Wash-out: A critique of follow-the-money methods in crime control policy

Crime, Law and Social Change

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-58

  Naylor, R T ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

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EID: 0033266948     PISSN: 09254994     EISSN: 15730751     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1008386203362     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. See, for example, United Nations, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Countering Money Laundering, Vienna, 15/8/97.
2. There is a growing critical literature on the use of asset forfeiture laws in the U.S. See especially David Fried, "Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture", Journal Of Law And Criminology, Vol. 79, No. 2, 1988; Steven Kessler, Civil And Criminal Forfeiture: Federal and State Practice, Clark, Boardman and Callaghan, New York: 1994; and Leonard Levy, A License to Steal: the Forfeiture of Property, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill: 1996.
3. There is a growing critical literature on the use of asset forfeiture laws in the U.S. See especially David Fried, "Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture", Journal Of Law And Criminology, Vol. 79, No. 2, 1988; Steven Kessler, Civil And Criminal Forfeiture: Federal and State Practice, Clark, Boardman and Callaghan, New York: 1994; and Leonard Levy, A License to Steal: the Forfeiture of Property, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill: 1996.
4. There is a growing critical literature on the use of asset forfeiture laws in the U.S. See especially David Fried, "Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture", Journal Of Law And Criminology, Vol. 79, No. 2, 1988; Steven Kessler, Civil And Criminal Forfeiture: Federal and State Practice, Clark, Boardman and Callaghan, New York: 1994; and Leonard Levy, A License to Steal: the Forfeiture of Property, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill: 1996.
5. For the Canadian statute, see 33-36-37 Elizabeth II Chapter 51 Section 420.17.
6. In Canada, for example, the government established Integrated Proceeds of Crime units of the RCMP financed by a loan from the Treasury Board which they are expected to repay from the proceeds of their seizures. In the province of British Colombia, police can apply to the provincial Attorney-General to use seized assets for "special projects."
7. Margaret Beare, Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime in Canada, Toronto, Nelson Canada: 1996, 191.
8. Some of these issues are discussed in R.T. Naylor, "Mafias, Myths and Markets: On the Theory and Practice of Enterprise Crime", Transnational Organized Crime Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997.
9. Cited in Kessler, Forfeiture, 140. That opinion was concurred in by no less prestigious a body than the President's Commission on Organized Crime in 1984. "Without the ability to freely utilize its ill-gotten gains, the underworld will have been delivered a crippling blow." (President's Commission on Organized Crime, The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions and Money Laundering, Washington: 1984, In.)
10. Cited in Kessler, Forfeiture, 140. That opinion was concurred in by no less prestigious a body than the President's Commission on Organized Crime in 1984. "Without the ability to freely utilize its ill-gotten gains, the underworld will have been delivered a crippling blow." (President's Commission on Organized Crime, The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions and Money Laundering, Washington: 1984, In.)
11. "We can strip the entrepreneurs of their illegal profits", not just current but past, claimed the chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in 1990 (International Drug Money Laundering: Issues and Options for Congress, Washington: 1990, 6) In Italy, too, the Minister of the Interior declared two years later, "We must hit them where it hurts most - in the pocket." ( Financial Times 1/12/92)
12. "We can strip the entrepreneurs of their illegal profits", not just current but past, claimed the chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in 1990 (International Drug Money Laundering: Issues and Options for Congress, Washington: 1990, 6) In Italy, too, the Minister of the Interior declared two years later, "We must hit them where it hurts most - in the pocket." ( Financial Times 1/12/92)
13. 9. House Foreign Affairs Committee, International Drug Money Laundering, 6-7.
14. Mike Levy, "Taking the Profit out of Crime: the U.K. Experience", mimeo, University of Wales, Cardiff, 1997, 1.
15. These numbers were, of course, totally fictional. For an interesting dissection of how the drug trade numbers are concocted and manipulated, see Peter Reuter, "The Mismeasurement of Illegal Drug Markets: the Implications of Its Irrelevance", in Susan Pozo, ed., Exploring The Underground Economy, Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute, 1996.
16. After hearing senior Canadian police officers angrily offer this story as proof the crime world was awash with cash, the author submitted a U.S. note to the test of two months of total immersion (unlike the basement scenario where the most of the bills would not likely come in direct contact with the water) and detected not the slightest deterioration.
17. U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, Drugs and Money Laundering in Panama, Washington: 28/1/88.
18. For the most hysterical example of this kind of "reasoning", see the late Claire Sterling's Crime Without Frontiers: The World-wide Expansion of Organized Crime and the Pax Mafioso, London: Little, Brown, 1994. For a critique see R.T. Naylor, "From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New 'National Security' Threat", Transnational Organized Crime Vol. 1, No. 4, 1995.
19. For the most hysterical example of this kind of "reasoning", see the late Claire Sterling's Crime Without Frontiers: The World-wide Expansion of Organized Crime and the Pax Mafioso, London: Little, Brown, 1994. For a critique see R.T. Naylor, "From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New 'National Security' Threat", Transnational Organized Crime Vol. 1, No. 4, 1995.
20. Washington Post 18/9/89. For a discussion of the myth of the "Medellin Cartel," see Rensselaer Lee III, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989 and Franscisco Thoumi, Political Economy & Illegal Drugs in Colombia, Lynne Reinner, Boulder Colorado: 1995.
21. Washington Post 18/9/89. For a discussion of the myth of the "Medellin Cartel," see Rensselaer Lee III, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989 and Franscisco Thoumi, Political Economy & Illegal Drugs in Colombia, Lynne Reinner, Boulder Colorado: 1995.
22. Washington Post 18/9/89. For a discussion of the myth of the "Medellin Cartel," see Rensselaer Lee III, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989 and Franscisco Thoumi, Political Economy & Illegal Drugs in Colombia, Lynne Reinner, Boulder Colorado: 1995.
23. It is fascinating, and a little depressing, to observe that the number games not only remain just as egregious but have gotten progressively worse since the exposure, nearly 30 years ago, of their fraudulent nature in Max Singer's "The Vitality of Mythical Numbers", The Public Interest, No. 23, 1971. Singer demonstrated that the amount of property crime attributed to heroin addicts in New York was perhaps ten times as much as could properly be attributed to them.
24. This is the main theme of R.T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985 and Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1994.
25. Testimony of Jeffrey Harris, Deputy Associate Attorney General, "Drug Enforcement Administration Oversight and Authorization", US Senate, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 1982. Cited in David Fried "Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture", Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1988, 363n.
26. Cited in Nicholas de Feir, "Asset Forfeiture: How far can U.S. Courts go?" International Financial Law Review March, 1992.
27. Cf. Michael Brake and Chris Hale, Public Order and Private Lives, London: Routledge, 1992.
28. This is well analyzed by Stephen Fox in his Blood and Power: Organized Crime in Twentieth Century America, Penguin, New York: 1989.
29. Law enforcement often uses the term "enterprise crime" in a sloppy way to refer to any crime with an economic motivation. See, for example, the category of enterprise crime as used in Canada's Bill C-61, its proceeds of crime law, in which everything from arson to murder to counterfeiting is lumped together. There is no actual definition of enterprise crime - it would be impossible to come up with an actual definition to deal with this grab bag list which has the air of being a typical political compromise: everyone involved in drafting the act apparently got to stick their favorite offense into the mix.
30. These distinctions were addressed in R.T. Naylor, "From Underworld to Underground: Enterprise Crime, 'Informal Sector' Business and the Public Policy Response", Crime, Law & Social Change, Vol. 24, 1996.
31. See especially Viviana Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money, New York: 1994.
32. See the analysis of Anilise Anderson, The Business of Organized Crime, Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1979 and Peter Reuter, The Organization of Illegal Markets, Washington: National Institute of Justice, 1985.
33. See the analysis of Anilise Anderson, The Business of Organized Crime, Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1979 and Peter Reuter, The Organization of Illegal Markets, Washington: National Institute of Justice, 1985.
34. For a survey of some of the worst excesses, see Rep. Henry Hyde, Forfeiting our Property Rights: Is Your Property Safe from Seizure?, Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1995.
35. A general analysis with some concrete examples can be found in Vito Tanzi (ed.) The Underground Economy in The United States and Around the World, Lexington Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982 and Edgar Feige (ed.) The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion, New York: Cambridge, Mass. 1989. There is a fifth type of calculation - it involves using technical indicators like electrical consumption by industry to figure out what output really is, rather than what industry reports it to be. But this has little significance for the "criminal" portion of the underground economy. It really reflects tax evasion by legitimate firms.
36. A general analysis with some concrete examples can be found in Vito Tanzi (ed.) The Underground Economy in The United States and Around the World, Lexington Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982 and Edgar Feige (ed.) The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion, New York: Cambridge, Mass. 1989. There is a fifth type of calculation - it involves using technical indicators like electrical consumption by industry to figure out what output really is, rather than what industry reports it to be. But this has little significance for the "criminal" portion of the underground economy. It really reflects tax evasion by legitimate firms.
37. There are also "discrepancy" calculations based on taking total national income based on the national income accounts on the one side and total national income based on tax data on the other, and subtracting the two. This, in theory, gives the total amount of unreported income. In fact the procedure is seriously flawed, since the national income accounts are themselves often based, at least in part, on tax data.
38. An interesting example is the 1993 anti-underground economy strategy of Revenue Canada. It allocated more than 1,000 auditors to the program. Yet in 1997-8 more than 60% of audits were in the construction sector. Revenue Canada claimed it had collected more than C$2.5 billion in extra taxes. The Auditor General put the real figure over five years at $500 million, imputing most of the rest to regular enforcement programs. (Globe and Mail 21/4/99)
39. For a devastating critique of the monetary approaches to calculating the underground economy see Richard Portes and Amanda Bayer, "Monetary Perspectives on Underground Economic Activity in the United States" in Feige, Underground Economies.
40. For an examination of some of the grey areas, see R.T. Naylor, "From Underworld to Underground: Enterprise Crime, 'Informal Sector' Business and the Public Policy Response", Crime, Law & Social Change, Vol. 24, 1996.
41. There might have to be some small downward adjustment of the total informal-plus-formal GNP estimate to take account of the fact that lower prices in the informal sector stimulate demand and therefore production. The impact of integrating the informal into the formal would be to raise prices on that part of production formerly sold off-the-books but now subject to taxes, social security levies and minimum wage laws. That might also lower total quantities sold, with the net effect indeterminate but, in aggregate, probably not too significant.
42. There is another methodological complication here. When commercial crimes are added to enterprise to arrive at total criminal income, it is not then possible to compare that figure to legal income to arrive at a crime within it! Hence a further adjustment. Once grand commercial crime is estimated, it must be simultaneously added to the criminal income and subtracted from legal before the calculation is made.
43. The path-breaking work in this regard was Peter Reuter's Disorganized Crime, New York: 1983. Though subject to much criticism, its basic thesis has remained largely unchallenged. In fact it has been repeatedly confirmed by other studies. See for example Pierre Tremblay, Maurice Cusson & Carlo Morselli, "Market Offenses and Limits to Growth," Crime, Law & Social Change, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1998.
44. The path-breaking work in this regard was Peter Reuter's Disorganized Crime, New York: 1983. Though subject to much criticism, its basic thesis has remained largely unchallenged. In fact it has been repeatedly confirmed by other studies. See for example Pierre Tremblay, Maurice Cusson & Carlo Morselli, "Market Offenses and Limits to Growth," Crime, Law & Social Change, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1998.
45. The U.S. has seen a rash of confessional works by Mafia figures, or by their offspring. As just one example, see Sam and Chuck Giancanna, Double Cross: The Explosive Inside Story of the Mobster Who Controlled America and Masterminded the Murders ofJFK and Marilyn Monroe, New York, Warner Books: 1992.
46. See, for example, the introduction by Rudolph Guiliani to Peter Maas, The Valachi Papers, New York: Pocket Books, 1986.
47. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the black market for nuclear materials in central Europe where the main customers have been police and intelligence officers looking for a high-profile case and newspaper reporters in pursuit of a scoop. They have, probably quite rightly, been accused of at least inflating the market, and possibly actually bringing it into existence. See Rensselaer Lee III, Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe, St. Martin's Press, New York: 1999, Chap. 2.
48. See, for example, Pino Arlacchi, "The Need for a Global Attack on Money-laundering," United Nationas Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Attacking the Proceeds of Crime: Drugs, Money and Laundering, Vienna: 1998, 5-6.
49. Testimony of Max Mermelstein, supposedly the most senior "cartel" executive to be grabbed and turned by the American police, and response. House Banking Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Money Laundering, Washington: 14-15/11/89.
50. Nicholas de Feir, "Asset Forfeiture: How far can U.S. Courts go?" International Financial Law Review, March 1992.
51. Business Week 4/5/90.
52. Business Week 26/6/93.
53. For example, it was claimed in the U.S. that the 1986 and 1988 anti-money laundering measures "resulted in a significant reduction in the amount of money laundering through tradititonal financial institutions." Hence "non-traditional" financial institutions were immediately proclaimed the new front line of the drug war. (United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Current Trends in Money Laundering, Washington: 1992.) New regulations were imposed that may have increased operating costs in precisely the sector of the financial system that is most in demand by the most economically disadvantaged part of the population, those who, for one reason or another, have great difficulty using orthodox banking channels.
54. The Report on Money-Laundering Techniques 1996-7 of the Financial Action Task Force (Feb. 1997) noted members reported no new techniques for laundering money. That, of course, simply means police forces were unable to uncover any cases using new and presumably better techniques.
55. These issues are discussed in a very lucid way in Thomas Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.
56. Cf. Barry Rider, "Fei Ch'ien Laundries - The Pursuit of Flying Money" in Fletcher Baldwin and R.J. Monro, Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and International Financial Crime, Oceana NY: Oceana Publications, 1993.
57. Charles Intriago, International Money Laundering, London: Eurostudy Publishing, 1991, 55.
58. Money Laundering Alert Jan. 1999, July 1999.
59. John K. Villa, "A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering Statutes," Catholic University Law Review, Vol. 37, 1988, 497-500.
60. See especially Berta Esperanza Hernandez "RIP to IRP - Money Laundering and Drug Trafficking Score a Knockout Victory over Bank Secrecy" North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, Vol. 18, 1993;
61. and Mike Levi, "Regulating Money Laundering: The Death of Bank Secrecy in the U.K." The British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 31, No. 2, Spring 1991.
62. On the imbroglio over KYC rules, see Money Laundering Alert March, April 1999.
63. The main target is the CTRs. But another persistent complaint is that non-bank financial institutions like check-cashing services were getting a free ride by not being subject to the BSA. (Money Laundering Alert June 1993). Shortly after a big regulatory attack began on the mom-and-pop financial sector.
64. Money Laundering Alert May, Nov. 1994.
65. Money Laundering Alert June, August 1991. The forms in question were IRS Form 8300 which requires certain businesses selling items like cars and jewelry to report transactions of more than $10,000 using cash and monetary instruments. That same year IRS undercover agents contacted 79 businesses in 9 cities to ask if they would accept cash for goods with no reporting. In 75 cases the businesses either agreed not to file or offered to do so using fictitious names.
66. House Banking Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Money Laundering, Washington: 14-15/11/89, 2. But that was not, of course, the view of the police agencies who continued to insist that all manner of cases have been initiated on the basis of the forms. See, for example, the counterclaims by Brian Bruh, then head of FinCEN, before the same committee a little more than a year later. (House Banking Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Money Laundering Enforcement Amendments of 1991, Washington: 19/2/91, 20.
67. House Banking Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Money Laundering, Washington: 14-15/11/89, 2. But that was not, of course, the view of the police agencies who continued to insist that all manner of cases have been initiated on the basis of the forms. See, for example, the counterclaims by Brian Bruh, then head of FinCEN, before the same committee a little more than a year later. (House Banking Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Money Laundering Enforcement Amendments of 1991, Washington: 19/2/91, 20.
68. Cf. Charles Karchmer, Illegal Money Laundering: A Strategy and Resource Guide for Law Enforcement Agencies, Washington: 1988 which states: "Bona fide law enforcement agencies that have opened criminal cases on individuals can obtain copies of CTRs filed by financial institutions by requesting such information in writing from the Treasury Department in Washingon." (p. 51)
69. Federal Reserve Bulletin March 1987; Globe and Mail 28/8/88; Wall Street Journal 5/2/87, 4/10/90; Financial Times 12/4/95; Case Sprinkle, "The Case of the Missing Money", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1993.
70. Federal Reserve Bulletin March 1987; Globe and Mail 28/8/88; Wall Street Journal 5/2/87, 4/10/90; Financial Times 12/4/95; Case Sprinkle, "The Case of the Missing Money", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1993.
71. Federal Reserve Bulletin March 1987; Globe and Mail 28/8/88; Wall Street Journal 5/2/87, 4/10/90; Financial Times 12/4/95; Case Sprinkle, "The Case of the Missing Money", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1993.
72. Federal Reserve Bulletin March 1987; Globe and Mail 28/8/88; Wall Street Journal 5/2/87, 4/10/90; Financial Times 12/4/95; Case Sprinkle, "The Case of the Missing Money", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1993.
73. Federal Reserve Bulletin March 1987; Globe and Mail 28/8/88; Wall Street Journal 5/2/87, 4/10/90; Financial Times 12/4/95; Case Sprinkle, "The Case of the Missing Money", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1993.
74. See, for example, United States General Accounting Office, Money Laundering: US Efforts to Fight It are threatened by Currency Smuggling, Washington: March, 1994.
75. U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, Drug Money Laundering Control Efforts, Washington: 1990, 3.
76. Of course the rate at which countries succumbed to U.S. pressure was highly variable. Australia, partially for its own reasons, introduced such reporting requirements for all currency instruments, not just U.S. ones, and for both foreign and domestic transactions, within a year of the Kerry Amendment as part of the process of creating AUSTRAC, a U.S. style financial police agency. Brazil capitulated in 1992, establishing a $US 10,000 rule for movements in and out of the country. The government stated its hope that the new law would be just as useful in combating money-laundering as was the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act. (FinCEN, Trends, Fall 1992.) The Brazilian government is undoubtedly right. The rules will be just as useful.
77. Banker Vol. 146, Oct. 1996, 71.
78. Villa, "Critical View" 502.
79. See the references in note 2 above, particularly the work of Levy. But see also Judy Osborne, Spectre of Forfeiture, Access Unlimited, Frazier Park, Calif.: 1991.
80. Apart from the works by Levy, Osborne and Kessler cited above, see James Bovard, Lost Rights: The Destruction of American Freedom, New York, St. Martin's Press: 1995, Chap. 2.
81. Allan Levine and Cindi Brandt, "Dirty Money" Criminal Justice, Winter 1998. Yet the response of the U.S. Department of Justice to revelations of the gap between the sentence guidelines for fraud and those for money laundering, was to call for increased penalties for fraud to bring them up to the level of those for money laundering!
82. Nicholas de Feir, "Asset Forfeiture: How far can U.S. Courts go?" International Financial Law Review March, 1992.
83. See the excellent discussion in Mike Gray, Drug Crazy: How We got into this Mess & How We can get Out, New York: Random House, 1998, 45, 78, 88.
84. Two decades later, former bootlegger and labour racketeer, Frank Costello, got the same treatment. (Andrew Tully, Treasury Agent, New York: 1958, 9.)
85. Former IRS Commissioner, Fred Goldberg, claimed that the lack of resources devoted to tax crimes from money of legal origin was a "major contributing factor" to the decline in voluntary compliance. In the U.S. (Money Laundering Alert Feb. 1992.)
86. The U.S. Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance gloated in one of its information circulars, "relying on analyses comparable to 'net worth' proof used in tax litigation, imaginative investigators may be able to find new avenues for attacking this problem [of tracing]." (Bureau of Justice Assistance, Asset Forfeiture - Civil Forfeiture: Tracing the Proceeds of Narcotics Trafficking, Washington, Nov. 1988.
87. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Asset Forfeiture - The Management and Disposition of Seized Assets, Washington, Nov. 1988, 3; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Drug Intelligence Estimate, Ottawa: 1988/9, 110.
88. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Asset Forfeiture - The Management and Disposition of Seized Assets, Washington, Nov. 1988, 3; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Drug Intelligence Estimate, Ottawa: 1988/9, 110.
89. Pittsburgh Press 27/2/91.
90. See Sunday Times 2/8/92 for how the police force of Little Hampton, Rhode Island became the richest per capita in America with all the latest gadgetry and fancy buildings even though it was a village effectively without crime.
91. Levy, License to Steal, 128-9.
92. Globe and Mail 15/11/94.
93. Susan Meeker-Lowry, "Asset Forfeiture," Z Magazine Jan. 1996.
94. F.E.A.R. Chronicles Vol. 3, No. 2, March 1996.
95. See Rep. Henry Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property Rights: Is Your Property Safe from Seizure?, Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1995. A political reactionary, Hyde inevitably focused his concern on "property rights" rather than civil rights.
96. Money Laundering Alert July 1997.
97. Many of these outrages were documented by the Pittsburgh Press in a series of articles on forfeiture in 1991, and have continued to be documented by an organization called FEAR - Forfeiture Endangers American Rights. See their website, WWW.FEAR.ORG.
98. When some states began using controlled substance taxes to add further charges against drug traffickers, law enforcement fought against the principle, seeing it in the first step to the state resurrecting its prior claim to illegal profits. The Boston Police Superintendent, for example, insisted that "We would fight all the way any attempt by the state to take a cut of that money." Bulletin of Justice Assistance, Asset Forfeiture Bulletin, Dec. 1989, p. 4.
99. National Drug Intelligence Center, Conference Report - Money Laundering: US Vulnerabilities, Product No. 99-PO314-001, December 1998. The author of this paper attended the conference.