Sickles into roses: The successor parties and democratic consolidation in post-communist politics

Democratization

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 52-73

  Ishiyama, John ^a  

^a TRUMAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL CHANGE; POST-COMMUNISM;

EID: 0033391545     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349908403632     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. John Ishiyama, 'Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe', Comparative Politics, Vol.27 (1995), pp. 146-77;
2. John Ishiyama, 'The Sickle or the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the ExCommunist Parties in Post-Communist Polities', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30 (1997), pp.258-74;
3. Andras Bozoki 'The Ideology of Modernization and the Policy of Materialism: The Day After for the Socialists', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition /o//i/,Vol. 13 (1997), pp.56-102.
4. Herbert Kitschelt, 'Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions', Party Politics, Vol.1 (1995), pp.447-72;
5. Attila Ägh, 'Partial Consolidation of the East-Central European Parties: The Case of the Hungarian Socialist Party, Party Politics, Vol.1 (1995), pp.491-514;
6. Ishiyama, 'The Sickle or the Rose?'; J. Ishiyama, 'Communist Parties in Transition'; Allison Mahr and John Nagle 'Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe', Communist and PostCommunist Studies, Vol.28 (1995), pp.393- 409.
7. Andreas Schedler, 'What is Democratic Consolidation?' Journal of Democracy, Vol.9 (1998), p.91.
8. Timothy Power and Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30 (1997), p. 131 ;
9. See, for instance, Guillermo O'Donnell, Transitions, Continuities and Paradoxes', in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992);
10. M. Burton, Richard Günther and J. Higley, 'Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes', in J. Higley and Richard Günther (eds.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992);
11. Phillipe Schmitter, 'The Consolidation of Democracy and the Representation of Social Groups', American Behavioral Scientist, Vol.35 (1992), pp.422-49;
12. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Process, and Facilitating Conditions', in Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela, op. cit.; Richard P. Günther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, 'Introduction', in R. Günther, N. Diamandouros and H. Puhle (eds.). The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp.1-32.
13. See also critical reviews by Scott Mainwaring, 'Transitions to Democracy: Theoretical and Comparative Issues', in Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela, op. cit.; Philippe Schmitter, 'Transitology: The Science or the Art of Democratization', in J. Tulchin and B. Romero (eds.), The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995);
14. Karen Dawisha, 'Democratization and Political Participation: Research Concepts and Methodologies', in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds.), Democratic Changes and
15. Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
16. One notable exception is Schedler who advocates a return to the concept's original concern with democratic survival a restoration of 'its classical meaning which is securing achieved levels of democratic rule against authoritarian regression ... the term 'democratic consolidation' should describe a regime that relevant observers expect to last well into - the future - and nothing else." Schedler 'What is Democratic Consolidation,' p. 103.
17. Bruce Parrott, 'Perspectives on Postcommunist Democratization', in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, p.6.
18. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.26.
19. Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings'.
20. Laurence Whitehead, "The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies', in Robert A. Pastor (ed.), Democracies in the Amcricas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989), p.79.
21. Günther et al., 'Introduction', p.7.
22. Alfred Stepan and Cynthia Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation', World Politics, Vol.46 (1993), p.5, fn. 12.
23. See also Schedler, 'What is Democratic Consolidation?'. This measure is less stringent than the two-turnover test proposed by Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
24. Power and Gasiorowski,'Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation', p.133, fn. 16.
25. Günther et al., 'Introduction', p. 13.
26. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.25 (1995), pp.485-514;
27. Dankwart Rustow, 'Transition to Democracy : Toward a Dynamic Model', Comparative Politics, Vol.2 (1970), pp.156-244;
28. Pamela WaldronMoore, 'Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of Democratic Transition: Evaluating Support for Democratic Institutions, Satisfaction with Democratic Government and Consolidation of Democratic Regimes', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.32 (1999), pp.32-62.
29. Günther et al., 'Introduction', p.15.
30. lan McAllister and Stephen. White, 'Democracy, Political Parties and Party-Formation in Post-communist Russia', Party Politics Vol. 1 (1995), pp.49-72;
31. Richard Sakwa, 'Parties and the Multiparly System in Russia', RFE/RL Research Report Vol.2, No.28 (1993), pp.7-15; Alexei M. Salmin, I.M. Bubnin, P.I. Kapelyushnikov and M. Yu. Urnov, Partiinaya sistema v Rossii I9S9-1993 (Moscow: Nachala Press, 1994);
32. John Ishiyama, 'Red Phoenix? The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russian Polities', Party Politics, Vol.2 (1996), pp.147-75.
33. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
34. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
35. S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments:An Introduction', in S.M.Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), p.4.
36. Huntington, 'Political Order', p.398; see also Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner, Political Parlies and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p.3.
37. Richard Sakwa, "The Development of the Russian Party System: Did the Elections Change Anything?', in Peter Lentini (ed.). Elections and the Political Order in Russia (Budapest: Central European Press, 1995); Richard Sakwa, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.47 (1995), pp. 195-227.
38. Sakwa, "The Development of the Russian Party System'.
39. Stephen White, Matthew Wyman and Olga Kryshtanovskaya, 'Parties and Politics in Post-communist Russia', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.25 (1995), pp. 199-200.
40. Sakwa, 'The Development of the Russian Party System', p.190.
41. See Maurice Duverger, Political Parlies (London:Methuen, 1954); Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967); Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
42. Paul G. Lewis, 'Introduction and Theoretical Overview', in Paul G. Lewis (ed.), Party Structure and Organization in East Central Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elger, 1996), p.3; and see Peter Mair, 'Party Organization: from Civil Society to the State', in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies (London: Sage, 1994), and Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, 'Changing Models .of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel Party', Party Politics, Vol.1 (1995), pp.5-28.
43. Parrott, 'Perspectives on Postcommunist Democratization', p. 17.
44. See also Ishiyama, 'Communist Parties in Transition'.
45. Kitschelt, 'Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-communist Democracies', p.449.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid, p.450.
48. I acknowledge that this hypothesis may, on the surface, be somewhat problematic. The problem lies in the fact that the greater satisfaction with democracy of the party's followers may be due to tn-o conceptually distinct factors. First, clearly followers of the successor party are not a static group (that is, the supporters of the party may change over time, especially as the party seeks to expand its appeal to other groups); thus greater satisfaction may be due to the inclusion of different kinds of supporters (and perhaps the exodus of more dogmatic hardline communists). On the other hand, it may be due the changing attitudes of the original supporters of the party. However I defend the use of the satisfaction measure on two grounds: ( 1 ) the focus of the study is on 'loser groups' or pensioners, unemployed and those engaged in industries most injured by the transition (such as heavy industry) over all seven years of the study. In other words I am not examining supporters of the party who have done fairly well in the transition (and whom it is reasonable to assume will be more positively disposed toward the development of democracy). Thus if changes in attitudes occur, it is more likely to have resulted from the changing attitudes of the original 'loser' supporters of the party, rather than the influx of new supporters; (2) Currently, there is no other way in the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer data to discern who w ere new supporters of the successor party as opposed to original supporters of the party over time. Thus the indirect controls I introduce by focusing only on 'loser' groups is the best possible way to address the potential conceptual heterogeneity of this measure of 'satisfaction with democracy'.
49. Clearly satisfaction with democracy is not the only measure of consolidation (quite the contrary) but given the level of analysis of this paper (individual/attitudinal) this aspect of consolidation appears to me the most appropriate.
50. Waldron-Moore, 'Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of Democratic Transition', p.53.
51. As Waldron-Moore notes in her justification for the use of this question, since respect for human rights is generally regarded as a fundamental feature of democracies, then a perception of new respect for human rights in formerly authoritarian societies is more than likely an indication of satisfaction with the democratic process. Waldron-Moore, 'Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of Democratic Transition', p. 10, fn. 46.
52. Duverger, Political Parties; Katz and Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization'.
53. Duverger, Political Parties; Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies; John Ishiyama, 'The Communist Successor Parties and Party Organizational Development in Post-Communist Polities', Political Research Quarterly, Vol.52 (1999), pp.87-112.
54. It is important to note that the term 'cadre' party is not used here in the same sense as connoted by Leninist theory. Instead 'cadre' refers to the well-known concept in party organizational theory developed by Maurice Duverger.43. Petr Kopecky, 'Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe: What Type of Puny is Likely to Emerge?', Party Politics, Vol.1 (1995), pp.515-44.
55. For a discussion of the use of this measure see Ishiyama, 'The Communist Successor Parties and Party Organizational Development'.
56. John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, 'Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Location in 42 Societies', Party Politics, Vol.1 (1995), pp.73-111.
57. Granted this may still be an imperfect measure of ideological coherence. For instance, it might be the case that with an extremely 'incoherent party' that takes both positions on extreme left and right, judges might conclude that these positions balance one another out and hence the party is scored at the midpoint of four with a standard deviation of zero. Although that possibility must be recognised as a shortcoming (and is a problem which plagues all measures which rely on 'expert coding'), the measure used here represents a convenient substitute for a more rigorous measures of party coherence. One such measure is the degree of coherence in terms of party fraction votes in the Russian State Duma. Until such a measure is developed for all ten cases examined here, the data measure supplied by Huber and Inglehart is the most accessible measure to use at this point.
58. Indeed, even in the most 'Soviet-like' of the post-Soviet republics, Belarus, President Lukashenka has felt compelled to convene a legislature in order to govern.
59. The 1993 file did not list the party for which the respondent intended to vote for all countries.
60. For the 1992 data, a separate response category for state enterprise employee did not appear. However the categories 'skilled worker' and 'unskilled worker' appeared in the 1992 data which did not appear in the 1994-97 data. Thus for the 1992 data respondents who claimed to be skilled workers and unskilled workers were used along with pensioners and the unemployed.
61. Operationally this meant that the respondent completed the statement 'Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household has ..." with either 'stayed the same' 'got a little worse' or 'got a lot worse'.
62. The following parties were thus identified as part of the sample: SPA (Socialist Party of Albania); BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party); CPBM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia); EDLP (Estonian Democratic Labor Party); HSP (Hungarian Socialist Party); LDLP (Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party); Social Democratic Union of Macedonia; SdRP (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland); PSDR (Party of Social Democracy of Romania); CPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation); PDL (Party of the Democratic Left); PDR (Party of Democratic Reform); CPU (Communist Party of the Ukraine).
63. However, there is some evidence that these parties have already begun to move away from the mass party model - particularly the CPRF. See John Ishiyama, 'Red versus Expert: Candidate Recruitment and Communist Party Adaptation in Post Soviet Polities', Party Politics, Vol.4 (1998), pp.297-318.