The Relationship between the District of Columbia Circuit and Its Critics

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 67, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 797-803

  Pierce Jr , Richard J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033468009     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1763 (1997); see also Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998) (arguing that D.C. Circuit judges defer to agencies more frequently when they agree with agencies on ideological grounds); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 11 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming June 1999) (arguing that Democratic D.C. Circuit judges vote to grant standing to environmental petitioners four times as often as Republican D.C. Circuit judges).
2. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1763.
3. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300.
5. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 110 (1990).
6. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991).
7. See Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
8. I also included large portions of the court's opinion in a casebook. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 135-37, 237-41, 315-16 (1994).
9. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1721.
10. See id. at 1748.
11. Id. at 1749.
12. See id. at 1763.
13. See id. at 1760-69.
14. See Edwards, supra note 3, at 1343-54.
15. See id. at 1352-54.
16. See id. at 1358-62.
17. See id. at 1362-64.
18. See id. at 1359.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1362-64.
21. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1748.
22. See Edwards, supra note 3, at 1362.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 1363.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
29. This doctrine of administrative law has been criticized on many bases. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); Douglas M. Costle, Brave New Chemical: The Future Regulatory History of Phlogiston, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 195 (1981); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65-71, 78-82 (1995).