The Soviet Union: A normal totalitarian society

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 1-16

  Shlapentokh, Vladimir ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLITICAL HISTORY; POST-COMMUNISM; SOCIAL STRUCTURE;

USSR;

EID: 0033367374     PISSN: 13523279     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13523279908415418     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London: Little, Brown, 1994).
2. Andrew Porter, 'Conquerors and Colonists', New York Times Review of Books, 14 Jan. 1996.
3. 'Society' or 'civilization' as the 'broadest cultural entity' (Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, p.43)) is here defined as a 'nation-state' formation (David Frisby and Derek Sayer, Society (Chichester: Ellis Horwood; London and New York: Tavistock Publications, 1986)).
4. 'Society' or 'civilization' as the 'broadest cultural entity' (Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, p.43)) is here defined as a 'nation-state' formation (David Frisby and Derek Sayer, Society (Chichester: Ellis Horwood; London and New York: Tavistock Publications, 1986)).
5. Neil Smelser, 'Social Structure', in Neil Smelser (ed.) Handbook of Sociology (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988), p. 109; Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), Neofunctionalism (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985).
6. Neil Smelser, 'Social Structure', in Neil Smelser (ed.) Handbook of Sociology (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988), p. 109; Jeffrey C. Alexander (ed.), Neofunctionalism (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985).
7. This definition of the Soviet system is very close to the explanations developed by Vasilii Grossman in Life and Fate (London: Flamingo, 1986), and Alexander Zinoviev in The Yawning Heights (New York: Random House, 1979).
8. This definition of the Soviet system is very close to the explanations developed by Vasilii Grossman in Life and Fate (London: Flamingo, 1986), and Alexander Zinoviev in The Yawning Heights (New York: Random House, 1979).
9. In his monumental work, Pipes devoted only a few perfunctory sentences to Marxism, and paid little attention to Lenin's views on history, economy and politics. Lenin's relationship with Marxism was treated as irrelevant to his activity for seizing power. Pipes mostly dismissed the ideology of the Soviet communists as a 'subsidiary factor' and rejected the utopian origin of Soviet society: see Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: Knopf, 1993), and his The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990), pp.341-84.
10. In his monumental work, Pipes devoted only a few perfunctory sentences to Marxism, and paid little attention to Lenin's views on history, economy and politics. Lenin's relationship with Marxism was treated as irrelevant to his activity for seizing power. Pipes mostly dismissed the ideology of the Soviet communists as a 'subsidiary factor' and rejected the utopian origin of Soviet society: see Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: Knopf, 1993), and his The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990), pp.341-84.
11. Malia accused the Soviet regime of compromising 'the moral idea of socialism' which did not bring about 'the fullness of human equality': see Martin E. Malia, 'A Fatal Logic', The National Interest, No.31 (Spring 1993), p.86; and Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994), p.494. He lamented that 'the gap between the original moral ideal and the real performance had grown dangerously wide': Malia, 1993, p.90; see also his 'Why Amalrik Was Right', Times Literary Supplement, 2 Nov. 1992. See also Martin E. Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum (Cambridge, MA: The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).
12. Malia accused the Soviet regime of compromising 'the moral idea of socialism' which did not bring about 'the fullness of human equality': see Martin E. Malia, 'A Fatal Logic', The National Interest, No.31 (Spring 1993), p.86; and Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994), p.494. He lamented that 'the gap between the original moral ideal and the real performance had grown dangerously wide': Malia, 1993, p.90; see also his 'Why Amalrik Was Right', Times Literary Supplement, 2 Nov. 1992. See also Martin E. Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum (Cambridge, MA: The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).
13. Malia accused the Soviet regime of compromising 'the moral idea of socialism' which did not bring about 'the fullness of human equality': see Martin E. Malia, 'A Fatal Logic', The National Interest, No.31 (Spring 1993), p.86; and Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994), p.494. He lamented that 'the gap between the original moral ideal and the real performance had grown dangerously wide': Malia, 1993, p.90; see also his 'Why Amalrik Was Right', Times Literary Supplement, 2 Nov. 1992. See also Martin E. Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum (Cambridge, MA: The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).
14. Malia accused the Soviet regime of compromising 'the moral idea of socialism' which did not bring about 'the fullness of human equality': see Martin E. Malia, 'A Fatal Logic', The National Interest, No.31 (Spring 1993), p.86; and Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994), p.494. He lamented that 'the gap between the original moral ideal and the real performance had grown dangerously wide': Malia, 1993, p.90; see also his 'Why Amalrik Was Right', Times Literary Supplement, 2 Nov. 1992. See also Martin E. Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum (Cambridge, MA: The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).
15. Malia accused the Soviet regime of compromising 'the moral idea of socialism' which did not bring about 'the fullness of human equality': see Martin E. Malia, 'A Fatal Logic', The National Interest, No.31 (Spring 1993), p.86; and Martin E. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994), p.494. He lamented that 'the gap between the original moral ideal and the real performance had grown dangerously wide': Malia, 1993, p.90; see also his 'Why Amalrik Was Right', Times Literary Supplement, 2 Nov. 1992. See also Martin E. Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum (Cambridge, MA: The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).
16. Martin E. Malia, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990), p.302.
17. Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p.523.
18. They discarded the totalitarian (or 'authoritarian') model as unscientific and 'useless as a conceptual category': see Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (London: Radius, 1988); see also Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp.70-73.
19. They discarded the totalitarian (or 'authoritarian') model as unscientific and 'useless as a conceptual category': see Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (London: Radius, 1988); see also Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp.70-73.
20. Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
21. Peter Kenez, 'Stalinism as Humdrum Politics', Russian Review, Vol.45 (1986), pp.375-84; Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'New Perspectives on Stalinism', Russian Review, Vol.45 (1986), pp.357-73.
22. Peter Kenez, 'Stalinism as Humdrum Politics', Russian Review, Vol.45 (1986), pp.375-84; Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'New Perspectives on Stalinism', Russian Review, Vol.45 (1986), pp.357-73.
23. Gail Lapidus, 'Political Mobilization, Participation, and Leadership', Comparative Politics, Oct. 1975, pp.115, 118; Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.37; Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, 'Introduction', in Arch Getty and Roberta Manning (eds.), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1993), pp.2-4.
24. Gail Lapidus, 'Political Mobilization, Participation, and Leadership', Comparative Politics, Oct. 1975, pp.115, 118; Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.37; Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, 'Introduction', in Arch Getty and Roberta Manning (eds.), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1993), pp.2-4.
25. Gail Lapidus, 'Political Mobilization, Participation, and Leadership', Comparative Politics, Oct. 1975, pp.115, 118; Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.37; Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, 'Introduction', in Arch Getty and Roberta Manning (eds.), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 1993), pp.2-4.
26. Susan Solomon (ed.), Pluralism in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan, 1983).
27. Alexander Dallin, 'Biases and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR', Slavic Review, Vol.32, No.3 (1973), pp.560-76.
28. Sheila Fitzpatrick recognized along with 'the positive side' of collectivization its several flaws. Her ultimate verdict was quite mild: 'nobody was really happy with collectivization'. She accepted Stalin's theory that it was the kulaks' fight against the Soviet authorities and collective farms (kulaks 'hid in the woods by day [and] returned to terrorize the village by night') and that 'the regime reacted' by expropriating 'kulaks and other trouble makers': see Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 1993), pp. 152-3. In her Stalin's Peasants (1994), without denying many atrocities of collectivization (as was typical for her works before 1991), she still presented the tragic turning of Soviet peasants into serfs (they could not leave their villages since they did not have internal passports, introduced in 1933) as an unpleasant measure, 'irksome to peasants', causing 'annoyance and inconvenience to kolkhozniks', asserting that 'in practice, however, the restrictions on peasant mobility were much less onerous than they were in theory' (p. 137). What is more, rejecting 'almost pathological representation of the famine', she in the same 1994 book goes as so far as to show solidarity with Stalin's interpretation that, even with some reservations, the cause of the famine was the peasants' 'go slow strike', or 'sabotage' (p.96).
29. Sheila Fitzpatrick recognized along with 'the positive side' of collectivization its several flaws. Her ultimate verdict was quite mild: 'nobody was really happy with collectivization'. She accepted Stalin's theory that it was the kulaks' fight against the Soviet authorities and collective farms (kulaks 'hid in the woods by day [and] returned to terrorize the village by night') and that 'the regime reacted' by expropriating 'kulaks and other trouble makers': see Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 1993), pp. 152-3. In her Stalin's Peasants (1994), without denying many atrocities of collectivization (as was typical for her works before 1991), she still presented the tragic turning of Soviet peasants into serfs (they could not leave their villages since they did not have internal passports, introduced in 1933) as an unpleasant measure, 'irksome to peasants', causing 'annoyance and inconvenience to kolkhozniks', asserting that 'in practice, however, the restrictions on peasant mobility were much less onerous than they were in theory' (p. 137). What is more, rejecting 'almost pathological representation of the famine', she in the same 1994 book goes as so far as to show solidarity with Stalin's interpretation that, even with some reservations, the cause of the famine was the peasants' 'go slow strike', or 'sabotage' (p.96).
30. Sheila Fitzpatrick suggested that the ugly anti-intelligentsia campaign in the late 1920s and early 1930s (which was quite similar to the Chinese Cultural Revolution) was not sponsored by Stalin, but initiated by rank-and-file communists: see Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, pp.137, 152-3.
31. See Hough and Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed.
32. It is not surprising that nostalgia for order in society is one of the strongest feelings in Russia today. No fewer than 80 per cent of the Russians reported that the absence of order in society was the biggest flaw in Russian life. In a 1997 survey, the Russians named Andropov (19 per cent) and Stalin (12 per cent) as the two top leaders who guaranteed an acceptable level of order in society: reported in Moskovskie novosti, 27 April 1998.
33. Goskomstat, Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1990 g. (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), p.175.
34. Ibid., p.211.
35. Goskomstat, Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1983 g. (Moscow: Statistika, 1984), p.393.
36. Yuri Levada (ed.), Sovetskii chelovek (Moscow: Mirovoi okean, 1993), p.53.
37. 'Wild vacationers' were those who could not obtain a vacation package at a government-funded resort or rest home. Without lodging reservations or concrete plans, they ventured to resort cities and tried to rent rooms in private houses. However, comfortable accommodation was limited and difficult to find.
38. See Vladimir Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
39. Dmitry Shlapentokh and Vladimir Shlapentokh, Soviet Cinematography, 1918-1991: Ideological Conflict and Social Reality (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993).
40. In the 1980s, about half of all families complained about the shortages of meat: see F. Borodkin (ed.), Blagosostoyanie gorodskogo naseleniya Sibiri (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1990), p.75. In the 1990s, the number of families with the same grievance increased to 70-80 per cent, in parallel with the sales growth of this product: see Mneniya naselenyia o tsenakh na tovary i uslugi (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1991), pp.125, 245.
41. In the 1980s, about half of all families complained about the shortages of meat: see F. Borodkin (ed.), Blagosostoyanie gorodskogo naseleniya Sibiri (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1990), p.75. In the 1990s, the number of families with the same grievance increased to 70-80 per cent, in parallel with the sales growth of this product: see Mneniya naselenyia o tsenakh na tovary i uslugi (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1991), pp.125, 245.
42. In 1990, only three per cent of the Russian population considered the products of the 'free market' affordable: see Goskomstat, Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1990 g, p.282.
43. From the author's personal archive.
44. John Robinson, Vladimir Andreenkov and Vasily Patrushev, The Rhythm of Everyday Life (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), pp. 106-31.
45. This special universe contains an disproportionately high ratio of people who for one reason or another had a grudge against the Soviet system and were afraid to return to the motherland. All the respondents claimed that they (or some members of their family) had been arrested. The authors of the project were fully aware of the nature of their sample: see Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, with the assistance of David Gleicher and Irving Rostow, The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp.25-40.
46. Ibid., p.47.
47. James Millar (ed.), Politics, Work and Daily Life in the USSR: A Survey of Former Soviet Citizens (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.33.
48. According to the longitudinal studies of VTsIOM in 1992-98, the number of those who were dissatisfied with their life was almost never lower than 50-60 per cent.
49. Yegor Gaidar, Gosudarstvo i revolutsiya (Moscow: Yevraziya, 1995), pp.107-8; Leonid Radzikovskii, 'Nomenkatura menyaet "Kapital" na kapital', Izvestiya, 7 March 1995; Grigorii Vodolazov, 'Nomenklaturnyi kapitalism', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 June 1997.
50. Yegor Gaidar, Gosudarstvo i revolutsiya (Moscow: Yevraziya, 1995), pp.107-8; Leonid Radzikovskii, 'Nomenkatura menyaet "Kapital" na kapital', Izvestiya, 7 March 1995; Grigorii Vodolazov, 'Nomenklaturnyi kapitalism', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 June 1997.
51. Yegor Gaidar, Gosudarstvo i revolutsiya (Moscow: Yevraziya, 1995), pp.107-8; Leonid Radzikovskii, 'Nomenkatura menyaet "Kapital" na kapital', Izvestiya, 7 March 1995; Grigorii Vodolazov, 'Nomenklaturnyi kapitalism', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 June 1997.
52. Vladimir Bukovsky, in his book Jugement dans Moscou (Paris: Laffont, 1995), described the dissident movement as the single threat to the regime. He recognized, however, that after Natan Shcharansky's arrest and the rout of the Helsinki group, by the 1970s the movement was practically obliterated (p.231).
53. See, for instance, Nikolai Yakovlev, 'Pochemu raspalsya Sovetskii Soyuz', Zavtra, 1999, Nos.20 and 21; Aleksandr Zinoviev, Katastroika: Perestroika in Partygrad (London: Peter Owen, 1992), and his 'Zavershenie Russkoi kontrrevolutsii', Pravda, 1 Oct. 1994.
54. See, for instance, Nikolai Yakovlev, 'Pochemu raspalsya Sovetskii Soyuz', Zavtra, 1999, Nos.20 and 21; Aleksandr Zinoviev, Katastroika: Perestroika in Partygrad (London: Peter Owen, 1992), and his 'Zavershenie Russkoi kontrrevolutsii', Pravda, 1 Oct. 1994.
55. See, for instance, Nikolai Yakovlev, 'Pochemu raspalsya Sovetskii Soyuz', Zavtra, 1999, Nos.20 and 21; Aleksandr Zinoviev, Katastroika: Perestroika in Partygrad (London: Peter Owen, 1992), and his 'Zavershenie Russkoi kontrrevolutsii', Pravda, 1 Oct. 1994.
56. In a special declaration soon after his accession to power Andropov characterized Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative as a programme 'aimed at the disarmament of the Soviet Union facing the American nuclear threat' and vowed that the USSR would never permit the military superiority of the USA (Yurii Andropov, Izbrannye stat'i i rechi (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), p.250; V. Boldin, Krushenie p"edestala (Moscow: Respublika, 1995), pp.97-107; Vadim Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva: Vzglyad iznutri (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), pp.26-41; see also the debates on the influence of SDI on the Kremlin among Russian generals in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.55-9.
57. In a special declaration soon after his accession to power Andropov characterized Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative as a programme 'aimed at the disarmament of the Soviet Union facing the American nuclear threat' and vowed that the USSR would never permit the military superiority of the USA (Yurii Andropov, Izbrannye stat'i i rechi (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), p.250; V. Boldin, Krushenie p"edestala (Moscow: Respublika, 1995), pp.97-107; Vadim Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva: Vzglyad iznutri (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), pp.26-41; see also the debates on the influence of SDI on the Kremlin among Russian generals in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.55-9.
58. In a special declaration soon after his accession to power Andropov characterized Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative as a programme 'aimed at the disarmament of the Soviet Union facing the American nuclear threat' and vowed that the USSR would never permit the military superiority of the USA (Yurii Andropov, Izbrannye stat'i i rechi (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), p.250; V. Boldin, Krushenie p"edestala (Moscow: Respublika, 1995), pp.97-107; Vadim Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva: Vzglyad iznutri (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), pp.26-41; see also the debates on the influence of SDI on the Kremlin among Russian generals in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.55-9.
59. In a special declaration soon after his accession to power Andropov characterized Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative as a programme 'aimed at the disarmament of the Soviet Union facing the American nuclear threat' and vowed that the USSR would never permit the military superiority of the USA (Yurii Andropov, Izbrannye stat'i i rechi (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), p.250; V. Boldin, Krushenie p"edestala (Moscow: Respublika, 1995), pp.97-107; Vadim Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva: Vzglyad iznutri (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), pp.26-41; see also the debates on the influence of SDI on the Kremlin among Russian generals in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.55-9.