Habermas and religious inclusion: Lessons from Kant's moral theology

Political Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 634-666

  Shaw, Brian J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033241310     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591799027005003     Document Type: Review

References (149)

1. Juergen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), xxxix, and Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), 8, 126.
2. Juergen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), xxxix, and Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), 8, 126.
3. Tracy B. Strong and Frank Andreas Sposito, "Habermas's Significant Other," in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, ed. Stephen K. White (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 269.
4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan/Library of Liberal Arts), 132, 130.
5. Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in This World," in Habermas and Public Theology, eds. Don S. Browning and Francis Schuessler Fiorenza (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 227.
6. See especially the exchanges between Habermas and prominent theologians such as Helmut Peukert, David Tracy, and Francis Schuessler Fiorenza collected in Browning and Fiorenza, Habermas and Public Theology. See also a reply to Habermas by Johann Baptist Metz in Stichworte zur "Geistigen Situation der Zeit," ed. Juergen Habermas (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), vol. II, 529-38, as well as essays by both in Diagnosen der Zeit, ed. J. B. Metz (Dusseldorf, 1994).
7. See especially the exchanges between Habermas and prominent theologians such as Helmut Peukert, David Tracy, and Francis Schuessler Fiorenza collected in Browning and Fiorenza, Habermas and Public Theology. See also a reply to Habermas by Johann Baptist Metz in Stichworte zur "Geistigen Situation der Zeit," ed. Juergen Habermas (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), vol. II, 529-38, as well as essays by both in Diagnosen der Zeit, ed. J. B. Metz (Dusseldorf, 1994).
8. Aside from the extensive literature debating the role of religion in the political liberalism of Habermas's fellow neo-Kantian, John Rawls, which flourishes in major law journals as well as in journals of moral and political philosophy, issues of religious identity and toleration emerge in debates about the recognition due to minority cultures within nation-states, as well as in those about European integration. See, for instance, representative discussions of "citizenship and sovereignty" in Political Theory 25 (December 1997), others devoted to toleration in Ratio Juris 10 (June 1997), and still others exploring "multicultural citizenship" in Constellations 4 (April 1997) and the "struggle for recognition" in Constellations 5 (March 1998). See too Rawls's recent essay, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," University of Chicago Law Review 64 (Summer 1997): 765-807, as well as the essays collected in Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998).
9. Aside from the extensive literature debating the role of religion in the political liberalism of Habermas's fellow neo-Kantian, John Rawls, which flourishes in major law journals as well as in journals of moral and political philosophy, issues of religious identity and toleration emerge in debates about the recognition due to minority cultures within nation-states, as well as in those about European integration. See, for instance, representative discussions of "citizenship and sovereignty" in Political Theory 25 (December 1997), others devoted to toleration in Ratio Juris 10 (June 1997), and still others exploring "multicultural citizenship" in Constellations 4 (April 1997) and the "struggle for recognition" in Constellations 5 (March 1998). See too Rawls's recent essay, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," University of Chicago Law Review 64 (Summer 1997): 765-807, as well as the essays collected in Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998).
10. Aside from the extensive literature debating the role of religion in the political liberalism of Habermas's fellow neo-Kantian, John Rawls, which flourishes in major law journals as well as in journals of moral and political philosophy, issues of religious identity and toleration emerge in debates about the recognition due to minority cultures within nation-states, as well as in those about European integration. See, for instance, representative discussions of "citizenship and sovereignty" in Political Theory 25 (December 1997), others devoted to toleration in Ratio Juris 10 (June 1997), and still others exploring "multicultural citizenship" in Constellations 4 (April 1997) and the "struggle for recognition" in Constellations 5 (March 1998). See too Rawls's recent essay, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," University of Chicago Law Review 64 (Summer 1997): 765-807, as well as the essays collected in Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998).
11. Aside from the extensive literature debating the role of religion in the political liberalism of Habermas's fellow neo-Kantian, John Rawls, which flourishes in major law journals as well as in journals of moral and political philosophy, issues of religious identity and toleration emerge in debates about the recognition due to minority cultures within nation-states, as well as in those about European integration. See, for instance, representative discussions of "citizenship and sovereignty" in Political Theory 25 (December 1997), others devoted to toleration in Ratio Juris 10 (June 1997), and still others exploring "multicultural citizenship" in Constellations 4 (April 1997) and the "struggle for recognition" in Constellations 5 (March 1998). See too Rawls's recent essay, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," University of Chicago Law Review 64 (Summer 1997): 765-807, as well as the essays collected in Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998).
12. Aside from the extensive literature debating the role of religion in the political liberalism of Habermas's fellow neo-Kantian, John Rawls, which flourishes in major law journals as well as in journals of moral and political philosophy, issues of religious identity and toleration emerge in debates about the recognition due to minority cultures within nation-states, as well as in those about European integration. See, for instance, representative discussions of "citizenship and sovereignty" in Political Theory 25 (December 1997), others devoted to toleration in Ratio Juris 10 (June 1997), and still others exploring "multicultural citizenship" in Constellations 4 (April 1997) and the "struggle for recognition" in Constellations 5 (March 1998). See too Rawls's recent essay, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," University of Chicago Law Review 64 (Summer 1997): 765-807, as well as the essays collected in Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998).
13. Aside from the extensive literature debating the role of religion in the political liberalism of Habermas's fellow neo-Kantian, John Rawls, which flourishes in major law journals as well as in journals of moral and political philosophy, issues of religious identity and toleration emerge in debates about the recognition due to minority cultures within nation-states, as well as in those about European integration. See, for instance, representative discussions of "citizenship and sovereignty" in Political Theory 25 (December 1997), others devoted to toleration in Ratio Juris 10 (June 1997), and still others exploring "multicultural citizenship" in Constellations 4 (April 1997) and the "struggle for recognition" in Constellations 5 (March 1998). See too Rawls's recent essay, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," University of Chicago Law Review 64 (Summer 1997): 765-807, as well as the essays collected in Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998).
14. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 7.
15. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 132-33.
16. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1964), 29 [B XXX].
17. Useful discussions of the development of Habermas's views on religion are found in Helmut Peukert, "Enlightenment and Theology as Unfinished Projects," in Habermas and Public Theology, 54, and William J. Meyer, "Private Faith or Public Religion? An Assessment of Habermas's Changing View of Religion," Journal of Religion 75 (July 1995): 371-91.
18. Useful discussions of the development of Habermas's views on religion are found in Helmut Peukert, "Enlightenment and Theology as Unfinished Projects," in Habermas and Public Theology, 54, and William J. Meyer, "Private Faith or Public Religion? An Assessment of Habermas's Changing View of Religion," Journal of Religion 75 (July 1995): 371-91.
19. Habermas, "Does Philosophy Still Have a Purpose?" in Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 12-13. Elsewhere in the same essay (pp. 17-18), Habermas speaks confidently of the contemporary "collapse of religious consciousness" and the unwillingness of philosophy to confront the "de facto meaninglessness of death in its contingency, that of individual suffering, or that of the private loss of happiness - in general, the meaninglessness of the negativity of the risks built into life - in a way that had been possible for the religious hope in salvation."
20. Habermas, "Israel oder Athen: Wem gehoert die anamnetische Vernunft?" in Habermas, Vom sinnlichen Eindruck zum sympolischen Ausdruck (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), 107.
21. Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 51.
22. Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 453-54; and Habermas, The New Conservatism, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 48-70. A notable exception to Habermas's generally indulgent treatment of the views of religiously devout thinkers is his sharp expression of irritation at some of Horkheimer's later theological pronouncements. Habermas, "To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning without God is a Futile Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark by Max Horkheimer," in Habermas, Justification and Application, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 134. A somewhat more muted stance emerges in another essay, "Max Horkheimer: Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte seines Werkes," in Habermas, Texte und Contexte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 91-109.
23. Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 453-54; and Habermas, The New Conservatism, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 48-70. A notable exception to Habermas's generally indulgent treatment of the views of religiously devout thinkers is his sharp expression of irritation at some of Horkheimer's later theological pronouncements. Habermas, "To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning without God is a Futile Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark by Max Horkheimer," in Habermas, Justification and Application, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 134. A somewhat more muted stance emerges in another essay, "Max Horkheimer: Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte seines Werkes," in Habermas, Texte und Contexte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 91-109.
24. Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 453-54; and Habermas, The New Conservatism, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 48-70. A notable exception to Habermas's generally indulgent treatment of the views of religiously devout thinkers is his sharp expression of irritation at some of Horkheimer's later theological pronouncements. Habermas, "To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning without God is a Futile Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark by Max Horkheimer," in Habermas, Justification and Application, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 134. A somewhat more muted stance emerges in another essay, "Max Horkheimer: Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte seines Werkes," in Habermas, Texte und Contexte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 91-109.
25. Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 453-54; and Habermas, The New Conservatism, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 48-70. A notable exception to Habermas's generally indulgent treatment of the views of religiously devout thinkers is his sharp expression of irritation at some of Horkheimer's later theological pronouncements. Habermas, "To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning without God is a Futile Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark by Max Horkheimer," in Habermas, Justification and Application, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 134. A somewhat more muted stance emerges in another essay, "Max Horkheimer: Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte seines Werkes," in Habermas, Texte und Contexte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 91-109.
26. See Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation" in From Max Weber, ed. and trans. C. Wright Mills and H. H. Gerth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 129-58. Revealing in this context is Habermas's expression of a "certain emotional difficulty" with the influence of the Catholic Church in the Polish Solidarity movement, an influence he contrasts unfavorably with that exercised by "a strongly positivist and secular intelligentsia" in Polish life about which he is "delighted." See "'More Humility, Fewer Illusions': A Talk between Adam Michnik and Juergen Habermas," New York Review of Books, 24 March 1994, 29.
27. See Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation" in From Max Weber, ed. and trans. C. Wright Mills and H. H. Gerth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 129-58. Revealing in this context is Habermas's expression of a "certain emotional difficulty" with the influence of the Catholic Church in the Polish Solidarity movement, an influence he contrasts unfavorably with that exercised by "a strongly positivist and secular intelligentsia" in Polish life about which he is "delighted." See "'More Humility, Fewer Illusions': A Talk between Adam Michnik and Juergen Habermas," New York Review of Books, 24 March 1994, 29.
28. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 18.
29. Ibid., 16.
30. Ibid., 16-17.
31. Ibid., 16.
32. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. II, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1987), 77.
33. Anne Fortin-Melkevik, "Le statu de la religion dans la modernite selon David Tracy and Juergen Habermas," Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 22 (1993): 424. See also David Tracy, "Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm," in Habermas, Modernity and Public Theology, 19-42.
34. Anne Fortin-Melkevik, "Le statu de la religion dans la modernite selon David Tracy and Juergen Habermas," Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 22 (1993): 424. See also David Tracy, "Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm," in Habermas, Modernity and Public Theology, 19-42.
35. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 11, 81, 77.
36. Habermas, "Israel oder Athen," 110.
37. Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 7.
38. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984), 69.
39. Ibid., 68.
40. Fortin Melkevik, "Le statu de la religion," 426. See also Donald Jay Rothberg, "Rationality and Religion in Habermas's Recent Work," Philosophy and Social Criticism 3 (1986): 221-43.
41. Fortin Melkevik, "Le statu de la religion," 426. See also Donald Jay Rothberg, "Rationality and Religion in Habermas's Recent Work," Philosophy and Social Criticism 3 (1986): 221-43.
42. Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in this World," in Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theology, 233.
43. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, 303.
44. Ibid., 20.
45. Habermas, Justification and Application, 146.
46. Indeed, in his exchanges with Tracy and Peukert, Habermas argues that neither religion nor even its most sophisticated theological articulations really make use of genuinely postconventional discursive procedures since religion's essentially contemplative attitude condemns it to various modes of speechlessness. In particular, he alleges that modern Christian theology confronts a well-neigh fatal dilemma. Should it take "the Protestant path" and appeal to "the kerygma and faith as a source of religious insight absolutely independent of reason," it explicitly subordinates (rational) communicative procedures to the dogmas of faith. Should it, on the contrary, follow "the path of 'enlightened Catholicism' in the sense that it relinquishes the status of a special discourse and exposes its assertions to the whole range of scientific discussion," theology incorporates communicative procedures only at the cost of opening itself to "a type of interpretation which no longer allows the religious experiences to be valid as religious." In Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in this World," 234-35.
47. Thus, in his exchange with public theologians, Habermas writes that in response to the criticisms of Albrecht Wellmer and Martin Seel he has sought to remedy "the reductions of an expressivistic aesthetics which The Theory of Communicative Action at least suggested." He now would "hesitate to name religious and aesthetic symbols in the same breath." Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in this World," 239.
48. Habermas, "Israel oder Athen," 110.
49. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 19.
50. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 97. See also Habermas's essay, "On the Employments of Practical Reason" in Justification and Application, 1-17, in which he introduces the distinction between moral, ethical, and pragmatic discourses.
51. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 97. See also Habermas's essay, "On the Employments of Practical Reason" in Justification and Application, 1-17, in which he introduces the distinction between moral, ethical, and pragmatic discourses.
52. Habermas's characterization of religion as alternately an instance of aesthetic-expressive or ethical discourse actually evinces greater conceptual consistency than might initially appear since uniting both is a shared concern with "authenticity" rather than the moral autonomy typical of properly moral discourses.
53. Thus, for instance, in his exchange with public theologians, Habermas allows that he might have once "suggested too quickly an affirmative answer to the question as to 'whether then from religious truths, after the religious world views have collapsed, nothing more and nothing other than the secular principles of a universalist ethics of responsibility can be salvaged, and this means: can be accepted for good reasons, on the basis of insight.'" In Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in this World," 237. This suggestion Habermas originally made in a 1982 essay, "Die Kulturkritik der Neokonservativen in den USA und in der Bundesrepublik," collected in Die Neue Unuebersichtlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985), 52. Revealingly, this passage does not appear in the English translation of the essay subsequently published in The New Conservatism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
54. Thus, for instance, in his exchange with public theologians, Habermas allows that he might have once "suggested too quickly an affirmative answer to the question as to 'whether then from religious truths, after the religious world views have collapsed, nothing more and nothing other than the secular principles of a universalist ethics of responsibility can be salvaged, and this means: can be accepted for good reasons, on the basis of insight.'" In Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in this World," 237. This suggestion Habermas originally made in a 1982 essay, "Die Kulturkritik der Neokonservativen in den USA und in der Bundesrepublik," collected in Die Neue Unuebersichtlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985), 52. Revealingly, this passage does not appear in the English translation of the essay subsequently published in The New Conservatism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
55. Thus, for instance, in his exchange with public theologians, Habermas allows that he might have once "suggested too quickly an affirmative answer to the question as to 'whether then from religious truths, after the religious world views have collapsed, nothing more and nothing other than the secular principles of a universalist ethics of responsibility can be salvaged, and this means: can be accepted for good reasons, on the basis of insight.'" In Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in this World," 237. This suggestion Habermas originally made in a 1982 essay, "Die Kulturkritik der Neokonservativen in den USA und in der Bundesrepublik," collected in Die Neue Unuebersichtlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985), 52. Revealingly, this passage does not appear in the English translation of the essay subsequently published in The New Conservatism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
56. Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," 451.
57. John Rawls, "Reply to Habermas," Journal of Philosophy 92 (March 1995): 135.
58. Habermas, "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls' Political Liberalism," Journal of Philosophy 92 (March 1995): 117.
59. Carter levels this charge in his Culture of Disbelief (New York: Basic Books, 1993). On Rawls's recent simplification and recasting of the elaborate criteria of inclusive public reason as "the proviso," see especially his Introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) and his essay, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited."
60. Carter levels this charge in his Culture of Disbelief (New York: Basic Books, 1993). On Rawls's recent simplification and recasting of the elaborate criteria of inclusive public reason as "the proviso," see especially his Introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) and his essay, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited."
61. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick D. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 210, 207.
62. Tracy, "Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm," 35.
63. Ibid., 36-37.
64. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 520 [A 623/B651].
65. Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 21, 23.
66. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 500 [A 591/B619]. Kant argues that the last two proofs rest implicitly on the first, the ontological, and for this reason directs his critical fire primarily against its central premise that existence is a real predicate.
67. Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, 39.
68. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 650 [A 828/B 856].
69. The phrase "holy and beneficent Author of the world" appears in Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 136; the account of his love for men in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T. M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 110, and the contrast between pragmatic, doctrinal, and moral (rational) faith in The Critique of Pure Reason, 645-52 [A 820/B 848 - A 830/B 858].
70. The phrase "holy and beneficent Author of the world" appears in Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 136; the account of his love for men in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T. M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 110, and the contrast between pragmatic, doctrinal, and moral (rational) faith in The Critique of Pure Reason, 645-52 [A 820/B 848 - A 830/B 858].
71. The phrase "holy and beneficent Author of the world" appears in Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 136; the account of his love for men in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T. M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 110, and the contrast between pragmatic, doctrinal, and moral (rational) faith in The Critique of Pure Reason, 645-52 [A 820/B 848 - A 830/B 858].
72. As Allan Wood points out, while Kant ordinarily speaks of moral faith in God's existence as "belief arising from a need of reason," he sometimes allows that this need might be satisfied if persons merely embrace the possibility, rather than the necessity, of divine existence. "Hence Kant thinks morality is compatible with a hopeful agnosticism about God's existence, even though something stronger than this would be preferable." Allan W. Wood, "Rational Theology, Moral Faith, and Religion," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 394-416 at 404-5.
73. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 119.
74. Ibid., 120.
75. Ibid., 111. See also Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, IN: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 9 [393].
76. Ibid., 111. See also Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, IN: Library of Liberal Arts, 1959), 9 [393].
77. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 25-26.
78. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 110-11.
79. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 50.
80. Ibid., 47.
81. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 129.
82. Ibid., 132. Within this context, John E. Hare provides a particularly insightful discussion of Kant's notion of grace as "God's supplement" and of its deep roots in Kant's profound, if unconventional, piety. He also offers reasons why he believes this notion ultimately fails to do the work Kant demands of it, arguing that perhaps "there is no such pure rational religion" and that "those at home within the structure of morality Kant describes will . . . have either to revise the structure or go outside the domain of pure reason in order to find a solution." See his The Moral Gap (Oxford, UK: Claredon, 1996), 67.
83. Ibid., 132. Within this context, John E. Hare provides a particularly insightful discussion of Kant's notion of grace as "God's supplement" and of its deep roots in Kant's profound, if unconventional, piety. He also offers reasons why he believes this notion ultimately fails to do the work Kant demands of it, arguing that perhaps "there is no such pure rational religion" and that "those at home within the structure of morality Kant describes will . . . have either to revise the structure or go outside the domain of pure reason in order to find a solution." See his The Moral Gap (Oxford, UK: Claredon, 1996), 67.
84. Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J. H. Bernard, in Kant Selections, ed. Theodore Meyer Greene (New York: Scribner's, 1929), 516 [452g 303e].
85. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 125-26.
86. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Religion Alone, 4-5.
87. Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 145.
88. As Kant explains in Critique of Pure Reason, 550 [A 670/B698 - A 671/B 699], "We declare . . . that the things of this world must be viewed as if they received their existence from a highest intelligence."
89. "I can according to the peculiar constitution of my cognitive faculties judge concerning the possibility of these things and their production, in no other fashion than by conceiving for this a cause working according to design, i.e. a Being which is productive in a way analogous to the causality of an intelligence." Kant, Critique of Judgement, 482.
90. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 149.
91. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 4, 15.
92. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 7 [A vii].
93. "Hence a necessary consequence of the physical and, at the same time, the moral predisposition in us, the latter being the basis and the interpreter of all religion, is that in the end religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and from all statutes which rest on history and which through the agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men from the requirements of the good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule over all, 'so that God may be all in all.'" Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 112.
94. This is not to claim that Kant treats all religious views respectfully since he undeniably responds scornfully and even abusively to some faith claims. For example, in just one paragraph (!) in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (pp. 120-21) he directs a stream of invective at Judaism and various Christian churches, accusing the latter especially of everything from "mystical fanaticism" and "blind superstition" to responsibility for "depopulating foreign wars" and "bloodthirsty hatred." The fact remains nonetheless that Kant never dismisses faith itself and that he writes to persuade both believers and nonbelievers to embrace his own.
95. Habermas, Justification and Application, 2.
96. An alternate - and considerably more problematic-strategy for remedying Habermas's insistence on forcing religious claims into the narrow (and inhospitable) confines of just one of the three modern validity spheres is simply to expand their number by adding a fourth "ontological-religious" sphere specialized for the discursive redemption of religious claims. As James L. Marsh asks, why not entertain "the hypothesis of a fourth domain, perhaps most adequately conceived not as running alongside normal constative, expressive and regulative sentences indicating three different worlds, objective, subjective, and social, but as grounding, surrounding, and rendering completely intelligible these worlds?" In Marsh, "The Religious Significance of Habermas," Faith and Philosophy 10 (October 1993): 521-38 at 524. Similar suggestions are raised by Tracy, "Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm," and Calvin O. Schrag, "The Kierkegaard-Effect in the Shaping of the Contours of Modernity," in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, eds. Martin J. Matustik and Merold Westphal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 1-17.
97. An alternate - and considerably more problematic-strategy for remedying Habermas's insistence on forcing religious claims into the narrow (and inhospitable) confines of just one of the three modern validity spheres is simply to expand their number by adding a fourth "ontological-religious" sphere specialized for the discursive redemption of religious claims. As James L. Marsh asks, why not entertain "the hypothesis of a fourth domain, perhaps most adequately conceived not as running alongside normal constative, expressive and regulative sentences indicating three different worlds, objective, subjective, and social, but as grounding, surrounding, and rendering completely intelligible these worlds?" In Marsh, "The Religious Significance of Habermas," Faith and Philosophy 10 (October 1993): 521-38 at 524. Similar suggestions are raised by Tracy, "Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm," and Calvin O. Schrag, "The Kierkegaard-Effect in the Shaping of the Contours of Modernity," in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, eds. Martin J. Matustik and Merold Westphal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 1-17.
98. An alternate - and considerably more problematic-strategy for remedying Habermas's insistence on forcing religious claims into the narrow (and inhospitable) confines of just one of the three modern validity spheres is simply to expand their number by adding a fourth "ontological-religious" sphere specialized for the discursive redemption of religious claims. As James L. Marsh asks, why not entertain "the hypothesis of a fourth domain, perhaps most adequately conceived not as running alongside normal constative, expressive and regulative sentences indicating three different worlds, objective, subjective, and social, but as grounding, surrounding, and rendering completely intelligible these worlds?" In Marsh, "The Religious Significance of Habermas," Faith and Philosophy 10 (October 1993): 521-38 at 524. Similar suggestions are raised by Tracy, "Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public Realm," and Calvin O. Schrag, "The Kierkegaard-Effect in the Shaping of the Contours of Modernity," in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, eds. Martin J. Matustik and Merold Westphal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 1-17.
99. Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in This World," 229. See also Habermas, "Israel oder Athen," 110-11.
100. Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in This World," 229. See also Habermas, "Israel oder Athen," 110-11.
101. See especially Habermas's "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," Praxis International 12 (April 1992): 1-19; "Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican View," Ratio Juris 7 (1994): 1-13; "Three Normative Models of Democracy," Constellations 1 (1994): 1-10; Between Facts and Norms, 84-103; "The European Nation State: Its Achievements and Limitations," Ratio Juris 9 (1996): 125-37; and "Zur Legitimation durch Menschenrechte," in Habermas, Die Postnationale Konstellation, 170-94.
102. See especially Habermas's "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," Praxis International 12 (April 1992): 1-19; "Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican View," Ratio Juris 7 (1994): 1-13; "Three Normative Models of Democracy," Constellations 1 (1994): 1-10; Between Facts and Norms, 84-103; "The European Nation State: Its Achievements and Limitations," Ratio Juris 9 (1996): 125-37; and "Zur Legitimation durch Menschenrechte," in Habermas, Die Postnationale Konstellation, 170-94.
103. See especially Habermas's "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," Praxis International 12 (April 1992): 1-19; "Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican View," Ratio Juris 7 (1994): 1-13; "Three Normative Models of Democracy," Constellations 1 (1994): 1-10; Between Facts and Norms, 84-103; "The European Nation State: Its Achievements and Limitations," Ratio Juris 9 (1996): 125-37; and "Zur Legitimation durch Menschenrechte," in Habermas, Die Postnationale Konstellation, 170-94.
104. See especially Habermas's "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," Praxis International 12 (April 1992): 1-19; "Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican View," Ratio Juris 7 (1994): 1-13; "Three Normative Models of Democracy," Constellations 1 (1994): 1-10; Between Facts and Norms, 84-103; "The European Nation State: Its Achievements and Limitations," Ratio Juris 9 (1996): 125-37; and "Zur Legitimation durch Menschenrechte," in Habermas, Die Postnationale Konstellation, 170-94.
105. See especially Habermas's "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," Praxis International 12 (April 1992): 1-19; "Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican View," Ratio Juris 7 (1994): 1-13; "Three Normative Models of Democracy," Constellations 1 (1994): 1-10; Between Facts and Norms, 84-103; "The European Nation State: Its Achievements and Limitations," Ratio Juris 9 (1996): 125-37; and "Zur Legitimation durch Menschenrechte," in Habermas, Die Postnationale Konstellation, 170-94.
106. See especially Habermas's "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," Praxis International 12 (April 1992): 1-19; "Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican View," Ratio Juris 7 (1994): 1-13; "Three Normative Models of Democracy," Constellations 1 (1994): 1-10; Between Facts and Norms, 84-103; "The European Nation State: Its Achievements and Limitations," Ratio Juris 9 (1996): 125-37; and "Zur Legitimation durch Menschenrechte," in Habermas, Die Postnationale Konstellation, 170-94.
107. See especially Habermas, Justification and Application, 1-18.
108. In a valuable essay, Maeve Cooke identifies three significant ways in which during the 1990s Habermas has reconceptualized the relation between ethics and morality: "(i) his introduction of a category of ethical discourses, (ii) the insistence on such discourses as in important strand of politics, and (iii) the acknowledgment of the ethical shaping of the constitutional state." Maeve Cooke, "Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of Recognition," Political Theory 25 (April 1997): 258-88 at 275. See also her article, "Are Ethical Conflicts Irreconcilable?" Philosophy and Social Criticism 23 (March 1997): 1-20.
109. In a valuable essay, Maeve Cooke identifies three significant ways in which during the 1990s Habermas has reconceptualized the relation between ethics and morality: "(i) his introduction of a category of ethical discourses, (ii) the insistence on such discourses as in important strand of politics, and (iii) the acknowledgment of the ethical shaping of the constitutional state." Maeve Cooke, "Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas, and the Politics of Recognition," Political Theory 25 (April 1997): 258-88 at 275. See also her article, "Are Ethical Conflicts Irreconcilable?" Philosophy and Social Criticism 23 (March 1997): 1-20.
110. Among these prominently are McCarthy, Wellmer, and Benhabib. See, for instance, Thomas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1992); and Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1991).
111. Among these prominently are McCarthy, Wellmer, and Benhabib. See, for instance, Thomas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1992); and Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1991).
112. Among these prominently are McCarthy, Wellmer, and Benhabib. See, for instance, Thomas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1992); and Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity, trans. David Midgley (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1991).
113. McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions, 191-92. See the similar criticism offered by Douglas Rasmussen, "Political Legitimacy and Discourse Ethics," International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (March 1992): 17-24.
114. McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions, 191-92. See the similar criticism offered by Douglas Rasmussen, "Political Legitimacy and Discourse Ethics," International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (March 1992): 17-24.
115. Habermas, Justification and Application, 2. See also his acknowledgment in Between Facts and Norms, 108, that in "my previous publications on discourse ethics, I have not sufficiently distinguished between the discourse principle and the moral principle."
116. Habermas, Justification and Application, 2. See also his acknowledgment in Between Facts and Norms, 108, that in "my previous publications on discourse ethics, I have not sufficiently distinguished between the discourse principle and the moral principle."
117. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 65-66. See also Habermas, Erlauterungen zur Diskursethik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 32; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 104-11; and Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 56-64.
118. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 65-66. See also Habermas, Erlauterungen zur Diskursethik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 32; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 104-11; and Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 56-64.
119. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 65-66. See also Habermas, Erlauterungen zur Diskursethik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 32; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 104-11; and Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 56-64.
120. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 65-66. See also Habermas, Erlauterungen zur Diskursethik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 32; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 104-11; and Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 56-64.
121. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 108.
122. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 89; see also Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 62; and Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, trans. Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick (Oxford, UK: Claredon, 1989). It worth noting that while Habermas originally linked up these rules with (U) rather than (D) and in fact spoke of (U) as being derived from them, he now argues that "these various rules of argumentation are so many ways of operationalizing the discourse principle" and that "the principle itself reflects those symmetrical relations of recognition built into communicative structured forms of life in general." Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 109.
123. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 89; see also Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 62; and Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, trans. Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick (Oxford, UK: Claredon, 1989). It worth noting that while Habermas originally linked up these rules with (U) rather than (D) and in fact spoke of (U) as being derived from them, he now argues that "these various rules of argumentation are so many ways of operationalizing the discourse principle" and that "the principle itself reflects those symmetrical relations of recognition built into communicative structured forms of life in general." Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 109.
124. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 89; see also Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 62; and Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, trans. Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick (Oxford, UK: Claredon, 1989). It worth noting that while Habermas originally linked up these rules with (U) rather than (D) and in fact spoke of (U) as being derived from them, he now argues that "these various rules of argumentation are so many ways of operationalizing the discourse principle" and that "the principle itself reflects those symmetrical relations of recognition built into communicative structured forms of life in general." Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 109.
125. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 89; see also Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 62; and Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, trans. Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick (Oxford, UK: Claredon, 1989). It worth noting that while Habermas originally linked up these rules with (U) rather than (D) and in fact spoke of (U) as being derived from them, he now argues that "these various rules of argumentation are so many ways of operationalizing the discourse principle" and that "the principle itself reflects those symmetrical relations of recognition built into communicative structured forms of life in general." Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 109.
126. Ibid., 161-62.
127. Ibid., 110.
128. Ibid., 108
129. Ibid.
130. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," in Multiculturalism and the "Politics of Recognition," ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 123.
131. As Benhabib argues in Situating the Self, 35, with the introduction of (U), Habermas's "theory is now subject to the kinds of arguments that deontological rights theorists have always successfully brought against utilitarians."
132. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 60. Significantly, although Habermas in this instance explicitly incorporates the consideration of participants' value orientations into moral deliberations, in other places he still insists on a strict divide between the fundamertal character of norms and values. See, for instance, the distinctions he draws in Between Facts and Norms, 255-56.
133. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 60. Significantly, although Habermas in this instance explicitly incorporates the consideration of participants' value orientations into moral deliberations, in other places he still insists on a strict divide between the fundamertal character of norms and values. See, for instance, the distinctions he draws in Between Facts and Norms, 255-56.
134. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 60.
135. Ibid., 173.
136. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition," 134.
137. Ibid.; Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 173. In his exchange with David Tracy, Habermas admits that "a philosophy that thinks postmetaphysically cannot answer the question that Tracy . . . calls attention to: why be moral at all?" But, Habermas continues, invoking a peculiar (and unfortunate) Fragesverbot, such a question "does not arise meaningfully for communicatively socialized individuals. We acquire our moral intuitions in our parents' home, not in school. And moral insights tell us that we do not have any good reasons for behaving otherwise; for this, no self-surpassing of morality is necessary." Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in This World," 239.
138. Ibid.; Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 173. In his exchange with David Tracy, Habermas admits that "a philosophy that thinks postmetaphysically cannot answer the question that Tracy . . . calls attention to: why be moral at all?" But, Habermas continues, invoking a peculiar (and unfortunate) Fragesverbot, such a question "does not arise meaningfully for communicatively socialized individuals. We acquire our moral intuitions in our parents' home, not in school. And moral insights tell us that we do not have any good reasons for behaving otherwise; for this, no self-surpassing of morality is necessary." Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in This World," 239.
139. Ibid.; Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 173. In his exchange with David Tracy, Habermas admits that "a philosophy that thinks postmetaphysically cannot answer the question that Tracy . . . calls attention to: why be moral at all?" But, Habermas continues, invoking a peculiar (and unfortunate) Fragesverbot, such a question "does not arise meaningfully for communicatively socialized individuals. We acquire our moral intuitions in our parents' home, not in school. And moral insights tell us that we do not have any good reasons for behaving otherwise; for this, no self-surpassing of morality is necessary." Habermas, "Transcendence from within, Transcendence in This World," 239.
140. Habermas, "Postscript" to Between Facts and Norms, 461; "Popular Sovereignty as Procedure," also in Between Facts and Norms, 487.
141. Habermas, "Postscript" to Between Facts and Norms, 461; "Popular Sovereignty as Procedure," also in Between Facts and Norms, 487.
142. Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 16-19; "Israel oder Athen," 103.
143. Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 16-19; "Israel oder Athen," 103.
144. "Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?" in Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 195-215.
145. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 131.
146. Thus, Habermas argues that "with his construction of an overlapping consensus Rawls displaces the accent from the Kantian concept of autonomy to something like ethical-existential self-determination: a person is free who undertakes the authorship of his own life." Rawls thereby neglects the fact that a "requirement of practical reason, to which worldviews must submit (beugen) if an overlapping consensus is to be possible, can be justified only on the strength of an epistemological authority which is itself independent of them." Habermas, "'Vernuenftig' versus 'wahr' - oder die Moral der Weltbilder," in Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 95-127 at 125, 117. The same concern animates Habermas's persistent efforts to distinguish even an ethically sensitive notion of practical reason from the sort of "ethnocentrism" embraced by Richard Rorty. In the work of Rorty and other communitarians, Habermas argues, an "ethical type of reasoning - in the Aristotelian sense of deliberating about what is good for me (or for us) in the long run-displaces all other kinds of reasoning." Habermas, "Coping with Contingencies," in Debating the State of Philosophy, eds. Jozef Niznik and John T. Sanders (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 1-24 at 22. See also his remarks on rational justification generally in "Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn," in Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. and trans. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 343-82.
147. Thus, Habermas argues that "with his construction of an overlapping consensus Rawls displaces the accent from the Kantian concept of autonomy to something like ethical-existential self-determination: a person is free who undertakes the authorship of his own life." Rawls thereby neglects the fact that a "requirement of practical reason, to which worldviews must submit (beugen) if an overlapping consensus is to be possible, can be justified only on the strength of an epistemological authority which is itself independent of them." Habermas, "'Vernuenftig' versus 'wahr' - oder die Moral der Weltbilder," in Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 95-127 at 125, 117. The same concern animates Habermas's persistent efforts to distinguish even an ethically sensitive notion of practical reason from the sort of "ethnocentrism" embraced by Richard Rorty. In the work of Rorty and other communitarians, Habermas argues, an "ethical type of reasoning - in the Aristotelian sense of deliberating about what is good for me (or for us) in the long run-displaces all other kinds of reasoning." Habermas, "Coping with Contingencies," in Debating the State of Philosophy, eds. Jozef Niznik and John T. Sanders (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 1-24 at 22. See also his remarks on rational justification generally in "Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn," in Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. and trans. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 343-82.
148. Thus, Habermas argues that "with his construction of an overlapping consensus Rawls displaces the accent from the Kantian concept of autonomy to something like ethical-existential self-determination: a person is free who undertakes the authorship of his own life." Rawls thereby neglects the fact that a "requirement of practical reason, to which worldviews must submit (beugen) if an overlapping consensus is to be possible, can be justified only on the strength of an epistemological authority which is itself independent of them." Habermas, "'Vernuenftig' versus 'wahr' - oder die Moral der Weltbilder," in Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 95-127 at 125, 117. The same concern animates Habermas's persistent efforts to distinguish even an ethically sensitive notion of practical reason from the sort of "ethnocentrism" embraced by Richard Rorty. In the work of Rorty and other communitarians, Habermas argues, an "ethical type of reasoning - in the Aristotelian sense of deliberating about what is good for me (or for us) in the long run-displaces all other kinds of reasoning." Habermas, "Coping with Contingencies," in Debating the State of Philosophy, eds. Jozef Niznik and John T. Sanders (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 1-24 at 22. See also his remarks on rational justification generally in "Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn," in Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. and trans. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 343-82.
149. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 60, 98.