Optimal procurement contracts under a binding budget constraint

Public Choice

Volumn 101, Issue 1-2, 1999, Pages 23-37

  Levaggi, Rosella ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENOA   (Italy)

^b NONE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033455371     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018311920072     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. Lewis, T.R. and Sappington, D.E.M. (1989), Countervailing incentives in agency relationships. Journal of Economic Theory 49: 293-313.
4. Lewis, T.R. and Sappington, D.E.M. (1995). Optimal capital structure in agency relationships. Rand Journal of Economics 26(3): 343-361.
5. Myerson, R. (1991). Game theory. Cambrdige MA: Cambridge University Press.
6. Rasmusen, E. (1989). Games and information: An introduction to game theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
7. Rees, R. (1985). The theory of principal and agent part I. Bulletin of Economic Research 37: 3-25.
8. Rees, R. (1985). The theory of principal and agent part II. Bulletin of Economic Research 37: 75-95.
9. Sappington, D.E.M. (1983). Limited liability contracts between principal and agent. Journal of Economic Theory 29: 1-21.
10. The Economist (1994). A healthy compromise. February 12th-118th: 15-16.