Forming Partnerships in Environmental Policy: The Business of Emissions Trading in Clean Air Management

American Behavioral Scientist

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 107-123

  Kamieniecki, Sheldon ^a   Shafie, David ^a   Silvers, Julie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033244425     PISSN: 00027642     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/00027649921955182     Document Type: Article

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