An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 27-65

  Nagel, Rosemarie ^a   Vriend, Nicolaas J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Adaptive behavior; Learning; Market game; Oligopoly

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033248594     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001910050074     Document Type: Article

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