Deconstructing the Rejection Letter: A Look at Elitism in Article Selection

Journal of Legal Education

Volumn 49, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 601-613

  Subotnik, Dan ^a   Lazar, Glen ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033260648     PISSN: 00222208     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (80)

1. Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745, 1807 (1989).
2. Roger D. Abrahams, Deep Down in the Jungle: Negro Narrative Folklore from the Streets of Philadelphia, 1st rev. ed., 113 (Chicago, 1970).
3. See Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique 14 (Princeton, 1990) (quoting Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in The Politics of Law, ed. David Kairys, 47 (New York, 1982)).
4. See Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique 14 (Princeton, 1990) (quoting Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in The Politics of Law, ed. David Kairys, 47 (New York, 1982)).
5. Id. at 15 (quoting David Kairys, Introduction, in Politics of Law, supra note 3, at 5-6).
6. Perhaps the best evidence of who runs the legal academy lies in the institutional affiliation of AALS presidents. Over the last 20 years all but six have come from the top 25 schools of 176 ranked by U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 29, 1999, at 90-95. For whatever it is worth, three of those six are self-identified as minorities. All the presidents, save two, have come from schools ranked in the top 50. None have come from the lower two tiers of law schools, which educate almost half the student population. For a list of presidents and their affiliations, see the AALS Directory of Law Teachers. A colleague asks why student editors would want to exercise control over faculty at non-elite schools. For now, suffice it to say that students of elite journals benefit from emphasizing the gap between their schools and the non-elite schools. If anyone is good enough to get published in the Harvard Law Review, what's the big deal about Harvard?
7. We use "criticalists" to mean adherents of critical legal studies and of critical race theory.
8. We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for Affirmative Action 30 (Boston, 1997).
9. When Equality Ends: Stories About Race and Resistance 208 (Boulder, 1999) ; see also Mari J. Matsuda et al., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment 6 (Boulder, 1993).
10. When Equality Ends: Stories About Race and Resistance 208 (Boulder, 1999) ; see also Mari J. Matsuda et al., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment 6 (Boulder, 1993).
11. See generally, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Symposium, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture; Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills? 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1258 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, The Rooster's Egg 68 (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).
13. See, e.g., Dink Stover, A "Welfare Prince" Looks at Welfare Reform, 15 Touro L. Rev. 439 (1999).
14. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Boundl 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 539.
15. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995).
16. Beverly Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 751.
17. Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1991).
18. See generally, e.g., John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2129 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Gary Peller, Toward a Critical Cultural Pluralism: Progressive Alternatives to Mainstream Civil Rights Ideology, in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement, eds. Kimberlé Crenshaw et al., 127 (NewYork, 1995).
20. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Symposium: Race-Based Remedies; Rethinking the Process of Classification and Evaluation: The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 966 (1996). Sturm and Guinier vigorously argue that since admissions tests are invalid, and many students could perform satisfactorily if given a chance, educational institutions should use a lottery system to help make admissions decisions. Their proposal is discussed in Dan Subotnik, Goodbye to the SAT/LSAT? Hello to Equity by Lottery? Evaluating Lani Guinier's Plan for Ending Race Consciousness, _ Howard L.J. _ (1999). Bar examinations have faced similar challenge. See Cecil J. Hunt II, Guests in Another's House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate Bar Performance, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 721 (1996).
21. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Symposium: Race-Based Remedies; Rethinking the Process of Classification and Evaluation: The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 966 (1996). Sturm and Guinier vigorously argue that since admissions tests are invalid, and many students could perform satisfactorily if given a chance, educational institutions should use a lottery system to help make admissions decisions. Their proposal is discussed in Dan Subotnik, Goodbye to the SAT/LSAT? Hello to Equity by Lottery? Evaluating Lani Guinier's Plan for Ending Race Consciousness, _ Howard L.J. _ (1999). Bar examinations have faced similar challenge. See Cecil J. Hunt II, Guests in Another's House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate Bar Performance, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 721 (1996).
22. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Symposium: Race-Based Remedies; Rethinking the Process of Classification and Evaluation: The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 966 (1996). Sturm and Guinier vigorously argue that since admissions tests are invalid, and many students could perform satisfactorily if given a chance, educational institutions should use a lottery system to help make admissions decisions. Their proposal is discussed in Dan Subotnik, Goodbye to the SAT/LSAT? Hello to Equity by Lottery? Evaluating Lani Guinier's Plan for Ending Race Consciousness, _ Howard L.J. _ (1999). Bar examinations have faced similar challenge. See Cecil J. Hunt II, Guests in Another's House: An Analysis of Racially Disparate Bar Performance, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 721 (1996).
23. See Richard Delgado, Comment, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561, 562-63 (1984).
24. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 Va. L. Rev. 461 (1993).
25. See Jean Stefancic & Fred R. Shapiro, Symposium on the Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship: Introduction, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 743, 749 (1996).
26. See Altman, supra note 3, at 3. Others have not had so benign a view. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law (New York, 1997).
27. See Altman, supra note 3, at 3. Others have not had so benign a view. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law (New York, 1997).
28. See Altman, supra note 3, at 3. Others have not had so benign a view. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law (New York, 1997).
29. One might argue that editors have earned great rewards for themselves and their employers by finding previously unknown talent. To be sure. The problem is that law review editors are not apprentices in the publishing business; they have little incentive to discover the next Ronald Dworkin.
30. The reference, of course, is to Peter Shaffer's play (and later film) Amadeus.
31. See James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, Symposium on the Trends in Legal Citations and Scholarship: The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 781 (1996).
32. These are the top nine schools, in order, in the 1999 ranking by U.S. News and World Report. See note 5 supra.
33. For a discussion of the history and use of law reviews at Harvard and elsewhere, see generally Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 615 (1996).
34. See Ira Mark Ellman, A Comparison of Law Faculty Production in Leading Law Reviews, 33 J. Legal Educ. 681, 685 Table 2 (1983). Perhaps more stunning, faculty at the leading schools published from about 50 to almost 90 percent of their work in their own school's law review. See id. at 687 Table 3. It is no doubt because of the leverage they have over editors at their own schools that junior faculty have been encouraged to publish elsewhere. See Jordan H. Leibman & James P. White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make Their Publication Decisions, 39 J. Legal Educ. 387, 395 (1989).
35. See Ira Mark Ellman, A Comparison of Law Faculty Production in Leading Law Reviews, 33 J. Legal Educ. 681, 685 Table 2 (1983). Perhaps more stunning, faculty at the leading schools published from about 50 to almost 90 percent of their work in their own school's law review. See id. at 687 Table 3. It is no doubt because of the leverage they have over editors at their own schools that junior faculty have been encouraged to publish elsewhere. See Jordan H. Leibman & James P. White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make Their Publication Decisions, 39 J. Legal Educ. 387, 395 (1989).
36. See Ellman, supra note 28, at 688-89, 692.
37. Intellectual Authority and Institutional Authority, 42 J. Legal Educ. 151, 169 (1992).
38. James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 527, 530 (1994).
39. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Legal Scholarship at the Crossroads: On Farce, Tragedy, and Redemption, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 321, 329 n.25 (1998).
40. See Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis G. Coleman, Ranking Law Reviews: An Empirical Analysis Based on Author Prominence, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 15 (1997); see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Symposium, An Empirical Evaluation of Specialized Law Reviews, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 813 (1999). According to George and Guthrie, snagging an author from a first-tier school would yield a law review 625 points, while a fifth-tier author would produce a mere 225 points. Id. at 827, 828 (citing Jarvis & Coleman, supra, at 16 n.7). Given the ratio of submissions to acceptances in this system, an author in the fifth tier clearly has no chance at stardom.
41. See Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis G. Coleman, Ranking Law Reviews: An Empirical Analysis Based on Author Prominence, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 15 (1997); see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Symposium, An Empirical Evaluation of Specialized Law Reviews, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 813 (1999). According to George and Guthrie, snagging an author from a first-tier school would yield a law review 625 points, while a fifth-tier author would produce a mere 225 points. Id. at 827, 828 (citing Jarvis & Coleman, supra, at 16 n.7). Given the ratio of submissions to acceptances in this system, an author in the fifth tier clearly has no chance at stardom.
42. See Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis G. Coleman, Ranking Law Reviews: An Empirical Analysis Based on Author Prominence, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 15 (1997); see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Symposium, An Empirical Evaluation of Specialized Law Reviews, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 813 (1999). According to George and Guthrie, snagging an author from a first-tier school would yield a law review 625 points, while a fifth-tier author would produce a mere 225 points. Id. at 827, 828 (citing Jarvis & Coleman, supra, at 16 n.7). Given the ratio of submissions to acceptances in this system, an author in the fifth tier clearly has no chance at stardom.
43. See Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis G. Coleman, Ranking Law Reviews: An Empirical Analysis Based on Author Prominence, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 15 (1997); see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Symposium, An Empirical Evaluation of Specialized Law Reviews, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 813 (1999). According to George and Guthrie, snagging an author from a first-tier school would yield a law review 625 points, while a fifth-tier author would produce a mere 225 points. Id. at 827, 828 (citing Jarvis & Coleman, supra, at 16 n.7). Given the ratio of submissions to acceptances in this system, an author in the fifth tier clearly has no chance at stardom.
44. Leibman & White, supra note 28, at 405. James Lindgren concurs. See Lindgren, supra note 31, at 538. Leibman and White acknowledge that one "very prestigious" law review (later identified as Yale) does use a blind review in the initial screening process. Leibman & White, supra note 28, at 405. See Hibbitts, supra note 27, at 651 n.201. Whatever its past practices, the system now in effect at the Yale Law Journal cannot really be considered blind reviewing. Only after a first screening are articles read blind. (Telephone conversation with Gerardo Vildostegui, editor in chief, Oct. 26, 1999.) Since Yale gets such a large number of submissions, it should not be surprising that it too ends up with disproportionately few articles by LSI authors. See Table 4. Nevertheless, it should be noted, Yale does better by LSI faculty than almost all other journals in its cohort. The Harvard Law Review approach is apparently just the reverse of Yale's; at Harvard articles are first read blind and only afterwards with school affiliations. (Telephone conversation with Thomas Lee, a recent articles editor, Oct. 28, 1999.) At no other elite law review that we know of is there even a half-hearted attempt at blind reviewing. At these schools, moreover, submissions from big-name schools are read first. This, as suggested above, essentially ensures that LSI authors are frozen out.
45. Leibman & White, supra note 28, at 405. James Lindgren concurs. See Lindgren, supra note 31, at 538. Leibman and White acknowledge that one "very prestigious" law review (later identified as Yale) does use a blind review in the initial screening process. Leibman & White, supra note 28, at 405. See Hibbitts, supra note 27, at 651 n.201. Whatever its past practices, the system now in effect at the Yale Law Journal cannot really be considered blind reviewing. Only after a first screening are articles read blind. (Telephone conversation with Gerardo Vildostegui, editor in chief, Oct. 26, 1999.) Since Yale gets such a large number of submissions, it should not be surprising that it too ends up with disproportionately few articles by LSI authors. See Table 4. Nevertheless, it should be noted, Yale does better by LSI faculty than almost all other journals in its cohort. The Harvard Law Review approach is apparently just the reverse of Yale's; at Harvard articles are first read blind and only afterwards with school affiliations. (Telephone conversation with Thomas Lee, a recent articles editor, Oct. 28, 1999.) At no other elite law review that we know of is there even a half-hearted attempt at blind reviewing. At these schools, moreover, submissions from big-name schools are read first. This, as suggested above, essentially ensures that LSI authors are frozen out.
46. Leibman & White, supra note 28, at 405. James Lindgren concurs. See Lindgren, supra note 31, at 538. Leibman and White acknowledge that one "very prestigious" law review (later identified as Yale) does use a blind review in the initial screening process. Leibman & White, supra note 28, at 405. See Hibbitts, supra note 27, at 651 n.201. Whatever its past practices, the system now in effect at the Yale Law Journal cannot really be considered blind reviewing. Only after a first screening are articles read blind. (Telephone conversation with Gerardo Vildostegui, editor in chief, Oct. 26, 1999.) Since Yale gets such a large number of submissions, it should not be surprising that it too ends up with disproportionately few articles by LSI authors. See Table 4. Nevertheless, it should be noted, Yale does better by LSI faculty than almost all other journals in its cohort. The Harvard Law Review approach is apparently just the reverse of Yale's; at Harvard articles are first read blind and only afterwards with school affiliations. (Telephone conversation with Thomas Lee, a recent articles editor, Oct. 28, 1999.) At no other elite law review that we know of is there even a half-hearted attempt at blind reviewing. At these schools, moreover, submissions from big-name schools are read first. This, as suggested above, essentially ensures that LSI authors are frozen out.
47. Leibman & White, supra note 28, at 405. James Lindgren concurs. See Lindgren, supra note 31, at 538. Leibman and White acknowledge that one "very prestigious" law review (later identified as Yale) does use a blind review in the initial screening process. Leibman & White, supra note 28, at 405. See Hibbitts, supra note 27, at 651 n.201. Whatever its past practices, the system now in effect at the Yale Law Journal cannot really be considered blind reviewing. Only after a first screening are articles read blind. (Telephone conversation with Gerardo Vildostegui, editor in chief, Oct. 26, 1999.) Since Yale gets such a large number of submissions, it should not be surprising that it too ends up with disproportionately few articles by LSI authors. See Table 4. Nevertheless, it should be noted, Yale does better by LSI faculty than almost all other journals in its cohort. The Harvard Law Review approach is apparently just the reverse of Yale's; at Harvard articles are first read blind and only afterwards with school affiliations. (Telephone conversation with Thomas Lee, a recent articles editor, Oct. 28, 1999.) At no other elite law review that we know of is there even a half-hearted attempt at blind reviewing. At these schools, moreover, submissions from big-name schools are read first. This, as suggested above, essentially ensures that LSI authors are frozen out.
48. See Leibman & White, supra note 28, at 420.
49. James Lindgren actually recommended such a study six years ago. Lindgren, supra note 31, at 537.
50. A recent study shows that affiliation with a high-ranked school predicts publishing in prestigious places (independently of such factors as status of J.D. school, types of clerkships, and advanced degrees). See Deborah Jones Merritt, Symposium on the Relation Between Scholarship and Teaching; Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: An Empirical Exploration, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 765, 798 (1998).
51. They represent a somewhat higher percentage of full-time faculty (8%), because they tend to be large schools. Thanks to Rick Morgan of the American Bar Association's Office of the Consultant on Legal Education for this information.
52. The reader's attention is called to the experience of tier-three and -four authors at the Harvard Law Review. The five-year average of 11.6 percent may finally help explain an eight-year-old story that has lost none of its haunting power. In April 1991 Mary Joe Frug, a well-published professor at New England Law School, was murdered outside of her home in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In 1992 the Harvard Law Review published her last article, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1992). Several months later, some Law Review members lampooned Frug - and the Law Review itself - in a piece entitled "He-Manifesto of Post-Mortem Legal Feminism" by "Mary Doe, Rigor-Mortis Professor of Law." See Mona Harrington, Women Lawyers: Rewriting the Rules 64-65 (NewYork, 1994) and The Diversity Battle at Harvard Law, Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 1993, at 9. At Harvard and New England Law, and indeed in academic communities around the country, many were shocked, even stupefied, by the insensitivity. Calls were issued for disciplining the offending students. Nothing, however, was done. The relevance of all this? Now we can "understand" the parody. Had Mary Joe taught at Yale, there would have been nothing incongruous in the Law Review's publication decision; such a happening would be routine and unworthy of comment. What was "funny" was the notion, well captured by the parodists, that in life Mary Joe would not have been published -that maybe she finally acquired the requisite rigor, and thus beat the system, by getting herself killed.
53. A recent articles editor at Virginia told us that an author's publishing history was examined in the selection process, and "some preference was given to untenured faculty" at the University of Virginia, but this editor insisted that "where people came from did not matter." (Telephone conversation, Sept 16, 1999; name available on request.) In four of the five years under review the University of Chicago Law Review likewise published no articles by faculty of third- or fourth-tier schools. Yet in a recent letter to Subotnik, far from acknowledging the almost impossibly high barrier for LSI faculty (which might have offered a measure of consolation), the editor felt it necessary to support the meritocractic assumption by offering the ludicrously false "hope that you will allow us to consider publishing your work in the future."
54. The Pennsylvania, Stanford, Michigan, and Virginia law reviews, for example, have all published CRT articles by Richard Delgado.
55. We picked these schools - Texas, Southern California, and North Carolina - at random. Southern California is tied with Minnesota, and North Carolina with Notre Dame.
56. See Lindgren & Seltzer, supra note 25, at 793-95 Table 4. Averages were compiled for the top 10 and bottom 10 on the list of 75 faculties.
57. Id. The 9.3 figure represents an average of the two different tabulations.
58. We have in mind here an experiment in which people would submit articles under different titles claiming real and fictitious school affiliations.
59. But again, on what basis can scholarship be judged if LSI authors do not have a fair (equal) access to outlets for publications?
60. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (holding that Title VII required the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers"' such as "testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for [protected] groups").
61. The articles editors of the 1994 University of Chicago Law Review acknowledged that publishing decisions should not be based on "credentials rather than merit" and that blind review would have the "benefit of avoiding the appearance of impropriety." See The Articles Editors, A Response, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 553, 554-55 (1994).
62. On this point there seems to be no dispute. See Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution": The American Law Review 36 J. Legal Educ. 1, 7-9 (1986); Lindgren, supra note 31, at 527; Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1131, 1136 (1995).
63. On this point there seems to be no dispute. See Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution": The American Law Review 36 J. Legal Educ. 1, 7-9 (1986); Lindgren, supra note 31, at 527; Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1131, 1136 (1995).
64. On this point there seems to be no dispute. See Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution": The American Law Review 36 J. Legal Educ. 1, 7-9 (1986); Lindgren, supra note 31, at 527; Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1131, 1136 (1995).
65. See Harvard Law Review, The Greenbook: Manual of Operations and Procedures 1999-2000 (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).
66. The Law Review Manuscript Glut: The Need for Guidelines, 39 J. Legal Educ. 383, 385 (1989). Melissa Koehn (in a private communication with the authors) rightly suggests that a tight market for law professors, such as we have now, substanitally vitiates the case for school affiliation as a proxy for merit. For a nice psychological description of the powerful impact of an author's status on an unseasoned editor, see Collier, supra note 30, at 161-67.
67. The Law Review Manuscript Glut: The Need for Guidelines, 39 J. Legal Educ. 383, 385 (1989). Melissa Koehn (in a private communication with the authors) rightly suggests that a tight market for law professors, such as we have now, substanitally vitiates the case for school affiliation as a proxy for merit. For a nice psychological description of the powerful impact of an author's status on an unseasoned editor, see Collier, supra note 30, at 161-67.
68. See Posner, supra note 49, at 1133-34.
69. Id. at 1154.
70. See Clarence M. Updegraff, Management of Law School Reviews, 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 115, 119-20 (1929); W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 739; Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1990); Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 461 (1997). We do not suggest here that CRT itself has been immune to corruption. Quite the contrary, sad to say. See Daniel Subotnik, What's Wrong with Critical Race Theory? Reopening the Case for Middle Class Values, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y. 681, 682 (1998); Dan Subotnik, Critical Race Theory - The Last Voyage, 15 Touro L. Rev. 657, 678-79 (1999). Is it surprising under the circumstances if law review authors wrap their ideas in race theory to maximize chances of successful article placement?
71. See Clarence M. Updegraff, Management of Law School Reviews, 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 115, 119- 20 (1929); W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 739; Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1990); Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 461 (1997). We do not suggest here that CRT itself has been immune to corruption. Quite the contrary, sad to say. See Daniel Subotnik, What's Wrong with Critical Race Theory? Reopening the Case for Middle Class Values, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y. 681, 682 (1998); Dan Subotnik, Critical Race Theory - The Last Voyage, 15 Touro L. Rev. 657, 678-79 (1999). Is it surprising under the circumstances if law review authors wrap their ideas in race theory to maximize chances of successful article placement?
72. See Clarence M. Updegraff, Management of Law School Reviews, 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 115, 119- 20 (1929); W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 739; Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1990); Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 461 (1997). We do not suggest here that CRT itself has been immune to corruption. Quite the contrary, sad to say. See Daniel Subotnik, What's Wrong with Critical Race Theory? Reopening the Case for Middle Class Values, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y. 681, 682 (1998); Dan Subotnik, Critical Race Theory - The Last Voyage, 15 Touro L. Rev. 657, 678-79 (1999). Is it surprising under the circumstances if law review authors wrap their ideas in race theory to maximize chances of successful article placement?
73. See Clarence M. Updegraff, Management of Law School Reviews, 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 115, 119- 20 (1929); W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 739; Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1990); Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 461 (1997). We do not suggest here that CRT itself has been immune to corruption. Quite the contrary, sad to say. See Daniel Subotnik, What's Wrong with Critical Race Theory? Reopening the Case for Middle Class Values, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y. 681, 682 (1998); Dan Subotnik, Critical Race Theory - The Last Voyage, 15 Touro L. Rev. 657, 678-79 (1999). Is it surprising under the circumstances if law review authors wrap their ideas in race theory to maximize chances of successful article placement?
74. See Clarence M. Updegraff, Management of Law School Reviews, 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 115, 119- 20 (1929); W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 739; Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1990); Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 461 (1997). We do not suggest here that CRT itself has been immune to corruption. Quite the contrary, sad to say. See Daniel Subotnik, What's Wrong with Critical Race Theory? Reopening the Case for Middle Class Values, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y. 681, 682 (1998); Dan Subotnik, Critical Race Theory - The Last Voyage, 15 Touro L. Rev. 657, 678-79 (1999). Is it surprising under the circumstances if law review authors wrap their ideas in race theory to maximize chances of successful article placement?
75. See Clarence M. Updegraff, Management of Law School Reviews, 3 U. Cin. L. Rev. 115, 119- 20 (1929); W. Lawrence Church, A Plea for Readable Law Review Articles, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 739; Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1990); Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 461 (1997). We do not suggest here that CRT itself has been immune to corruption. Quite the contrary, sad to say. See Daniel Subotnik, What's Wrong with Critical Race Theory? Reopening the Case for Middle Class Values, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y. 681, 682 (1998); Dan Subotnik, Critical Race Theory - The Last Voyage, 15 Touro L. Rev. 657, 678-79 (1999). Is it surprising under the circumstances if law review authors wrap their ideas in race theory to maximize chances of successful article placement?
76. CRT theorist Michael Selmi makes a similar argument with respect to affirmative action: emphasizing diversity will lead to a "tightening [of] the job market for white men, which may then provide effort incentives for those men who will now have a greater fear of unemployment." Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1251, 1305 (1995).
77. See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women, Law School, and Institutional Change 50, 66-67 (Boston, 1997). See also Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation (New York, 1991); Deborah Tannen, Gender and Discourse (New York, 1994).
78. See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women, Law School, and Institutional Change 50, 66-67 (Boston, 1997). See also Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation (New York, 1991); Deborah Tannen, Gender and Discourse (New York, 1994).
79. See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women, Law School, and Institutional Change 50, 66-67 (Boston, 1997). See also Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation (New York, 1991); Deborah Tannen, Gender and Discourse (New York, 1994).
80. Sexy Dressing Etc. 46 (Cambridge, Mass., 1993).