Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?

Economics Letters

Volumn 64, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 343-349

  Koskela, Erkki ^a   Schöb, Ronnie ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

H20; J51; Non equivalence; Payroll tax; Tax wedge; Wage bargaining; Wage tax

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033457768     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00102-0     Document Type: Article

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