Establishing toleration

Political Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 667-693

  Dees, Richard H ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033241336     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591799027005004     Document Type: Review

References (92)

1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 158-68.
2. For the distinction here between two kinds of toleration, see John Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997): 783.
3. Getting the two sides to the point where they can accept toleration as a modus vivendi is itself a difficult task. Indeed, both sides usually have plenty of reason to distrust the other and plenty of reason to think that toleration in any form would be irrational. I discuss these issues in "Trust and the Rationality of Toleration," Noûs 32 (1998): 82-98.
4. Thus, we begin to see toleration as a virtue somewhere around the third of the five points on Michael Walzer's spectrum of attitudes of toleration: it is somewhere near the "principled recognition that the 'others' have rights even if they exercise those rights in unattractive ways." See Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 11 and chap. 1 in general. I do not think we have to see the issues in terms of rights, but the point is that we must think there is some positive value in living together with those who are different. We could do so because we think they have rights to moral autonomy in a Kantian, manner because we think such differences help us find the truth in a more Millian manner, or because we have yet other reasons to find their presence valuable.
5. For the general historical scenario, I rely on the following sources: Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 7; Emmanuel La Roy Ladurie, The Ancien Régime, 1610-1774, trans. Mark Greengrass (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996), chaps. 1-2; A. D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-29, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and Robin Briggs, Early Modern France, 1560-1715 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), chap. 3(i)-(ii).
6. For the general historical scenario, I rely on the following sources: Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 7; Emmanuel La Roy Ladurie, The Ancien Régime, 1610-1774, trans. Mark Greengrass (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996), chaps. 1-2; A. D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-29, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and Robin Briggs, Early Modern France, 1560-1715 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), chap. 3(i)-(ii).
7. For the general historical scenario, I rely on the following sources: Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 7; Emmanuel La Roy Ladurie, The Ancien Régime, 1610-1774, trans. Mark Greengrass (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996), chaps. 1-2; A. D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-29, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and Robin Briggs, Early Modern France, 1560-1715 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), chap. 3(i)-(ii).
8. For the general historical scenario, I rely on the following sources: Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 7; Emmanuel La Roy Ladurie, The Ancien Régime, 1610-1774, trans. Mark Greengrass (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996), chaps. 1-2; A. D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-29, trans. Brian Pearce (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and Robin Briggs, Early Modern France, 1560-1715 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), chap. 3(i)-(ii).
9. This point is emphasized in N. M. Sutherland, "The Crown, the Huguenots, and the Edict of Nantes," in The Huguenot Connection, ed. R. M. Golden (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer, 1988), 28-48.
10. On Henri's conversion and various factions' perspectives on it, see Michael Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV: Politics, Power, and Religious Belief in Early Modern France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
11. At best, both sides sought what Mario Turchetti calls "religious concord" - an attempt to reach a substantive agreement between the two groups about the correct religion - rather than any genuine form of toleration. See Turchetti, "Religious Concord and Political Tolerance in Sixteenth-and Seventeenth-Century France," Sixteenth Century Journal 22 (1991): 15-25.
12. On this point on the Catholic side at least, see Barbara Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 2. Many of these differences in values can, I think, be explained by rational choice mechanisms discussed in Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). But as Robert Goodin points out, these mechanisms do not fully explain the deep attachments people have to these values. See Goodin, "Conventions and Conversions, or, Why Is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty?," in The Morality of Nationalism, eds. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 88-104. Indeed, I would argue that Goodin's additions, while suggestive, do not go far enough.
13. On this point on the Catholic side at least, see Barbara Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 2. Many of these differences in values can, I think, be explained by rational choice mechanisms discussed in Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). But as Robert Goodin points out, these mechanisms do not fully explain the deep attachments people have to these values. See Goodin, "Conventions and Conversions, or, Why Is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty?," in The Morality of Nationalism, eds. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 88-104. Indeed, I would argue that Goodin's additions, while suggestive, do not go far enough.
14. On this point on the Catholic side at least, see Barbara Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 2. Many of these differences in values can, I think, be explained by rational choice mechanisms discussed in Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). But as Robert Goodin points out, these mechanisms do not fully explain the deep attachments people have to these values. See Goodin, "Conventions and Conversions, or, Why Is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty?," in The Morality of Nationalism, eds. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 88-104. Indeed, I would argue that Goodin's additions, while suggestive, do not go far enough.
15. This point was made clear to me by J. Donald Moon.
16. David Gauthier suggests such an argument in "In the Neighbourhood of the Newcomb-Predictor (Reflections on Rationality)," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1988-1989): 179-94.
17. I discuss these and other kinds of value transformations in "Moral Conversions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 531-50.
18. Whether the Huguenots' assessment was accurate is hard to determine since their beliefs created distrust in the Catholics. Nevertheless, that belief was not unreasonable on its face, and the Catholics did nothing to assuage the Huguenots' fears.
19. See Christian Desplat, "Louis XIII and the Union of Béarn to France," trans. Mark Greengrass, in Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the Modern State in Early Modern Europe, ed. Mark Greengrass (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), 68-83.
20. After 1622, only the heavily fortified port city of La Rochelle held out for the Huguenots on the hope of English intervention. But that intervention, when it eventually came, was woefully inadequate, and the fortress finally fell in 1628.
21. The Fronde was a series of rebellions against Mazarin and the young Louis XIV that at various times involved the officeholders in the parlements and the Prince de Condé. It represented the last resistance to the absolutist pretensions of the French Crown. See La Roy Ladurie, The Ancien Régime, chap. 3.
22. See Elisabeth Labrousse, "Une foi, une loi, un roi ?": Essai sur la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes (Geneva: Éditions Labor et Fides, 1985), chap. 2.
23. See Elisabeth Labrousse, "Understanding the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes from the Perspective of the French Court," trans. Ruth Whelan, in The Huguenot Connection, 49-62.
24. One result was that both sides framed any conflict that arose as one in which the other side provoked a hostile response, and each side saw its own actions merely as a defense of rights already established by the Edict of Nantes. So, for example, Louis XIII saw his invasion of Béarn as an act to protect the Catholic minority in the province, and the Huguenots saw it as a prelude to a more general campaign against them and the rights guaranteed to them by the edict.
25. See, for example, Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1984), 62-66.
26. See Jonas Proast, The Argument of the Letter Concerning Toleration, Briefly Consider'd and Answer'd (Oxford, 1690; reprint, New York: Garland, 1984).
27. I canvass these arguments more thoroughly in "The Justification of Toleration," in Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance, eds. Mehdi Amin Razavi and David Ambuel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 134-56.
28. Rawls would not, I think, disagree with this conclusion. In his terms, the people of the sixteenth century were "rational," but they were not "reasonable." For Rawls, they do not count as "reasonable" because they do not accept the "burdens of judgment" - that is, they do not accept the view that rational people can have deep disagreements about facts and values. But Rawls, of course, is quite clear that his conception of the "reasonable" is a moral conception and that the "reasonable" cannot be derived from the "rational." See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 48-58. For an account of the limits of Rawls's view of the reasonable, see Leif Wenar, "Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique," Ethics 106 (1995): 32-62.
29. Rawls would not, I think, disagree with this conclusion. In his terms, the people of the sixteenth century were "rational," but they were not "reasonable." For Rawls, they do not count as "reasonable" because they do not accept the "burdens of judgment" - that is, they do not accept the view that rational people can have deep disagreements about facts and values. But Rawls, of course, is quite clear that his conception of the "reasonable" is a moral conception and that the "reasonable" cannot be derived from the "rational." See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 48-58. For an account of the limits of Rawls's view of the reasonable, see Leif Wenar, "Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique," Ethics 106 (1995): 32-62.
30. I discuss such alternative models for a situation similar to this one in part III of "Trust and the Rationality of Toleration."
31. I discuss various forms of conversion and the extent to which they can be rationally justified in "Moral Conversions." For a similar view about the rationality of belief changes, see Anna Kussler, "Rational by Shock: A Reply to Brandt," in Preferences, eds. Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 78-87.
32. This conversion is then what I have called a "conversion by evolution" or perhaps a "conversion by discovery," but not a "conversion by revelation." For my use of these terms, see "Moral Conversions."
33. One could argue that the Edict of Nantes was an important part of a success story that led to toleration for Protestants during the French Revolution. In that way, one could argue, it was part of a process that led to greater toleration than in England, where Catholics did not achieve full rights until 1829. In a sense, of course, this point is correct: in a sense, every past event shapes the future in some way. But the toleration needed to end the religious conflicts in France required the massive upheavals of the French Revolution, while a structurally similar toleration was achieved in Britain by the Act of Toleration. In Britain, that toleration, once achieved, was never revoked - though a broader form of toleration in Britain was achieved only with painful slowness.
34. For a general account of the context, see J. R. Jones, "The Revolution in Context," in Liberty Secured? Britain before and after 1688, ed. J. R. Jones (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 11 -52 and his earlier book, The Revolution of 1688 in England (New York: Norton, 1972).
35. For a general account of the context, see J. R. Jones, "The Revolution in Context," in Liberty Secured? Britain before and after 1688, ed. J. R. Jones (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 11 -52 and his earlier book, The Revolution of 1688 in England (New York: Norton, 1972).
36. The Whigs, led by Locke's patron, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Lord of Shaftesbury, tried to pass a bill that would have excluded Charles II's Catholic brother, James, from the throne after Charles's death. All these efforts ultimately failed, and James became king in 1685. For an account, see J. R. Jones, The First Whigs (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1961).
37. In addition, the Act of Toleration only applied to England and Wales. In Scotland, the Revolution led to the reestablishment of the Presbyterian Church, which allowed no toleration for dissenters, even members of the previous Episcopalian establishment. See Jones, "The Revolution in Context," 43-45.
38. The most significant acts of public violence were those in 1710 in support of Henry Sacheverell, a high-church cleric who was impeached for preaching against the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and against toleration, the anti-Catholic riots in 1780 inspired by the efforts of Lord George Gordon to oppose freedom of worship for Catholics, and the riots against Radical Dissenter (and chemist) Joseph Priestley in 1791. For an account of religious dissent in the eighteenth century, see J.C.D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 5.
39. The only exception was Queen Anne, who was much attached to the Anglican hierarchy. Toward the end of her reign (1702-1714), the newly elected Tory majority closed loopholes in the laws and supported the Anglican complaints against Dissenters. But even they did not repeal the Act of Toleration.
40. And even that formality was often overlooked. My account here rests on Clark, English Society, chap. 5 and on Israel, "William III and Toleration"; John Bossey, "English Catholics after 1688"; and Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Toleration and Religion after 1688," all in From Persecution to Toleration, eds. Ole PeterGrell, Jonathan Israel, and Nicholas Tyacke (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1991), 129-70, 369-87, 389-408, respectively.
41. And even that formality was often overlooked. My account here rests on Clark, English Society, chap. 5 and on Israel, "William III and Toleration"; John Bossey, "English Catholics after 1688"; and Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Toleration and Religion after 1688," all in From Persecution to Toleration, eds. Ole PeterGrell, Jonathan Israel, and Nicholas Tyacke (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1991), 129-70, 369-87, 389-408, respectively.
42. And even that formality was often overlooked. My account here rests on Clark, English Society, chap. 5 and on Israel, "William III and Toleration"; John Bossey, "English Catholics after 1688"; and Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Toleration and Religion after 1688," all in From Persecution to Toleration, eds. Ole PeterGrell, Jonathan Israel, and Nicholas Tyacke (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1991), 129-70, 369-87, 389-408, respectively.
43. And even that formality was often overlooked. My account here rests on Clark, English Society, chap. 5 and on Israel, "William III and Toleration"; John Bossey, "English Catholics after 1688"; and Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Toleration and Religion after 1688," all in From Persecution to Toleration, eds. Ole PeterGrell, Jonathan Israel, and Nicholas Tyacke (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1991), 129-70, 369-87, 389-408, respectively.
44. And even that formality was often overlooked. My account here rests on Clark, English Society, chap. 5 and on Israel, "William III and Toleration"; John Bossey, "English Catholics after 1688"; and Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Toleration and Religion after 1688," all in From Persecution to Toleration, eds. Ole PeterGrell, Jonathan Israel, and Nicholas Tyacke (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1991), 129-70, 369-87, 389-408, respectively.
45. These measures then precipitated the great democratic reform in English history, the Reform Bill of 1832, which itself became a religious issue when the bishops in the House of Lords opposed it in 1831. For an account of these changes, see Clark, English Society, chap. 6.
46. See Keith Luria, "Rituals of Conversion: Catholics and Protestants in Seventeenth-Century Poitou," in Culture and Identity in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800), eds. Barbara Diefendorf and Carla Hesse (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 65-81; Gregory Hanlon, Confession and Community in Seventeenth Century France (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); and Labrousse, "Une foi, une loi, un roi?," chap. 4.
47. See Keith Luria, "Rituals of Conversion: Catholics and Protestants in Seventeenth-Century Poitou," in Culture and Identity in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800), eds. Barbara Diefendorf and Carla Hesse (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 65-81; Gregory Hanlon, Confession and Community in Seventeenth Century France (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); and Labrousse, "Une foi, une loi, un roi?," chap. 4.
48. See Keith Luria, "Rituals of Conversion: Catholics and Protestants in Seventeenth-Century Poitou," in Culture and Identity in Early Modern Europe (1500-1800), eds. Barbara Diefendorf and Carla Hesse (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 65-81; Gregory Hanlon, Confession and Community in Seventeenth Century France (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); and Labrousse, "Une foi, une loi, un roi?," chap. 4.
49. For example, the negotiations at Camp David in 1978 between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin nearly broke down when the ;wo principals spoke directly to each other. Only by shuttling between them could American President Jimmy Carter salvage an agreement. See Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982), 327-60.
50. See, for example, Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Violent Civil War," International Security (forthcoming) and I. William Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," in Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 20-34.
51. See, for example, Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Violent Civil War," International Security (forthcoming) and I. William Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," in Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 20-34.
52. This issue is precisely the one debated by Charles Taylor and his critics in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Using Québec as his model, Taylor argues that a government should go to great lengths to ensure the survival of a cultural group. See Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 25-73. His critics are, however, suspicious of these claims. See especially, Michael Walzer, "Comment," 99-103, and Jürgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," 107-415.
53. This issue is precisely the one debated by Charles Taylor and his critics in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Using Québec as his model, Taylor argues that a government should go to great lengths to ensure the survival of a cultural group. See Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 25-73. His critics are, however, suspicious of these claims. See especially, Michael Walzer, "Comment," 99-103, and Jürgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," 107-415.
54. This issue is precisely the one debated by Charles Taylor and his critics in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Using Québec as his model, Taylor argues that a government should go to great lengths to ensure the survival of a cultural group. See Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 25-73. His critics are, however, suspicious of these claims. See especially, Michael Walzer, "Comment," 99-103, and Jürgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," 107-415.
55. This issue is precisely the one debated by Charles Taylor and his critics in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Using Québec as his model, Taylor argues that a government should go to great lengths to ensure the survival of a cultural group. See Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 25-73. His critics are, however, suspicious of these claims. See especially, Michael Walzer, "Comment," 99-103, and Jürgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," 107-415.
56. See Will Kymlicka, "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance," Analyse und Kritik 14 (1992): 33-56. Indeed, as Michael Walzer points out, toleration can be achieved in many different kinds of settings. See Walzer, On Toleration, chap. 2. For more on the Ottoman example, see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, "Introduction," in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard d Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 1:1-34.
57. See Will Kymlicka, "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance," Analyse und Kritik 14 (1992): 33-56. Indeed, as Michael Walzer points out, toleration can be achieved in many different kinds of settings. See Walzer, On Toleration, chap. 2. For more on the Ottoman example, see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, "Introduction," in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard d Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 1:1-34.
58. See Will Kymlicka, "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance," Analyse und Kritik 14 (1992): 33-56. Indeed, as Michael Walzer points out, toleration can be achieved in many different kinds of settings. See Walzer, On Toleration, chap. 2. For more on the Ottoman example, see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, "Introduction," in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard d Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 1:1-34.
59. For a criticism of the Ottoman Empire as an example of toleration, see Moshe Halbertal, "Autonomy, Toleration, and Groups Rights: A Response to Will Kymlicka," in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 106-13. See also C. E. Bosworth, "The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam," in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, 1:37-51.
60. For a criticism of the Ottoman Empire as an example of toleration, see Moshe Halbertal, "Autonomy, Toleration, and Groups Rights: A Response to Will Kymlicka," in Toleration: An Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 106-13. See also C. E. Bosworth, "The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam," in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, 1:37-51.
61. As "peoples of the book," most religions had some element of the truth. But as Seyyed Hossein Nasr notes, traditional Muslims cannot accept a view in which "man's rights" are placed above "God's rights." See Nasr, "The Metaphysical Roots of Tolerance and Intolerance," in Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance, 43-56.
62. coz, "Communal Conflicts in Ottoman Syria during the Reform Era: The Role of Political and Economic Factors," both in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, II:107-34 and 11:91-105, respectively.
63. coz, "Communal Conflicts in Ottoman Syria during the Reform Era: The Role of Political and Economic Factors," both in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, II:107-34 and 11:91-105, respectively.
64. For a discussion of the importance of voice in organizations, particularly in politics, see Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
65. See Braude and Lewis, "Introduction" and Bosworth, "The Concept of Dhimma."
66. See Braude and Lewis, "Introduction" and Bosworth, "The Concept of Dhimma."
67. The importance of economic arguments was emphasized to me by William Charron.
68. Voltaire, Letters on England, trans. Leonard Tancock (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1980), 41.
69. Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). See also Stephen Holmes, "The Secret History of Self-interest," in Passions and Constraints (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 42-68.
70. Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). See also Stephen Holmes, "The Secret History of Self-interest," in Passions and Constraints (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 42-68.
71. See Warren Scoville, The Persecution of the Huguenots and French Economic Development, 1680-1720 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), chap. 2, especially 47-57, and Elisabeth Labrousse, "Unefoi, une loi, un roi?" chap. 4.
72. See Warren Scoville, The Persecution of the Huguenots and French Economic Development, 1680-1720 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), chap. 2, especially 47-57, and Elisabeth Labrousse, "Unefoi, une loi, un roi?" chap. 4.
73. See Scoville, Persecution of the Huguenots, chap. 5.
74. This point was emphasized to me by Eric Margolis.
75. Karl Marx, "Marx to Meyer and Vogt, 9 Apr. 1870," in Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), 591-92. For a discussion of the issues at stake in this letter, see Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21-22.
76. Karl Marx, "Marx to Meyer and Vogt, 9 Apr. 1870," in Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1977), 591-92. For a discussion of the issues at stake in this letter, see Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21-22.
77. Even in the Netherlands, however, toleration was a very recent practice, and it was not well established even in 1688. Indeed, William III had to intervene personally to quash an anti-Catholic measure in Holland in 1687. See Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1995), chap. 27.
78. Quoted in Desplat, "Louis XIII and the Union of Béarn to France," 69.
79. See Scoville, Persecution of the Huguenots, 30 and Labrousse, "Understanding the Revocation."
80. See Scoville, Persecution of the Huguenots, 30 and Labrousse, "Understanding the Revocation."
81. Luria, "Rituals of Conversion."
82. Scoville, Persecution of the Huguenots, chap. 2.
83. For an account of the radical religious ideas that emerged in the English Revolution, see Christopher Hill, The WorldTurned Upside Down (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1972).
84. Voltaire, Letters on England, 41.
85. On this phenomenon in politics, see Michael Ignatieff, "The Narcissism of Minor Differences" in The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and Modern Conscience (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 34-71. See also his Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993).
86. On this phenomenon in politics, see Michael Ignatieff, "The Narcissism of Minor Differences" in The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and Modern Conscience (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 34-71. See also his Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993).
87. This view is confirmed by Bernard Williams's conclusions about the nature of trust: "The problem of cooperation cannot be solved merely at the level of decision theory, social psychology, or the general theory of social institutions." See Williams, "Formal Structures and Social Reality," in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 3-13; the quotation is at 13.
88. Such "norms of exclusion" have many kinds of benefits for the group, as Russell Hardin points out. See Hardin, One for All, chap. 4.
89. For more on issues of identity in the early modern context, see Ingrid Creppell, "Toleration and Identity in Early Modern Europe: The Contribution of Jean Bodin" (unpublished manu-script, 1999).
90. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 160-67.
91. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 32.
92. This process is, in fact, how almost all virtues are taught. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), chap. 14.