Capitalist forms and the essence of capitalism

Review of International Political Economy

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-26

  Screpanti, Ernesto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Banks; Capital; Capitalism; Evolution; Governance; Institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033445167     PISSN: 09692290     EISSN: 14664526     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/096922999347326     Document Type: Article

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