"Cyberspace": Sector-specific regulation and competition rules in European telecommunications

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 36, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 937-969

  Grewlich, Klaus W ^a,b,c,d  

^a EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

^c Faculty of Law   (Germany)

^d DEUTSCHE TELEKOM LABORATORIES   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033411126     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1018727324750     Document Type: Article

References (153)

1. World Trade Organization (WTO) - Agreement on Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to General Agreement on Trade in Services), Geneva, 15 Feb. 1997, 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997).
2. See Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996, amending Directive 90/388 with regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, O.J. 1996, L 74/13.
3. Negroponte, Being digital, (New York, Knopf, 1995); Koelsch, The Infomedia Revolution - How it is changing our world and Your life, (Toronto/Montreal, Mc-Graw Hill, 1995).
4. Negroponte, Being digital, (New York, Knopf, 1995); Koelsch, The Infomedia Revolution - How it is changing our world and Your life, (Toronto/Montreal, Mc-Graw Hill, 1995).
5. Humpe, "The Implications of convergence for the markets and for the regulator", Paper presented in the Seminar Technology and International Competition - Conflict and Order in Global Communications, Bruges: College of Europe 1999 (http://mars.coleurop.be/infosoc).
6. Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide for the Network Economy, (Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1999); Héritier, "After liberalization: Public-interest services in utilities", Reprint Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, (Bonn 1998) p. 3 et seq.
7. Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide for the Network Economy, (Boston, Harvard Business School Press, 1999); Héritier, "After liberalization: Public-interest services in utilities", Reprint Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, (Bonn 1998) p. 3 et seq.
8. Majone, Regulating Europe, (London, Routledge, 1996).
9. Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, with Introduction by Mestmäcker, 6th ed., (Tübingen, Mohr, 1990).
10. Gerber, "Constitutionalizing the economy: German neo-liberalism, competition law and the 'new' Europe", 42 AJCL (1994), 25.
11. Grewlich, Governance in Cyberspace - Access and Public Interest in Global Communications, (Kluwer Law International 1999, forthcoming).
12. See Art. 5 (ex 3b) EC; Cases 44/79, Hauer, [1979] ECR 3727; Case 122/78, Buitoni, ECR [1979] 677; Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst, ECR [1989] 2859; see also Bellamy and Child, Common Market Law of Competition, 4th. ed. (London 1993), 24 et seq.; Herdegen, Europarecht, (München, 1997) p. 113.
13. See Art. 5 (ex 3b) EC; Cases 44/79, Hauer, [1979] ECR 3727; Case 122/78, Buitoni, ECR [1979] 677; Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst, ECR [1989] 2859; see also Bellamy and Child, Common Market Law of Competition, 4th. ed. (London 1993), 24 et seq.; Herdegen, Europarecht, (München, 1997) p. 113.
14. See KPMG, Report to the European Commission: Public Policy Issues arising from Telecommunications and Audiovisual Convergence, (Brussels 1996).
15. See European Commission, Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation -Towards an Information Society Approach, 3 Dec. 1997, COM(97)632,; European Commission (DG XIII), Compte-rendu de la conférence à haut niveau sur la convergence, held in Vienna 3 Nov. 1998, http://www.ispo.cec.be/convergencegp/Wienno98.html.
16. This involves the conflux of digital computer technologies and advanced telecommunications techniques, utilizing terrestrial and maritime fibre optic networks, satellites and cellular radio as well as sophisticated software permitting switching and routing, multiplexing and datacompression and state-of-the-art network management. For a comprehensive description of modern information and communications technology developments see Dertouzos, What will be: How the New World of Information Will Change Our Lives, (San Francisco, Harper, 1997).
17. An early observer of the phenomenon of "noossphere" is Teilhard de Chardin, Le Phénomène Humain, (Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1955).
18. This information is part of the traffic of symbols, images, sounds and "impressions" that constitute the human enterprise in science, art and culture, business and politics. Cf. Uncapher, "Trouble in cyberspace: Civil liberties at peril in the information age", Humanist Sept./Oct. 1991 at 5, 9; Burnstein, "Conflicts on the Net: Choice of law in transnational cyberspace", 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, (1996), 75, at 78 et seq.
19. This information is part of the traffic of symbols, images, sounds and "impressions" that constitute the human enterprise in science, art and culture, business and politics. Cf. Uncapher, "Trouble in cyberspace: Civil liberties at peril in the information age", Humanist Sept./Oct. 1991 at 5, 9; Burnstein, "Conflicts on the Net: Choice of law in transnational cyberspace", 29 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, (1996), 75, at 78 et seq.
20. See OECD, "The role of telecommunications and information infrastructures in advancing electronic commerce", Background paper for the OECD Ottawa Ministerial Conference A Borderless World: Releasing the Potential of Global Electronic Commerce, OECD Doc. DSTI/ICCP//TISP/(98)8/REV3 (5 Oct. 1998); European Commission, A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce, 15 April 1997, COM(97) 157.
21. Grewlich, Konflikt und Ordnung in der globalen Kommunikation Kommunikation -Wettstreit der Staaten und Wettbewerb der Unternehmen, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1997).
22. The notion of "bottleneck" needs explanation. It may relate to objective scarcities in capacity. In this context, the "European Initiative in Electronic Commerce" (supra note 16) indicates (p. 9) "Removing capacity bottlenecks: Europe must take steps to ensure that a high bandwidth infrastructure is put in place in order to ensure that consumers and business take full benefit of ongoing technological developments which, inevitably, lead to ever increasing needs for more transmission capacity." On the other hand, there is a more subjective significance of "bottleneck facility" where, although objectively sufficient capacity exists, a service provider requires access to one or more (upstream or downstream) facilities in order to provide services to end users. E.g. to make the respective service physically available to end users, it needs access to the termination points of the telecommunications network to which these end users are connected. As well as physical access, a service provider may need access to other facilities to enable it to market its service to end users, e.g. the ability to create awareness of services. The concept of Access to bottleneck facilities started to be defined more explicitly as an "essential facilities concept" in the context of EU competition law. See Engel and Knieps, Die Vorschriften des Telekommunikationsgesetzes über den Zugang zu wesentlichen Leistungen, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1998) p. 13 et seq.
23. Grewlich, "La Société d'information et les communications planétaires: Concurrence et coopération", RMC, No. 396 (March 1996), 236-243.
24. Squire, Sanders & Dempsy, Analysis (EU-DG XIII), Study on Adapting the EU Regulatory Framework to the Developing Multimedia Environment, (Summary Report, Main Report, Annexes 1 and 2) (Brussels/Luxembourg: EU-Commission 1998).
25. P.A. David, Standards, Markets and Network Evolution, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, forthcoming).
26. See Kiriaziz, "Positive Comity in EU/US Cooperation in Competition Matters", (1998/3) EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 11-14.
27. Drexl, Perspektiven eines Weltkartellrechts, (Bonn, Friedrich Wilhelms Universität, 1998); Grewlich, op.cit., supra note 17, pp. 229-252.
28. Drexl, Perspektiven eines Weltkartellrechts, (Bonn, Friedrich Wilhelms Universität, 1998); Grewlich, op.cit., supra note 17, pp. 229-252.
29. Squire et al., op. cit. supra note 20, at 197; European Commission, Green Paper, op. cit. supra note 12; Commission (DG XIII), op. cit. supra note 12.
30. Ostry, "Beyond the border: The international policy arena", in Kantzenbach, Scharrer and Wavermann (Eds.) Competition policy in an Interdependent World Economy, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1993).
31. Bronckers and Larouche, "Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization", 31 JWTL (1997), 5-48.
32. European Commission (DG X, DG XIII), Working Document of the Commission -Summary of the Results of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors: Areas for further Reflection, 29 July 1998 SEC(98) 1284; this paper intends to contribute to the conceptual debate around "convergence", where the issue of governance is particularly relevant.
33. See Grewlich, "Access to global networks: European telecommunications law and policy", 41 German Yearbook International Law (1999), p. 9 et seq.
34. Commission Directive 96/19 cited supra note 2. The recent history of the development of telecom markets and regulation in the EU is extensively covered elsewhere, see e.g. Scherer, Telecommunications Laws in Europe, 3d. ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1995), Grewlich, op. cit. supra note 9, Chapt. 5.
35. Commission Directive 96/19 cited supra note 2. The recent history of the development of telecom markets and regulation in the EU is extensively covered elsewhere, see e.g. Scherer, Telecommunications Laws in Europe, 3d. ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1995), Grewlich, op. cit. supra note 9, Chapt. 5.
36. Van Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 3rd. ed., (Bicester, CCH Europe, 1994); Mestmäcker (Ed.), Kommunikation ohne Monopole II - Ein Symposium über Ordnungsprinzipien im Wirtschaftsrecht der Telekommunikation und der elektronischen Medien, Law and Economics of International Telecommunications (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1995), p. 116 et seq.
37. Van Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 3rd. ed., (Bicester, CCH Europe, 1994); Mestmäcker (Ed.), Kommunikation ohne Monopole II - Ein Symposium über Ordnungsprinzipien im Wirtschaftsrecht der Telekommunikation und der elektronischen Medien, Law and Economics of International Telecommunications (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1995), p. 116 et seq.
38. Coll, The Deal of the Century - The Break-up of AT&T, (New York, Atheneum, 1986).
39. This term was used by the U.S. in order to avoid the impression of (bilateralized) anticipated "Trade in Services" negotiations.
40. Commission, Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, 30 June 1987, COM(87)290; see Ungerer, Telecommunications in Europe: The European Perspectives Series, (Brussels/Luxembourg 1990)
41. The predecessors of today's political and legal discussion on global information networks, Internet and "Cyberspace" were the efforts relating to 'Transborder Data Flows", see Grewlich, Europa im globalen Technologiewettlauf - Der Weltmarkt wird zum Binnenmarkt, (Gütersloh, Berteismann Stiftung, 1992), pp. 111-121.
42. Formalized by the ONP Framework Directive, Council Directive 90/387/EEC, O.J. 1990, L 192/1.
43. Commission, "Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the consultation on the review of the situation in the telecommunications sector", 28 April 1993, COM(93)159; based on Commission, 1992 Review of the situation in the telecommunications sector, 21 Oct. 1992, SEC(92) 1048.
44. Commission Decision No. 82/861/EEC, O.J. 1985,L41/83,1 [1983] CMLR 457 (British Telecommunications); subject to appeal in Case C-41/83, Italy v. Commission, [1985] ECR 873. Two subsequent cases upheld legality of Commission (as opposed to Council) directives, which where used to open the markets for equipment and services respectively. These judgments allowed the Commission to sidestep important political obstacles to liberalization; see Cases C-202/88, (equipment) [1991] ECR 1223 and C-271/90 (services), [1992] ECR 5833.
45. The service in question would have permitted telex messages to be received and forwarded on behalf of third parties at prices lower than those charged by BT for its international telex service.
46. Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13 Oct. 1994 amending Directive 88/301/EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in particular with regard to satellite communications, O.J. 1994, L 268/15; Commission Directive 95/51/EC of 18 Oct. 1995, amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the abolition of the restrictions on the use of cabel television networks for the provision of already liberalized telecommunications services, O.J. 1995, L 256/49; Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 Jan. 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to mobile and personal communication, O.J. 1996, L 20/59; Commission Directive 96/19 cited supra note 2.
47. The Liberalization and Harmonization Directives are listed in European Commission (DG XIII), Status Report on European Union Telecommunications Policy (Update: January 1998), (26 Jan. 1998) and reproduced in European Commission (DG XIII), Official Documents of Community Telecommunicatioons Policy, (January 1996 and update January 1998).
48. See e.g. Commission Decision in Case No. IV/34.857 (BT-MCI) of 27 July 1994, O.J. 1994, L 223, and other Commission actions, including Decisions under Reg. 17/62 (Arts. 81 and 82 (ex 85 and 86) EC) and under Reg. 4064/89 (Merger control) reproduced in Commission (DG IV) Official Documents on Community Competition Policy in the Telecommunications Sector (1998); see also Commission, Guidelines on the application of EC competition rules in the telecommunication sector, O.J. 1991, C 233; Cox, "European Competition Law", in Management Center Europe, Global Management 1996, pp. 88-95; Bellamy and Child, op. cit. supra note 10.
49. See e.g. Commission Decision in Case No. IV/34.857 (BT-MCI) of 27 July 1994, O.J. 1994, L 223, and other Commission actions, including Decisions under Reg. 17/62 (Arts. 81 and 82 (ex 85 and 86) EC) and under Reg. 4064/89 (Merger control) reproduced in Commission (DG IV) Official Documents on Community Competition Policy in the Telecommunications Sector (1998); see also Commission, Guidelines on the application of EC competition rules in the telecommunication sector, O.J. 1991, C 233; Cox, "European Competition Law", in Management Center Europe, Global Management 1996, pp. 88-95; Bellamy and Child, op. cit. supra note 10.
50. See Ungerer, "Ensuring efficient access to bottleneck network facilities: The case of telecommunications in the European Union", http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/dg4home.htm, reporting that in December 1989, a basic policy compromise was reached between the EC Commission and Member States in terms of the complementary role of liberalization under Art. 86 (ex 90) EC, harmonization under Art. 95 (ex 100a) EC and competition law.
51. This refers not only to Research and Technological Development (Title XVIII EC Treaty), Trans-European Networks (Title XV EC Treaty) and Culture (audiovisual sector) (Title XII), but e.g. also to "Public Sector Information", see Commission, "Public Sector Information: A Key Resource for Europe, Green Paper on Public Sector Information in the Information Society", COM(1998)585.
52. See Krugman, "Competitiveness: A dangerous obsession", (March/Apr. 1994) Foreign Affairs, 28-44; on "information power", see Nye and Owens, "America's Information Edge", (1996) Foreign Affairs, 20-36.
53. See Krugman, "Competitiveness: A dangerous obsession", (March/Apr. 1994) Foreign Affairs, 28-44; on "information power", see Nye and Owens, "America's Information Edge", (1996) Foreign Affairs, 20-36.
54. Cowhey, "Building the global information highway: Toll booths, construction contracts and rules of the road", in Drake (Ed.), The New Information Infrastructure: Strategies for U.S. Policy (New York, 1995).
55. Hutter, "The commercialization of the Internet: A progress report", in Engel and Keller (Eds.), Understanding the Impact of Global Networks on Local Social, Political and Cultural Values 1999 (forthcoming).
56. Up to a turnover of around US$ 50 billion in the United States alone, see OECD, "Electronic Commerce and the Information Society", (Paris, OECD, 1998).
57. Dreyden, "Realizing the potential of global electronic commerce", The OECD Observer No. 214 Oct./Nov. 1998, 1.
58. Grewlich, op. cit. supra note 34.
59. "A large portion of the computers, software, and Internet services sold in Europe are provided by U.S.-based orU.S.-owned companies. In many cases, Microsoft is selling software developed in the U.S.; Cisco and others are selling switches and routers designed and sometimes built in the U.S.; and AOL is selling Internet services that include content largely designed in the United States", Cohen, "An economic model of future changes in the U.S. communications and media industries", 28 Communications & Strategies (4th quarter 1997), 87-104, at 96.
60. This is admitted by EU Commissioner Bangemann, "A new world order for global communications", Telecom Interactive 97 (Geneva: ITU 1997).
61. For recent developments in the military area see U.S., National Research Council, "Commercial Multimedia Technologies for Twenty-First Century Army Battlefields - A Technology Management Strategy", Washington 1995; U.S., National Research Council (Computer Science and Telecommunications Board), "Modeling and Simulation - Linking Entertainment and Defense", Washington 1997.
62. E.g. the MPEG (Motion Picture Experts Group) range of standards. The family of standards extends from MPEG-1 to MPEG-4, of which MPEG-2 (studio-quality television and multiple CD quality audio channels) is the most widely used.
63. Bullinger and Mestmäcker, Multimediadienste - Struktur und staatliche Aufgaben nach deutschem und europäischem Recht, Law and Economics of International telecommunications Vol. 30, (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1997), p. 29 et seq.
64. Commission, Green Paper op. cit. supra note 12, at p. 2; Squire et al., supra note 20, at 87 et seq.
65. From a technological point of view, this analysis is correct. However, from a business economics point of view, one must not lose sight of the different costs of different networks.
66. The ONP framework consists of a series of Directives issued since 1990, when the ONP Framework Directive was adopted. In the present context, the most important ONP Directive is the ONP Interconnection Directive: Directive 97/33/EC of 30 June 1997 on Interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), O.J. 1997, L 199/37.
67. in Art. 3 ONP Directive 90/387/EEC and Art. 10 ONP Interconnection Directive.
68. Hatzopoulos, "'L'Open Network Provision' (ONP): Moyen de la dérégulation", 30 RTDE (1994) 63, 67.
69. Arts. 9(1) and (3) ONP Interconnection Directive.
70. See the "Access Notice" and Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market power for the purposes of Community competition law, O.J. 1997, C 372/03 (Demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential competition. The relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by consumers, because of the products' characteristics, intended use and prices. The relevant geographic market normally comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are commercially involved, in which the conditions of competition in the supply of products and services are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be clearly distinguished from neighbouring areas); Commission Notice on the application of access agreements in the telecommunications sector: Framework, relevant markets and principles 98/C 265/02, O.J. 1998, C 265; Ungerer, "The Arrival of Competition in European Telecommunications", European Lawyers Union, Luxembourg 19 June 1998.
71. Art. 5(3) ONP Interconnection Directive: "An organization shall be presumed to have significant market power, when it has a share of more than 25% of a particular telecommunications market in the geographical area in a Member State within which it is authorized to operate. National regulatory authorities may nevertheless determine that an organization with a market share of less than 25% in the relevant market has significant market power. They may also determine that an organization with a market share of more than 25% in the relevant market does not have significant market power." It is important to understand, that in either case the determination takes account of the following criteria: the organization's ability to influence market conditions, its turnover relative to the size of the market, its control of the means of access to end users, its access to financial resources, and its experience in providing products and services in the market.
72. See e.g. Baumol and Sidak, Toward Competition in Local Telephony, (Cambridge 1994).
73. Telecommunications display positive externalities; "Adoption externalities" create "first mover" advantages; see Katz and Shapiro, "Network externalities, competition, and compatibility", 75 American Economic Review (1985), 424; Carlton and Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, 2nd. ed. (New York, 1994).
74. Telecommunications display positive externalities; "Adoption externalities" create "first mover" advantages; see Katz and Shapiro, "Network externalities, competition, and compatibility", 75 American Economic Review (1985), 424; Carlton and Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, 2nd. ed. (New York, 1994).
75. See Armstrong, "Competition in telecommunications", 13 Oxford Rev. of Ec. Pol. (1997), 64.
76. Directive 97/33, cited supra note 57.
77. Squire et al. op. cit. supra note 20 at 191 et seq.
78. Squire et al op. cit. supra note 20, Annex 2 (National reports).
79. "Price cap" regulation should result in passing technology improvements (in terms of falling unit costs) on to telecommunications customers and to other market players (as would be the case in a fully competitive market) rather than resulting in higher profits for telecommunications organizations.
80. Commission Recommendation 98/195/EC on interconnection in a liberalized telecommunications market on Intereconnect Pricing; Commission Recommendation 98/511/EC of 29 July 1998 amending Recommendation 98/195/EC (Part 1 - Interconnect pricing), O.J. 1998, L 228/30; Commission Recommendation 98/322/EC of 8 April 1998 on interconnection in a liberalized telecommunications market (Part 2 - Accounting separation and cost accounting), O.J. 1998, L 141/6.
81. Council Directive 95/62/EC of 13 Dec. 1995 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, O.J. 1995, L 321/6.
82. Commission, Communication concerning the review under competition rules of the joint provision of telecommunications and cable TV networks by a single operator and the abolition of restrictions on the provission of the cable TV capacity over telecommunications networks, O.J. 1998, C 71/4 (Cable Review).
83. Case 127/27, BRT v. SABAM, [1974] ECR 51.
84. See Cases 66/86, Aluned Saeed, [1989] ECR 838; Case 153/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Delta Schiffahrtsges, [1994] ECR I-2517; Case 267/86, Van Eycke, [1988] ECR 4769.
85. Case 13/77, GB-Inno-BM/ATAB, [1977] ECR 2115, at para 33: "... while it is true that Article 86 is directed at undertakings, nonetheless it is also true that the Treaty imposes a duty on Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any measure that could deprive the provision of its effectiveness"; for further duties of national authorities see Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo, [1989] ECR 1839.
86. See for instance recital 18 of the Leased Lines Directive (Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision to leased lines, O.J. 1992, L 165/27) and Art. 9(3) of the ONP Interconnection Directive (supra note 57).
87. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich, [1991] ECR I-5357; Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Germany, and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029.
88. Gerber, op. cit. supra note 8, at 74.
89. Notably Commission Directive 96/19 cited supra note 2.
90. Cited supra note 41, at 2.
91. Supra note 61.
92. Ibid, at 5.
93. See also Guidelines cited supra note 41, paras. 15 et seq. In fact, competition rules are perceived as ranking high in the hierarchy of European norms; we refer to the notion of "Eigengesetzlichkeit des Marktes", see the considerations by Mestmäcker, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Europäischen Union, (Bonn, Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms Universität, 1993); and Mestmäcker, Bausteine zu einer Wirtschaftsverfassung: Franz Böhm in Jena, (Jena, Akademische Buchhandlung, 1996).
94. See also Guidelines cited supra note 41, paras. 15 et seq. In fact, competition rules are perceived as ranking high in the hierarchy of European norms; we refer to the notion of "Eigengesetzlichkeit des Marktes", see the considerations by Mestmäcker, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Europäischen Union, (Bonn, Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms Universität, 1993); and Mestmäcker, Bausteine zu einer Wirtschaftsverfassung: Franz Böhm in Jena, (Jena, Akademische Buchhandlung, 1996).
95. Case 85/76, Hofmann-La Roche, [1979] ECR 461.
96. Venit and Kallaugher, "Essential facilities: A comparative law approach", (1994) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 315, 333.
97. The essential facilities concept has been substantially developed in U.S. antitrust law. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F. 2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.),cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnely Information Publishing, 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.S. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 933 F. 2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991); see also ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments, Washington/American Bar Association 1992, 246; and the National Contributions in OECD, The Essential Facilities Concept, Working Papers/Series Roundtables on Competition No.5, (Paris, OECD, 1996).
98. Areeda, "Essential facilities: An epithet in need of limiting principles", 58 Antitrust Law Journal (1990), 841-853.
99. Temple Lang, "Defining legitimate competition: Companies' duties to supply competitors and access to essential facilities", 18 Fordham Int'l L.J. (1994), 276.
100. Section 6 of the Form A/B defines the "relevant product market" as follows: "A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use."
101. Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, [1996] ECR I-5951.
102. Definition included in the "additional commitment on regulatory principles by the European Communities and their Member State" used by the group on basic telecommunications in the context of WTO negotiations, see Annex to the "Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services". See also Grewlich op. cit. supra note 17, pp. 190-203.
103. Case 85/76, Hqffmann-La Roche v. Commission (Vitamins), [1979] ECR 401; Joined cases 6 & 7/73, Comnmercial Solvents, [1974] ECR 223; Case 27/76, United Brands, [1978] ECR 207; Case 311/84, Télémarketing, [1985] ECR 3261; Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II, ECR I-5951 (1996); Cases C-241 and 242/91P, RTE and Others v. Commission (Magill), [1995] ECR I-743; Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 87, 437-524.
104. See Grewlich op. cit. supra note 9, Chapt. 8.
105. Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 87, 477, 511 et seq.
106. Directive 97/33 cited supra note 57; Engel and Knieps, op. cit. supra note 18.
107. Ridyard, "Essential facilities and the obligation to supply competitors under UK and EC Competition Law", 8 ECLR (1998), 438.
108. This can be summed up as: what a non-dominant firm would be allowed to do is not always permissible for a dominant one, on the ground that it would damage the competitive structure of the market, Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, [1983] ECR 3461.
109. See Commission notice cited supra note 61, notably paras. 63 et seq.
110. See also Coates, "Commission Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access agreements in the Telecommunications Sector", Competition Policy Newsletter, (1998/1) (Commission, DGIV).
111. See Commission Notice cited supra note 61 esp. paras. 104 et seq.
112. Haag and Klotz, "Commission Practice concerning excessive pricing in Telecommunications", Competition Policy Newsletter, (1998/2) (Commission, DG IV).
113. Case C-62/86, Akzo v. Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359, paras. 71-72.
114. Ibid, para 114.
115. Arlandis, "Concurrence et dominance: Le problème de la boucle locale", 23 Communications & Strategies (1996), 79, at 93.
116. Knieps, "Phasing out sector-specific regulation in competitive telecommunications", 50 Kyklos (1997), 325; Art. 22 Interconnection directive is not a real "sunset clause", but simply an obligation for the EU Commission to submit a report by 31 Dec. 1999.
117. Ungerer, supra note 42. 106. See Bellamy & Child, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 709.
118. "Relative slowness" does not mean ineffective in terms of enforceability: anti-competitive behaviour such as unfair pricing can entail substantial fines under EU competition law for bottleneck holders; see Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Art. 5(2) of Reg. No. 17, O.J. 1998, C 9/3.
119. See Press Releases IP/98/707 (27.7.1998) and IP/98/763 (13.8.1998)
120. Ungerer, supra note 42, 19.
121. WTO, Agreement on Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to General Agreement on Trade in Services), Geneva, 15 Feb. 1997, 36 I.L.M. (1997) 354.
122. See text at and note 90 supra for the definitions in that context.
123. See note 110 supra; see also Council Decisions 97/838/EC of 28 Nov. 1997 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the results of the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications services, O.J. 1997, L 347/45
124. OECD Ministerial Conference, mentioned supra note 16; for a critical position arguing that the OECD Ottawa meeting was dominated by big business see Love, "Democracy, privatization and the governance of cyberspace", 1 info (1999/1), 16-22.
125. OECD, "The Economic and Social Impact of Electronic Commerce - Preliminary Findings and Research Agenda", (Paris, OECD, 1999).
126. Ungerer, supra note 42, 24.
127. Dertouzos, op. cit. supra note 13.
128. The telephone, the computer or the TV set.
129. See section 3.1.3. supra. 119. Some small firms may find "niche opportunities", but in general enterprises need to be large enough to gain the necessary economies of scale, and will attempt upward integration on the value chain, bundling infrastructure with higher level services and some content packaging.
130. This can be observed in the applications relating to the Internet and related software, which allow enterprises to deliver services without owning a complete telecom network.
131. Ranging from state-of-the-art network resources to access to set-top boxes, conditional access systems, application program interfaces, browsers and navigation software and content rights, but also e.g. those concerning Internet-domain names.
132. See Sections 2 and 3.1.2. and 3.1.3. supra. 123. See Part III in Drexl, "Unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit des WTO-Rechts in der globalen Privatrechtsordnung", in Grossfeld et al. Festschrift Fickentscher, (Tübingen, Mohr, 1998) pp. 823, 838 et seq.
133. Local, national, regional or global, linked by subsidiarity.
134. See Roebling, "Securing public interest objectives in the light of convergence", Paper presented in the framework of the Seminar Technology and International Competition - Conflict and Order in Global Communications, College of Europe, Bruges (Academic Year 1997-1998).
135. Also recalling the transition to a "constitutionalization of European and international law". Cf. Gerber, op. cit. supra note 8, at 25; Petersmann, "How to constitutionalize international law and foreign policy for the benefit of civil society?", (1999) Michigan Journal of International Law, 20.
136. Also recalling the transition to a "constitutionalization of European and international law". Cf. Gerber, op. cit. supra note 8, at 25; Petersmann, "How to constitutionalize international law and foreign policy for the benefit of civil society?", (1999) Michigan Journal of International Law, 20.
137. In this context see also OECD, "Recommendations of the Council of the OECD on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation", (Paris 1995).
138. Engel, "Das Internet und der Nationalstaat", in Reprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter (Bonn, 1999) passim.
139. Grewlich, "Wirtschaftsvölkerrechtliche Ordnung für das Internet - Multimediadienste und elektronischer Geschäftsverkehr im internationalen und europäischen Wirtschaftsrecht", (1998) Kommunikation & Recht, 81-90.
140. As to the relationship between new forms of private voluntary agreements and self-regulation, both at the national and the European level and the traditional (hierarchical) public administrative process, see Knill and Lenschow, "Governance im Mehrebenensystem - Die institutionellen Grenzen effektiver Implementation in der europäischen Umweltpolitik", Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter (Bonn, 1999); also Grewlich, "Umweltschutz durch 'Umweltvereinbarungen' nach nationalem Recht und Europarecht", (1998) DÖV, 54-62.
141. As to the relationship between new forms of private voluntary agreements and self-regulation, both at the national and the European level and the traditional (hierarchical) public administrative process, see Knill and Lenschow, "Governance im Mehrebenensystem - Die institutionellen Grenzen effektiver Implementation in der europäischen Umweltpolitik", Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter (Bonn, 1999); also Grewlich, "Umweltschutz durch 'Umweltvereinbarungen' nach nationalem Recht und Europarecht", (1998) DÖV, 54-62.
142. See esp. the OECD Ottawa Conference, supra note 16, and the draft OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI); cf. Kobrin, "The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations", (1998/Fall) Foreign Policy, 97; Bunnenberg, "Die Bedeutung globaler Informationsnetze (Internet) für den Verlauf der MAI (OECD) - Verhandlungen über Direktinvestitionen,-Auswirkungen auf die völkerrechtliche Einordnung global agierender nichtstaatlicher Akteure (NGOs)", (unpublished Seminar Paper, Freiburg Mai 1999).
143. See esp. the OECD Ottawa Conference, supra note 16, and the draft OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI); cf. Kobrin, "The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations", (1998/Fall) Foreign Policy, 97; Bunnenberg, "Die Bedeutung globaler Informationsnetze (Internet) für den Verlauf der MAI (OECD) - Verhandlungen über Direktinvestitionen,-Auswirkungen auf die völkerrechtliche Einordnung global agierender nichtstaatlicher Akteure (NGOs)", (unpublished Seminar Paper, Freiburg Mai 1999).
144. See esp. the OECD Ottawa Conference, supra note 16, and the draft OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI); cf. Kobrin, "The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations", (1998/Fall) Foreign Policy, 97; Bunnenberg, "Die Bedeutung globaler Informationsnetze (Internet) für den Verlauf der MAI (OECD) - Verhandlungen über Direktinvestitionen,-Auswirkungen auf die völkerrechtliche Einordnung global agierender nichtstaatlicher Akteure (NGOs)", (unpublished Seminar Paper, Freiburg Mai 1999).
145. "Modern science has given us vastly increased facilities and speed of communications, and modern commerce has created demands for the commodities of other nations which even the extravagancies of modern economic nationalism are not able to stifle. If human affairs were more wisely ordered, and if men were clearer sighted than they are in seeing their own interests, it might be that this interdependence of nations would lead to a strengthening of their feelings of community. But their interdependence is mainly in material things and though material bonds are necessary, they are not enough without a common social consciousness; without that they are as likely to lead to friction as to friendship." Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. (Waldock, 1963), pp. 41 et seq.
146. Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, London 1651.
147. Fox, "Trade, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO - Forging the Links of Competition and Trade", 4 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (1995), 1-36; see "Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO plurilateral Trade Agreement" (Munich Code), in 64 Antitrust and Trade Regulations Report, Special Supp. 19 Aug. 1993 (No. 1628); detailed analysis in Grewlich, supra note 17 pp. 229 et seq.; Drexl, Perspektiven eines Weltkartellrechts, (Bonn 1998) 26 et seq.; Hoekman and Mavroidis, "Competition Policy and the GATT", 17 The World Economy (1994), 121-150.
148. Fox, "Trade, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO - Forging the Links of Competition and Trade", 4 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (1995), 1-36; see "Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO plurilateral Trade Agreement" (Munich Code), in 64 Antitrust and Trade Regulations Report, Special Supp. 19 Aug. 1993 (No. 1628); detailed analysis in Grewlich, supra note 17 pp. 229 et seq.; Drexl, Perspektiven eines Weltkartellrechts, (Bonn 1998) 26 et seq.; Hoekman and Mavroidis, "Competition Policy and the GATT", 17 The World Economy (1994), 121-150.
149. Fox, "Trade, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO - Forging the Links of Competition and Trade", 4 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (1995), 1-36; see "Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO plurilateral Trade Agreement" (Munich Code), in 64 Antitrust and Trade Regulations Report, Special Supp. 19 Aug. 1993 (No. 1628); detailed analysis in Grewlich, supra note 17 pp. 229 et seq.; Drexl, Perspektiven eines Weltkartellrechts, (Bonn 1998) 26 et seq.; Hoekman and Mavroidis, "Competition Policy and the GATT", 17 The World Economy (1994), 121-150.
150. Fox, "Trade, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO - Forging the Links of Competition and Trade", 4 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (1995), 1-36; see "Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO plurilateral Trade Agreement" (Munich Code), in 64 Antitrust and Trade Regulations Report, Special Supp. 19 Aug. 1993 (No. 1628); detailed analysis in Grewlich, supra note 17 pp. 229 et seq.; Drexl, Perspektiven eines Weltkartellrechts, (Bonn 1998) 26 et seq.; Hoekman and Mavroidis, "Competition Policy and the GATT", 17 The World Economy (1994), 121-150.
151. Fox, "Trade, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO - Forging the Links of Competition and Trade", 4 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (1995), 1-36; see "Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO plurilateral Trade Agreement" (Munich Code), in 64 Antitrust and Trade Regulations Report, Special Supp. 19 Aug. 1993 (No. 1628); detailed analysis in Grewlich, supra note 17 pp. 229 et seq.; Drexl, Perspektiven eines Weltkartellrechts, (Bonn 1998) 26 et seq.; Hoekman and Mavroidis, "Competition Policy and the GATT", 17 The World Economy (1994), 121-150.
152. Kiriaziz, "Positive Comity in EU/US Cooperation in Competition Matters", (1998/3) EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 11-14, 12; J. Schwarze, Die Jurisdiktionsabgrenzung im Völkerrecht - Neuere Entwicklungen im internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1994).
153. Kiriaziz, "Positive Comity in EU/US Cooperation in Competition Matters", (1998/3) EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 11-14, 12; J. Schwarze, Die Jurisdiktionsabgrenzung im Völkerrecht - Neuere Entwicklungen im internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1994).