A different perspective: Cohesion, morale, and operational effectiveness in the German Army, fall 1944

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 477-508

  Rush, Robert S ^a  

^a NONE   (United States)

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EID: 0033425550     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9902500307     Document Type: Article

References (93)

1. Also known as the Siegfried Line.
2. This article is based on primary source data gathered from prisoner-of-war reports obtained immediately after capture; unpublished analyses of German soldiers' attitudes based on interrogations and captured personal mail; interrogations of German general officers after the war; and unpublished manuscripts prepared for the writing of the Center of Military History's Siegfried Line Campaign. A surplus of books exists that details the operations, training, and motivations of what I refer to as elite units, called such if for no other reason than that they were occasionally pulled out of the line to rest and refit, or had been a part of the pre-war Wehrmacht. Ami was a German colloquialism for American.
3. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1948) 280-315; Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U. S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983); Omer Bartov, German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
4. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1948) 280-315; Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U. S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983); Omer Bartov, German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
5. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1948) 280-315; Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U. S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983); Omer Bartov, German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
6. Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization; A Study of the Larger Mind (New York, 1909), 23. Cited as the basic definition of a primary group in Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II
7. Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization; A Study of the Larger Mind (New York, 1909), 23. Cited as the basic definition of a primary group in Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II
8. Nora Kinzer Stewart, South Atlantic Conflict of 1982: A Case Study of Military Cohesion (Alexandria, VA: U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Report No. 159, 1988), xii. John Guilmartin succinctly describes small unit cohesion as "the 'we' of war stories." Based on twenty-nine years of personal experience as an infantryman, private through sergeant major, I must add that significant events (sometimes termed rites of passage), such as demanding and stressful training that all members of the organization endure together, do more to promote primary group cohesion than any other precombat activity.
9. Field Manual 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1987), 52.
10. Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, "The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest"; hereafter cited as Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 892" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study A-892), 1; Adolph Hohenstein and Wolfgang Trees, Hölle im Hürtgenwald (Aachen, GE: Triangel Verlag, 1981), 88. This includes, by German estimates in 1944, 29,000 killed, 83,000 wounded, 280,000 missing, and 95,000 in bypassed forts.
11. Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, "The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest"; hereafter cited as Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 892" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study A-892), 1; Adolph Hohenstein and Wolfgang Trees, Hölle im Hürtgenwald (Aachen, GE: Triangel Verlag, 1981), 88. This includes, by German estimates in 1944, 29,000 killed, 83,000 wounded, 280,000 missing, and 95,000 in bypassed forts.
12. Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, "The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest"; hereafter cited as Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 892" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study A-892), 1; Adolph Hohenstein and Wolfgang Trees, Hölle im Hürtgenwald (Aachen, GE: Triangel Verlag, 1981), 88. This includes, by German estimates in 1944, 29,000 killed, 83,000 wounded, 280,000 missing, and 95,000 in bypassed forts.
13. Historical Documents World War II, 4th Infantry Division, G2 Section, Military History Institute (hereafter cited as MHI 4IDG2) Reel 2080, Annex 3 to G2 Periodic Report 140, VIII Corps "German Morale, Military and Civilian"; VIII Corps Periodic Report 142. "German Morale, Military and Civilian" was based on an army intelligence analysis of thousands of letters captured in France and Belgium dated between 1 July and 15 October 1944. This is significant, since we may assume the letters were not written by individuals predisposed to surrender, the main cause of bias in Shils and Janowitz's database. In many of the German letters and POW interviews, enlisted men complained about senior officers running off and leaving them while they fought their way back from France, as well as the officers' treasonous activities against Hitler. Other points made were general agreement the war was lost if new weapons not used; overall belief in Hitler; little criticism of the Party or its leadership and the idea that something should be done against the leadership was practically unheard of; agreement with the Himmler decrees concerning total mobilization; little apprehension about being taken prisoner; worry about displaced families; fear of the Allied fighter bombers; respect for Allied artillery; and the view that American infantry were cowardly. A remark on the use of interrogation reports: the higher up reports went in the intelligence channels, the more filtered they became, with less typical and more unusual data highlighted.
14. MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2080, Annex 2 to G2 Periodic report 148, 1st US Infantry Division, 14 November 1944. Military intelligence analysts were initially confused over how German divisions went from empty shells to something more in a month.
15. Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 892," 1.
16. Ibid. Erich Straube, "Operations of the LXXIV Corps Sep-Dec 1944"; hereafter cited as Straube "LXXIV Corps" (Foreign Mil Study C016, USAREUR, n.d.), 1-3. East front units were composed of Slavic "volunteers" recruited from PW camps serving under German officers and NCOs.
17. Ibid. Erich Straube, "Operations of the LXXIV Corps Sep-Dec 1944"; hereafter cited as Straube "LXXIV Corps" (Foreign Mil Study C016, USAREUR, n.d.), 1-3. East front units were composed of Slavic "volunteers" recruited from PW camps serving under German officers and NCOs.
18. Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 892," 2. Limited duty battalions were units made up of soldiers not physically qualified to perform duties with front-line units. That they were assigned to front line organizations is an indicator of how deep the German army had dug to find replacements.
19. Robert S. Rush, "Comparing Light Divisions," Military Review LXVII (January 1987), 64; Helmuth Reinhardt, "The Volksgrenadier Division and Volksturm Organization in the German Military Establishment" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study P-065, n.d.), 1-2; Incl. 9 to FUSA G2 Periodic Report #169 that includes a translation of captured documents of the 1125th Infantry Regiment dated 2 November 1944. Many of the Germans captured in the Hürtgen Forest commented favorably on the soldiers and equipment of the Volksgrenadier divisions in the Schnee Eifel - the location of the German buildup for the Ardennes counter-offensive.
20. Robert S. Rush, "Comparing Light Divisions," Military Review LXVII (January 1987), 64; Helmuth Reinhardt, "The Volksgrenadier Division and Volksturm Organization in the German Military Establishment" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study P-065, n.d.), 1-2; Incl. 9 to FUSA G2 Periodic Report #169 that includes a translation of captured documents of the 1125th Infantry Regiment dated 2 November 1944. Many of the Germans captured in the Hürtgen Forest commented favorably on the soldiers and equipment of the Volksgrenadier divisions in the Schnee Eifel - the location of the German buildup for the Ardennes counter-offensive.
21. Strabe, "LXXIV Corps" 1-3; W. Victor Madej, German Order of Battle, 1939-1945, Vol. II, Hereafter cited as Madej, OB (Allentown, PA: Game Marketing Company), 20; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as Harrison, Attack (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1951), 260, 379; Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as MacDonald, Siegfried Line (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 83, 87, 91, 330.
22. Strabe, "LXXIV Corps" 1-3; W. Victor Madej, German Order of Battle, 1939-1945, Vol. II, Hereafter cited as Madej, OB (Allentown, PA: Game Marketing Company), 20; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as Harrison, Attack (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1951), 260, 379; Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as MacDonald, Siegfried Line (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 83, 87, 91, 330.
23. Strabe, "LXXIV Corps" 1-3; W. Victor Madej, German Order of Battle, 1939-1945, Vol. II, Hereafter cited as Madej, OB (Allentown, PA: Game Marketing Company), 20; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as Harrison, Attack (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1951), 260, 379; Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as MacDonald, Siegfried Line (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 83, 87, 91, 330.
24. Strabe, "LXXIV Corps" 1-3; W. Victor Madej, German Order of Battle, 1939-1945, Vol. II, Hereafter cited as Madej, OB (Allentown, PA: Game Marketing Company), 20; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as Harrison, Attack (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1951), 260, 379; Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as MacDonald, Siegfried Line (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 83, 87, 91, 330.
25. Strabe, "LXXIV Corps" 1-3; W. Victor Madej, German Order of Battle, 1939-1945, Vol. II, Hereafter cited as Madej, OB (Allentown, PA: Game Marketing Company), 20; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as Harrison, Attack (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1951), 260, 379; Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as MacDonald, Siegfried Line (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 83, 87, 91, 330.
26. Strabe, "LXXIV Corps" 1-3; W. Victor Madej, German Order of Battle, 1939-1945, Vol. II, Hereafter cited as Madej, OB (Allentown, PA: Game Marketing Company), 20; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as Harrison, Attack (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1951), 260, 379; Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army in World War II; Hereafter cited as MacDonald, Siegfried Line (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 83, 87, 91, 330.
27. Madej, OB, 68; MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 83; Wolf Treiernburg, "347th Volksgrenadier Division" (USAREUR Foreign Military Stud B 563 n.d.), 4-5. The Division's original regiments were the 860th, 861st and 862nd. The 347th gave up the 862nd in 1943 and gained the 880th in 1944. Before and during the war, German infantry organizations mobilized in a series of 35 Welle or waves. This method of mobilization matched available age groups with available equipment. Divisions organized within the same wave were usually similarly equipped. Madej, OB, 71.
28. Madej, OB, 68; MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 83; Wolf Treiernburg, "347th Volksgrenadier Division" (USAREUR Foreign Military Stud B 563 n.d.), 4-5. The Division's original regiments were the 860th, 861st and 862nd. The 347th gave up the 862nd in 1943 and gained the 880th in 1944. Before and during the war, German infantry organizations mobilized in a series of 35 Welle or waves. This method of mobilization matched available age groups with available equipment. Divisions organized within the same wave were usually similarly equipped. Madej, OB, 71.
29. Madej, OB, 68; MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 83; Wolf Treiernburg, "347th Volksgrenadier Division" (USAREUR Foreign Military Stud B 563 n.d.), 4-5. The Division's original regiments were the 860th, 861st and 862nd. The 347th gave up the 862nd in 1943 and gained the 880th in 1944. Before and during the war, German infantry organizations mobilized in a series of 35 Welle or waves. This method of mobilization matched available age groups with available equipment. Divisions organized within the same wave were usually similarly equipped. Madej, OB, 71.
30. Madej, OB, 68; MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 83; Wolf Treiernburg, "347th Volksgrenadier Division" (USAREUR Foreign Military Stud B 563 n.d.), 4-5. The Division's original regiments were the 860th, 861st and 862nd. The 347th gave up the 862nd in 1943 and gained the 880th in 1944. Before and during the war, German infantry organizations mobilized in a series of 35 Welle or waves. This method of mobilization matched available age groups with available equipment. Divisions organized within the same wave were usually similarly equipped. Madej, OB, 71.
31. Madej, OB, 37, Harrison, Attack, 233: MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 83-85, 333: Samuel W. Mitcham Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II; hereafter cited as Mitcham, Hitler's Legions New York: Stein & Day, 1985), 105. Reinforced Infantry Regiment 1023 was formed in January 1944 with the 23d Welle. The 89th's assigned infantry regiments were the 1055th and 1056th. The Russian Freiwillige Stamm Regiment 4 is very hard to define, but is believed to be a skeleton or cadre organization.
32. Madej, OB, 37, Harrison, Attack, 233: MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 83-85, 333: Samuel W. Mitcham Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II; hereafter cited as Mitcham, Hitler's Legions New York: Stein & Day, 1985), 105. Reinforced Infantry Regiment 1023 was formed in January 1944 with the 23d Welle. The 89th's assigned infantry regiments were the 1055th and 1056th. The Russian Freiwillige Stamm Regiment 4 is very hard to define, but is believed to be a skeleton or cadre organization.
33. Madej, OB, 37, Harrison, Attack, 233: MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 83-85, 333: Samuel W. Mitcham Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II; hereafter cited as Mitcham, Hitler's Legions New York: Stein & Day, 1985), 105. Reinforced Infantry Regiment 1023 was formed in January 1944 with the 23d Welle. The 89th's assigned infantry regiments were the 1055th and 1056th. The Russian Freiwillige Stamm Regiment 4 is very hard to define, but is believed to be a skeleton or cadre organization.
34. Madej, OB, 37, Harrison, Attack, 233: MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 83-85, 333: Samuel W. Mitcham Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II; hereafter cited as Mitcham, Hitler's Legions New York: Stein & Day, 1985), 105. Reinforced Infantry Regiment 1023 was formed in January 1944 with the 23d Welle. The 89th's assigned infantry regiments were the 1055th and 1056th. The Russian Freiwillige Stamm Regiment 4 is very hard to define, but is believed to be a skeleton or cadre organization.
35. Madej, OB, 37, Harrison, Attack, 233: MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 83-85, 333: Samuel W. Mitcham Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II; hereafter cited as Mitcham, Hitler's Legions New York: Stein & Day, 1985), 105. Reinforced Infantry Regiment 1023 was formed in January 1944 with the 23d Welle. The 89th's assigned infantry regiments were the 1055th and 1056th. The Russian Freiwillige Stamm Regiment 4 is very hard to define, but is believed to be a skeleton or cadre organization.
36. Madej, OB, 69; MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 70. The 328th Infantry Division had been destroyed on the Eastern Front during the German retreat after Operation Citadel. The 353d Division's assigned infantry regiments were the 941st, 942nd and 943rd.
37. Madej, OB, 69; MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 70. The 328th Infantry Division had been destroyed on the Eastern Front during the German retreat after Operation Citadel. The 353d Division's assigned infantry regiments were the 941st, 942nd and 943rd.
38. Paul Mahlmann, "Rhineland 353d Infantry Division, III"; hereafter cited as Mahlmann, "Rhineland" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study B-502, 3 May 1947), 2, 3. This transfer included the division staff; the weak staffs of the 942nd Infantry and the 353rd Artillery Regiments; remnants of the 353rd Füsilier and 353rd Engineer Battalions; the division training school; and supply troops.
39. Paul Mahlmann, "Rhineland 353d Infantry Division, III"; hereafter cited as Mahlmann, "Rhineland" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study B-502, 3 May 1947), 2, 3. This transfer included the division staff; the weak staffs of the 942nd Infantry and the 353rd Artillery Regiments; remnants of the 353rd Füsilier and 353rd Engineer Battalions; the division training school; and supply troops.
40. Mitcham, Hitler's Legions, 172, 200; Madej, OB, 58; Hans Schmidt, "275th Infantry Division, 3 October-21 November 1944; hereafter cited as Schmidt "275 Infantry" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study B-810, n.d., German language), Appendix 6. The 223rd division was destroyed in the Battle of Kiev in summer, 1943. The 275th's infantry regiments were numbered 983, 984, and 985.
41. Mitcham, Hitler's Legions, 172, 200; Madej, OB, 58; Hans Schmidt, "275th Infantry Division, 3 October-21 November 1944; hereafter cited as Schmidt "275 Infantry" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study B-810, n.d., German language), Appendix 6. The 223rd division was destroyed in the Battle of Kiev in summer, 1943. The 275th's infantry regiments were numbered 983, 984, and 985.
42. Mitcham, Hitler's Legions, 172, 200; Madej, OB, 58; Hans Schmidt, "275th Infantry Division, 3 October-21 November 1944; hereafter cited as Schmidt "275 Infantry" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study B-810, n.d., German language), Appendix 6. The 223rd division was destroyed in the Battle of Kiev in summer, 1943. The 275th's infantry regiments were numbered 983, 984, and 985.
43. Mitcham, Hitler's Legions, 172, 200; Madej, OB, 58; Hans Schmidt, "275th Infantry Division, 3 October-21 November 1944; hereafter cited as Schmidt "275 Infantry" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study B-810, n.d., German language), Appendix 6. The 223rd division was destroyed in the Battle of Kiev in summer, 1943. The 275th's infantry regiments were numbered 983, 984, and 985.
44. 4IDG2 MII Report, unknown date, November 1944; Amex 1 to G2 Periodic Report #123.
45. Schmidt "275 Infantry," 1-2; MHI 4IDG2 Annex 2 to G2 Periodic Report 143, HQ 1st US Infantry Division, 14 November 44. The six units that made up the 253rd Ersatz Regiment were the IIId Battalion 860th Regiment and remnants of the 861st Regiment, both from the 347th Division; remnants of the 328th Ersatz Battalion; Landesschützen Battalion I/9; the IId Battalion 942nd Infantry Regiment, and one other infantry Ersatz battalion.
46. MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 330-339; Schmidt "275 Infantry," 10-21; MHI 4IDG2 Annex 2 to G2 Periodic Report 143, HQ 1st US Infantry Division, 14 November 44. Most of the transfers between the 941st and 983rd Regiment took place during the third week of September. Combat strength of the 1412th Fortress Battalion on 23 October was 6 officers, 29 NCOs and 207 enlisted soldiers.
47. MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 330-339; Schmidt "275 Infantry," 10-21; MHI 4IDG2 Annex 2 to G2 Periodic Report 143, HQ 1st US Infantry Division, 14 November 44. Most of the transfers between the 941st and 983rd Regiment took place during the third week of September. Combat strength of the 1412th Fortress Battalion on 23 October was 6 officers, 29 NCOs and 207 enlisted soldiers.
48. Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 892," 11-14; Appendix D: Analysis of Enemy Strength Opposed to the 28th Division, Unpublished background manuscript for Three Battles, Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt, (OCMH; n.d.), III 504-506. Schmidt "275 Infantry," Appendix 6. Battalion Dienelt was the former 365th Infantry Replacement Battalion and named for its battalion commander. Oberst Heinz had commanded the 984th Regiment during the Normandy Campaign with great distinction. The 942nd was later renumbered as the 275th's 985th Regiment. On 2 November, the 983rd Regiment included the XI Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion and, by 13 November, the regiment's total strength was 250. The immediate German reaction to the 28th Division's attack was greatly facilitated by a war game currently being played by the army group, army, corps, and division staffs. As messages arrived, they were plotted on the map and staff measures taken to counter the attack.
49. Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 892," 11-14; Appendix D: Analysis of Enemy Strength Opposed to the 28th Division, Unpublished background manuscript for Three Battles, Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt, (OCMH; n.d.), III 504-506. Schmidt "275 Infantry," Appendix 6. Battalion Dienelt was the former 365th Infantry Replacement Battalion and named for its battalion commander. Oberst Heinz had commanded the 984th Regiment during the Normandy Campaign with great distinction. The 942nd was later renumbered as the 275th's 985th Regiment. On 2 November, the 983rd Regiment included the XI Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion and, by 13 November, the regiment's total strength was 250. The immediate German reaction to the 28th Division's attack was greatly facilitated by a war game currently being played by the army group, army, corps, and division staffs. As messages arrived, they were plotted on the map and staff measures taken to counter the attack.
50. Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 892," 11-14; Appendix D: Analysis of Enemy Strength Opposed to the 28th Division, Unpublished background manuscript for Three Battles, Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt, (OCMH; n.d.), III 504-506. Schmidt "275 Infantry," Appendix 6. Battalion Dienelt was the former 365th Infantry Replacement Battalion and named for its battalion commander. Oberst Heinz had commanded the 984th Regiment during the Normandy Campaign with great distinction. The 942nd was later renumbered as the 275th's 985th Regiment. On 2 November, the 983rd Regiment included the XI Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion and, by 13 November, the regiment's total strength was 250. The immediate German reaction to the 28th Division's attack was greatly facilitated by a war game currently being played by the army group, army, corps, and division staffs. As messages arrived, they were plotted on the map and staff measures taken to counter the attack.
51. Schmidt "275 Infantry," 25, 27, Appendix 6. von Bottlenburg's Kampfgruppe included the two battalions of the former Kampfgruppe Wegelin; the small I/985 Infantry Battalion; the V Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion and one company of the XVIII Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion; the 253rd Engineer Battalion; the 7th Army Mortar Battalion; and the XXXI Fortress Machine Gun Battalion.
52. 4IDMII Periodic Report 26, November 1944. A captured company commander stated, "German troops are restrained from ready surrender or desertion by fear of being sent to Siberia as slave labor after the war, rather than being evacuated and returned to Germany."
53. MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2083, G2 Periodic Report, 22 November 1944; Special Intelligence Report, 4th Infantry Division 27 November, 1944; Intelligence Report MII Team 417 G.
54. MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2082, Translation and Condensation of Battalion Order 15-44 (16 November 1944) IId Bn 984th Regiment.
55. Ibid., 18 November, Translation of proclamation of 18th Volksgrenadier Division in the Schnee Eifel.
56. Lucian Heichler, "The Third Battle of Aachen, The German Situation in Mid-November 1944" (Center for Military History, Monograph R 52, n.d.), 41-43; Extracts from 4th Division Orders, UPCI 34, Field Order 53, Attachments, 15 November 1944. German artillery outnumbered U.S. artillery 134 to 96 pieces on the 4th U.S. Division front.
57. Rudolf-Christoph Freiheff von Gersdorff, "The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest"; hereafter cited as Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 891" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study A-891), 23 Straube "LXXIV Corps," 11, 13; Schmidt "275 Infantry," 27; MHI 4IDG2 Annex 2 to G2 Periodic Report 143, HQ 1st US Infantry Division, 14 November 1944. IPW Reports 4th Div 16-20 November 1944. Each of the Kampfgruppen contained between 30 and 50 soldiers. Americans captured German soldiers from the following organizations: 275th Infantry Division, 984th Regiment, 985th Regiment, Kampfgruppe von Bottlenburg, XVIII and XX Luftwaffe Fortress Battalions, 275th Füsilier, 275th Replacement and Training Battalion, 275th Engineer Battalion; the 89th Division, 1055th Regiment; 116th Panzer Division, the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment; the 1031st Security Battalion; and the 460th Heavy Field Artillery Battalion.
58. Rudolf-Christoph Freiheff von Gersdorff, "The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest"; hereafter cited as Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 891" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study A-891), 23 Straube "LXXIV Corps," 11, 13; Schmidt "275 Infantry," 27; MHI 4IDG2 Annex 2 to G2 Periodic Report 143, HQ 1st US Infantry Division, 14 November 1944. IPW Reports 4th Div 16-20 November 1944. Each of the Kampfgruppen contained between 30 and 50 soldiers. Americans captured German soldiers from the following organizations: 275th Infantry Division, 984th Regiment, 985th Regiment, Kampfgruppe von Bottlenburg, XVIII and XX Luftwaffe Fortress Battalions, 275th Füsilier, 275th Replacement and Training Battalion, 275th Engineer Battalion; the 89th Division, 1055th Regiment; 116th Panzer Division, the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment; the 1031st Security Battalion; and the 460th Heavy Field Artillery Battalion.
59. Rudolf-Christoph Freiheff von Gersdorff, "The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest"; hereafter cited as Gersdorff, "Hürtgen Forest 891" (USAREUR Foreign Military Study A-891), 23 Straube "LXXIV Corps," 11, 13; Schmidt "275 Infantry," 27; MHI 4IDG2 Annex 2 to G2 Periodic Report 143, HQ 1st US Infantry Division, 14 November 1944. IPW Reports 4th Div 16-20 November 1944. Each of the Kampfgruppen contained between 30 and 50 soldiers. Americans captured German soldiers from the following organizations: 275th Infantry Division, 984th Regiment, 985th Regiment, Kampfgruppe von Bottlenburg, XVIII and XX Luftwaffe Fortress Battalions, 275th Füsilier, 275th Replacement and Training Battalion, 275th Engineer Battalion; the 89th Division, 1055th Regiment; 116th Panzer Division, the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment; the 1031st Security Battalion; and the 460th Heavy Field Artillery Battalion.
60. This combined offensive of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies (eighteen divisions) was part of the general offensive toward the Rhine. Ten U.S. divisions were crowded into a twenty-four mile front during the height of the offensive. T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent Esposito, Military History of World War II (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy Printing Office, 1953), 484.
61. Translation of Order of the Day, Field Marshal Model, undated, found in 183rd Volksgrenadier Division "Miscellaneous" Folder, September 1944-February 1945. The third battle of Aachen was the German designation of the American attack launched to cross the Roer on 16 November 1944.
62. Gersdorff "Hürtgen Forest 891," 21; Mitcham, Hitler's Legions, 236, 237; Madej, OB, 67. Original infantry regiments of the 344th Infantry Division were the 854 and 855th Grenadier Regiments.
63. Gersdorff "Hürtgen Forest 891," 21; Mitcham, Hitler's Legions, 236, 237; Madej, OB, 67. Original infantry regiments of the 344th Infantry Division were the 854 and 855th Grenadier Regiments.
64. Gersdorff "Hürtgen Forest 891," 21; Mitcham, Hitler's Legions, 236, 237; Madej, OB, 67. Original infantry regiments of the 344th Infantry Division were the 854 and 855th Grenadier Regiments.
65. The 91st Luftlande Division had been a two-regiment division formed in April of 1944 from reinforced infantry regiments and replacement centers and sent to the Cotentin Peninsula for training, where it was on 6 June. The 91st Division fought elements of U.S. 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions during the early morning hours of the invasion; in the weeks that followed, most of the members of the Division were killed or captured in the Cherbourg area, but some managed to escape. The 91st was reformed from miscellaneous units and two replacement battalions and sent back to the front in late July. What was left of the division was pulled back to the Siegfried Line after slowing Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Third Army around Rennes. The change of the numerical designation of the two units caused great confusion among the American intelligence analysts, who first identified the 91st Division in the area, then the 488th Volksgrenadier and finally the 344th Volksgrenadier. The problem was that most of the German prisoners did not know their division designation had been changed.
66. MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2083, IPW Reports 22, 24, 26 November 1944.
67. MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2083, 4th Division Intelligence Report, 1 December 1944. The narrative was given by the Surgeon of the Ist Battalion 1058th Regiment.
68. MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2082, Special Intelligence Report 25 November 1944, 1058th Rgt. Translation of extract from diary of POW 5th Co. 1058th Infantry Regiment.
69. MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2083, IPW Reports 22, 24, 25, 26 November. One German company reported losing twenty-five soldiers to German artillery fire in a two-day period.
70. Schmidt "275 Infantry," 38; MHI 4IDG2 Reels 2080 through 2083, Periodic Intelligence Reports 20 November-3 December 1944.
71. MacDonald, Siegfried Line, Map VII, 330, 465; Mahlmann, "Rhineland," 8; MHI 22dS3, Reel 2179, 29 November 1944, 1850.
72. MacDonald, Siegfried Line, Map VII, 330, 465; Mahlmann, "Rhineland," 8; MHI 22dS3, Reel 2179, 29 November 1944, 1850.
73. Mahlmann, "Rhineland," 8. The 1st Security Regiment was repeatedly involved in combat during the retreat across France, and was heavily engaged at Le Mans.
74. Mahlmann, "Rhineland," 3; MHI 4IDG2 Reel 2083 22IR IPW Report 2 December 1944; 22IR IPW Report 29 November 1944. One of two battalions in the 943rd had been an immobile infantry fortress battalion made up of soldiers not previously drafted because of age or physical defects. The other battalion was a former Luftwaffe fortress battalion of soldiers averaging 24 years of age, but the bulk were not physically fit for combat assignments The 943rd's composition included raw recruits with four months of service, remnants of divisions destroyed in France, home guards aged from 40 to 60, as well as rear echelon soldiers and soldiers convalescing from wounds.
75. Madej, OB, 15, 78. As earlier cited, the 275th Infantry replaced the 353rd Infantry Division on 3 October 1944. The 275th was in turn replaced by the 344th Volksgrenadier on 21 November, and on 27 November, the newly renamed 353d Volksgrenadier Division completed the cycle when it replaced the 344th.
76. Many German divisions were formed in one month and committed to combat two months later, although the norm was about six months. Analysis of Madej, OB, 23-104.
77. Schmidt "275 Infantry," 38.
78. Creveld, Fighting Power, 75; MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 330; MHI 4IDG2, Reels 2080-2083, Intelligence Activities, November 1944.
79. Creveld, Fighting Power, 75; MacDonald, Siegfried Line, 330; MHI 4IDG2, Reels 2080-2083, Intelligence Activities, November 1944.
80. MHI 4IDG2 Reel 2083 Annex 3 to G2 Periodic Report 170, HQ 1st U.S. Infantry Division 6 December 1944; Mahlmann, "Rhineland," 5; Contrary to van Creveld's contention that all German officers went through a rigorous screening process, many of the older officers in the Landesschützen, and fortress units of the LXXIV Corps did not go through the standard commissioning procedure. Many NCOs with five or more years of service were promoted to an officer's rank at the beginning of the war without attending an officer's course. In 1943, veterans who had obtained an NCO grade during WWI were commissioned after attending a four-week course. These officers wound up in regional defense units or as administrative officers. Many of the German units in the Hürtgen had such officers on the front lines. In 1944 the German Personnel Office attempted to alleviate the growing officer shortage by promoting reserve sergeants who were serving as acting platoon commanders to commissioned grade. Only two courses of four weeks each were held, with the attempt being dropped after it was found the candidates could not assimilate the course work in such a short period. Different from van Creveld's prewar army, the majority of NCOs in the field army consisted of reserve NCOs. These were soldiers who were promoted because of their ability, but who did not wish to become regular NCOs. They were not given any further training before their promotions and often did not possess any instructional ability. As a result, they were for the most part competent in combat but were unable to adequately impart their knowledge and experience to their subordinates when the units were taken out of the line for rest and training. This same deficiency was apparent when wounded reserve NCOs were sent to the Replacement Army for a tour of duty as instructional duty during their recuperation. GMDS, "German Military Training: A Study of German Military Training," (GMDS by a combination of British, Canadian, and US staff officers NP May 1946), 60, 69.
81. MHI 4IDG2, Reels 2080 through 2083; Mahlmann, "Rhineland," 6. The views here are compiled from the EPW (Enemy Prisoner of War) Reports for the First US Army Sector during November 1944.
82. 4IDG2 Reel 2083, VII Corps Periodic Report, 17 November 1944, Enclosure 3.
83. 4IDG2 Reel 2083, 4th Division Annex 1 to G2 Periodic Report 141 29 November 1944, 2.
84. 22IR S2 Interrogation Report 30 November 1944, Reel 2084; 4IDG2, Reel 2083 4th Division MII Periodic Report 14 Nov 44; 29 November 1944; MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2082, 8th Division MII Periodic Report 3 November 1944. The Soldbuch was the soldier's pay book and listed his organization, Wehrkreis affiliation, blood type, gas mask size, and other items of importance. As an example, one company commander told of companies and battalions in reserve, although he knew each contained only 20-30 men. He maintained that had he done otherwise; his men would have surrendered at the first opportunity. In one case soldiers tried to persuade their corporal of the guard to surrender with them. They did not succeed, but fired a few rounds into the air so that he could tell his commander that they were engaged in a firefight and that he was the only one who got away.
85. Mahlmann, "Rhineland," 6.
86. MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2083, 1st Division Annex 1 to G2 Report 142, 29 November 1944.
87. MHI 4IDG2, Reel 2083, 1st Division G2 Periodic Report 131, 18 November 1944.
88. Mahlmann, "Rhineland," 6.
89. Sun Tzu, Art of War in Roots of Strategy, ed. T. R. Phillips (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1958), 38; 4IDG2 VII Corps Periodic Report 17 November 1944, Enclosure 3.
90. In contrast to the more than 20,000 soldiers Germans executed in World War II, the Imperial German Army in World War I executed only 48 soldiers: M. Hobohm, Sozial Heeresmisstände als Mitursache des deutschen Zusammenbruchs (Berlin, 1929), 63. Manfred Messerschmidt Was damals Recht war. . . NS-Militär-und Strafjustiz im Vernichtungskrieg Herausgegeben von Wolfram Wette (Essen, GE: Klartext, 1996), 75. Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army" Soldiers, Nazis and the War in the Third Reich (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), 96. Gerhard Weinberg cites 200 and 30,000 executions, respectively, in "Unexplored Questions about the German Military During World War II." The Journal of Military History 62 (April 1998): 374. I believe there is most likely a correlation between the failure of the 20 July plot against Hitler, the subsequent executions of many senior officers, and the remaining generals' attitudes for carrying on the war.
91. In contrast to the more than 20,000 soldiers Germans executed in World War II, the Imperial German Army in World War I executed only 48 soldiers: M. Hobohm, Sozial Heeresmisstände als Mitursache des deutschen Zusammenbruchs (Berlin, 1929), 63. Manfred Messerschmidt Was damals Recht war. . . NS-Militär-und Strafjustiz im Vernichtungskrieg Herausgegeben von Wolfram Wette (Essen, GE: Klartext, 1996), 75. Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army" Soldiers, Nazis and the War in the Third Reich (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), 96. Gerhard Weinberg cites 200 and 30,000 executions, respectively, in "Unexplored Questions about the German Military During World War II." The Journal of Military History 62 (April 1998): 374. I believe there is most likely a correlation between the failure of the 20 July plot against Hitler, the subsequent executions of many senior officers, and the remaining generals' attitudes for carrying on the war.
92. In contrast to the more than 20,000 soldiers Germans executed in World War II, the Imperial German Army in World War I executed only 48 soldiers: M. Hobohm, Sozial Heeresmisstände als Mitursache des deutschen Zusammenbruchs (Berlin, 1929), 63. Manfred Messerschmidt Was damals Recht war. . . NS-Militär-und Strafjustiz im Vernichtungskrieg Herausgegeben von Wolfram Wette (Essen, GE: Klartext, 1996), 75. Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army" Soldiers, Nazis and the War in the Third Reich (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), 96. Gerhard Weinberg cites 200 and 30,000 executions, respectively, in "Unexplored Questions about the German Military During World War II." The Journal of Military History 62 (April 1998): 374. I believe there is most likely a correlation between the failure of the 20 July plot against Hitler, the subsequent executions of many senior officers, and the remaining generals' attitudes for carrying on the war.
93. In contrast to the more than 20,000 soldiers Germans executed in World War II, the Imperial German Army in World War I executed only 48 soldiers: M. Hobohm, Sozial Heeresmisstände als Mitursache des deutschen Zusammenbruchs (Berlin, 1929), 63. Manfred Messerschmidt Was damals Recht war. . . NS-Militär-und Strafjustiz im Vernichtungskrieg Herausgegeben von Wolfram Wette (Essen, GE: Klartext, 1996), 75. Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army" Soldiers, Nazis and the War in the Third Reich (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), 96. Gerhard Weinberg cites 200 and 30,000 executions, respectively, in "Unexplored Questions about the German Military During World War II." The Journal of Military History 62 (April 1998): 374. I believe there is most likely a correlation between the failure of the 20 July plot against Hitler, the subsequent executions of many senior officers, and the remaining generals' attitudes for carrying on the war.