; Tismaneanu, "The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents"; and Henry F. Carey, "From Big Lie to Small Lies: State Mass Media Dominance in Post-Communist Romania," East European Politics and Societies 10:1 (1996): 16-45.
97. Such an approach characterizes both Verdery and Kligman, and Stokes. These accounts do little to dispel the conspiracy theories they criticize. This is precisely because they fail to address the content of these conspiracy theories, and because, after having dismissed these theories as conspiratorial, they subtly work the arguments and details of the very same theories back into their own understandings of the December events. For example, after criticizing conspiracy theories of the December events as reflecting a defective aspect of Balkan political culture, Stokes suggests that "less extreme forms of the plot theory are not at all implausible." See Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 165-66; and Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 119-21.
98. Such an approach characterizes both Verdery and Kligman, and Stokes. These accounts do little to dispel the conspiracy theories they criticize. This is precisely because they fail to address the content of these conspiracy theories, and because, after having dismissed these theories as conspiratorial, they subtly work the arguments and details of the very same theories back into their own understandings of the December events. For example, after criticizing conspiracy theories of the December events as reflecting a defective aspect of Balkan political culture, Stokes suggests that "less extreme forms of the plot theory are not at all implausible." See Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, 165-66; and Verdery and Kligman, "Romania after Ceauşescu," 119-21.
99. It is important to observe that although such an account runs into some logical contradictions, it is far from impossible and, indeed, has been argued. For one of those rare instances, see Gheorghe Simionicǎ, "Decembrie 1989: Şi totuşi cine a tras?" Strict Secret, no. 39 (23-30 January 1991), 12.
100. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 346.
101. Silviu Brucan, Generaţia Irositǎ: Memorii (Bucharest: Editurile Univers & Calistrat Hogaş), 245.
102. Compare, for example Angela Bǎcescu, "Adevǎrul despre Sibiu," Zig-Zag, no. 15 (19-26 June 1990), 8, an article that revises the understanding of the December events in Sibiu, with the almost identical idem, "Noi lumini asupra evenimentelor din decembrie 1989," România Mare, no. 16 (21 August 1990), 4A-5A. For a good synopsis of Bǎcescu's understanding of the December events, see idem, "Faţa nevǎzutǎ a revoluţiei şi provocǎrile maghiare," România Mare, no. 14 (7 September 1990), 4-5, and idem, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 (January 1991), 3; 2.
103. Compare, for example Angela Bǎcescu, "Adevǎrul despre Sibiu," Zig-Zag, no. 15 (19-26 June 1990), 8, an article that revises the understanding of the December events in Sibiu, with the almost identical idem, "Noi lumini asupra evenimentelor din decembrie 1989," România Mare, no. 16 (21 August 1990), 4A-5A. For a good synopsis of Bǎcescu's understanding of the December events, see idem, "Faţa nevǎzutǎ a revoluţiei şi provocǎrile maghiare," România Mare, no. 14 (7 September 1990), 4-5, and idem, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 (January 1991), 3; 2.
104. Compare, for example Angela Bǎcescu, "Adevǎrul despre Sibiu," Zig-Zag, no. 15 (19-26 June 1990), 8, an article that revises the understanding of the December events in Sibiu, with the almost identical idem, "Noi lumini asupra evenimentelor din decembrie 1989," România Mare, no. 16 (21 August 1990), 4A-5A. For a good synopsis of Bǎcescu's understanding of the December events, see idem, "Faţa nevǎzutǎ a revoluţiei şi provocǎrile maghiare," România Mare, no. 14 (7 September 1990), 4-5, and idem, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 (January 1991), 3; 2.
105. Compare, for example Angela Bǎcescu, "Adevǎrul despre Sibiu," Zig-Zag, no. 15 (19-26 June 1990), 8, an article that revises the understanding of the December events in Sibiu, with the almost identical idem, "Noi lumini asupra evenimentelor din decembrie 1989," România Mare, no. 16 (21 August 1990), 4A-5A. For a good synopsis of Bǎcescu's understanding of the December events, see idem, "Faţa nevǎzutǎ a revoluţiei şi provocǎrile maghiare," România Mare, no. 14 (7 September 1990), 4-5, and idem, "Diversiunea Timişoara," Europa, no. 15 (January 1991), 3; 2.
106. Sorin Roşca Stǎnescu, "Iliescu apǎrat de K. G. B?" România Liberǎ, 18 April 1991, 8; idem, "Se destramǎ conspiraţia tǎcerii?" România Liberǎ, 14 June 1990, 2a.
107. Sorin Roşca Stǎnescu, "Iliescu apǎrat de K. G. B?" România Liberǎ, 18 April 1991, 8; idem, "Se destramǎ conspiraţia tǎcerii?" România Liberǎ, 14 June 1990, 2a.
108. For one of many such accounts, with a title that says it all, see Ion Şerbǎnoiu, interview by Angela Bǎcescu, "În 22 decembrie 1989 la Cluj se aflau peste 800 de aşa-zişi turişti unguri şi ruşi cu maşini Lada, Dacia, si Wartburg" [On 22 December 1989 in Cluj there were 800 so-called Hungarian and Russian tourists with Lada, Dacia, and Wartburg automobiles], Europa, no. 55 (December 1991), 5. For one of the early expressions of this thesis see A Group of former Securitate Officers, "Aşa vǎ place revoluţia? Aşa a fost!" Democraţia, no. 36 (24-30 September 1990), 4.
109. For one of many such accounts, with a title that says it all, see Ion Şerbǎnoiu, interview by Angela Bǎcescu, "În 22 decembrie 1989 la Cluj se aflau peste 800 de aşa-zişi turişti unguri şi ruşi cu maşini Lada, Dacia, si Wartburg" [On 22 December 1989 in Cluj there were 800 so-called Hungarian and Russian tourists with Lada, Dacia, and Wartburg automobiles], Europa, no. 55 (December 1991), 5. For one of the early expressions of this thesis see A Group of former Securitate Officers, "Aşa vǎ place revoluţia? Aşa a fost!" Democraţia, no. 36 (24-30 September 1990), 4.
110. The former director of the Securitate, General Iulian Vlad, invoked the "massive groups of Soviet tourists . . . in 'LADA' automobiles" during his trial in February 1991. See his testimony in Bunea, Praf în Ochi, 460-61. Not surprisingly, Pǎunescu also embraces this thesis: see Pǎunescu, "Diversiunea."
111. See, for example, the discussion of Roşca Stǎnescu's 1991 article in (former Securitate colonel) Filip Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat: Timişoara decembrie 1989 (Editura Viitorul Românesc, 1992), 93-94, and Radu Bǎlan (former party first secretary in Timiş county), interview by Adrian Pǎunescu, "Fanfara din Timişoara a început, în 17 decembrie 1989, ora 10, prohodul socialismului (2)," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 60 (October 1991), 8A.
112. See, for example, the discussion of Roşca Stǎnescu's 1991 article in (former Securitate colonel) Filip Teodorescu, Un Risc Asumat: Timişoara decembrie 1989 (Editura Viitorul Românesc, 1992), 93-94, and Radu Bǎlan (former party first secretary in Timiş county), interview by Adrian Pǎunescu, "Fanfara din Timişoara a început, în 17 decembrie 1989, ora 10, prohodul socialismului (2)," Totuşi Iubirea, no. 60 (October 1991), 8A.
113. Sorin Roşca Stǎnescu, "Grozǎvia declaraţiei lui Victor Babiuc," Ziua (electronic edition), 22 April 1998. Stǎnescu states: "regarding the feared Securitate. It did not fire. And if there existed killers [among them], these were [just] individuals and very small in number."
114. DIA had been mentioned earlier in connection with the events in Timisoara which preceded Ceauşescu's flight from power. There was, however, at this point no suggestion that they were the terrorists. See, for example, G. I. Olbojan, "Morţii din TIR-ul frigorific-ofiţeri DIA?" Zig-Zag, no. 9 (23-29 April 1990), and a spirited defense hinting at the possible role of Securitate disinformation in Oblojan's account, Colonel V. Gheorghe, "Încǎ o faţetǎ a diversiunii," Armata Poporului, 3 May 1990, 1; 3a.
115. DIA had been mentioned earlier in connection with the events in Timisoara which preceded Ceauşescu's flight from power. There was, however, at this point no suggestion that they were the terrorists. See, for example, G. I. Olbojan, "Morţii din TIR-ul frigorific-ofiţeri DIA?" Zig-Zag, no. 9 (23-29 April 1990), and a spirited defense hinting at the possible role of Securitate disinformation in Oblojan's account, Colonel V. Gheorghe, "Încǎ o faţetǎ a diversiunii," Armata Poporului, 3 May 1990, 1; 3a.
116. Liviu Man and Eugen Popescu, "Un colonel din contrainformaţiile militare vrea adevǎrul: Generalul Guşe si Direcţia de Informaţii a Armatei," Nu (Cluj), no. 32 (10-16 November 1990), 5. Interestingly, this former officer openly admits that DIA and his own Fourth Directorate were on very bad terms with one another during the late Ceauşescu era. Nevertheless, the journalists who introduce this article never question the former officer's motives for alleging that the DIA and not the Securitate were the terrorists.
117. Sǎndulescu, Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat, 57-58.
118. See my discussion in "Dupǎ 7 ani," 62-63. The original military prosecutor investigating the Sibiu events, Anton Socaciu, had also identified these imported terrorists as USLA personnel. Even the former Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial that Nicu had called him requesting "some troops" and he had advised Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of this fact. It is doubtful that Nicu would have called Postelnicu and Postelnicu would have informed Vlad of the request if the requested troops had been other than Securitate personnel (see Emil Munteanu, "Postelnicu a vorbit neîntrebat!" România Liberǎ (30 January 1990), Significantly, as early as the fall of 1990, an army journalist commented upon a growing movement by certain journalists in the Romanian press to place the blame for the diversion in Sibiu upon the army by alleging that the terrorists were "pure and simple, an invention of the Army." He specifically attacked Angela Bǎcescu who had written that the terrorists in Sibiu were army personnel and that the Securitate had been innocent victims of events there. See Colonel Dumitru Mocanu, "Sibiu: Cine a organizat diversiunea?" Armata Poporului, no. 41 (October 1990), 1; 3.
119. See my discussion in "Dupǎ 7 ani," 62-63. The original military prosecutor investigating the Sibiu events, Anton Socaciu, had also identified these imported terrorists as USLA personnel. Even the former Interior Minister, Tudor Postelnicu, admitted at his trial that Nicu had called him requesting "some troops" and he had advised Securitate Director General Iulian Vlad of this fact. It is doubtful that Nicu would have called Postelnicu and Postelnicu would have informed Vlad of the request if the requested troops had been other than Securitate personnel (see Emil Munteanu, "Postelnicu a vorbit neîntrebat!" România Liberǎ (30 January 1990), Significantly, as early as the fall of 1990, an army journalist commented upon a growing movement by certain journalists in the Romanian press to place the blame for the diversion in Sibiu upon the army by alleging that the terrorists were "pure and simple, an invention of the Army." He specifically attacked Angela Bǎcescu who had written that the terrorists in Sibiu were army personnel and that the Securitate had been innocent victims of events there. See Colonel Dumitru Mocanu, "Sibiu: Cine a organizat diversiunea?" Armata Poporului, no. 41 (October 1990), 1; 3.
120. Sǎndulescu, Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat, 57-58. For reasons he does not divulge to his readers, Sǎndulescu maintains that after initially suspecting the SRI officer of disinformation, he decided that the officer's confirmation was, instead, a "patriotic gesture."
121. Ibid., 35; 45; 47. Sǎndulescu argues that "5,000-6,000" is a more sober estimate than the 40,000 alleged by Sergiu Nicolaescu, the chair of the previous commission investigating the December events!
122. Ibid., 35; 45; 47. Sǎndulescu argues that "5,000-6,000" is a more sober estimate than the 40,000 alleged by Sergiu Nicolaescu, the chair of the previous commission investigating the December events!
123. See the testimony of former Securitate Colonel Dumitru Rǎşinǎ in ibid., 246-82. Sǎndulescu describes Rǎşinä's credibility as "above any suspicion," see ibid., 36-37.
124. See the testimony of former Securitate Colonel Dumitru Rǎşinǎ in ibid., 246-82. Sǎndulescu describes Rǎşinä's credibility as "above any suspicion," see ibid., 36-37.
125. See Itu, "Armata trage;" idem, "În România a fost (II), 1; and Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 360-62.
126. See Itu, "Armata trage;" idem, "În România a fost (II), 1; and Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate, 360-62.
127. Itu, "Armata trage."
128. - ber events of the role played by the Securitate (specifically the USLA) (see Ondine Gherguţ, "Diversiunea Otopeni, decembrie 1989," Cotidianul, 23 and 24 December 1996). Constantin Isac, the survivor in question, alleged that after the confrontation at the Defense Ministry, someone mysteriously reoriented the USLA vehicles and the bodies of the dead USLA officers to make it look as if the USLA unit had come in a terrorist attack. This was not the first time he had made such allegations: see Constantin Isac, interview by Angela Bǎcescu, "Acum poporul român are dreptul šä afle adevǎrul," Europa, no. 42 & 44 (September 1991) and no. 45 (October 1991).
129. - ber events of the role played by the Securitate (specifically the USLA) (see Ondine Gherguţ, "Diversiunea Otopeni, decembrie 1989," Cotidianul, 23 and 24 December 1996). Constantin Isac, the survivor in question, alleged that after the confrontation at the Defense Ministry, someone mysteriously reoriented the USLA vehicles and the bodies of the dead USLA officers to make it look as if the USLA unit had come in a terrorist attack. This was not the first time he had made such allegations: see Constantin Isac, interview by Angela Bǎcescu, "Acum poporul român are dreptul šä afle adevǎrul," Europa, no. 42 & 44 (September 1991) and no. 45 (October 1991).
130. - ber events of the role played by the Securitate (specifically the USLA) (see Ondine Gherguţ, "Diversiunea Otopeni, decembrie 1989," Cotidianul, 23 and 24 December 1996). Constantin Isac, the survivor in question, alleged that after the confrontation at the Defense Ministry, someone mysteriously reoriented the USLA vehicles and the bodies of the dead USLA officers to make it look as if the USLA unit had come in a terrorist attack. This was not the first time he had made such allegations: see Constantin Isac, interview by Angela Bǎcescu, "Acum poporul român are dreptul šä afle adevǎrul," Europa, no. 42 & 44 (September 1991) and no. 45 (October 1991).
131. Angela Bǎcescu, "O crimǎ ce trebuie neapǎrat dezvǎluitǎ," Zig-Zag, no. 9 (23-29 April 1990), 10.
132. Major Mihai Floca, "Crimǎ?!" Armata Poporului, no. 23 (6 June 1990), 3. It is important to recognize just how dissident this and the articles cited below were within the army when they appeared. Soon after becoming the new defense minister in Febru-ary 1990, General Victor Stǎnculescu had revised the official understanding of the Defense Ministry incident, arguing that the USLA unit in question had been innocent victims and that the USLA had played no role in the repression and terrorism of December in general (see Rompres dispatch, 8 March 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-051, 15 March 1990, 57). At the time, at least one foreign observer interpreted this as a possible attempt at rehabilitating the Securitate, see Mihai Sturdza, "How Dead is Ceauşescu's Secret Police Force?" Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe, no. 15 (13 April 1990), 33-34. Floca had noted as early as March 1990 that "Now, three months after the revolution, everyone is with the people and the Army . . . So then who was shooting? . . . The idea that only the Army fired in December is being suggested with great skill." (Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta Ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3).
133. Major Mihai Floca, "Crimǎ?!" Armata Poporului, no. 23 (6 June 1990), 3. It is important to recognize just how dissident this and the articles cited below were within the army when they appeared. Soon after becoming the new defense minister in Febru-ary 1990, General Victor Stǎnculescu had revised the official understanding of the Defense Ministry incident, arguing that the USLA unit in question had been innocent victims and that the USLA had played no role in the repression and terrorism of December in general (see Rompres dispatch, 8 March 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-051, 15 March 1990, 57). At the time, at least one foreign observer interpreted this as a possible attempt at rehabilitating the Securitate, see Mihai Sturdza, "How Dead is Ceauşescu's Secret Police Force?" Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe, no. 15 (13 April 1990), 33-34. Floca had noted as early as March 1990 that "Now, three months after the revolution, everyone is with the people and the Army . . . So then who was shooting? . . . The idea that only the Army fired in December is being suggested with great skill." (Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta Ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3).
134. Major Mihai Floca, "Crimǎ?!" Armata Poporului, no. 23 (6 June 1990), 3. It is important to recognize just how dissident this and the articles cited below were within the army when they appeared. Soon after becoming the new defense minister in Febru-ary 1990, General Victor Stǎnculescu had revised the official understanding of the Defense Ministry incident, arguing that the USLA unit in question had been innocent victims and that the USLA had played no role in the repression and terrorism of December in general (see Rompres dispatch, 8 March 1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-051, 15 March 1990, 57). At the time, at least one foreign observer interpreted this as a possible attempt at rehabilitating the Securitate, see Mihai Sturdza, "How Dead is Ceauşescu's Secret Police Force?" Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe, no. 15 (13 April 1990), 33-34. Floca had noted as early as March 1990 that "Now, three months after the revolution, everyone is with the people and the Army . . . So then who was shooting? . . . The idea that only the Army fired in December is being suggested with great skill." (Major Mihai Floca, "Servieta Ucigaşǎ," Armata Poporului, 14 March 1990, 3).
135. Major Mihai Floca and Captain Victor Stoica, "Unde sînt teroriştii? PE STRADǍ, PRINTRE NOI," Armata Poporului, no. 24 (13 June 1990), 3; no. 26 (27 June 1990), 1; 3. These residents were indeed indignant that journalists who were questioning the existence of the terrorists and arguing staged war scenarios had not bothered to interview them about their experiences during December.
136. Floca, "Crimǎ?!"
137. Major Mihai Floca, "Eroi, victime, sau terorişti?" Adevǎrul, 29 August 1990, 1-2.
138. Floca and Stoica, "Unde sînt teroriştii? (I)." Residents also claimed that one block resident suspected of having collaborated with the Securitate was going around suggest-ing "how to 'correctly' interpret the incident with the two armored personnel vehicles [i.e. the USLA unit] on the night of 23/24 December." Floca and Stoica conclude from the revelations of these residents: "Therefore, 'the boys' [a euphemism for the Securitate] are [still] at work." This article, seems to me, critical for any accurate understanding of the December events and of the disinformation campaign since.
139. See, for example, how Ion Dincǎ (an influential member of the Ceauşescu regime sentenced to prison for his role in December 1989) insinuates the staged war theory in Ion Dincǎ, interview by Petre Mihai Bǎcanu, "Teroriştii ascultau şi cei din balcon" România Liberǎ, 4 November 1993, 10.
140. See, for example, the case of former naval captain and Iliescu comrade, Nicolae Radu. After breaking with the Front in the spring of 1990, Radu made the rounds of the Romanian opposition press. He became a focal point of foreign advocacy of the staged war theory, telling Olivier Weber and Radu Portocala of Le Point in their famous 21 May 1990 exposé: "There needed to be victims in order to legitimate the new power and in order to create [the image of] a mass revolution . . . A lot of people died for nothing." (In reference to the Le Point article, Floca and Stoica retorted: "We do not question the good faith of the French journalists, although the idea promoted by them is remarkably convenient to those who are just dying to demonstrate that, in fact, the 'terrorists' did not exist." (Floca and Stoica, "Unde sînt teroriştii? (I)").) Radu clearly had an axe to grind and his actions raise questions about his credibility: in early 1991 he could be found giving interviews and writing virulently antisemitic articles in the pages of Europa. Nevertheless, he has been presented as one of the star witnesses before the Gabrielescu commission since his allegations play nicely into the revisionist historiography (see Sǎndulescu, Lovitura de Stat a Confiscat, 83-152).
141. Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag, 232.