Inflation rules with consistent escape clauses

European Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 509-523

  Alexius, Annika ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Escape clauses; Inflation targets; Monetary policy

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL MARKET; EXCHANGE RATE; INFLATION;

EID: 0033394341     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00022-1     Document Type: Article

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