The selection of joint projects by a consortium: Cost sharing mechanisms

Journal of the Operational Research Society

Volumn 50, Issue 12, 1999, Pages 1244-1251

  Aloysius, J A ^a   Rosentha, E C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

^b TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capital budgeting; Cost allocation; Game theory; Integer programming; Project selection

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; GAME THEORY; INTEGER PROGRAMMING; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

CAPITAL BUDGETING; COST ALLOCATIONS;

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0033284098     PISSN: 01605682     EISSN: 14769360     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jors.2600842     Document Type: Article

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