Multiple goals or deterrence: A test of two models in nuclear and nonnuclear alliances

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 43, Issue 6, 1999, Pages 748-770

  Palmer, Glenn ^a   David, J Sky ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033264110     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043006004     Document Type: Article

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