The architectonic of Michael Walzer's theory of justice

Political Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 491-522

  Den Hartogh, Govert ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033246150     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591799027004004     Document Type: Review

References (74)

1. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford, UK: Robertson, 1983).
2. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
3. It is rather obvious that the same criticism applies to hierarchical societies that differentiate between ranked forms of membership, irrespective of the endorsement of the system by the lowly ranked members.
4. But cf. notes 38 and 41.
5. "The meanings with which we invest objects have normative consequences. I have been calling these norms 'rules of use and value'; they are also rules of distribution. . . . We will know what objects we owe to other people as soon as we understand what those objects (really) are and what they are for." Michael Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning," in The Quality of Life, eds. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 169. "[W]e need focus only on things, the objects of distribution, to work out a critical account of distributive justice." Walzer, Thick and Thin, x, cf. 33.
6. "The meanings with which we invest objects have normative consequences. I have been calling these norms 'rules of use and value'; they are also rules of distribution. . . . We will know what objects we owe to other people as soon as we understand what those objects (really) are and what they are for." Michael Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning," in The Quality of Life, eds. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 169. "[W]e need focus only on things, the objects of distribution, to work out a critical account of distributive justice." Walzer, Thick and Thin, x, cf. 33.
7. Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in Problems of the Self, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
8. Robert J. van der Veen, "Sociale Zekerheid: een Omstreden Domein," in Lokale Rechtsvaardigheid, De Politieke Theorie van Michael Walzer, eds. Paul Van den Berg and Margo Trappenburg (Zwolle, the Netherlands: Tjeenk Willink, 1994), 22-23; Robert J. van der Veen, "The Adjudicating Citizen: On Equal Membership in Walzer's Theory of Justice," British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming; David Miller, "Introduction," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, eds. David Miller and Michael Walzer (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3; Michael Walzer, "Response," ibid., 283. Richard Arneson fails to appreciate the point; Arneson, "Against 'Complex Equality,'" in Pluralism, Justice and Equality, 234.
9. Robert J. van der Veen, "Sociale Zekerheid: een Omstreden Domein," in Lokale Rechtsvaardigheid, De Politieke Theorie van Michael Walzer, eds. Paul Van den Berg and Margo Trappenburg (Zwolle, the Netherlands: Tjeenk Willink, 1994), 22-23; Robert J. van der Veen, "The Adjudicating Citizen: On Equal Membership in Walzer's Theory of Justice," British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming; David Miller, "Introduction," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, eds. David Miller and Michael Walzer (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3; Michael Walzer, "Response," ibid., 283. Richard Arneson fails to appreciate the point; Arneson, "Against 'Complex Equality,'" in Pluralism, Justice and Equality, 234.
10. Robert J. van der Veen, "Sociale Zekerheid: een Omstreden Domein," in Lokale Rechtsvaardigheid, De Politieke Theorie van Michael Walzer, eds. Paul Van den Berg and Margo Trappenburg (Zwolle, the Netherlands: Tjeenk Willink, 1994), 22-23; Robert J. van der Veen, "The Adjudicating Citizen: On Equal Membership in Walzer's Theory of Justice," British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming; David Miller, "Introduction," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, eds. David Miller and Michael Walzer (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3; Michael Walzer, "Response," ibid., 283. Richard Arneson fails to appreciate the point; Arneson, "Against 'Complex Equality,'" in Pluralism, Justice and Equality, 234.
11. Robert J. van der Veen, "Sociale Zekerheid: een Omstreden Domein," in Lokale Rechtsvaardigheid, De Politieke Theorie van Michael Walzer, eds. Paul Van den Berg and Margo Trappenburg (Zwolle, the Netherlands: Tjeenk Willink, 1994), 22-23; Robert J. van der Veen, "The Adjudicating Citizen: On Equal Membership in Walzer's Theory of Justice," British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming; David Miller, "Introduction," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, eds. David Miller and Michael Walzer (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3; Michael Walzer, "Response," ibid., 283. Richard Arneson fails to appreciate the point; Arneson, "Against 'Complex Equality,'" in Pluralism, Justice and Equality, 234.
12. Robert J. van der Veen, "Sociale Zekerheid: een Omstreden Domein," in Lokale Rechtsvaardigheid, De Politieke Theorie van Michael Walzer, eds. Paul Van den Berg and Margo Trappenburg (Zwolle, the Netherlands: Tjeenk Willink, 1994), 22-23; Robert J. van der Veen, "The Adjudicating Citizen: On Equal Membership in Walzer's Theory of Justice," British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming; David Miller, "Introduction," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, eds. David Miller and Michael Walzer (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3; Michael Walzer, "Response," ibid., 283. Richard Arneson fails to appreciate the point; Arneson, "Against 'Complex Equality,'" in Pluralism, Justice and Equality, 234.
13. Equality of membership may be critical in adjudicating internal disputes between competing principles "within" spheres; Walzer, "Response," 287.
14. Of some goods, the enjoyment cannot be given on a claim of right (divine grace) or not without seriously distorting the nature of the good (love and friendship, praise and blame; cf. section 7). Cf. Judith Andre, "Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy," Ethics 103 (1992/1993): 32-33, reprinted in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality; Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens (New York: Russell Sage, 1992), 13; Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, 158-59. As they cannot be owned, they cannot be exchanged either.
15. Of some goods, the enjoyment cannot be given on a claim of right (divine grace) or not without seriously distorting the nature of the good (love and friendship, praise and blame; cf. section 7). Cf. Judith Andre, "Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy," Ethics 103 (1992/1993): 32-33, reprinted in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality; Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens (New York: Russell Sage, 1992), 13; Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, 158-59. As they cannot be owned, they cannot be exchanged either.
16. Of some goods, the enjoyment cannot be given on a claim of right (divine grace) or not without seriously distorting the nature of the good (love and friendship, praise and blame; cf. section 7). Cf. Judith Andre, "Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy," Ethics 103 (1992/1993): 32-33, reprinted in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality; Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens (New York: Russell Sage, 1992), 13; Jeremy Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, 158-59. As they cannot be owned, they cannot be exchanged either.
17. Waldron, "Money and Complex Equality," 149-55, ascribes to Walzer an independent account of the proper sphere of money (roughly: privately accessible goods), which I cannot find in his work.
18. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1974), 160-64. The argument only undermines insatiable principles. (On this concept, see section 10, at note 37.)
19. The criticism offered by Brian Barry, "Spherical Justice and Global Injustice," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, 70-71, is off target: Walzer doesn't deny that free exchange is subject to many constraints, which may involve the forced redistribution of money. These constraints may even follow from comparative concerns (cf. my discussion of the principle of equal membership in section 10).
20. Cf. Barry, "Spherical Justice and Global Injustice," 71, but he fails to appreciate the relevance of the distinction between P- and D-spheres.
21. As I mentioned in section 2, within the sphere of welfare, Walzer finds an additional principle at work: that the distribution should respect everyone's full membership (pp. 78, 84). This principle, however, doesn't lead to the recognition of claims on welfare beyond needs; rather, it contributes to the identification of needs.
22. I will argue, in section 7, that the sphere of private honor is coextensive with the sphere of the private use of the same principle and not really a "free competitive market."
23. This is not a paternalistic principle, as Elster, Local Justice, 13, says. It rather protects the voluntary character of the exercise of free choice;
24. cf. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986), 80, 249ff. This explains why the principle of need precedes the principle of free exchange. Such insights are a first step in the process of developing the list of principles into a theory.
25. Compare the limitations on the market provision of vacations, discussed on pp. 191-92. Considerations of efficiency may be relevant as well (e.g., the need to solve collective action problems [votes] or to ensure efficient job performance [degrees]); cf. Elster, Local Justice, 13. I don't want to deny that value considerations may play a direct role as well; cf. Andre, "Blocked Exchanges," 37-40, arguing that markets influence the character of what is sold, sometimes for the worse, by altering incentive structures. The classical example is the comparison by Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship (New York: Pantheon, 1970) of the quality of donor blood from gifts and from market exchange.
26. Compare the limitations on the market provision of vacations, discussed on pp. 191-92. Considerations of efficiency may be relevant as well (e.g., the need to solve collective action problems [votes] or to ensure efficient job performance [degrees]); cf. Elster, Local Justice, 13. I don't want to deny that value considerations may play a direct role as well; cf. Andre, "Blocked Exchanges," 37-40, arguing that markets influence the character of what is sold, sometimes for the worse, by altering incentive structures. The classical example is the comparison by Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship (New York: Pantheon, 1970) of the quality of donor blood from gifts and from market exchange.
27. Compare the limitations on the market provision of vacations, discussed on pp. 191-92. Considerations of efficiency may be relevant as well (e.g., the need to solve collective action problems [votes] or to ensure efficient job performance [degrees]); cf. Elster, Local Justice, 13. I don't want to deny that value considerations may play a direct role as well; cf. Andre, "Blocked Exchanges," 37-40, arguing that markets influence the character of what is sold, sometimes for the worse, by altering incentive structures. The classical example is the comparison by Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship (New York: Pantheon, 1970) of the quality of donor blood from gifts and from market exchange.
28. For example, several papers in van den Berg and Trappenburg, eds., Lokale Rechtsvaardigheid; cf. also Margo J. Trappenburg, "Defining the Medical Sphere," Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 6 (1997): 416-34. Or see the criticism by Michael W. Howard, "Walzer's Socialism," Social Theory and Practice 12 (1986): 103-13: the system of decentralized worker control Walzer advocates straddles the spheres of political power and of money and commodities.
29. For example, several papers in van den Berg and Trappenburg, eds., Lokale Rechtsvaardigheid; cf. also Margo J. Trappenburg, "Defining the Medical Sphere," Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 6 (1997): 416-34. Or see the criticism by Michael W. Howard, "Walzer's Socialism," Social Theory and Practice 12 (1986): 103-13: the system of decentralized worker control Walzer advocates straddles the spheres of political power and of money and commodities.
30. For example, several papers in van den Berg and Trappenburg, eds., Lokale Rechtsvaardigheid; cf. also Margo J. Trappenburg, "Defining the Medical Sphere," Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 6 (1997): 416-34. Or see the criticism by Michael W. Howard, "Walzer's Socialism," Social Theory and Practice 12 (1986): 103-13: the system of decentralized worker control Walzer advocates straddles the spheres of political power and of money and commodities.
31. Cf. Amy Gutmann, "Justice across the Spheres," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, 99-119, but she doesn't realize the extent to which this account describes Walzer's actual treatment of (D-)spheres. Walzer, "Response," 282, cheerfully accepts the points, unaware, apparently, of their inconsistency with the explicit formulations of his theory.
32. Cf. Amy Gutmann, "Justice across the Spheres," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, 99-119, but she doesn't realize the extent to which this account describes Walzer's actual treatment of (D-)spheres. Walzer, "Response," 282, cheerfully accepts the points, unaware, apparently, of their inconsistency with the explicit formulations of his theory.
33. Ronald Dworkin, "To Each His Own," New York Review of Books, 14 April 1983, 4-6, reprinted in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10.
34. Ronald Dworkin, "To Each His Own," New York Review of Books, 14 April 1983, 4-6, reprinted in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 10.
35. But see note 3. The other principles may have almost universal applicability, which suggests that their recognition can be explained in a naturalistic way; cf. note 27.
36. As Walzer entreats us to do; "Response," 282. But I will argue (sections 9, 10) that the concepts of nondominance and of complex equality require a list.
37. M. J. Trappenburg, Soorten van Gelijk, Medisch-ethische Discussies in Nederland (Zwolle, the Netherlands: Tjeenk Willink, 1993), chap. 7; Trappenburg, "Defining the Medical Sphere."
38. M. J. Trappenburg, Soorten van Gelijk, Medisch-ethische Discussies in Nederland (Zwolle, the Netherlands: Tjeenk Willink, 1993), chap. 7; Trappenburg, "Defining the Medical Sphere."
39. To give an example: an action is courageous (higher level) because it is performed competently in a dangerous situation (lower level). When two actions share all other properties, it cannot be the case that one of them is courageous and the other is not. For then the second one can't share the properties that make the first one courageous.
40. Cf. Walzer, Thick and Thin, 22-24, on the understanding of human lives as "careers." The distributive principle of equality of opportunity may presuppose this understanding, but it isn't entailed by it.
41. Though actual distribuenda aren't natural or conventional signs for other things, Walzer's use of the concepts of "meaning" and "interpretation" is a perfectly legitimate one; cf. such expressions as "the meaning of life" or "the meaning of x," where x refers to certain historical events.
42. Cf. Walzer, Thick and Thin, 28-31. "Given the human body, the construction of edible objects is not an entirely free construction." Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning," 170. If social constructions are "reiterated," they probably have naturalistic explanations; Walzer, Thick and Thin, 8, 17, 26.
43. Cf. Walzer, Thick and Thin, 28-31. "Given the human body, the construction of edible objects is not an entirely free construction." Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning," 170. If social constructions are "reiterated," they probably have naturalistic explanations; Walzer, Thick and Thin, 8, 17, 26.
44. Cf. Walzer, Thick and Thin, 28-31. "Given the human body, the construction of edible objects is not an entirely free construction." Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning," 170. If social constructions are "reiterated," they probably have naturalistic explanations; Walzer, Thick and Thin, 8, 17, 26.
45. Cf. Lyle A. Downing and Robert A. Thigpen, "Beyond Shared Understandings," Political Theory 14 (1986): 462.
46. Dworkin, "To Each His Own" (if social meanings are contested, the interpretation can only make an arbitrary choice); Joshua Cohen, "Review of 'Spheres of Justice,'" Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 457-68 (interpretation is either conservative or arbitrary); Susan Moller Okin, "Justice and Gender," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 42-73 (interpretation cannot criticise forms of dominance [e.g., of gender] enshrined in common understandings); G. Warnke, Justice and Interpretation (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1992), chap. 2;
47. Dworkin, "To Each His Own" (if social meanings are contested, the interpretation can only make an arbitrary choice); Joshua Cohen, "Review of 'Spheres of Justice,'" Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 457-68 (interpretation is either conservative or arbitrary); Susan Moller Okin, "Justice and Gender," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 42-73 (interpretation cannot criticise forms of dominance [e.g., of gender] enshrined in common understandings); G. Warnke, Justice and Interpretation (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1992), chap. 2;
48. Dworkin, "To Each His Own" (if social meanings are contested, the interpretation can only make an arbitrary choice); Joshua Cohen, "Review of 'Spheres of Justice,'" Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 457-68 (interpretation is either conservative or arbitrary); Susan Moller Okin, "Justice and Gender," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 42-73 (interpretation cannot criticise forms of dominance [e.g., of gender] enshrined in common understandings); G. Warnke, Justice and Interpretation (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1992), chap. 2;
49. Dworkin, "To Each His Own" (if social meanings are contested, the interpretation can only make an arbitrary choice); Joshua Cohen, "Review of 'Spheres of Justice,'" Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 457-68 (interpretation is either conservative or arbitrary); Susan Moller Okin, "Justice and Gender," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 42-73 (interpretation cannot criticise forms of dominance [e.g., of gender] enshrined in common understandings); G. Warnke, Justice and Interpretation (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1992), chap. 2;
50. Walzer, Thick and Thin, chap. 3.
51. Cf. the following argument about the distribution of food: food is used to appease hunger, therefore it should be provided to the hungry. For that reason, "[h]oarders in time of famine act wrongly . . . given what food is for." Walzer, "Objectivity and Social Meaning," 170-71. Obviously the distributional norm is not entailed by the functional statement.
52. Miller, "Introduction," argues that, disregarding the special goods I discuss in section 7, Walzer isn't committed to claiming the existence of aconceptual link between the social meaning of the good and the proper principle of its distribution. "Once we see what kind of good medicine is, this immediately triggers a particular distributive principle" (Miller, "Introduction," 6). My comments: (1) this concedes that the validity of the principle should be recognized on independent grounds; (2) only a higher-level description really "triggers" a principle in the way described in this section; and (3) therefore Miller's claim is false for actual distribuenda such as medicine.
53. Something analogous may be said about some burdens (e.g., the task of expressing gratitude). These burdens don't pose the usual "problem of scarcity" (in the case of burdens, of the good of avoidance) either. The problem of recruiting priests is that priesthood belongs to both categories of burdens at the same time: it is the proper expression of vocation but also a job that is there to be done. Only Providence can match the two allocative schemes arising from these "shared understandings."
54. Despite Walzer talking about the "inhabitants" of a sphere policing its boundaries; "Response," 187.
55. Cf. Barry, "Spherical Justice and Global Injustice," 73.
56. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986), 227.
57. For arguments of this type, from the quality of a relation to a comparative norm, cf. Dennis McKerlie, "Equality between Age-Groups," Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992): 276-95; G. J. Postema, "Equality as Membership," Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 19 (1990): 155-78.
58. For arguments of this type, from the quality of a relation to a comparative norm, cf. Dennis McKerlie, "Equality between Age-Groups," Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992): 276-95; G. J. Postema, "Equality as Membership," Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 19 (1990): 155-78.
59. For this concept, see Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 235-44.
60. Taking status as a basic distribuendum has been proposed by David Miller, "Complex Equality," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, chap. 9, and Adam Swift, "The Sociology of Complex Equality," ibid., chap. 11. It is implicitly accepted as a possible interpretation of complex equality by Walzer, "Response." Because this requires commensurability of actual distribuenda, the result is a form of simple equality. Miller tries to evade this consequence by introducing his principle as nothing but a tiebreaker in cases of conflict between other criteria but, in so doing, only succeeds in reducing the scope of the egalitarian concern without changing its basic character.
61. Taking status as a basic distribuendum has been proposed by David Miller, "Complex Equality," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, chap. 9, and Adam Swift, "The Sociology of Complex Equality," ibid., chap. 11. It is implicitly accepted as a possible interpretation of complex equality by Walzer, "Response." Because this requires commensurability of actual distribuenda, the result is a form of simple equality. Miller tries to evade this consequence by introducing his principle as nothing but a tiebreaker in cases of conflict between other criteria but, in so doing, only succeeds in reducing the scope of the egalitarian concern without changing its basic character.
62. Taking status as a basic distribuendum has been proposed by David Miller, "Complex Equality," in Pluralism, Justice, and Equality, chap. 9, and Adam Swift, "The Sociology of Complex Equality," ibid., chap. 11. It is implicitly accepted as a possible interpretation of complex equality by Walzer, "Response." Because this requires commensurability of actual distribuenda, the result is a form of simple equality. Miller tries to evade this consequence by introducing his principle as nothing but a tiebreaker in cases of conflict between other criteria but, in so doing, only succeeds in reducing the scope of the egalitarian concern without changing its basic character.
63. Walzer, Thick and Thin, chap. 1. (Published before as Michael Walzer, "Moral Minimalism," in From the Twilight of Probability, eds. William R. Shea and Antonio Spadafora (Canton, MA: Science History Publishers, 1992), 3-14.
64. Walzer, Thick and Thin, chap. 1. (Published before as Michael Walzer, "Moral Minimalism," in From the Twilight of Probability, eds. William R. Shea and Antonio Spadafora (Canton, MA: Science History Publishers, 1992), 3-14.
65. Cf. Michael Walzer, "Liberalism and the Art of Separation," Political Theory 12 (1984): 315-30.
66. Although Walzer, "Response," 283, advises against the method of weighted averaging of people's standing vis-à-vis different social goods, he doesn't want to argue for their radical incommensurability either, only for the inherently controversial character of the weighing required. This weighing is said to have an egalitarian effect of its own because it will tend to prevent the emergence of a commonly recognised measure of overall standing. (That is a paradoxical claim. Suppose that some people who happen to subscribe to the correct theory of justice are able to verify the radical inegalitarian character of its requirements, which only fail to be implemented on account of widespread ignorance. From which point of view are they supposed to be so happy with this situation?)
67. It will require another paper to argue this in detail: Govert den Hartogh, "Agency and Distribution" (unpublished manuscript, available from the author).
68. Excellently reviewed by D. Miller, "Distributive Justice: What the People Think," Ethics 102 (1992): 555-93.
69. It is an interesting question why this principle is lacking in social psychological accounts: because the people studied do not consider entitlements a matter of justice or rather because the psychologists don't. One suggestion is that people tend to misinterpret entitlements as deserts, especially people who hold them.
70. In the Netherlands, Rawls's difference principle has been appealed to by both defenders and opponents of the existing welfare arrangements.
71. Govert den Hartogh, "Priorities in Collective Health Care Provision: Why the Search for Criteria Failed," in The Good life as a Public Good, ed. Govert den Hartogh (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer, forthcoming).
72. Govert den Hartogh, "Generalist and Particularist Considerations in Applied Ethics," in Reasoning in Ethics and Law: Theory, Principle, and Judgment, eds. A. W. Musschenga and W. van der Steen (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, forthcoming).
73. Henry Richardson, "Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems," Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1990): 279-310; Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 1.
74. Henry Richardson, "Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems," Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1990): 279-310; Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 1.