Regionalism, rotten boroughs, race, and realignment: The seventeenth amendment and the politics of representation

Studies in American Political Development

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-30

  Wirls, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033413718     PISSN: 0898588X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0898588x99001935     Document Type: Article

References (82)

1. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: a Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). See also, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen Control, and Popular Acquiescence (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1982).
2. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: a Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). See also, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen Control, and Popular Acquiescence (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1982).
3. Indeed, few issues have such a consistent legal and political presence at all levels of American government. Most recently, the controversy over majority-minority districts has produced a significant political struggle involving state governments, Congress, the executive branch, and the courts, as well as a rapidly expanding scholarly debate over the rights and wrongs, and causes and effects of forms of minority representation: Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (New York: Free Press, 1994); Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
4. Indeed, few issues have such a consistent legal and political presence at all levels of American government. Most recently, the controversy over majority-minority districts has produced a significant political struggle involving state governments, Congress, the executive branch, and the courts, as well as a rapidly expanding scholarly debate over the rights and wrongs, and causes and effects of forms of minority representation: Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (New York: Free Press, 1994); Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
5. Indeed, few issues have such a consistent legal and political presence at all levels of American government. Most recently, the controversy over majority-minority districts has produced a significant political struggle involving state governments, Congress, the executive branch, and the courts, as well as a rapidly expanding scholarly debate over the rights and wrongs, and causes and effects of forms of minority representation: Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (New York: Free Press, 1994); Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
6. Indeed, few issues have such a consistent legal and political presence at all levels of American government. Most recently, the controversy over majority-minority districts has produced a significant political struggle involving state governments, Congress, the executive branch, and the courts, as well as a rapidly expanding scholarly debate over the rights and wrongs, and causes and effects of forms of minority representation: Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (New York: Free Press, 1994); Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
7. For commentary and analysis on what the Seventeenth Amendment did produce, see Wallace Worthy Hall, The History and the Effects of the Seventeenth Amendment (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1936), 369-442, and Sara Brandes Crook and John R. Hibbing, "A Not-so-distant Mirror: The Seventeenth Amendment and Congressional Change," American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 845-53. Another recent work that addresses both causes and consequences is C.H. Hoebecke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amendment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1995).
8. For commentary and analysis on what the Seventeenth Amendment did produce, see Wallace Worthy Hall, The History and the Effects of the Seventeenth Amendment (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1936), 369-442, and Sara Brandes Crook and John R. Hibbing, "A Not-so-distant Mirror: The Seventeenth Amendment and Congressional Change," American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 845-53. Another recent work that addresses both causes and consequences is C.H. Hoebecke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amendment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1995).
9. For commentary and analysis on what the Seventeenth Amendment did produce, see Wallace Worthy Hall, The History and the Effects of the Seventeenth Amendment (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1936), 369-442, and Sara Brandes Crook and John R. Hibbing, "A Not-so-distant Mirror: The Seventeenth Amendment and Congressional Change," American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 845-53. Another recent work that addresses both causes and consequences is C.H. Hoebecke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amendment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1995).
10. Ronald F. King and Susan Ellis, "Partisan Advantage and Constitutional Change: The Case of the Seventeenth Amendment," Studies in American Political Development 10 (1996): 69-102.
11. I have drawn from longer and more detailed histories of the fight for the amendment. The most complete is Hall, Seventeenth Amendment, 1-336. A more compact overview is offered by George H. Haynes in his work from 1938, The Senate of the United States (1938; New York: Russell and Russell, 1960, 96-117; see also his The Election of Senators (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1906) for a contemporary view of the movement for the amendment.
12. I have drawn from longer and more detailed histories of the fight for the amendment. The most complete is Hall, Seventeenth Amendment, 1-336. A more compact overview is offered by George H. Haynes in his work from 1938, The Senate of the United States (1938; New York: Russell and Russell, 1960, 96-117; see also his The Election of Senators (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1906) for a contemporary view of the movement for the amendment.
13. I have drawn from longer and more detailed histories of the fight for the amendment. The most complete is Hall, Seventeenth Amendment, 1-336. A more compact overview is offered by George H. Haynes in his work from 1938, The Senate of the United States (1938; New York: Russell and Russell, 1960, 96-117; see also his The Election of Senators (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1906) for a contemporary view of the movement for the amendment.
14. Wilson's proposal for direct election was rejected by a vote of 1-10, with his state of Pennsylvania the lone supporter. Max Ferrand, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) 1:149. Wilson remained the only delegate to speak in favor of direct election.
15. The Supreme Court could be said to run afoul of the same trends during the post-Reconstruction era. In fact, some of the same reformers who favored direct election of the Senate also criticized the Court and even favored an elected judiciary. But the Supreme Court was protected by its more explicit anti-majoritarian justification and purpose.
16. Hall, Seventeenth Amendment, App. B.
17. There are several general treatments of the history of constitutional amendments: David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1996); Richard Bernstein, Amending America (New York: Times Books, 1993); Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1978). A more theoretical analysis is offered by John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought (New York: Praeger, 1992). For one attempt at theory building and testing about constitutional amendments in general see, Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment," American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 355-70.
18. There are several general treatments of the history of constitutional amendments: David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1996); Richard Bernstein, Amending America (New York: Times Books, 1993); Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1978). A more theoretical analysis is offered by John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought (New York: Praeger, 1992). For one attempt at theory building and testing about constitutional amendments in general see, Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment," American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 355-70.
19. There are several general treatments of the history of constitutional amendments: David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1996); Richard Bernstein, Amending America (New York: Times Books, 1993); Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1978). A more theoretical analysis is offered by John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought (New York: Praeger, 1992). For one attempt at theory building and testing about constitutional amendments in general see, Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment," American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 355-70.
20. There are several general treatments of the history of constitutional amendments: David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1996); Richard Bernstein, Amending America (New York: Times Books, 1993); Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1978). A more theoretical analysis is offered by John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought (New York: Praeger, 1992). For one attempt at theory building and testing about constitutional amendments in general see, Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment," American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 355-70.
21. There are several general treatments of the history of constitutional amendments: David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1996); Richard Bernstein, Amending America (New York: Times Books, 1993); Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1978). A more theoretical analysis is offered by John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought (New York: Praeger, 1992). For one attempt at theory building and testing about constitutional amendments in general see, Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment," American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 355-70.
22. King and Ellis, "Partisan Advantage," 93.
23. Ibid., 70. At another point: "The Senate, we believe, was freed from state legislative control primarily to enhance the Democratic party's ability to place its agents in office" (92).
24. "The central hypothesis is that there was a systematic partisan change in Senate outcomes, relative to other elected government institutions, which occurred with ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. The Senate was structurally more Republican than these other government institutions before direct election and structurally less Republican after direct election" (ibid., 76).
25. Ibid., 75-76.
26. Ibid., 77.
27. Haynes, Election: 73-74.
28. Ibid., 65, 114, 183-84.
29. Congressional Record, May 11, 1898: 4815.
30. They are in the Congressional Record as follows: Representatives Bushnell (D-Wisc.), July 12, 1892: 6066; Lanham (D-Tex.), July 12, 1892: 6071; Sulzer (D-N.Y.), April 14, 1900: 4121.
31. They are in the Congressional Record as follows: Representatives Bushnell (D-Wisc.), July 12, 1892: 6066; Lanham (D-Tex.), July 12, 1892: 6071; Sulzer (D-N.Y.), April 14, 1900: 4121.
32. They are in the Congressional Record as follows: Representatives Bushnell (D-Wisc.), July 12, 1892: 6066; Lanham (D-Tex.), July 12, 1892: 6071; Sulzer (D-N.Y.), April 14, 1900: 4121.
33. "Rotten borough" is a term first applied in the late eighteenth century to British parliamentary districts "in places so small that they supplied few or no resident electors." Eliminated by the 1832 Reform Act, rotten boroughs provided those few or nonexistent resident voters (a landowner, for example) with representation equal to that of a densely populated urban constituency. Vernon Bogdanor, The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 545. For discussions of how rural-urban malapportionment was accomplished and maintained in New York and Connecticut among other states: Malcolm Jewell, ed., The Politics of Reapportionment (New York: Atherton Press, 1962); Gordon E. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political Power: The Nature and Consequences of Unbalanced Representation (New York: Random House, 1962); Alfred De Grazi, Apportionment and Representative Government (New York: Praeger 1963);
34. "Rotten borough" is a term first applied in the late eighteenth century to British parliamentary districts "in places so small that they supplied few or no resident electors." Eliminated by the 1832 Reform Act, rotten boroughs provided those few or nonexistent resident voters (a landowner, for example) with representation equal to that of a densely populated urban constituency. Vernon Bogdanor, The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 545. For discussions of how rural-urban malapportionment was accomplished and maintained in New York and Connecticut among other states: Malcolm Jewell, ed., The Politics of Reapportionment (New York: Atherton Press, 1962); Gordon E. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political Power: The Nature and Consequences of Unbalanced Representation (New York: Random House, 1962); Alfred De Grazi, Apportionment and Representative Government (New York: Praeger 1963);
35. "Rotten borough" is a term first applied in the late eighteenth century to British parliamentary districts "in places so small that they supplied few or no resident electors." Eliminated by the 1832 Reform Act, rotten boroughs provided those few or nonexistent resident voters (a landowner, for example) with representation equal to that of a densely populated urban constituency. Vernon Bogdanor, The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 545. For discussions of how rural-urban malapportionment was accomplished and maintained in New York and Connecticut among other states: Malcolm Jewell, ed., The Politics of Reapportionment (New York: Atherton Press, 1962); Gordon E. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political Power: The Nature and Consequences of Unbalanced Representation (New York: Random House, 1962); Alfred De Grazi, Apportionment and Representative Government (New York: Praeger 1963);
36. "Rotten borough" is a term first applied in the late eighteenth century to British parliamentary districts "in places so small that they supplied few or no resident electors." Eliminated by the 1832 Reform Act, rotten boroughs provided those few or nonexistent resident voters (a landowner, for example) with representation equal to that of a densely populated urban constituency. Vernon Bogdanor, The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 545. For discussions of how rural-urban malapportionment was accomplished and maintained in New York and Connecticut among other states: Malcolm Jewell, ed., The Politics of Reapportionment (New York: Atherton Press, 1962); Gordon E. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political Power: The Nature and Consequences of Unbalanced Representation (New York: Random House, 1962); Alfred De Grazi, Apportionment and Representative Government (New York: Praeger 1963);
37. National Municipal League, Compendium on Legislative Apportionment, 2nd ed. (New York, 1962). By its 1818 constitution, as amended in 1874 and 1876, Connecticut's lower house seats were distributed one per "town" under 5000 citizens, and two seats (and no more than two seats) for every town over 5000, except that 33 of the oldest towns under 5000 got two seats regardless. New York's rural-urban disparity was written into the 1894 state constitution, which allocated the lower house largely by county rather than population. In many states such practices lasted until the apportionment revolution of the 1960s.
38. Laurence Frederick Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1941), 127-92.
39. I did not include New Jersey because it was a very competitive state; in fact, largely Democratic. New Jersey went Democratic in 6 of the 10 presidential elections from 1876 to 1912, but also had Democratic Senators for 53 (class 1) and 63 percent (class 3) of these years. Its inclusion would only strengthen my point.
40. Connecticut's gubernatorial elections, at first glance, would seem to be less than compelling evidence of the effects of malapportionment. During the period, gubernatorial elections produced thirteen Republican governors and four Democrats (one in 1911). The complication is that, until 1901, Connecticut had a law that mandated a majority victory in the gubernatorial race. Absent a majority, the election went to the state legislature. This happened four times in the period, and all produced Republicans. I have not investigated to see whether the Republican candidate was the plurality winner in the popular vote. Nevertheless, after the law was repealed, Republicans won eight straight gubernatorial elections from 1894 to 1908.
41. Illinois, for example, was another Republican powerhouse and the fourth largest state. It also, at least in the 1930 apportionment, had the widest numerical discrepancy between its largest and smallest House districts, and so seems another suspect for malapportionment. Yet, except for 1912, Illinois voted Democratic for president only once, in 1892, two years after it had elected its only Democratic Senator during the 1890 Republican debacle (no Illinois senator was up in 1892). The Land of Lincoln elected one Democratic governor, also in 1892.
42. This is evident throughout the debates in the Senate and in the roll call votes in both chambers. See Hall, Seventeenth Amendment, chap. 9 for a summary of sectional voting behavior.
43. Charles Stewart III and Barry R. Weingast, "Stacking the Senate, Changing the Nation: Republican Rotten Boroughs, Statehood Politics, and American Political Development," Studies in American Political Development 6 (1992): 223-71. Though King and Ellis cite the work of Stewart and Weingast on this process, they fail to incorporate or deal with their findings.
44. My thanks to Bartholomew Sparrow for drawing my attention to this point. One could argue that criteria for state admissions were lax and the western territories would have pressured for admission and probably gained it regardless of partisan motives, though the timing and order might have been different.
45. Stewart and Weingast, "Stacking the Senate," 228.
46. As Stewart and Weingast argue, "two factors advantaged the Republicans after 1860 in the effort to enhance partisan majorities through the admission of new states: migration patterns and Republican hegemony over the federal government during the years of rebellion and reconstruction. Antebellum settlement patterns tended to produce more loyal Republican communities west of the Mississippi, a pattern reinforced in the postwar western migration (ibid., 227).
47. Ibid., 227.
48. James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 1995), 527.
49. Stewart and Weingast, "Stacking the Senate," 227.
50. The omnibus bill was handled while Democrats controlled the House and presidency, but they were compelled to act following the Republican unified takeover in the 1888 elections, and so they used the lame duck session to avoid something worse. The succeeding Republican Congress then took care of Idaho and Wyoming (see ibid., 236-42).
51. Quoted in ibid., 240 (from the Congressional Record, February 14, 1889: 1906).
52. Quoted in ibid., 238 (from the Congressional Record, April 9, 1888: 2836).
53. Lewis L. Gould, Wyoming: A Political History, 1868-1896 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 114. See also, Clyde A. Milner II, ́National Initiatives,́ in The Oxford History of the American West, eds. Clyde A. Milner II, Carol A.O. Connor, Martha A. Sandweiss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 189. In their 1888 national platforms, each party accused the other of playing politics by refusing to admit that party's slate of western states; National Party Platforms, 1840-1960, compiled by Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1961), 78, 81.
54. Lewis L. Gould, Wyoming: A Political History, 1868-1896 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 114. See also, Clyde A. Milner II, ́National Initiatives,́ in The Oxford History of the American West, eds. Clyde A. Milner II, Carol A.O. Connor, Martha A. Sandweiss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 189. In their 1888 national platforms, each party accused the other of playing politics by refusing to admit that party's slate of western states; National Party Platforms, 1840-1960, compiled by Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1961), 78, 81.
55. Lewis L. Gould, Wyoming: A Political History, 1868-1896 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 114. See also, Clyde A. Milner II, ́National Initiatives,́ in The Oxford History of the American West, eds. Clyde A. Milner II, Carol A.O. Connor, Martha A. Sandweiss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 189. In their 1888 national platforms, each party accused the other of playing politics by refusing to admit that party's slate of western states; National Party Platforms, 1840-1960, compiled by Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1961), 78, 81.
56. I assume Stewart and Weingast mean none of the new states from 1860 to 1896, but at one point they say their data are based on "removing all states admitted beginning with Kansas," ("Stacking the Senate," 250) and at another describe it composed of the "post-Kansas states" (ibid., 251).
57. I assume Stewart and Weingast mean none of the new states from 1860 to 1896, but at one point they say their data are based on "removing all states admitted beginning with Kansas," ("Stacking the Senate," 250) and at another describe it composed of the "post-Kansas states" (ibid., 251).
58. Ibid., 248-59.
59. Spooner letter of January 1891, quoted in Morgan: From Hayes to McKinley, 342.
60. Quoted in H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, 1877-1896 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969), 343.
61. The data represented in Figure 4 include the following western states: Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North DAkota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wyoming. All these had only one or two representatives during the period, expect for Colorado and Washington, which were given three representatives in the 1990 apportionment. I excluded any states that had more than three districts (Nebraska, Oklahoma) and the ones that only affected one Congress (Arizona and New Mexico).
62. The states were Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. These are the small western states that either were apportioned one Representative for the entire period or had at-large elections for one or more representatives, in which case, only the at-large elections were counted. The most complicated example is Colorado. Colorado had only one Representative from 1888-1892, than had two districted Representatives from 1894-1900 (and so was not included for these years), and finally had two districted and one at-large Representative from 1902-1910 (the at-large was included in the data for these years).
63. David Mayhew, Placing Parties in American Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Martin Shefter, "Regional Receptivity to Reform in the United States," in Political Parties and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 169-94. The author thanks both Michael Brown and Scott James for their suggestions that regional diversity in both party structures and factions might explain the difference between the West and Northeast.
64. David Mayhew, Placing Parties in American Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Martin Shefter, "Regional Receptivity to Reform in the United States," in Political Parties and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 169-94. The author thanks both Michael Brown and Scott James for their suggestions that regional diversity in both party structures and factions might explain the difference between the West and Northeast.
65. Shefter, "Regional Receptivity," 189.
66. Haynes, Election, 39-46.
67. The candidates, the most famous examples being Lincoln and Douglas in 1958, sometimes then campaigned for the state party ticket, and it was assumed that state legislative candidates would be loyal to their party's nominee when the time came to choose a Senator.
68. Hall (app. H) lists a total of 118 instances of the "use of Direct Primaries to nominate senatorial candidates" between 1894 and 1913. Of the 118,52 (or 44 percent) took place in the 11 states of the confederacy, all done by state Democratic parties. Twenty-three other states used the primary, mostly in a bipartisan fashion, at some point prior to ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. In these states, Republican nominations slightly outnumbered Democratic nominations, 35-30.
69. Haynes, Election, 138.
70. J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
71. Sherman letter of July 1890, quoted in Morgan, "From Hayes to McKinley", 341.
72. Congressional Record, February 27, 1911: 3541. Senator Percy's phraseology was part of a most forthright and clear explanation of the ends and means of the South's efforts "to obstruct the exercise of Negro suffrage to the point where it would not be a menace to the government." His speech came toward the end of Senate debate on the direct election amendment.
73. Congressional Record, July 12, 1892: 6065. Another forthright defense is made by Missouri Democrat David De Armond (6077-78).
74. Representative William Hepburn (R-Ia.), a proponent of direct election, commenting on the Democrats' version of direct election resolution during the 53rd Congress. See Congressional Record, July 20, 1894: 7777-78. He goes on to accuse the Democrats of wanting to "out-Herod the Populists of your localities in their demand for this change" because Democrats don't expect any legislation, "but you expect it to do something for yourselves on the hustings."
75. Ibid.
76. References to the House of Lords were not uncommon during the debates. This one is from Representative McEttrick of Massachusetts, Congressional Record, July 20, 1894: 7770.
77. Congressional Record, April 10, 1902: 3925. The amendment read as follows: The qualifications of citizens entitled to vote for United States Senators and Representatives in Congress shall be uniform in all the States, and Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation and to provide for the registration of citizens entitled to vote, the conduct of such elections, and the certification of the results.
78. Congressional Record, April 10, 1902: 3925-26.
79. See Hall, Seventeenth Amendment, 173-83, for details on the vigorous and protracted opposition by southern Representatives.
80. In the 1930 apportionment, for example, the small western states discussed earlier, with the addition of Arizona and New Mexico, produced twenty-three Representatives (just over 5 percent of the House) and twenty-two Senators (23 percent of that chamber).
81. King and Ellis compare presidential vote share (percentage of popular vote) with percentage of Senate seats. The loss of majority status in the western rotten borough, while signifcantly altering Republican Senate power, would only marginally affect presidential vote (as opposed to electoral college) totals.
82. King and Ellis, "Partisan Advantage," 74.