The impact of U.S. lobbying practice on the European business-government relationship

California Management Review

Volumn , Issue 4, 1999, Pages 27-44

  Coen, David ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033463371     PISSN: 00081256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/41166008     Document Type: Review

References (66)

1. Heclo saw government policy making in the U.S. as more than a series of informal but enduring "iron triangles" that linked the executive bureau, congress committees, and interests groups in a closed system. Rather, he argued that the public policy system was a number of sub-systems (policy networks) that were composed of shared knowledge groups. Moreover, as competition for access to these triangles and the number of policy areas increased, writers such as David Vogel and David Polke believed that business had to establish profiles through grassroots lobbying. H. Heclo, Issue Networks and Executive Establishment in The New American Political System (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979); David Vogel, "The Study of Business and Politics," California Management Review, 38/3 (Spring 1996): 146-165; David Polke, "Political Mobilization of Business," in M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
2. Heclo saw government policy making in the U.S. as more than a series of informal but enduring "iron triangles" that linked the executive bureau, congress committees, and interests groups in a closed system. Rather, he argued that the public policy system was a number of sub-systems (policy networks) that were composed of shared knowledge groups. Moreover, as competition for access to these triangles and the number of policy areas increased, writers such as David Vogel and David Polke believed that business had to establish profiles through grassroots lobbying. H. Heclo, Issue Networks and Executive Establishment in The New American Political System (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979); David Vogel, "The Study of Business and Politics," California Management Review, 38/3 (Spring 1996): 146-165; David Polke, "Political Mobilization of Business," in M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
3. Heclo saw government policy making in the U.S. as more than a series of informal but enduring "iron triangles" that linked the executive bureau, congress committees, and interests groups in a closed system. Rather, he argued that the public policy system was a number of sub-systems (policy networks) that were composed of shared knowledge groups. Moreover, as competition for access to these triangles and the number of policy areas increased, writers such as David Vogel and David Polke believed that business had to establish profiles through grassroots lobbying. H. Heclo, Issue Networks and Executive Establishment in The New American Political System (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979); David Vogel, "The Study of Business and Politics," California Management Review, 38/3 (Spring 1996): 146-165; David Polke, "Political Mobilization of Business," in M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
4. For an excellent discussion of the creeping regulating competencies of the EU institutions, see G. Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996). For a full discussion of the changing role of large European firms under different market and institutional conditions, see David Coen, "The Evolution of the Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union," Journal of European Public Policy, 4/1 (1997): 91-108.
5. For an excellent discussion of the creeping regulating competencies of the EU institutions, see G. Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996). For a full discussion of the changing role of large European firms under different market and institutional conditions, see David Coen, "The Evolution of the Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union," Journal of European Public Policy, 4/1 (1997): 91-108.
6. See A. L. Fritschler and B. Ross, Executive's Guide to Government: How Washington Works (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980); Heclo, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
7. See A. L. Fritschler and B. Ross, Executive's Guide to Government: How Washington Works (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980); Heclo, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
8. For descriptions of government affairs in Washington, see M. Ryan, C. Swanson, and R. Buchholz, Corporate Strategy, Public Policy and the Fortune 500 (London: Backwell, 1987); A. Marcus, A. Kaufman, and D. Beam, eds., Business Strategy and Public Policy : Perspectives from Industry and Academia (New York, NY: Quorum Books, 1987); S. Spielmann, "Evolution of the Business-Government Relations Function," speech to International Business Diplomacy School, Georgetown University, 1993; M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests: Interests Groups Transformed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); D. Vogel, Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Business and Politics in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
9. For descriptions of government affairs in Washington, see M. Ryan, C. Swanson, and R. Buchholz, Corporate Strategy, Public Policy and the Fortune 500 (London: Backwell, 1987); A. Marcus, A. Kaufman, and D. Beam, eds., Business Strategy and Public Policy : Perspectives from Industry and Academia (New York, NY: Quorum Books, 1987); S. Spielmann, "Evolution of the Business-Government Relations Function," speech to International Business Diplomacy School, Georgetown University, 1993; M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests: Interests Groups Transformed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); D. Vogel, Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Business and Politics in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
10. For descriptions of government affairs in Washington, see M. Ryan, C. Swanson, and R. Buchholz, Corporate Strategy, Public Policy and the Fortune 500 (London: Backwell, 1987); A. Marcus, A. Kaufman, and D. Beam, eds., Business Strategy and Public Policy : Perspectives from Industry and Academia (New York, NY: Quorum Books, 1987); S. Spielmann, "Evolution of the Business-Government Relations Function," speech to International Business Diplomacy School, Georgetown University, 1993; M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests: Interests Groups Transformed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); D. Vogel, Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Business and Politics in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
11. For descriptions of government affairs in Washington, see M. Ryan, C. Swanson, and R. Buchholz, Corporate Strategy, Public Policy and the Fortune 500 (London: Backwell, 1987); A. Marcus, A. Kaufman, and D. Beam, eds., Business Strategy and Public Policy : Perspectives from Industry and Academia (New York, NY: Quorum Books, 1987); S. Spielmann, "Evolution of the Business-Government Relations Function," speech to International Business Diplomacy School, Georgetown University, 1993; M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests: Interests Groups Transformed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); D. Vogel, Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Business and Politics in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
12. For descriptions of government affairs in Washington, see M. Ryan, C. Swanson, and R. Buchholz, Corporate Strategy, Public Policy and the Fortune 500 (London: Backwell, 1987); A. Marcus, A. Kaufman, and D. Beam, eds., Business Strategy and Public Policy : Perspectives from Industry and Academia (New York, NY: Quorum Books, 1987); S. Spielmann, "Evolution of the Business-Government Relations Function," speech to International Business Diplomacy School, Georgetown University, 1993; M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests: Interests Groups Transformed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); D. Vogel, Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Business and Politics in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
13. McFarland saw the need for business to increasingly work with what were their traditional countervailing interest groups to help them compete with rival firms for share of regulatory goods. See A. McFarland, "Interest Groups and the Policy Making Process: A Source of Countervailing Power in America," in M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests: Interests Groups Transformed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). Also, see Vogel (Spring 1996), op. cit.; Polke, op. cit.
14. McFarland saw the need for business to increasingly work with what were their traditional countervailing interest groups to help them compete with rival firms for share of regulatory goods. See A. McFarland, "Interest Groups and the Policy Making Process: A Source of Countervailing Power in America," in M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests: Interests Groups Transformed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). Also, see Vogel (Spring 1996), op. cit.; Polke, op. cit.
15. McFarland saw the need for business to increasingly work with what were their traditional countervailing interest groups to help them compete with rival firms for share of regulatory goods. See A. McFarland, "Interest Groups and the Policy Making Process: A Source of Countervailing Power in America," in M. Petracca, ed., The Politics of Interests: Interests Groups Transformed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). Also, see Vogel (Spring 1996), op. cit.; Polke, op. cit.
16. For detailed examples of the European institutions and lobbying, see B. Andersen, Influencing the European Community (London: Kogan Page, 1992): Michael Calingaert, "Government Business Relations in the European Community," California Management Reviews, 35/2 (Winter 1993): 118-133; David Coen, The Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union (London: Routledge, forthcoming 1999); Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Paul Claeys, Corrinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets, and Pascaline Winand, eds., Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration (Brussels: European University Press, 1998); James Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991 ); S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
17. For detailed examples of the European institutions and lobbying, see B. Andersen, Influencing the European Community (London: Kogan Page, 1992): Michael Calingaert, "Government Business Relations in the European Community," California Management Reviews, 35/2 (Winter 1993): 118-133; David Coen, The Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union (London: Routledge, forthcoming 1999); Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Paul Claeys, Corrinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets, and Pascaline Winand, eds., Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration (Brussels: European University Press, 1998); James Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991 ); S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
18. For detailed examples of the European institutions and lobbying, see B. Andersen, Influencing the European Community (London: Kogan Page, 1992): Michael Calingaert, "Government Business Relations in the European Community," California Management Reviews, 35/2 (Winter 1993): 118-133; David Coen, The Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union (London: Routledge, forthcoming 1999); Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Paul Claeys, Corrinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets, and Pascaline Winand, eds., Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration (Brussels: European University Press, 1998); James Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991 ); S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
19. For detailed examples of the European institutions and lobbying, see B. Andersen, Influencing the European Community (London: Kogan Page, 1992): Michael Calingaert, "Government Business Relations in the European Community," California Management Reviews, 35/2 (Winter 1993): 118-133; David Coen, The Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union (London: Routledge, forthcoming 1999); Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Paul Claeys, Corrinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets, and Pascaline Winand, eds., Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration (Brussels: European University Press, 1998); James Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991 ); S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
20. For detailed examples of the European institutions and lobbying, see B. Andersen, Influencing the European Community (London: Kogan Page, 1992): Michael Calingaert, "Government Business Relations in the European Community," California Management Reviews, 35/2 (Winter 1993): 118-133; David Coen, The Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union (London: Routledge, forthcoming 1999); Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Paul Claeys, Corrinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets, and Pascaline Winand, eds., Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration (Brussels: European University Press, 1998); James Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991 ); S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
21. For detailed examples of the European institutions and lobbying, see B. Andersen, Influencing the European Community (London: Kogan Page, 1992): Michael Calingaert, "Government Business Relations in the European Community," California Management Reviews, 35/2 (Winter 1993): 118-133; David Coen, The Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union (London: Routledge, forthcoming 1999); Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Paul Claeys, Corrinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets, and Pascaline Winand, eds., Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration (Brussels: European University Press, 1998); James Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991 ); S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
22. For detailed examples of the European institutions and lobbying, see B. Andersen, Influencing the European Community (London: Kogan Page, 1992): Michael Calingaert, "Government Business Relations in the European Community," California Management Reviews, 35/2 (Winter 1993): 118-133; David Coen, The Large Firm as a Political Actor in the European Union (London: Routledge, forthcoming 1999); Justin Greenwood, Representing Interests in the European Union (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Paul Claeys, Corrinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets, and Pascaline Winand, eds., Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration (Brussels: European University Press, 1998); James Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991 ); S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
23. For a good comparative study of lobbying patterns across the EU member states and a discussion of "identity and trust building" in the European public policy system, see David Coen, "The European Business Interest and the Nation State: Large-Firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States," Journal of Public Policy, 18/1 (1998): 75-100.
24. See Vogel (Spring 1996), op cit., p. 152.
25. See, for example, Coen [op. cit.] for a description of national lobbying variance and the EU. For a discussion of country government-politics relationships, see Graham Wilson, Business and Politics (London: Chatham House Publishers, 1985); M. P. Van Schendelen, National Public and Private EC Lobbying (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1994); W. Grant, A. Martinelli, W. Paterson, "Large Firms as Political Actors: A Comparative Analysis of the Chemical Industry in Britain, France and Germany," West European Politics, 12/2 (1989).
26. See, for example, Coen [op. cit.] for a description of national lobbying variance and the EU. For a discussion of country government-politics relationships, see Graham Wilson, Business and Politics (London: Chatham House Publishers, 1985); M. P. Van Schendelen, National Public and Private EC Lobbying (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1994); W. Grant, A. Martinelli, W. Paterson, "Large Firms as Political Actors: A Comparative Analysis of the Chemical Industry in Britain, France and Germany," West European Politics, 12/2 (1989).
27. See, for example, Coen [op. cit.] for a description of national lobbying variance and the EU. For a discussion of country government-politics relationships, see Graham Wilson, Business and Politics (London: Chatham House Publishers, 1985); M. P. Van Schendelen, National Public and Private EC Lobbying (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1994); W. Grant, A. Martinelli, W. Paterson, "Large Firms as Political Actors: A Comparative Analysis of the Chemical Industry in Britain, France and Germany," West European Politics, 12/2 (1989).
28. See, for example, Coen [op. cit.] for a description of national lobbying variance and the EU. For a discussion of country government-politics relationships, see Graham Wilson, Business and Politics (London: Chatham House Publishers, 1985); M. P. Van Schendelen, National Public and Private EC Lobbying (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1994); W. Grant, A. Martinelli, W. Paterson, "Large Firms as Political Actors: A Comparative Analysis of the Chemical Industry in Britain, France and Germany," West European Politics, 12/2 (1989).
29. The transparency requirements and need for firm-level information are reiterated in the European Commission's white papers. European Commission, "An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interests," 1993, C63, 02, p. 2; European Commission "Transparency in the Community," 1993, C166, 04. Also, see Denise Claveloux, "Talking to the EC: Consultation, Lobbying and Openness," Forum Europe (June 1993), which attempts to discuss the formalization of interest representation with the European Commission.
30. The transparency requirements and need for firm-level information are reiterated in the European Commission's white papers. European Commission, "An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interests," 1993, C63, 02, p. 2; European Commission "Transparency in the Community," 1993, C166, 04. Also, see Denise Claveloux, "Talking to the EC: Consultation, Lobbying and Openness," Forum Europe (June 1993), which attempts to discuss the formalization of interest representation with the European Commission.
31. The transparency requirements and need for firm-level information are reiterated in the European Commission's white papers. European Commission, "An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interests," 1993, C63, 02, p. 2; European Commission "Transparency in the Community," 1993, C166, 04. Also, see Denise Claveloux, "Talking to the EC: Consultation, Lobbying and Openness," Forum Europe (June 1993), which attempts to discuss the formalization of interest representation with the European Commission.
32. See the Burston-Marsteller survey report, Lobbying the EC; The Views of the Policy Makers, Brussels offices, 1991.
33. The SEA the Executive European Commission must consider the opinions of both the Council of Ministers and the EP. For full descriptions of the relationship, see Martin Westlake, The Commission and Parliament: Partners and Rivals in the European Policy-Making Process (London: Butterworths, 1994).
34. European Voice, an Economist publication, noted that "although the Parliament has undoubtedly emerged strengthened from its institutional battles with the Commission, the jury is still out on whether its standing has risen in the eyes of the public." European Voice, January 21, 1999, p. 12.
35. See, for example, David Vogel, "Why Businessmen Mistrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives," British Journal of Political Science, 8/1 (1978); David Vogel, "The Globalization of Business Ethics: Why America Remains Distinctive," California Management Review, 35/1 (Fall 1992): 30-49. These articles explore the distinctiveness of business-government relations in the U.S. and the significance of their managers ethical behavior.
36. See, for example, David Vogel, "Why Businessmen Mistrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives," British Journal of Political Science, 8/1 (1978); David Vogel, "The Globalization of Business Ethics: Why America Remains Distinctive," California Management Review, 35/1 (Fall 1992): 30-49. These articles explore the distinctiveness of business-government relations in the U.S. and the significance of their managers ethical behavior.
37. See The New York Times, July 7, 1993, p. 1.
38. See The New York Times, June 23, 1997.
39. See David Coen, "The European Business Lobby," Business Strategy Review, 8/4 (1997): 23-24. In the survey, the author noted that 52 firms replied to the question: "Will the Maastricht Treaty alter your weighting of political channels?" and if yes, "which channels will gain most from reallocation?" While 57% of firms believed that the EP would grow in legislative importance, 73% then asserted that they would maintain their existing budget allocation for the foreseeable future.
40. The figure was constructed from the responses of 54 of the top 200 firms, to the question: "How would you allocate 100 units of political resources between the channels listed?" See Coen (1997), op. cit.
41. Coen discusses how European institutions are the primary focus of political activity on Trade, Environmental and Social issues, while lobbying on technical standards and implementation focused on the nation state. Financial and Taxation matters were more mixed as some aspects were seen as global issues and others were primarily seen as domestic questions. Coen (1998), op. cit., pp. 84-94.
42. T. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," World Politics, 16 (1964): 677-715.
43. For a full discussion of the postal liberalization case, see J. Campbell, "Couriers and The European Postal Monopolies," in R.H. Pedler and M.P.C.M. Van Schendelen, eds., Lobbying the European Union, Companies, Trade Associations, and Issue Groups (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Press 1995).
44. This uncertainty of allegiance is consistent with much of the post-Maastricht Treaty debate.
45. For a discussion of how IBM gradually illustrated to the European Commission that it could be an important European policy player, see Jackey Gold, "From Pariah to Partner," Financial World, 160/21 (1991): 34, 37.
46. See, for example, R. Hull, "Lobbying Brussels: A View From Within," in Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, eds., Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
47. See Coen (1998), op. cit.
48. Interview with Director of Amcham EU committee, 1996.
49. According to Oliver Gray, the EU committee had over 140 members and issued 60 position papers of which 10-15% were actually requested by the European Commission. Oliver Gray, "Lobbying Actors in the EU: An Overview," in Paul Claeys, Corrinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets, and Pascaline Winand, eds., Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration (Brussels: European University Press, 1998).
50. Interview with Director of Amcham EU committee, 1999. Moreover, U.S. firms European credentials were further strengthened vis-à-vis their European rivals as a consequence of their more international recruitment policy of senior management. As nationally embedded firms were more reluctant to establish an international management, cultural and institutional investors favored homegrown management, and personnel traditions favored domestic education systems. For example, Dan Gocurdevert, a senior French executive, missed out on the top job at Volkswagen because the company shareholders report felt it should be run by a German [Economist, July 11, 1992].
51. H. Jacek, "The American Organization of Firms," in Justin Greenwood, eds., European Casebook on Business Alliances (New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 1995). Also, see M. Cowles, "The EU Committee of Amcham: The Powerful Voice of American Firms in Brussels," Journal of European Public Policy, 3/1 (1996).
52. H. Jacek, "The American Organization of Firms," in Justin Greenwood, eds., European Casebook on Business Alliances (New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 1995). Also, see M. Cowles, "The EU Committee of Amcham: The Powerful Voice of American Firms in Brussels," Journal of European Public Policy, 3/1 (1996).
53. See, for example, W. Grant, "Pressure Groups and the European Community: An Overview," in Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, eds., Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
54. The ERT is an organization composed of forty European industrial leaders and it has formed a number of technical working committees on broad-based issues such as EU competition policy, network industries, transport policy, education, and the environment. For a discussion of its role in the ERT in the formation of the SEA, see Maria Green Cowles "Setting the agenda for a new Europe: The ERT and EC 1992," Journal of Common Market Studies, 33/4 (1995).
55. UNICE is the primary business interest group in Brussels and is expected as a formal social partner to produce position papers on all European Commission industrial and social policy initiatives. Unlike the direct firm membership ERT and Amcham, it is the sum of 32 national federations from 22 European Countries.
56. See, for example, Justin Greenwood and Karsten Ronit, "Interest Groups in The European Community: Newly Emerging Dynamics and Forms," West European Politics, 17/1 (January 1994); Andrew M. McLaughlin, Grant Jordan, William A. Maloney, "Corporate Lobbying in the European Community," Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/2 (June 1993).
57. See, for example, Justin Greenwood and Karsten Ronit, "Interest Groups in The European Community: Newly Emerging Dynamics and Forms," West European Politics, 17/1 (January 1994); Andrew M. McLaughlin, Grant Jordan, William A. Maloney, "Corporate Lobbying in the European Community," Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/2 (June 1993).
58. See D. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political interests and Public Opinion (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957).
59. Burston-Marsteller (1991), op. cit.
60. See, for example, Coen (1997), op. cit.; Coen, (1998), op. cit., pp. 80-89; R. Pijenburg, "EU Lobbying by Ad-Hoc Coalitions: An Exploratory Case Study," Journal of European Public Policy, 5/2 (1997); L. Cram, "Business Alliances in the Information Technology Sector," in Justin Greenwood, eds., European Casebook on Business Alliances (New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 1995).
61. See, for example, Coen (1997), op. cit.; Coen, (1998), op. cit., pp. 80-89; R. Pijenburg, "EU Lobbying by Ad-Hoc Coalitions: An Exploratory Case Study," Journal of European Public Policy, 5/2 (1997); L. Cram, "Business Alliances in the Information Technology Sector," in Justin Greenwood, eds., European Casebook on Business Alliances (New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 1995).
62. See, for example, Coen (1997), op. cit.; Coen, (1998), op. cit., pp. 80-89; R. Pijenburg, "EU Lobbying by Ad-Hoc Coalitions: An Exploratory Case Study," Journal of European Public Policy, 5/2 (1997); L. Cram, "Business Alliances in the Information Technology Sector," in Justin Greenwood, eds., European Casebook on Business Alliances (New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 1995).
63. See, for example, Coen (1997), op. cit.; Coen, (1998), op. cit., pp. 80-89; R. Pijenburg, "EU Lobbying by Ad-Hoc Coalitions: An Exploratory Case Study," Journal of European Public Policy, 5/2 (1997); L. Cram, "Business Alliances in the Information Technology Sector," in Justin Greenwood, eds., European Casebook on Business Alliances (New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 1995).
64. I would like to thank Oliver Gray and John Russell at Amcham for drawing this change in U.S. membership to my attention during recent interviews in 1999.
65. This contraction of some U.S. firms' government affairs functions was similar to the trend previously observed by Spielmann in Washington.
66. An interesting recent exception is the relocation of French firms, from Brussels back to Paris, with the introduction of the TGV high-speed trains (1 hour, 30 minutes) in 1997. This is not to say that the focus of activity has move away from Brussels, only that many directors of government relations now commute for daily meetings. This may disadvantage them in the long run as informal contact is important in establishing trust and gathering information.