Setting the agenda: Electoral competition, commitment of policy, and issue salience

Public Choice

Volumn 99, Issue 3-4, 1999, Pages 377-394

  Glazer, Amihai ^a   Lohmann, Susanne ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033459991     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018353406412     Document Type: Article

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