Capacity choice and allocation: strategic behavior and supply chain performance

Management Science

Volumn 45, Issue 8, 1999, Pages 1091-1108

  Cachon, Gérard P ^a   Lariviere, Martin A ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; GAME THEORY; INVENTORY CONTROL; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; PRODUCTION CONTROL; SALES;

BULL-WHIP EFFECT; CAPACITY ALLOCATION; INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; SUPPLY CHAIN;

MARKETING;

EID: 0033284151     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.45.8.1091     Document Type: Article

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