The fox and the lion: Machiavelli replies to Cicero

History of Political Thought

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 627-645

  Barlow, J J ^a  

^a JUNIATA COLLEGE   (United States)

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EID: 0033268590     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (236)

1. The list is a long one, and it is easy to overlook commentary offered in passing, some of which is found in works cited later. Most frequently cited is Marcia L. Colish, 'Cicero's De Officiis and Machiavelli's Prince', Sixteenth Century Journal, IX (1978), pp. 81-93 (hereafter cited as 'Cicero and Machiavelli'). Colish cites a long list of works that have shown the parallels (p. 84). See also Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue (Chicago, 1996); Mark Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli (Princeton, 1983); Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, ed. and trans. M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins (Cambridge, 1991), p. xviii.
2. The list is a long one, and it is easy to overlook commentary offered in passing, some of which is found in works cited later. Most frequently cited is Marcia L. Colish, 'Cicero's De Officiis and Machiavelli's Prince', Sixteenth Century Journal, IX (1978), pp. 81-93 (hereafter cited as 'Cicero and Machiavelli'). Colish cites a long list of works that have shown the parallels (p. 84). See also Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue (Chicago, 1996); Mark Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli (Princeton, 1983); Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, ed. and trans. M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins (Cambridge, 1991), p. xviii.
3. The list is a long one, and it is easy to overlook commentary offered in passing, some of which is found in works cited later. Most frequently cited is Marcia L. Colish, 'Cicero's De Officiis and Machiavelli's Prince', Sixteenth Century Journal, IX (1978), pp. 81-93 (hereafter cited as 'Cicero and Machiavelli'). Colish cites a long list of works that have shown the parallels (p. 84). See also Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue (Chicago, 1996); Mark Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli (Princeton, 1983); Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, ed. and trans. M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins (Cambridge, 1991), p. xviii.
4. The list is a long one, and it is easy to overlook commentary offered in passing, some of which is found in works cited later. Most frequently cited is Marcia L. Colish, 'Cicero's De Officiis and Machiavelli's Prince', Sixteenth Century Journal, IX (1978), pp. 81-93 (hereafter cited as 'Cicero and Machiavelli'). Colish cites a long list of works that have shown the parallels (p. 84). See also Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue (Chicago, 1996); Mark Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli (Princeton, 1983); Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, ed. and trans. M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins (Cambridge, 1991), p. xviii.
5. Hans Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XXII (1938), pp. 72-97, pp. 77, 83-5; Jerome E. Siegel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism (Princeton, 1968), p. 3; Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (2 vols., Cambridge, 1978), Vol. 1, p. 87; Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (New York, 1981), pp. 36-8; Felix Gilbert, 'The Humanist Concept of the Prince and The Prince of Machiavelli', The Journal of Modern History, XI (December, 1939), pp. 449-83.
6. Hans Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XXII (1938), pp. 72-97, pp. 77, 83-5; Jerome E. Siegel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism (Princeton, 1968), p. 3; Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (2 vols., Cambridge, 1978), Vol. 1, p. 87; Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (New York, 1981), pp. 36-8; Felix Gilbert, 'The Humanist Concept of the Prince and The Prince of Machiavelli', The Journal of Modern History, XI (December, 1939), pp. 449-83.
7. Hans Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XXII (1938), pp. 72-97, pp. 77, 83-5; Jerome E. Siegel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism (Princeton, 1968), p. 3; Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (2 vols., Cambridge, 1978), Vol. 1, p. 87; Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (New York, 1981), pp. 36-8; Felix Gilbert, 'The Humanist Concept of the Prince and The Prince of Machiavelli', The Journal of Modern History, XI (December, 1939), pp. 449-83.
8. Hans Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XXII (1938), pp. 72-97, pp. 77, 83-5; Jerome E. Siegel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism (Princeton, 1968), p. 3; Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (2 vols., Cambridge, 1978), Vol. 1, p. 87; Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (New York, 1981), pp. 36-8; Felix Gilbert, 'The Humanist Concept of the Prince and The Prince of Machiavelli', The Journal of Modern History, XI (December, 1939), pp. 449-83.
9. Hans Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XXII (1938), pp. 72-97, pp. 77, 83-5; Jerome E. Siegel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism (Princeton, 1968), p. 3; Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (2 vols., Cambridge, 1978), Vol. 1, p. 87; Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (New York, 1981), pp. 36-8; Felix Gilbert, 'The Humanist Concept of the Prince and The Prince of Machiavelli', The Journal of Modern History, XI (December, 1939), pp. 449-83.
10. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 28; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue; Skinner, Machiavelli; Martin Fleisher, 'The Ways of Machiavelli and the Ways of Polities', History of Political Thought, XVI (1995), pp. 330-55; Siegel, Rhetoric, pp. 19-20; Victoria Kahn, 'Virtù and the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli's Prince', in Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 195-218, p. 198.
11. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 28; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue; Skinner, Machiavelli; Martin Fleisher, 'The Ways of Machiavelli and the Ways of Polities', History of Political Thought, XVI (1995), pp. 330-55; Siegel, Rhetoric, pp. 19-20; Victoria Kahn, 'Virtù and the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli's Prince', in Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 195-218, p. 198.
12. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 28; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue; Skinner, Machiavelli; Martin Fleisher, 'The Ways of Machiavelli and the Ways of Polities', History of Political Thought, XVI (1995), pp. 330-55; Siegel, Rhetoric, pp. 19-20; Victoria Kahn, 'Virtù and the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli's Prince', in Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 195-218, p. 198.
13. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 28; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue; Skinner, Machiavelli; Martin Fleisher, 'The Ways of Machiavelli and the Ways of Polities', History of Political Thought, XVI (1995), pp. 330-55; Siegel, Rhetoric, pp. 19-20; Victoria Kahn, 'Virtù and the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli's Prince', in Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 195-218, p. 198.
14. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 28; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue; Skinner, Machiavelli; Martin Fleisher, 'The Ways of Machiavelli and the Ways of Polities', History of Political Thought, XVI (1995), pp. 330-55; Siegel, Rhetoric, pp. 19-20; Victoria Kahn, 'Virtù and the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli's Prince', in Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 195-218, p. 198.
15. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 28; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue; Skinner, Machiavelli; Martin Fleisher, 'The Ways of Machiavelli and the Ways of Polities', History of Political Thought, XVI (1995), pp. 330-55; Siegel, Rhetoric, pp. 19-20; Victoria Kahn, 'Virtù and the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli's Prince', in Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 195-218, p. 198.
16. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli'; Jerome E. Siegel, ' "Civic Humanism" or Ciceronian Rhetoric?', Past and Present, XXXIV (1966), pp. 3-44, pp. 32 ff.; Isaiah Berlin, 'The Originality of Machiavelli', in I. Berlin, Against the Current (New York, 1980), pp. 25-79, p. 39. Some scholars have also reconciled Machiavelli with conventional moral ideas e.g. Philip J. Kain, 'Niccolo Machiavelli - Adviser of Princes', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XXV (March 1995), pp. 33-55, and Russell Price, 'The Senses of Virtu in Machiavelli', European Studies Review, III (1973), pp. 315-45.
17. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli'; Jerome E. Siegel, ' "Civic Humanism" or Ciceronian Rhetoric?', Past and Present, XXXIV (1966), pp. 3-44, pp. 32 ff.; Isaiah Berlin, 'The Originality of Machiavelli', in I. Berlin, Against the Current (New York, 1980), pp. 25-79, p. 39. Some scholars have also reconciled Machiavelli with conventional moral ideas e.g. Philip J. Kain, 'Niccolo Machiavelli - Adviser of Princes', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XXV (March 1995), pp. 33-55, and Russell Price, 'The Senses of Virtu in Machiavelli', European Studies Review, III (1973), pp. 315-45.
18. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli'; Jerome E. Siegel, ' "Civic Humanism" or Ciceronian Rhetoric?', Past and Present, XXXIV (1966), pp. 3-44, pp. 32 ff.; Isaiah Berlin, 'The Originality of Machiavelli', in I. Berlin, Against the Current (New York, 1980), pp. 25-79, p. 39. Some scholars have also reconciled Machiavelli with conventional moral ideas e.g. Philip J. Kain, 'Niccolo Machiavelli - Adviser of Princes', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XXV (March 1995), pp. 33-55, and Russell Price, 'The Senses of Virtu in Machiavelli', European Studies Review, III (1973), pp. 315-45.
19. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli'; Jerome E. Siegel, ' "Civic Humanism" or Ciceronian Rhetoric?', Past and Present, XXXIV (1966), pp. 3-44, pp. 32 ff.; Isaiah Berlin, 'The Originality of Machiavelli', in I. Berlin, Against the Current (New York, 1980), pp. 25-79, p. 39. Some scholars have also reconciled Machiavelli with conventional moral ideas e.g. Philip J. Kain, 'Niccolo Machiavelli - Adviser of Princes', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XXV (March 1995), pp. 33-55, and Russell Price, 'The Senses of Virtu in Machiavelli', European Studies Review, III (1973), pp. 315-45.
20. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli'; Jerome E. Siegel, ' "Civic Humanism" or Ciceronian Rhetoric?', Past and Present, XXXIV (1966), pp. 3-44, pp. 32 ff.; Isaiah Berlin, 'The Originality of Machiavelli', in I. Berlin, Against the Current (New York, 1980), pp. 25-79, p. 39. Some scholars have also reconciled Machiavelli with conventional moral ideas e.g. Philip J. Kain, 'Niccolo Machiavelli - Adviser of Princes', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XXV (March 1995), pp. 33-55, and Russell Price, 'The Senses of Virtu in Machiavelli', European Studies Review, III (1973), pp. 315-45.
21. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli'; Jerome E. Siegel, ' "Civic Humanism" or Ciceronian Rhetoric?', Past and Present, XXXIV (1966), pp. 3-44, pp. 32 ff.; Isaiah Berlin, 'The Originality of Machiavelli', in I. Berlin, Against the Current (New York, 1980), pp. 25-79, p. 39. Some scholars have also reconciled Machiavelli with conventional moral ideas e.g. Philip J. Kain, 'Niccolo Machiavelli - Adviser of Princes', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XXV (March 1995), pp. 33-55, and Russell Price, 'The Senses of Virtu in Machiavelli', European Studies Review, III (1973), pp. 315-45.
22. Yet Machiavelli does not take Cicero's argument point by point, or example by example. The relatively few direct disagreements on specific historical examples are mentioned below. Machiavelli generally does not use Cicero's examples, or cite the same authors. Both, for example, recommend books by Xenophon; but Cicero recommends the Oeconomicus while Machiavelli recommends the Education of Cyrus.
23. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago, 1985), p. v (all references to The Prince are to this edition); Martin Fleisher, 'A Passion for Politics: The Vital Core of the World of Machiavelli', in Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, ed. Martin Fleisher (New York, 1972), pp. 114-47, p. 119.
24. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago, 1985), p. v (all references to The Prince are to this edition); Martin Fleisher, 'A Passion for Politics: The Vital Core of the World of Machiavelli', in Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, ed. Martin Fleisher (New York, 1972), pp. 114-47, p. 119.
25. Siegel, 'Civic Humanism', pp. 32 ff.; Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', pp. 85 ff.
26. Siegel, 'Civic Humanism', pp. 32 ff.; Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', pp. 85 ff.
27. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 82.
28. Ibid., p. 87. Colish has repeated this argument in her book The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (2 vols., Leiden, 1990), Vol. 1, pp. 143-52. Cf. De Officiis, III, 33-5: '. . . if we are born for honourableness and that should be sought alone (as Zeno held) or at least should be thought entirely to outweigh everything else (as was Aristotle's view) it is necessary that what is honourable is either the only good or the highest; and what is good is certainly beneficial, and so whatever is honourable is beneficial'.
29. Ibid., p. 87. Colish has repeated this argument in her book The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (2 vols., Leiden, 1990), Vol. 1, pp. 143-52. Cf. De Officiis, III, 33-5: '. . . if we are born for honourableness and that should be sought alone (as Zeno held) or at least should be thought entirely to outweigh everything else (as was Aristotle's view) it is necessary that what is honourable is either the only good or the highest; and what is good is certainly beneficial, and so whatever is honourable is beneficial'.
30. Ibid., p. 87. Colish has repeated this argument in her book The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (2 vols., Leiden, 1990), Vol. 1, pp. 143-52. Cf. De Officiis, III, 33-5: '. . . if we are born for honourableness and that should be sought alone (as Zeno held) or at least should be thought entirely to outweigh everything else (as was Aristotle's view) it is necessary that what is honourable is either the only good or the highest; and what is good is certainly beneficial, and so whatever is honourable is beneficial'.
31. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', pp. 86-7. This un-Stoic reading of Cicero's arguments in De Officiis does, however, have the virtue of making Cicero more independent of his sources than many classical scholars would allow him to be.
32. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 2-6. For all references to De Officiis I have generally followed the Griffin and Atkins translations, but sometimes have substituted a word or phrase of my own. For the Latin text I have used the Loeb Classical Library edition, ed. and trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, MA, 1913).
33. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61. On the appeal of The Prince to the young, see Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago, 1958), p. 81.
34. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61. On the appeal of The Prince to the young, see Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago, 1958), p. 81.
35. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 45; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 25, p. 101.
36. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 45; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 25, p. 101.
37. Cicero, De Officiis, III, 121.
38. Ibid., II, 2-3.
39. Ibid., II, 45.
40. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, p. 15; Ch. 26, pp. 101-5; Strauss, Thoughts, p. 63.
41. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, p. 15; Ch. 26, pp. 101-5; Strauss, Thoughts, p. 63.
42. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 23, 28-9; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, pp. 38-9; Ch. 12, p. 50; Neal Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù Reconsidered', Political Studies, XV (1967), pp. 159-72, pp. 167-8; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 252; Skinner, Foundations, pp. 183-4.
43. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 23, 28-9; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, pp. 38-9; Ch. 12, p. 50; Neal Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù Reconsidered', Political Studies, XV (1967), pp. 159-72, pp. 167-8; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 252; Skinner, Foundations, pp. 183-4.
44. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 23, 28-9; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, pp. 38-9; Ch. 12, p. 50; Neal Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù Reconsidered', Political Studies, XV (1967), pp. 159-72, pp. 167-8; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 252; Skinner, Foundations, pp. 183-4.
45. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 23, 28-9; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, pp. 38-9; Ch. 12, p. 50; Neal Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù Reconsidered', Political Studies, XV (1967), pp. 159-72, pp. 167-8; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 252; Skinner, Foundations, pp. 183-4.
46. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 23, 28-9; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, pp. 38-9; Ch. 12, p. 50; Neal Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù Reconsidered', Political Studies, XV (1967), pp. 159-72, pp. 167-8; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 252; Skinner, Foundations, pp. 183-4.
47. With respect to the explicit issue of both books, i.e. how to succeed in politics, there is no difference between the actions of republican citizens and those of princes for Machiavelli. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 252; Skinner, Foundations, pp. 118-19; Skinner, Machiavelli, p. 58; Strauss, Thoughts, p. 47.
48. With respect to the explicit issue of both books, i.e. how to succeed in politics, there is no difference between the actions of republican citizens and those of princes for Machiavelli. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 252; Skinner, Foundations, pp. 118-19; Skinner, Machiavelli, p. 58; Strauss, Thoughts, p. 47.
49. With respect to the explicit issue of both books, i.e. how to succeed in politics, there is no difference between the actions of republican citizens and those of princes for Machiavelli. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 252; Skinner, Foundations, pp. 118-19; Skinner, Machiavelli, p. 58; Strauss, Thoughts, p. 47.
50. With respect to the explicit issue of both books, i.e. how to succeed in politics, there is no difference between the actions of republican citizens and those of princes for Machiavelli. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 252; Skinner, Foundations, pp. 118-19; Skinner, Machiavelli, p. 58; Strauss, Thoughts, p. 47.
51. Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', p. 86; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 20; Skinner, Foundations, p. 115; Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli's Three Romes (DeKalb, IL, 1996), p. 12. The distinction goes back to Aristotle, Politics, 1324a, and even further to Socrates' insistence on his 'foreignness' in Plato's Apology.
52. Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', p. 86; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 20; Skinner, Foundations, p. 115; Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli's Three Romes (DeKalb, IL, 1996), p. 12. The distinction goes back to Aristotle, Politics, 1324a, and even further to Socrates' insistence on his 'foreignness' in Plato's Apology.
53. Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', p. 86; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 20; Skinner, Foundations, p. 115; Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli's Three Romes (DeKalb, IL, 1996), p. 12. The distinction goes back to Aristotle, Politics, 1324a, and even further to Socrates' insistence on his 'foreignness' in Plato's Apology.
54. Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', p. 86; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 20; Skinner, Foundations, p. 115; Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli's Three Romes (DeKalb, IL, 1996), p. 12. The distinction goes back to Aristotle, Politics, 1324a, and even further to Socrates' insistence on his 'foreignness' in Plato's Apology.
55. Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', p. 86; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 20; Skinner, Foundations, p. 115; Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli's Three Romes (DeKalb, IL, 1996), p. 12. The distinction goes back to Aristotle, Politics, 1324a, and even further to Socrates' insistence on his 'foreignness' in Plato's Apology.
56. Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', p. 86; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 20; Skinner, Foundations, p. 115; Vickie B. Sullivan, Machiavelli's Three Romes (DeKalb, IL, 1996), p. 12. The distinction goes back to Aristotle, Politics, 1324a, and even further to Socrates' insistence on his 'foreignness' in Plato's Apology.
57. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 3-4.
58. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 88. Cicero does treat the virtues in this way in other books, notably De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum and the Tusculan Disputations. The concluding section of De Republica, known as 'Scipio's Dream', is an explicit argument for the position that the ultimate justification of the political life lies beyond politics itself, in the eternal things. This is the one section of De Republica that has been available throughout history, and it is likely that Machiavelli knew it. Colish's argument depends on the assumption that Cicero had modified or abandoned the views he expressed in De Republica when he wrote De Officiis. See also E.M. Atkins, 'Domina et Regina Virtutum: Justice and Societas in De Officiis', Phronesis, XXXV (1990), pp. 258-89, p. 259.
59. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 88. Cicero does treat the virtues in this way in other books, notably De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum and the Tusculan Disputations. The concluding section of De Republica, known as 'Scipio's Dream', is an explicit argument for the position that the ultimate justification of the political life lies beyond politics itself, in the eternal things. This is the one section of De Republica that has been available throughout history, and it is likely that Machiavelli knew it. Colish's argument depends on the assumption that Cicero had modified or abandoned the views he expressed in De Republica when he wrote De Officiis. See also E.M. Atkins, 'Domina et Regina Virtutum: Justice and Societas in De Officiis', Phronesis, XXXV (1990), pp. 258-89, p. 259.
60. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 28-9, 69-73, 153-9; II, 12-16; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61; Ch. 18, p. 70; Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 195.
61. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 28-9, 69-73, 153-9; II, 12-16; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61; Ch. 18, p. 70; Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 195.
62. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 28-9, 69-73, 153-9; II, 12-16; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61; Ch. 18, p. 70; Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 195.
63. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 28-9, 69-73, 153-9; II, 12-16; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61; Ch. 18, p. 70; Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 195.
64. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 21; cf. II, 73, and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 67. Cicero gives the same list again in De Officiis, II, 22, but there he emphasizes that these are motives for men to 'submit themselves to the command or power of another', not to 'assist another in promoting' himself.
65. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 21; cf. II, 73, and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 67. Cicero gives the same list again in De Officiis, II, 22, but there he emphasizes that these are motives for men to 'submit themselves to the command or power of another', not to 'assist another in promoting' himself.
66. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 21; cf. II, 73, and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 67. Cicero gives the same list again in De Officiis, II, 22, but there he emphasizes that these are motives for men to 'submit themselves to the command or power of another', not to 'assist another in promoting' himself.
67. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 21; cf. II, 73, and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 67. Cicero gives the same list again in De Officiis, II, 22, but there he emphasizes that these are motives for men to 'submit themselves to the command or power of another', not to 'assist another in promoting' himself.
68. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 22.
69. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', pp. 86, 88.
70. At the end of De Officiis, III, 96, Cicero says that some things may 'become no longer honorable if what is beneficial changes', which would appear to be explicit support for Colish's position. Yet Cicero's discussion centres on keeping promises, and the circumstances under which a promise might be broken. As he presents it, this requires a comparison of ends, not of utilities.
71. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 32, 59; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 63.
72. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 32, 59; Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 63.
73. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 65.
74. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 60.
75. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87, citing De Officiis, I, 45. One might note that Cicero, in De Officiis, I, 41-2, announces that he is shifting his theme away from justice and towards 'beneficence and liberality', thus calling into question the extent to which this is an adjustment in Cicero's treatment of justice. Although it appears to strengthen her case, Colish does not comment on Cicero's treatment of this theme in Book II.
76. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87, citing De Officiis, I, 45. One might note that Cicero, in De Officiis, I, 41-2, announces that he is shifting his theme away from justice and towards 'beneficence and liberality', thus calling into question the extent to which this is an adjustment in Cicero's treatment of justice. Although it appears to strengthen her case, Colish does not comment on Cicero's treatment of this theme in Book II.
77. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87, citing De Officiis, I, 45. One might note that Cicero, in De Officiis, I, 41-2, announces that he is shifting his theme away from justice and towards 'beneficence and liberality', thus calling into question the extent to which this is an adjustment in Cicero's treatment of justice. Although it appears to strengthen her case, Colish does not comment on Cicero's treatment of this theme in Book II.
78. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 45; cf. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, and Atkins, 'Domina et regina virtutum', p. 261.
79. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 45; cf. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, and Atkins, 'Domina et regina virtutum', p. 261.
80. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 45; cf. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, and Atkins, 'Domina et regina virtutum', p. 261.
81. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 63.
82. Cf. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, p. 8; Ch. 17, p. 66; Ch. 19, pp. 76-7; Ch. 22, p. 93, and William Shakespeare, Richard II, Act V, scene 1.
83. Cf. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, p. 8; Ch. 17, p. 66; Ch. 19, pp. 76-7; Ch. 22, p. 93, and William Shakespeare, Richard II, Act V, scene 1.
84. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 63.
85. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 33-4, 36-8.
86. Ibid., II, 23; cf. II, 29.
87. Ibid., II, 23; cf. II, 29.
88. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 67; cf. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 91, where she ignores Machiavelli's discussion of fear and implies that he agrees with Cicero.
89. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 67; cf. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 91, where she ignores Machiavelli's discussion of fear and implies that he agrees with Cicero.
90. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68.
91. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 12, 36.
92. Ibid., I, 65; II, 43; cf. I, 99; in this case, I agree with Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 91, but with the important reservation that Cicero is speaking of the virtues and Machiavelli of virtù, which includes the capacity to fake the virtues.
93. Ibid., I, 65; II, 43; cf. I, 99; in this case, I agree with Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 91, but with the important reservation that Cicero is speaking of the virtues and Machiavelli of virtù, which includes the capacity to fake the virtues.
94. Ibid., I, 65; II, 43; cf. I, 99; in this case, I agree with Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 91, but with the important reservation that Cicero is speaking of the virtues and Machiavelli of virtù, which includes the capacity to fake the virtues.
95. Ibid., I, 65; II, 43; cf. I, 99; in this case, I agree with Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 91, but with the important reservation that Cicero is speaking of the virtues and Machiavelli of virtù, which includes the capacity to fake the virtues.
96. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 18, p. 71, and especially Ch. 25. Cf. Kahn, 'Virtù and the Example of Agathocles', pp. 205-6.
97. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 18, p. 71, and especially Ch. 25. Cf. Kahn, 'Virtù and the Example of Agathocles', pp. 205-6.
98. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, pp. 61, 62; cf. Ch. 18, p. 70. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 217; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 25.
99. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, pp. 61, 62; cf. Ch. 18, p. 70. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 217; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 25.
100. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, pp. 61, 62; cf. Ch. 18, p. 70. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 217; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 25.
101. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 53-8, 155-60.
102. Ibid., I, 34, 36, 82; II, 26-7, 45, 85.
103. Ibid., I, 34, 36, 82; II, 26-7, 45, 85.
104. Ibid., I, 75.
105. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 76-8. Cicero undoubtedly wanted to gloss over the fact that by the time De Officiis was written Pompey's victories were meaningless anyway. That his actions in suppressing the conspiracy were not strictly legal, moreover, would not have been lost on Marcus. In suppressing the conspiracy, Cicero had executed Roman citizens on the basis of a Senate decree, and without trial. Whether the conspiracy was as serious as Cicero thought, and whether his actions were legal, are still controversial.
106. Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', p. 170.
107. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 12, p. 48.
108. Ibid., Ch. 14, p. 58.
109. Walter Nicgorski, 'Cicero's Paradoxes and His Idea of Utility', Political Theory, XII (1984), pp. 557-78, p. 568.
110. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 21-2.
111. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
112. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
113. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
114. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
115. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
116. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
117. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
118. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
119. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
120. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
121. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
122. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
123. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
124. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
125. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
126. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
127. On Scipio: Cicero, De Officiis, III, 1-4 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 17, p. 68; on Caesar: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 43; II, 83 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64; on the Gracchi: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 78-80 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 9, p. 41; on Romulus, Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, pp. 22-4 and Cicero, De Officiis, III, 40-1. Machiavelli and Cicero also have two non-Roman examples in common, Pyrrhus of Epirus and Alexander the Great. On Pyrrhus: Cicero, De Officiis, I, 38, 40; II, 26; III, 86 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 4, p. 19; on Alexander: Cicero, De Officiis, II, 53 and Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 16, p. 64. Besides Romulus, Alexander is the only one whose foresight Machiavelli does not call into question. Other examples of disagreement on specific actions might also be given. Compare for example Cicero's arguments on keeping promises in De Officiis, I, 31-3 with Machiavelli's discussion of how a prince should keep faith in The Prince, Ch. 18.
128. Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. xi.
129. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 17.
130. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 23, p. 95.
131. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 41.
132. Ibid., I, 38; cf. I, 34.
133. Ibid., I, 38; cf. I, 34.
134. Ibid., II, 51.
135. Atkins, 'Domina et Regina Virtutum', p. 268.
136. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 41.
137. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 18, p. 70.
138. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87; at p. 91, she claims that Machiavelli agrees with Cicero that the statesman needs both natures - which Cicero explicitly does not say. See Ezio Raimondi, 'The Politician and the Centaur', in Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 145-60, 146-8.
139. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87; at p. 91, she claims that Machiavelli agrees with Cicero that the statesman needs both natures - which Cicero explicitly does not say. See Ezio Raimondi, 'The Politician and the Centaur', in Machiavelli and the Discourse of Literature, ed. Albert Russell Ascoli and Victoria Kahn (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 145-60, 146-8.
140. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 19; cf. I, 153, 155-60; II, 11-14; III, 13-15; Colish does not emphasize Cicero's distinction between these two sources of duty, which seem to have their origin in the Stoic distinction between the wise man's duties and everyone else's. See De Officiis, III, 17, where Cicero distinguishes between 'true' and 'common' senses of honestum.
141. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 19; cf. I, 153, 155-60; II, 11-14; III, 13-15; Colish does not emphasize Cicero's distinction between these two sources of duty, which seem to have their origin in the Stoic distinction between the wise man's duties and everyone else's. See De Officiis, III, 17, where Cicero distinguishes between 'true' and 'common' senses of honestum.
142. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 19; cf. I, 153, 155-60; II, 11-14; III, 13-15; Colish does not emphasize Cicero's distinction between these two sources of duty, which seem to have their origin in the Stoic distinction between the wise man's duties and everyone else's. See De Officiis, III, 17, where Cicero distinguishes between 'true' and 'common' senses of honestum.
143. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 19; cf. I, 153, 155-60; II, 11-14; III, 13-15; Colish does not emphasize Cicero's distinction between these two sources of duty, which seem to have their origin in the Stoic distinction between the wise man's duties and everyone else's. See De Officiis, III, 17, where Cicero distinguishes between 'true' and 'common' senses of honestum.
144. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 19; cf. I, 153, 155-60; II, 11-14; III, 13-15; Colish does not emphasize Cicero's distinction between these two sources of duty, which seem to have their origin in the Stoic distinction between the wise man's duties and everyone else's. See De Officiis, III, 17, where Cicero distinguishes between 'true' and 'common' senses of honestum.
145. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 19, 156; cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1324a-1325b.
146. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 19, 156; cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1324a-1325b.
147. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 11-14; Atkins, 'Domina et Regina Virtutum', pp. 258-63.
148. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 11-14; Atkins, 'Domina et Regina Virtutum', pp. 258-63.
149. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 13, 18.
150. Ibid., I, 28, 66-71.
151. Ibid., I, 64-5.
152. Ibid., I, 157; cf. I, 19-20.
153. Ibid., I, 157; cf. I, 19-20.
154. Ibid., I, 30-2, 50-8. Although there is not space to discuss the issue in detail here, note the way that Cicero silently drops the discussion of duties to humankind as such at De Officiis, I, 58, following his discussion of those duties at I, 51, which again suggests a selective use of his Stoic sources. Cf. Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', pp. 565-6.
155. Ibid., I, 30-2, 50-8. Although there is not space to discuss the issue in detail here, note the way that Cicero silently drops the discussion of duties to humankind as such at De Officiis, I, 58, following his discussion of those duties at I, 51, which again suggests a selective use of his Stoic sources. Cf. Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', pp. 565-6.
156. Ibid., I, 30-2, 50-8. Although there is not space to discuss the issue in detail here, note the way that Cicero silently drops the discussion of duties to humankind as such at De Officiis, I, 58, following his discussion of those duties at I, 51, which again suggests a selective use of his Stoic sources. Cf. Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', pp. 565-6.
157. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 11, 105, 157.
158. Ibid., I, 158-60.
159. Ibid., I, 12-13.
160. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 88; cf. De Officiis, III, 17-18, where Cicero explicitly tries to define utile as a mode of honestum in denying the possibility of a conflict between the two. On p. 89, Colish concedes that for Cicero, 'man is part of a larger social and moral whole, which makes radical individualism unacceptable as a basis for ethical action', but does not follow out the implications of this for her argument about the useful. See also Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 195, and Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', p. 566.
161. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 88; cf. De Officiis, III, 17-18, where Cicero explicitly tries to define utile as a mode of honestum in denying the possibility of a conflict between the two. On p. 89, Colish concedes that for Cicero, 'man is part of a larger social and moral whole, which makes radical individualism unacceptable as a basis for ethical action', but does not follow out the implications of this for her argument about the useful. See also Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 195, and Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', p. 566.
162. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 88; cf. De Officiis, III, 17-18, where Cicero explicitly tries to define utile as a mode of honestum in denying the possibility of a conflict between the two. On p. 89, Colish concedes that for Cicero, 'man is part of a larger social and moral whole, which makes radical individualism unacceptable as a basis for ethical action', but does not follow out the implications of this for her argument about the useful. See also Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 195, and Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', p. 566.
163. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 88; cf. De Officiis, III, 17-18, where Cicero explicitly tries to define utile as a mode of honestum in denying the possibility of a conflict between the two. On p. 89, Colish concedes that for Cicero, 'man is part of a larger social and moral whole, which makes radical individualism unacceptable as a basis for ethical action', but does not follow out the implications of this for her argument about the useful. See also Hulliung, Citizen Machiavelli, p. 195, and Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', p. 566.
164. Cicero, De Officiis, III, 11.
165. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87; cf. De Officiis, III, 15, where Cicero says he is writing about duties for everyone, and makes the analogy with art appreciation, suggesting that his book will help teach people not to praise things 'when they ought not to be praised'.
166. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87; cf. De Officiis, III, 15, where Cicero says he is writing about duties for everyone, and makes the analogy with art appreciation, suggesting that his book will help teach people not to praise things 'when they ought not to be praised'.
167. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87, citing De Officiis, I, 155.
168. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87, citing De Officiis, I, 155.
169. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 159.
170. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 86.
171. Cicero, De Officiis, III, 26-8.
172. Later in her essay, Colish says: 'In cases where the two values appear to conflict, utility, to be sure, is the norm invoked to resolve the conflict. But it is utility on a social level, utilitas rei publicae.' She does not, however, cite any text to support this claim. One might point to a number of passages in Book III where Cicero explicitly appeals to honestum as the ruling principle - e.g. at De Officiis, III, 11-17, 19, 31, 35, 41-2, 64 and 72. At De Officiis, III, 96, however - a passage ignored by Colish - Cicero abruptly reverses course and acknowledges that changes in the utile may affect the nature of one's duties. See the discussion in note 27, above.
173. Later in her essay, Colish says: 'In cases where the two values appear to conflict, utility, to be sure, is the norm invoked to resolve the conflict. But it is utility on a social level, utilitas rei publicae.' She does not, however, cite any text to support this claim. One might point to a number of passages in Book III where Cicero explicitly appeals to honestum as the ruling principle - e.g. at De Officiis, III, 11-17, 19, 31, 35, 41-2, 64 and 72. At De Officiis, III, 96, however - a passage ignored by Colish - Cicero abruptly reverses course and acknowledges that changes in the utile may affect the nature of one's duties. See the discussion in note 27, above.
174. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 4-5; II, 7-8.
175. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 4-5; II, 7-8.
176. Ibid., I, 82; II, 1-5; III, 1-4.
177. Ibid., I, 82; II, 1-5; III, 1-4.
178. Ibid., I, 82; II, 1-5; III, 1-4.
179. To what extent he follows or modifies his Stoic source here is unclear. Panaetius seems to have had opinions at variance from those of stricter Stoics, but we cannot know how much Cicero followed Panaetius and how much is his own. See De Officiis, III, 11-15 for Cicero's discussion of the two levels.
180. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 19-20.
181. Cf. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 88. Colish does not take into account that there are two levels or kinds of morality under discussion. Cf. Julia Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Philosophy and Private Property', in Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, ed. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford, 1989), pp. 151-73, pp. 172-3.
182. Cf. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 88. Colish does not take into account that there are two levels or kinds of morality under discussion. Cf. Julia Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Philosophy and Private Property', in Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, ed. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford, 1989), pp. 151-73, pp. 172-3.
183. Gilbert, 'The Humanist Concept of the Prince', pp. 477 ff.
184. Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', p. 86; Skinner, Foundations, p. 108.
185. Baron, 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit', p. 86; Skinner, Foundations, p. 108.
186. This is not the place to provide a detailed examination of this claim; but on this generally see the Discourses, and the comments of Sullivan, Mansfield and Hulliung.
187. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 153; II, 11; III, 28.
188. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 153; II, 11; III, 28.
189. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 153; II, 11; III, 28.
190. Ibid., I, 17, 158; II, 17-18.
191. Ibid., I, 17, 158; II, 17-18.
192. Ibid., I, 153.
193. Ibid., I, 159; III, 11-17; cf. The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61, where Machiavelli says that the choice of being good or not good is made 'according to necessity', i.e. that the controlling factor is the circumstances, not the virtues.
194. Ibid., I, 159; III, 11-17; cf. The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61, where Machiavelli says that the choice of being good or not good is made 'according to necessity', i.e. that the controlling factor is the circumstances, not the virtues.
195. Ibid., I, 159; III, 11-17; cf. The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61, where Machiavelli says that the choice of being good or not good is made 'according to necessity', i.e. that the controlling factor is the circumstances, not the virtues.
196. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 153.
197. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87; Cicero, De Officiis, II, 6; III, 15. I take Colish to be making a different argument from Nicgorski, who characterizes the 'rule of necessity' in Cicero thus: 'to do what is necessary is to act in accord with duty, that is, to act appropriately; to act appropriately is at first to act in accord with the natural prephilosophical understanding of the needs of man'. He concludes, as I do, that Cicero sees no tension between the prephilosophical and philosophical understanding of those needs. Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', p. 565.
198. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87; Cicero, De Officiis, II, 6; III, 15. I take Colish to be making a different argument from Nicgorski, who characterizes the 'rule of necessity' in Cicero thus: 'to do what is necessary is to act in accord with duty, that is, to act appropriately; to act appropriately is at first to act in accord with the natural prephilosophical understanding of the needs of man'. He concludes, as I do, that Cicero sees no tension between the prephilosophical and philosophical understanding of those needs. Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', p. 565.
199. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87; Cicero, De Officiis, II, 6; III, 15. I take Colish to be making a different argument from Nicgorski, who characterizes the 'rule of necessity' in Cicero thus: 'to do what is necessary is to act in accord with duty, that is, to act appropriately; to act appropriately is at first to act in accord with the natural prephilosophical understanding of the needs of man'. He concludes, as I do, that Cicero sees no tension between the prephilosophical and philosophical understanding of those needs. Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', p. 565.
200. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87; Cicero, De Officiis, II, 6; III, 15. I take Colish to be making a different argument from Nicgorski, who characterizes the 'rule of necessity' in Cicero thus: 'to do what is necessary is to act in accord with duty, that is, to act appropriately; to act appropriately is at first to act in accord with the natural prephilosophical understanding of the needs of man'. He concludes, as I do, that Cicero sees no tension between the prephilosophical and philosophical understanding of those needs. Nicgorski, 'Paradoxes', p. 565.
201. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 22.
202. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 15, p. 61.
203. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 31-2; II, 19.
204. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 31-2; II, 19.
205. Ibid., II, 10, 85; III, 17.
206. Ibid., II, 10, 85; III, 17.
207. Ibid., II, 74.
208. Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', pp. 167, 170.
209. Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, p. 38.
210. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, pp. 14-15; Ch. 6, pp. 22-4; Ch. 14, p. 60. Cf. Mansfield, introduction to The Prince, xi-xii, and Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21. Note that Colish does not consider the problem of Cicero's silence on this issue; see Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87. See also Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy', p. 170; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', pp. 167 ff.; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, pp. 75, 290, 306; Fleisher, 'Ways', p. 335.
211. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, pp. 14-15; Ch. 6, pp. 22-4; Ch. 14, p. 60. Cf. Mansfield, introduction to The Prince, xi-xii, and Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21. Note that Colish does not consider the problem of Cicero's silence on this issue; see Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87. See also Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy', p. 170; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', pp. 167 ff.; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, pp. 75, 290, 306; Fleisher, 'Ways', p. 335.
212. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, pp. 14-15; Ch. 6, pp. 22-4; Ch. 14, p. 60. Cf. Mansfield, introduction to The Prince, xi-xii, and Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21. Note that Colish does not consider the problem of Cicero's silence on this issue; see Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87. See also Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy', p. 170; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', pp. 167 ff.; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, pp. 75, 290, 306; Fleisher, 'Ways', p. 335.
213. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, pp. 14-15; Ch. 6, pp. 22-4; Ch. 14, p. 60. Cf. Mansfield, introduction to The Prince, xi-xii, and Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21. Note that Colish does not consider the problem of Cicero's silence on this issue; see Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87. See also Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy', p. 170; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', pp. 167 ff.; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, pp. 75, 290, 306; Fleisher, 'Ways', p. 335.
214. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, pp. 14-15; Ch. 6, pp. 22-4; Ch. 14, p. 60. Cf. Mansfield, introduction to The Prince, xi-xii, and Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21. Note that Colish does not consider the problem of Cicero's silence on this issue; see Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87. See also Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy', p. 170; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', pp. 167 ff.; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, pp. 75, 290, 306; Fleisher, 'Ways', p. 335.
215. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, pp. 14-15; Ch. 6, pp. 22-4; Ch. 14, p. 60. Cf. Mansfield, introduction to The Prince, xi-xii, and Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21. Note that Colish does not consider the problem of Cicero's silence on this issue; see Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87. See also Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy', p. 170; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', pp. 167 ff.; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, pp. 75, 290, 306; Fleisher, 'Ways', p. 335.
216. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, pp. 14-15; Ch. 6, pp. 22-4; Ch. 14, p. 60. Cf. Mansfield, introduction to The Prince, xi-xii, and Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21. Note that Colish does not consider the problem of Cicero's silence on this issue; see Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87. See also Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy', p. 170; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', pp. 167 ff.; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, pp. 75, 290, 306; Fleisher, 'Ways', p. 335.
217. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, pp. 14-15; Ch. 6, pp. 22-4; Ch. 14, p. 60. Cf. Mansfield, introduction to The Prince, xi-xii, and Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21. Note that Colish does not consider the problem of Cicero's silence on this issue; see Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 87. See also Annas, 'Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy', p. 170; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', pp. 167 ff.; Mansfield, Machiavelli's Virtue, pp. 75, 290, 306; Fleisher, 'Ways', p. 335.
218. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21, 75; II, 85.
219. Cicero, De Officiis, I, 21, 75; II, 85.
220. Ibid., I, 50 ff., 158; II, 12-15.
221. Ibid., I, 50 ff., 158; II, 12-15.
222. Fleisher, 'Passion', p. 129; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', p. 170; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 165.
223. Fleisher, 'Passion', p. 129; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', p. 170; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 165.
224. Fleisher, 'Passion', p. 129; Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', p. 170; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 165.
225. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 18, p. 70.
226. Ibid., Ch. 1, p. 6; Ch. 3, pp. 8-15; Cicero, De Officiis, II, 85.
227. Ibid., Ch. 1, p. 6; Ch. 3, pp. 8-15; Cicero, De Officiis, II, 85.
228. Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 3, pp. 14-15.
229. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 24; III, 41; Skinner, Machiavelli, p. 54.
230. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 24; III, 41; Skinner, Machiavelli, p. 54.
231. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 24; III, 41; Skinner, Machiavelli, p. 54.
232. Wood, 'Machiavelli's Concept of Virtù', p. 167.
233. e.g. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 26-7, 85; III, 86-7.
234. e.g. Cicero, De Officiis, II, 26-7, 85; III, 86-7.
235. Colish, 'Cicero and Machiavelli', p. 84.
236. Leo Strauss, 'Restatement', in On Tyranny, ed. Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (New York, 1991), p. 206.