Law, fact and legal language

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 18, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 461-473

  Morawski, Lech ^a  

^a University of Toru   (Poland)

Author keywords

Applicability rule; Brute fact; Fact; Institutional fact; Law; Semantic instrumentalism; Semantic realism; Statement; Term

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033269213     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3505140     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. According to typical definitions observational terms refer to observable properties and objects and theoretical terms to unobservable ones - see for instance R. Carnap: The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, ed. by H. Feigel and M. Scriven, Un. of Minnesota Press Minneapolis 1959; C. Hempel: The Theoretician's Dilemma, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II, Un. of Minnesota Press 1963, p. 42, 47.
2. According to typical definitions observational terms refer to observable properties and objects and theoretical terms to unobservable ones - see for instance R. Carnap: The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, ed. by H. Feigel and M. Scriven, Un. of Minnesota Press Minneapolis 1959; C. Hempel: The Theoretician's Dilemma, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II, Un. of Minnesota Press 1963, p. 42, 47.
3. K. Popper: Objective Knowledge, Oxford 1973, p. 258, 346 and Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, New York 1968, p. 23; P. Feyerabend: Against Method, London 1978, p. 168.
4. K. Popper: Objective Knowledge, Oxford 1973, p. 258, 346 and Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, New York 1968, p. 23; P. Feyerabend: Against Method, London 1978, p. 168.
5. K. Popper: Objective Knowledge, Oxford 1973, p. 258, 346 and Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, New York 1968, p. 23; P. Feyerabend: Against Method, London 1978, p. 168.
6. G.E.M. Anscombe: On Brute Facts, Analysis 1958/18.
7. A. Giddens: Risk, Trust, Reflexivity, (in:) U. Beck, A. Giddens, S. Lash: Reflexive Modernization, Oxford, Cambridge 1994, p. 189.
8. U. Beck: Risk-Society. Towards a New Modernity, London 1992, p. 81.
9. T. Gizberet-Studnicki: The Language of law and Weltbild, (in:) Prawo w zmieniajicym sie spoleczeñstwie, ed. G. Ska̧pska, Kraków 1992 (in Polish).
10. For instance, R. Cross, N. Wilkins: An Outline of the Law of Evidence, London 1964, p. 12.
11. See Due Process, ed. by J. Pennock and J. Chapman, New York 1977; R. Cross, N. Wilkins: An Outline of the Law of Evidence, London 1964, p. 161; G. Williams: The Proof of Guilt, London 1963, p. 195; A. Kaissis: Die Verwertbarkeit materiell-rechtswidrig erlangter Beweismittel im Zivilprozess, Frankfurt am Main 1978, p. 81.
12. See Due Process, ed. by J. Pennock and J. Chapman, New York 1977; R. Cross, N. Wilkins: An Outline of the Law of Evidence, London 1964, p. 161; G. Williams: The Proof of Guilt, London 1963, p. 195; A. Kaissis: Die Verwertbarkeit materiell-rechtswidrig erlangter Beweismittel im Zivilprozess, Frankfurt am Main 1978, p. 81.
13. See Due Process, ed. by J. Pennock and J. Chapman, New York 1977; R. Cross, N. Wilkins: An Outline of the Law of Evidence, London 1964, p. 161; G. Williams: The Proof of Guilt, London 1963, p. 195; A. Kaissis: Die Verwertbarkeit materiell-rechtswidrig erlangter Beweismittel im Zivilprozess, Frankfurt am Main 1978, p. 81.
14. See Due Process, ed. by J. Pennock and J. Chapman, New York 1977; R. Cross, N. Wilkins: An Outline of the Law of Evidence, London 1964, p. 161; G. Williams: The Proof of Guilt, London 1963, p. 195; A. Kaissis: Die Verwertbarkeit materiell-rechtswidrig erlangter Beweismittel im Zivilprozess, Frankfurt am Main 1978, p. 81.
15. L. Morawski: Presumptions and Legal Proof, Torun 1981 (in Polish).
16. N. MacCormick: Law as an Institutional Fact (in:) N. MacCormick, O. Weinberger: An Institutional Theory of Law. New Approaches to Legal Positivism, Dordrecht 1986, p. 52.
17. See, however, my considerations about mixed terms which can be classified both as legal terms and factual terms.
18. N. MacCormick, O. Weinberger: An Institutional Theory of Law. New Approaches to Legal Positivism, Dordrecht 1986, p. 10.
19. Op. cit.
20. L. Morawski: Law-Fact Distinction and its Applications, RPEiS 1980/1, p. 190 (in Polish).
21. J. Jackson: Questions of Fact and Questions of Law, p. 93.
22. M. Ockelton: Comments on J. Jackson's. Questions of Fact and Questions of Law, ARSP 1983, Beiheft 16, p. 103.
23. J. Searle contrasts in his paper regulative and constitutive rules. In order to avoid misunderstandings with the notion of regulative definitions I substituted his expression "regulative rules" by "declarative rules" - see J. Searle: What is speech act, (in:) The Philosophy of Language, ed. by J. Searle, Oxford 1972, p. 41.
24. T. Gizbert-Studnicki: The Language of Law and Weltbild, (in:) Prawo w zmieniajacym sie spoleczeñstwie, red. G. Ska̧pska, Kraków 1992; P. Nerhot: The Fact of Law, (in:) Autopoietic Law, ed. G. Teubner, Berlin, New York 1988, p. 325.
25. T. Gizbert-Studnicki: The Language of Law and Weltbild, (in:) Prawo w zmieniajacym sie spoleczeñstwie, red. G. Ska̧pska, Kraków 1992; P. Nerhot: The Fact of Law, (in:) Autopoietic Law, ed. G. Teubner, Berlin, New York 1988, p. 325.
26. J. Jackson, op. cit., p. 92.
27. J. Jackson, op. cit., p. 92. See also L. Morawski, p. 191.
28. J. Jackson, op. cit., p. 92. See also L. Morawski, p. 191.
29. 1 M. Ockelton, op. cit., p. 104.
30. R. Tuomela: Theoretical Concepts, Wien - New York 1973, p. 8. See also C. Hempel, op. cit.
31. R. Tuomela: Theoretical Concepts, Wien - New York 1973, p. 8. See also C. Hempel, op. cit.
32. A. Ross: On Law and Justice, London 1958, pp. 159, 174, 178. See also his paper "Tu-Tu", Harvard Law Review 1957/70.
33. A. Ross: On Law and Justice, London 1958, pp. 159, 174, 178. See also his paper "Tu-Tu", Harvard Law Review 1957/70.
34. N. MacCormick, O. Weinberger: An Institutional Theory of Law ..., p. 86.
35. H.L.A. Hart: The Ascription of Resposibility and Rights, (in:) Logic and Language, Oxford 1963, p. 156.
36. C. Hempel: The Theoretician's. Dilemma ..., p. 50; K. Popper: Objective Knowledge ..., p. 106.
37. C. Hempel: The Theoretician's. Dilemma ..., p. 50; K. Popper: Objective Knowledge ..., p. 106.
38. H.L.A. Hart: The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights ..., pp. 148, 154 and Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, Oxford 1953, p. 7.
39. H.L.A. Hart: The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights ..., pp. 148, 154 and Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, Oxford 1953, p. 7.
40. L. Morawski: Law-Fact Distinction and its Applications ..., 70. 195.
41. A. Ross demonstrates this in a brilliant way - see On Law and Justice, London 1958, p. 171.
42. With respect to theoretical terms in scientific theories compare C. Hempel: The Theoretician's. Dilemma ..., p. 67; R. Tuomela: Theoretical Concepts ..., p. 6.
43. With respect to theoretical terms in scientific theories compare C. Hempel: The Theoretician's. Dilemma ..., p. 67; R. Tuomela: Theoretical Concepts ..., p. 6.