Institutional endowment as foundation for regulatory performance and regime transitions: The role of the US constitution in telecommunications regulation in the United States

Telecommunications Policy

Volumn 23, Issue 9, 1999, Pages 607-623

  Cherry, Barbara A ^a   Wildman, Steve S ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LAWS AND LEGISLATION; PUBLIC POLICY; TELECOMMUNICATION CONTROL;

UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURES;

TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES;

EID: 0033329199     PISSN: 03085961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0308-5961(99)00046-4     Document Type: Article

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