Explaining regional integration outcomes

Journal of European Public Policy

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-27

  Mattli, Walter ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination; Deepening; Demand of integration; Economic integration; Externalities; Institutional theories; Integration theories; Regionalism; Supply of integration

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033441768     PISSN: 13501763     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/135017699343775     Document Type: Article

References (159)

1. This article draws on Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapters 1-3.
2. See Ernst Francke, 'Zollpolitische Einigungsbestrebungen in Mitteleuropa während des letzten Jahrzehnts', Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik 90 (Leipzig, 1900), 187-272.
3. The Treaty of Rome established two new communities: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community. The EEC has been referred to as the European Community (EC) for many years. I will follow this convention throughout the study.
4. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', International Organization 15 (Summer 1961), 366-92; Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); 'Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe', in Joseph Nye (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 149-79; 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflection on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970), 607-46. See also Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter, 'Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America', International Organization 18 (Autumn 1964), 705-37.
5. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', International Organization 15 (Summer 1961), 366-92; Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); 'Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe', in Joseph Nye (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 149-79; 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflection on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970), 607-46. See also Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter, 'Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America', International Organization 18 (Autumn 1964), 705-37.
6. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', International Organization 15 (Summer 1961), 366-92; Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); 'Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe', in Joseph Nye (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 149-79; 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflection on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970), 607-46. See also Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter, 'Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America', International Organization 18 (Autumn 1964), 705-37.
7. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', International Organization 15 (Summer 1961), 366-92; Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); 'Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe', in Joseph Nye (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 149-79; 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflection on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970), 607-46. See also Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter, 'Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America', International Organization 18 (Autumn 1964), 705-37.
8. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', International Organization 15 (Summer 1961), 366-92; Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); 'Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe', in Joseph Nye (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 149-79; 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflection on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970), 607-46. See also Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter, 'Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America', International Organization 18 (Autumn 1964), 705-37.
9. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', International Organization 15 (Summer 1961), 366-92; Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); 'Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe', in Joseph Nye (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 149-79; 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflection on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970), 607-46. See also Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter, 'Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America', International Organization 18 (Autumn 1964), 705-37.
10. Joseph Nye, 'Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration', International Organization 19 (Autumn 1965), 870-84.
11. See Stanley Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe', Daedalus 95 (Summer 1966), 862-915.
12. See Ernst Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
13. James Caporaso, 'Regional Integration Theory: Understanding Our Past and Anticipating Our Future', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), Supranational Governance: The Institutionalization of the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press), forthcoming.
14. For a review of the literature, see Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Revisiting the European Court of Justice,' International Organization 52 (Winter 1998), 177-209. For an interesting set of studies inspired, in part, by (neo)functionalist premises, see Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), Supranational Governance: The Institutionalization of the European Union.
15. For a review of the literature, see Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Revisiting the European Court of Justice,' International Organization 52 (Winter 1998), 177-209. For an interesting set of studies inspired, in part, by (neo)functionalist premises, see Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), Supranational Governance: The Institutionalization of the European Union.
16. Caporaso, 'Regional Integration Theory: Understanding Our Past and Anticipating Our Future'.
17. Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', International Organization 45 (Winter 1991), 19-56. See also Paul Taylor, 'Intergovernmentalism in the European Communities in the 1970s: Patterns and Perspectives', International Organization 36 (Autumn 1982), 741-66.
18. Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', International Organization 45 (Winter 1991), 19-56. See also Paul Taylor, 'Intergovernmentalism in the European Communities in the 1970s: Patterns and Perspectives', International Organization 36 (Autumn 1982), 741-66.
19. Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', 25-6.
20. Paul Pierson, 'The Path of European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis', Comparative Political Studies 29 (1995), 126.
21. Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (December 1993), 473.
22. Caporaso, 'Regional Integration Theory: Understanding Our Past and Anticipating Our Future'.
23. Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach', 517.
24. Caporaso, 'Regional Integration Theory: Understanding Our Past and Anticipating Our Future'; for a similar critique, see Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz, 'European Integration and Supranational Governance', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), Supranational Governance: The Institutionalization of the European Union.
25. Caporaso, 'Regional Integration Theory: Understanding Our Past and Anticipating Our Future'; for a similar critique, see Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz, 'European Integration and Supranational Governance', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), Supranational Governance: The Institutionalization of the European Union.
26. See Joseph Grieco, 'Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas', in Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner (eds), The Political Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 164-87.
27. See Edward Mansfield, 'Effects of International Politics on Regionalism in International Trade', in Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 199-217; Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Edward Mansfield and Rachel Bronson, 'The Political Economy of Major-Power Trade Flows', in Mansfield and Milner (eds), The Political Economy of Regionalism, pp. 188-208.
28. See Edward Mansfield, 'Effects of International Politics on Regionalism in International Trade', in Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 199-217; Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Edward Mansfield and Rachel Bronson, 'The Political Economy of Major-Power Trade Flows', in Mansfield and Milner (eds), The Political Economy of Regionalism, pp. 188-208.
29. See Edward Mansfield, 'Effects of International Politics on Regionalism in International Trade', in Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 199-217; Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Edward Mansfield and Rachel Bronson, 'The Political Economy of Major-Power Trade Flows', in Mansfield and Milner (eds), The Political Economy of Regionalism, pp. 188-208.
30. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
31. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
32. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
33. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
34. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
35. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
36. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
37. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
38. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
39. Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See also Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); idem, 'Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market', Economic Journal 77 (1967); idem, 'Monetary Integration in the European Common Market', in Bela Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1975), pp. 175-220; Melvyn Krauss, 'Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory', Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 413-36; Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 'The General Theory of the Second Best', Review of Economic Studies 24 (1956-7), 11-32; James Meade, Problems of Economic Union (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953); idem, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1955); Tibor Scitovski, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958); Paul Wonnacott and Ronald Wonnacott, 'Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs', American Economic Review 71 (1981), 704-14.
40. Robert Mundell, 'A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas', American Economic Review (September 1963), 657-65; Ronald McKinnon, 'Optimum Currency Area', American Economic Review 53 (September 1963), 717-25; Peter Kenen, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View', in Alexander Swoboda and Robert Mundell (eds), Monetary Problems of the International Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 41-60. See also Herbert Grubel, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas', Canadian Journal of Economics 3 (May 1970), 318-24; and John Presley and Geoffrey Dennis, Currency Areas (London: Macmillan Press, 1976).
41. Robert Mundell, 'A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas', American Economic Review (September 1963), 657-65; Ronald McKinnon, 'Optimum Currency Area', American Economic Review 53 (September 1963), 717-25; Peter Kenen, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View', in Alexander Swoboda and Robert Mundell (eds), Monetary Problems of the International Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 41-60. See also Herbert Grubel, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas', Canadian Journal of Economics 3 (May 1970), 318-24; and John Presley and Geoffrey Dennis, Currency Areas (London: Macmillan Press, 1976).
42. Robert Mundell, 'A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas', American Economic Review (September 1963), 657-65; Ronald McKinnon, 'Optimum Currency Area', American Economic Review 53 (September 1963), 717-25; Peter Kenen, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View', in Alexander Swoboda and Robert Mundell (eds), Monetary Problems of the International Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 41-60. See also Herbert Grubel, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas', Canadian Journal of Economics 3 (May 1970), 318-24; and John Presley and Geoffrey Dennis, Currency Areas (London: Macmillan Press, 1976).
43. Robert Mundell, 'A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas', American Economic Review (September 1963), 657-65; Ronald McKinnon, 'Optimum Currency Area', American Economic Review 53 (September 1963), 717-25; Peter Kenen, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View', in Alexander Swoboda and Robert Mundell (eds), Monetary Problems of the International Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 41-60. See also Herbert Grubel, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas', Canadian Journal of Economics 3 (May 1970), 318-24; and John Presley and Geoffrey Dennis, Currency Areas (London: Macmillan Press, 1976).
44. Robert Mundell, 'A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas', American Economic Review (September 1963), 657-65; Ronald McKinnon, 'Optimum Currency Area', American Economic Review 53 (September 1963), 717-25; Peter Kenen, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View', in Alexander Swoboda and Robert Mundell (eds), Monetary Problems of the International Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 41-60. See also Herbert Grubel, 'The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas', Canadian Journal of Economics 3 (May 1970), 318-24; and John Presley and Geoffrey Dennis, Currency Areas (London: Macmillan Press, 1976).
45. See Willem Buiter and Richard Marston (eds), International Economic Policy Coordination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Matthew Canzoneri and Jo Anne Gray, 'Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-Cooperative Behavior', International Economic Review 36 (1985), 547-64; Richard Cooper, The International Monetary System (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987); and Koichi Hamada, The Political Economy of International Monetary Interdependence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).
46. See Willem Buiter and Richard Marston (eds), International Economic Policy Coordination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Matthew Canzoneri and Jo Anne Gray, 'Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-Cooperative Behavior', International Economic Review 36 (1985), 547-64; Richard Cooper, The International Monetary System (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987); and Koichi Hamada, The Political Economy of International Monetary Interdependence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).
47. See Willem Buiter and Richard Marston (eds), International Economic Policy Coordination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Matthew Canzoneri and Jo Anne Gray, 'Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-Cooperative Behavior', International Economic Review 36 (1985), 547-64; Richard Cooper, The International Monetary System (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987); and Koichi Hamada, The Political Economy of International Monetary Interdependence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).
48. See Willem Buiter and Richard Marston (eds), International Economic Policy Coordination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Matthew Canzoneri and Jo Anne Gray, 'Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-Cooperative Behavior', International Economic Review 36 (1985), 547-64; Richard Cooper, The International Monetary System (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987); and Koichi Hamada, The Political Economy of International Monetary Interdependence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).
49. See, for example, Peter Bofinger, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?', Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Working Paper No. 915 (London, 1994); Paul De Grauwe and Wim Vanhaverbeke, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area? Evidence From Regional Data', Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Working Paper No. 555 (London, 1991); Barry Eichengreen, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?' National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 3579 (Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, 1991); and Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose, 'The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria', NBER Working Paper No. 5700 (Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, 1996).
50. See, for example, Peter Bofinger, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?', Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Working Paper No. 915 (London, 1994); Paul De Grauwe and Wim Vanhaverbeke, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area? Evidence From Regional Data', Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Working Paper No. 555 (London, 1991); Barry Eichengreen, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?' National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 3579 (Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, 1991); and Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose, 'The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria', NBER Working Paper No. 5700 (Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, 1996).
51. See, for example, Peter Bofinger, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?', Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Working Paper No. 915 (London, 1994); Paul De Grauwe and Wim Vanhaverbeke, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area? Evidence From Regional Data', Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Working Paper No. 555 (London, 1991); Barry Eichengreen, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?' National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 3579 (Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, 1991); and Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose, 'The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria', NBER Working Paper No. 5700 (Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, 1996).
52. See, for example, Peter Bofinger, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?', Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Working Paper No. 915 (London, 1994); Paul De Grauwe and Wim Vanhaverbeke, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area? Evidence From Regional Data', Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Working Paper No. 555 (London, 1991); Barry Eichengreen, 'Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?' National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 3579 (Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, 1991); and Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose, 'The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria', NBER Working Paper No. 5700 (Cambridge, Mass.: NBER, 1996).
53. Jaime de Melo, Arvind Panagariya, and Dam Rodrik, 'The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective', in Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds), New Dimensions in Regional Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 176.
54. Robert Lawrence, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1996), p. 7.
55. Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade: The Strategic Organizational Approach (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 11; and Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), p. 201.
56. Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade: The Strategic Organizational Approach (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 11; and Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), p. 201.
57. Gary Libecap, 'Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights', in Lee Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass North (eds), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 34-58. See also Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).
58. Gary Libecap, 'Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights', in Lee Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass North (eds), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 34-58. See also Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).
59. Lance Davis and Douglass North, Institutional Change and American Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 59.
60. Harold Demsetz, 'Towards a Theory of Property Rights', American Economic Review - Papers and Proceedings 57 (May 1969), 350. Externalities arise when one person's actions affect others and the person is not penalized for the loss or damage caused (or rewarded for the benefits conferred).
61. Douglass North, 'Transaction Costs in History', The Journal of European Economic History 14 (Winter 1985), 558.
62. North, Structure and Change in Economic History.
63. See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975); and Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985).
64. See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975); and Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985).
65. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p. 18.
66. For theories on foreign investment, see Richard Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Dunning, Explaining International Production (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Stephen Hymer, The International Operation of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976); Charles Kindleberger, American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969). For further examples and a discussion, see Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade.
67. For theories on foreign investment, see Richard Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Dunning, Explaining International Production (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Stephen Hymer, The International Operation of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976); Charles Kindleberger, American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969). For further examples and a discussion, see Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade.
68. For theories on foreign investment, see Richard Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Dunning, Explaining International Production (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Stephen Hymer, The International Operation of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976); Charles Kindleberger, American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969). For further examples and a discussion, see Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade.
69. For theories on foreign investment, see Richard Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Dunning, Explaining International Production (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Stephen Hymer, The International Operation of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976); Charles Kindleberger, American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969). For further examples and a discussion, see Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade.
70. For theories on foreign investment, see Richard Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Dunning, Explaining International Production (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Stephen Hymer, The International Operation of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976); Charles Kindleberger, American Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969). For further examples and a discussion, see Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade.
71. I follow Oliver Williamson's definition of opportunism which is 'self-interest seeking with guile.' He adds: 'This includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as stealing and cheating . . . More generally, opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.' (See Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p. 47).
72. See Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), in particular pp. 7, 10, 22, 24-30, 97, 119, 162, 182; Michael Duerr, The Problems Facing International Management (New York: Conference Board, 1974), p. 5. See also Stephen Kobrin, 'Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in LDCs', International Organization 34 (1980), 65-88; idem, 'Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in LDCs: Trends from 1960-1979', International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984), 329-48. Note that not all investment is equally vulnerable to government-level opportunism. For a discussion see Lipson, Standing Guard.
73. See Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), in particular pp. 7, 10, 22, 24-30, 97, 119, 162, 182; Michael Duerr, The Problems Facing International Management (New York: Conference Board, 1974), p. 5. See also Stephen Kobrin, 'Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in LDCs', International Organization 34 (1980), 65-88; idem, 'Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in LDCs: Trends from 1960-1979', International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984), 329-48. Note that not all investment is equally vulnerable to government-level opportunism. For a discussion see Lipson, Standing Guard.
74. See Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), in particular pp. 7, 10, 22, 24-30, 97, 119, 162, 182; Michael Duerr, The Problems Facing International Management (New York: Conference Board, 1974), p. 5. See also Stephen Kobrin, 'Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in LDCs', International Organization 34 (1980), 65-88; idem, 'Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in LDCs: Trends from 1960-1979', International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984), 329-48. Note that not all investment is equally vulnerable to government-level opportunism. For a discussion see Lipson, Standing Guard.
75. See Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), in particular pp. 7, 10, 22, 24-30, 97, 119, 162, 182; Michael Duerr, The Problems Facing International Management (New York: Conference Board, 1974), p. 5. See also Stephen Kobrin, 'Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in LDCs', International Organization 34 (1980), 65-88; idem, 'Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in LDCs: Trends from 1960-1979', International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984), 329-48. Note that not all investment is equally vulnerable to government-level opportunism. For a discussion see Lipson, Standing Guard.
76. See Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), in particular pp. 7, 10, 22, 24-30, 97, 119, 162, 182; Michael Duerr, The Problems Facing International Management (New York: Conference Board, 1974), p. 5. See also Stephen Kobrin, 'Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in LDCs', International Organization 34 (1980), 65-88; idem, 'Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in LDCs: Trends from 1960-1979', International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984), 329-48. Note that not all investment is equally vulnerable to government-level opportunism. For a discussion see Lipson, Standing Guard.
77. Yarbrough and Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade, pp. 34 and 88; see also Farok Contractor and Peter Lorange (eds), Comparative Strategies in International Business: Joint Ventures and Technology Partnerships between Firms (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988).
78. Yarbrough and Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade, pp. 34 and 88; see also Farok Contractor and Peter Lorange (eds), Comparative Strategies in International Business: Joint Ventures and Technology Partnerships between Firms (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988).
79. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p. 163.
80. The distinction between internal and external safeguards was first made by the Yarbroughs. They argue that preferential trade agreements are the 'public sector equivalent of private non-standard contractual arrangements.' My discussion in this section has been greatly inspired by their pioneering work. However, my overall argument is quite different from theirs and I am in disagreement with their analysis of European integration. For example, I argue that the Court of Justice has been the key enforcer of Community obligations; they argue instead that majority voting brought about enforcement. They also overlook the importance of coordination games in integration (Yarbrough and Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade). On the idea that international regimes serve to minimize transaction costs, see also Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
81. See chapters 4 and 5 of Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration.
82. See Stephen Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Anne Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), 291-303; Gordon Tullock, 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft', Western Economic Journal 5 (June 1967), 224-32; Robert Tollison, 'Rent Seeking: A Survey', Kyklos 35 (1982), 576-602; George Stigler, 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (Spring 1971), 137-46; Sam Peltzman, 'Towards a More General Theory of Regulation?', Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976), 211-40; and Gary Becker, 'A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983), 371-400.
83. See Stephen Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Anne Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), 291-303; Gordon Tullock, 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft', Western Economic Journal 5 (June 1967), 224-32; Robert Tollison, 'Rent Seeking: A Survey', Kyklos 35 (1982), 576-602; George Stigler, 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (Spring 1971), 137-46; Sam Peltzman, 'Towards a More General Theory of Regulation?', Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976), 211-40; and Gary Becker, 'A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983), 371-400.
84. See Stephen Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Anne Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), 291-303; Gordon Tullock, 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft', Western Economic Journal 5 (June 1967), 224-32; Robert Tollison, 'Rent Seeking: A Survey', Kyklos 35 (1982), 576-602; George Stigler, 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (Spring 1971), 137-46; Sam Peltzman, 'Towards a More General Theory of Regulation?', Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976), 211-40; and Gary Becker, 'A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983), 371-400.
85. See Stephen Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Anne Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), 291-303; Gordon Tullock, 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft', Western Economic Journal 5 (June 1967), 224-32; Robert Tollison, 'Rent Seeking: A Survey', Kyklos 35 (1982), 576-602; George Stigler, 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (Spring 1971), 137-46; Sam Peltzman, 'Towards a More General Theory of Regulation?', Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976), 211-40; and Gary Becker, 'A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983), 371-400.
86. See Stephen Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Anne Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), 291-303; Gordon Tullock, 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft', Western Economic Journal 5 (June 1967), 224-32; Robert Tollison, 'Rent Seeking: A Survey', Kyklos 35 (1982), 576-602; George Stigler, 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (Spring 1971), 137-46; Sam Peltzman, 'Towards a More General Theory of Regulation?', Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976), 211-40; and Gary Becker, 'A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983), 371-400.
87. See Stephen Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Anne Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), 291-303; Gordon Tullock, 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft', Western Economic Journal 5 (June 1967), 224-32; Robert Tollison, 'Rent Seeking: A Survey', Kyklos 35 (1982), 576-602; George Stigler, 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (Spring 1971), 137-46; Sam Peltzman, 'Towards a More General Theory of Regulation?', Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976), 211-40; and Gary Becker, 'A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983), 371-400.
88. See Stephen Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Anne Krueger, 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), 291-303; Gordon Tullock, 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft', Western Economic Journal 5 (June 1967), 224-32; Robert Tollison, 'Rent Seeking: A Survey', Kyklos 35 (1982), 576-602; George Stigler, 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (Spring 1971), 137-46; Sam Peltzman, 'Towards a More General Theory of Regulation?', Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976), 211-40; and Gary Becker, 'A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983), 371-400.
89. Dani Rodrik, 'The Rush to Free Trade in the Developing World: Why So Late? Why Now? Will It Last?', in Stephen Haggard and Steven Webb, Voting for Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 61-88.
90. Robert Lawrence, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1996), p. 86.
91. However, this may well change in the wake of the prolonged market turmoils in Asia.
92. See Duncan Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes', American Political Science Review 79 (December 1985), 923-42; and Arthur Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115-40. See also Keohane, After Hegemony; Lisa Martin, 'Interests, Power, and Multilateralism', International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992), 765-92; and Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, 'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions', in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 173-206.
93. See Duncan Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes', American Political Science Review 79 (December 1985), 923-42; and Arthur Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115-40. See also Keohane, After Hegemony; Lisa Martin, 'Interests, Power, and Multilateralism', International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992), 765-92; and Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, 'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions', in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 173-206.
94. See Duncan Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes', American Political Science Review 79 (December 1985), 923-42; and Arthur Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115-40. See also Keohane, After Hegemony; Lisa Martin, 'Interests, Power, and Multilateralism', International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992), 765-92; and Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, 'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions', in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 173-206.
95. See Duncan Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes', American Political Science Review 79 (December 1985), 923-42; and Arthur Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115-40. See also Keohane, After Hegemony; Lisa Martin, 'Interests, Power, and Multilateralism', International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992), 765-92; and Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, 'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions', in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 173-206.
96. See Duncan Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes', American Political Science Review 79 (December 1985), 923-42; and Arthur Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115-40. See also Keohane, After Hegemony; Lisa Martin, 'Interests, Power, and Multilateralism', International Organization 46 (Autumn 1992), 765-92; and Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, 'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions', in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 173-206.
97. Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma', 923-4.
98. Lawrence, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration.
99. The importance of coordination games in international relations is stressed in Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'Mesoinstitutions in International Polities', paper presented in the Program of International Politics, Economics, and Security, University of Chicago, April 1995, 31.
100. Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma', 926-7.
101. Exceptions to this rule are discussed in Helen Milner, 'International
102. Exceptions to this rule are discussed in Helen Milner, 'International Theories of Cooperation among Nations', World Politics 44 (April 1992), 467-96; and Duncan Snidal, 'The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions', Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1994), 449-72.
103. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
104. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); and Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
105. This result depends on the rate at which the players discount future gains; the higher the discount rate, the less likely is cooperation.
106. Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma', 939.
107. See Jeremy Bullow and Kenneth Rogoff, 'A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt', Journal of Political Economy 97 (February 1989), 155-78; John Veitch, 'Repudiation and Confiscation by the Medieval State', Journal of Economic History 46 (March 1986); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast, 'Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild', Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994), 745-76.
108. See Jeremy Bullow and Kenneth Rogoff, 'A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt', Journal of Political Economy 97 (February 1989), 155-78; John Veitch, 'Repudiation and Confiscation by the Medieval State', Journal of Economic History 46 (March 1986); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast, 'Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild', Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994), 745-76.
109. See Jeremy Bullow and Kenneth Rogoff, 'A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt', Journal of Political Economy 97 (February 1989), 155-78; John Veitch, 'Repudiation and Confiscation by the Medieval State', Journal of Economic History 46 (March 1986); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast, 'Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild', Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994), 745-76.
110. See Jeremy Bullow and Kenneth Rogoff, 'A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt', Journal of Political Economy 97 (February 1989), 155-78; John Veitch, 'Repudiation and Confiscation by the Medieval State', Journal of Economic History 46 (March 1986); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast, 'Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild', Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994), 745-76.
111. Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast, 'The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs', Economics and Politics 2 (March 1990), 21. For a related argument, see Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy', in Kenneth Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 226-54.
112. Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast, 'The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs', Economics and Politics 2 (March 1990), 21. For a related argument, see Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy', in Kenneth Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 226-54.
113. Douglass North and Barry Weingast, 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England', in Alston, Eggertsson, and North, Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, pp. 134-65.
114. Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma', 931-2; see also Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', pp. 125-7.
115. Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma', 931-2; see also Stein, 'Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World', pp. 125-7.
116. The same result holds in an n-person coordination game.
117. Snidal, 'Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma', 932.
118. Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, Democracy, forthcoming.
119. Distributional issues have generally been neglected by students in international political economy, while scholars of the Realist school have exaggerated their importance. Realists argue that states refrain from cooperation because they fear the security implications of unbalanced distribution of the gains from cooperation (see Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Stephen Krasner, 'Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier', World Politics 43 (April 1991), 336-66). I argue that distributional issues matter- not primarily because of security reasons but because they can affect domestic politics or raise questions of fairness.
120. Distributional issues have generally been neglected by students in international political economy, while scholars of the Realist school have exaggerated their importance. Realists argue that states refrain from cooperation because they fear the security implications of unbalanced distribution of the gains from cooperation (see Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Stephen Krasner, 'Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier', World Politics 43 (April 1991), 336-66). I argue that distributional issues matter- not primarily because of security reasons but because they can affect domestic politics or raise questions of fairness.
121. Note that this account is different from hegemonic stability theory (see, for example, Keohane, After Hegemony). The latter is based on an analysis of public goods, a special case of the Prisoners' Dilemma, and deals with the implications of free-riding. The present account, however, refers to the coordination game, where the issue is not free-riding but how to overcome distributional inequities.
122. Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, chapters 4-6.
123. The petition is reprinted in W. von Eisenhart Rothe and A. Ritthaler, Vorgeschichte und Begründung des Deutschen Zollvereins, 1915-1834, vol. I (1934), pp. 320-4.
124. Arnold Price, The Evolution of the Zollverein (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1949), p. 37.
125. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, 'Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration', International Organization (Winter 1993), 41-76; and Alec Stone and James Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and Integration, Working Paper No. 2.45 (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, University of California, 1996); see also Alec Stone and Thomas Brunell, 'Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community', American Political Science Review 92 (1998), 63-81.
126. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, 'Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration', International Organization (Winter 1993), 41-76; and Alec Stone and James Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and Integration, Working Paper No. 2.45 (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, University of California, 1996); see also Alec Stone and Thomas Brunell, 'Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community', American Political Science Review 92 (1998), 63-81.
127. Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, 'Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration', International Organization (Winter 1993), 41-76; and Alec Stone and James Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and Integration, Working Paper No. 2.45 (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, University of California, 1996); see also Alec Stone and Thomas Brunell, 'Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community', American Political Science Review 92 (1998), 63-81.
128. The classic account is Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics 42 (October 1989), 95-128; see also Maria Green Cowles, The Politics of Big Business in the European Community: Setting the Agenda for a New Europe, Ph.D. dissertation (Washingon, DC: The American University, Department of Political Science, 1994).
129. The classic account is Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics 42 (October 1989), 95-128; see also Maria Green Cowles, The Politics of Big Business in the European Community: Setting the Agenda for a New Europe, Ph.D. dissertation (Washingon, DC: The American University, Department of Political Science, 1994).
130. Stephan Haggard, Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995), p. 90.
131. Ibid., p. 91, emphasis added.
132. Peter Ludlow, The Making of the European Monetary System: A Case Study of the Politics of the European Community (London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982), p. 290.
133. Peter Katzenstein, 'United Germany in an Integrating Europe', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).
134. Subsidiarity means that the Community should take action only if the objective of a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states at the domestic level.
135. See Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, 'Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?', International Affairs 72 (1996), 9-32. On the broader influence of Germany's pragmatic version of monetary policy, see Kathleen McNamara, A Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
136. See Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, 'Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?', International Affairs 72 (1996), 9-32. On the broader influence of Germany's pragmatic version of monetary policy, see Kathleen McNamara, A Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
137. Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 12; and Michael Hodges and Stephen Woolcock, 'Atlantic Capitalism versus Rhine Capitalism in the EC,' West European Politics 16 (July 1993), 329-44.
138. Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 12; and Michael Hodges and Stephen Woolcock, 'Atlantic Capitalism versus Rhine Capitalism in the EC,' West European Politics 16 (July 1993), 329-44.
139. European Standards Committee and European Electrical Standards Committee; both are know by their French acronyms.
140. Stephen Woolcock, Michael Hodges, and Kristin Schreiber, Britain, Germany and 1992 (London: Pinter, 1991), pp. 48-9.
141. 'Gentle giant' is how Simon Bulmer characterizes Germany in his writings. See above.
142. Jeffrey Anderson, 'Hard Interests and Soft Power, and Germany's Changing Role in Europe', in Katzenstein, Tamed Power: Germany in Europe. The European monetary system was presented as a Franco-German project, as were proposals for an intergovernmental treaty on foreign policy coordination, tabled at the 1985 Milan Council summit. The German initiative for reviving the integration project, originally put forth by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in 1981, became the Genscher-Colombo initiative, once Italian support was canvassed. Similarly, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's letter of April 1990 to the Irish presidency, calling for an IGC on political union, was co-signed by French President Mitterrand.
143. Katzenstein, 'United Germany in an Integrating Europe', p. 32. See also Michael Shackleton, 'The Budget of the European Community', in Juliet Lodge (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter, 1989), pp. 129-47.
144. Katzenstein, 'United Germany in an Integrating Europe', p. 32. See also Michael Shackleton, 'The Budget of the European Community', in Juliet Lodge (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter, 1989), pp. 129-47.
145. Pierre Benaerts, Les Origines de la Grande Industrie Allemande (Paris: F.H. Twot, 1933), pp. 409-10, 536, 627. See also William Otto Henderson, The Zollverein (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1958, 2nd edn), p. 343.
146. Pierre Benaerts, Les Origines de la Grande Industrie Allemande (Paris: F.H. Twot, 1933), pp. 409-10, 536, 627. See also William Otto Henderson, The Zollverein (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1958, 2nd edn), p. 343.
147. Benaerts, Les Origines de la Grande Industrie Allemande, p. 287.
148. On 9 July 1873, the silver standard was replaced by a new gold standard with a monetary unit named the mark. The thaler was slowly withdrawn from circulation but remained legal tender until 1907; see Witt Bowden, Michael Karpovich, and Abbott Payson Usher, An Economic History of Europe since 1750 (New York: AMS Press, 1970), p. 571.
149. Bowden, Karpovich and Usher, An Economic History of Europe since 1750, p. 338.
150. Henderson, The Zollverein, pp. 141-2.
151. In a memorandum of 22 December 1839, for example, the Prussian government complained: 'Although Prussia fully recognizes that its subjects have shared in the general advantageous results of the customs union . . . the position is quite different when viewed from the financial standpoint. . . Prussia . . . has good reasons for having considerable misgivings if it is to hold no other prospect save that of new financial sacrifices in the future while all other members of the union look forward to a permanent increase of customs revenue.' Quoted in Henderson, The Zollverein, p. 142.
152. Martin Feldstein, 'National Security Aspects of United States-Japan Economic Relations in the Pacific Asian Region', in Jeffrey Frankel and Miles Kahler (eds), Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), p. 453. The recent row over development plans for Vietnam is characteristic Japan opposes the American-style development promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It believes that price stability would hurt Vietnam's growth and thus undermine popular support for reform. It also opposes rapid privatization. Its own blueprint for development emphasizes the importance of government intervention. See 'The Struggle for Vietnam's Soul', The Economist (June 24, 1995), 33.
153. Martin Feldstein, 'National Security Aspects of United States-Japan Economic Relations in the Pacific Asian Region', in Jeffrey Frankel and Miles Kahler (eds), Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), p. 453. The recent row over development plans for Vietnam is characteristic Japan opposes the American-style development promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It believes that price stability would hurt Vietnam's growth and thus undermine popular support for reform. It also opposes rapid privatization. Its own blueprint for development emphasizes the importance of government intervention. See 'The Struggle for Vietnam's Soul', The Economist (June 24, 1995), 33.
154. 'The Struggle for Vietnam's Soul', The Economist, p. 33. Chalmers Johnson observes that many Japanese writers and economists are beginning to acknowledge that there are major differences between Japan and the United States. Sakakibara Eisuke characterizes Japan as a 'non-capitalist market economy'. Noda Masaaki lists seven principles that distinguish Japan's 'samurai capitalism' from its Anglo-American counterpart. And Terasawa Yoshio writes that 'Japan is not really the pure survival-of-the-fittest American-type of capitalism. It is half socialism. . . and the government is in control . . . On the surface Japan is a capitalist system like that of the United States . . . but on the inside it is different.' See Chalmers Johnson, 'History Restarted: Japanese-American Relations at the End of the Century' in Richard Higgot, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill (eds), Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993), pp. 51-2.
155. 'The Struggle for Vietnam's Soul', The Economist, p. 33. Chalmers Johnson observes that many Japanese writers and economists are beginning to acknowledge that there are major differences between Japan and the United States. Sakakibara Eisuke characterizes Japan as a 'non-capitalist market economy'. Noda Masaaki lists seven principles that distinguish Japan's 'samurai capitalism' from its Anglo-American counterpart. And Terasawa Yoshio writes that 'Japan is not really the pure survival-of-the-fittest American-type of capitalism. It is half socialism. . . and the government is in control . . . On the surface Japan is a capitalist system like that of the United States . . . but on the inside it is different.' See Chalmers Johnson, 'History Restarted: Japanese-American Relations at the End of the Century' in Richard Higgot, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill (eds), Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict? (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993), pp. 51-2.
156. The outbreak of the 'Soccer War' between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 brought CACM's integration effort to an abrupt end.
157. Janamitra Devan, 'The ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement: Some Problems, Ex Ante Results, and a Multipronged Approach to Future Intra-ASEAN Trade Development', ASEAN Economic Bulletin 4 (November 1987), 197-209.
158. John Barham and Agnes Foster, 'Teething Troubles Continue to Nag at Mercosur Market', Financial Times (7 January 1994), 6; see also 'Mercosur Deadline Slips By', Latin American Monitor - Southern Cone 11 (2 January 1994), 2.
159. John Barham and Agnes Foster, 'Teething Troubles Continue to Nag at Mercosur Market', Financial Times (7 January 1994), 6; see also 'Mercosur Deadline Slips By', Latin American Monitor - Southern Cone 11 (2 January 1994), 2.