Veterans interests and the transition to government growth: 1870-1915

Public Choice

Volumn 99, Issue 3-4, 1999, Pages 311-326

  Holcombe, Randall G ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033416635     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018393518127     Document Type: Article

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