Foucault's subject: An ontological reading

Polity

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 395-414

  Gordon, Neve ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

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EID: 0033241156     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235247     Document Type: Article

References (82)

1. 1. Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," appeared as an Afterword in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 212 (emphasis added).
2. 1. Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," appeared as an Afterword in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 212 (emphasis added).
3. 2. Particularly Michel Foucault, The Order to Things, (New York: Vintage, 1994). Also interesting is James Bernauer's interpretation of Foucault on this issue, Michel Foucault's Force of Flight (London: Humanities Press International, 1990).
4. 2. Particularly Michel Foucault, The Order to Things, (New York: Vintage, 1994). Also interesting is James Bernauer's interpretation of Foucault on this issue, Michel Foucault's Force of Flight (London: Humanities Press International, 1990).
5. 3. Thomas McCarthy also claims that Foucault's conception of the subject changed, yet he concludes that Foucault ends with a self-constituting subject, rather than a middle notion balancing agency and structure. "The Critique of Impure Reason, Foucault and the Frankfurt School," Political Theory 18 (August 1990): 437-69.
6. 4. Michel Foucault, "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom" in The Final Foucault, ed. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
7. 5. Arnold I. Davidson, "Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics," in Foucault, A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 221-34. As I understand it, the first period - archaeology - ends with The Archaeology of Knowledge, around 1969, and the second period - genealogy - ends following the publication of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, in the late 1970s. Davidson's differentiation between the periods corresponds with the three axes Foucault mentions in the introduction to the Second Volume of the History of Sexuality: the formation of sciences (savoirs), systems of power, and forms with which individuals recognize themselves as subjects. The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 5.
8. 5. Arnold I. Davidson, "Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics," in Foucault, A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 221-34. As I understand it, the first period - archaeology - ends with The Archaeology of Knowledge, around 1969, and the second period - genealogy - ends following the publication of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, in the late 1970s. Davidson's differentiation between the periods corresponds with the three axes Foucault mentions in the introduction to the Second Volume of the History of Sexuality: the formation of sciences (savoirs), systems of power, and forms with which individuals recognize themselves as subjects. The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 5.
9. 6. Foucault's critics include Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion," Praxis International (1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and Said vs. Foucault and Bove," Philosophy Today, (Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault's defenders, consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory 13 (August (1985): 365-76; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," Political Studies, 37 (1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom, the Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault," International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L. Picket, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
10. 6. Foucault's critics include Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion," Praxis International (1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and Said vs. Foucault and Bove," Philosophy Today, (Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault's defenders, consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory 13 (August (1985): 365-76; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," Political Studies, 37 (1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom, the Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault," International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L. Picket, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
11. 6. Foucault's critics include Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion," Praxis International (1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and Said vs. Foucault and Bove," Philosophy Today, (Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault's defenders, consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory 13 (August (1985): 365-76; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," Political Studies, 37 (1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom, the Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault," International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L. Picket, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
12. 6. Foucault's critics include Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion," Praxis International (1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and Said vs. Foucault and Bove," Philosophy Today, (Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault's defenders, consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory 13 (August (1985): 365-76; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," Political Studies, 37 (1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom, the Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault," International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L. Picket, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
13. 6. Foucault's critics include Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion," Praxis International (1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and Said vs. Foucault and Bove," Philosophy Today, (Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault's defenders, consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory 13 (August (1985): 365-76; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," Political Studies, 37 (1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom, the Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault," International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L. Picket, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
14. 6. Foucault's critics include Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion," Praxis International (1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and Said vs. Foucault and Bove," Philosophy Today, (Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault's defenders, consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory 13 (August (1985): 365-76; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," Political Studies, 37 (1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom, the Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault," International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L. Picket, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
15. 6. Foucault's critics include Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion," Praxis International (1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and Said vs. Foucault and Bove," Philosophy Today, (Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault's defenders, consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory 13 (August (1985): 365-76; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," Political Studies, 37 (1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom, the Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault," International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L. Picket, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
16. 6. Foucault's critics include Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion," Praxis International (1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and Said vs. Foucault and Bove," Philosophy Today, (Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault's defenders, consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory 13 (August (1985): 365-76; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," Political Studies, 37 (1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom, the Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault," International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L. Picket, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
17. 6. Foucault's critics include Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusion," Praxis International (1981): 272-87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and Said vs. Foucault and Bove," Philosophy Today, (Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault's defenders, consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory 13 (August (1985): 365-76; Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," Political Studies, 37 (1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom, the Self, and Ethical Practice According to Michel Foucault," International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L. Picket, "Foucault and the Politics of Resistance," Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
18. 7. Charles Taylor, for example, says that "Foucault wants to explain the modern notion of individuality as one of [technology's] products," in "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," 75. William Connolly states that Foucault's "Power produces the subject that becomes not a mere fiction of theory and law, but a real artifact," in "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," 371. Leslie Thiele states that in Foucault's opinion "power traverses and produces subjects" in "Foucault's Triple Murder and the Modern Development of Power" Canadian Journal of Political Science 19 (June, 1986) 257. Harold Weiss points out that "Foucault views the subject or 'human nature' as constituted, whether discursively, institutionally, or autonomically," in "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy," 77. Paul Patton claims that "it has been one of Foucault's constant theses since Discipline and Punish, that power creates subjects," in "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," 264. In Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, Thomas Dumm says that Foucault exposes the "techniques through which individuals are produced," 71, see also 101.
19. 8. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1993), 139. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Vintage, 1980), 117.
20. 8. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1993), 139. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Vintage, 1980), 117.
21. 10. One should note that often Foucault does not distinguish clearly between the concepts individual and subject, and uses them alternately. Unless I am quoting Foucault or one of his commentators I will restrict myself to the term "subject."
22. 11. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 74; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage, 1979), 170.
23. 11. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 74; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage, 1979), 170.
24. 12. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200ff.
25. 13. C. Colwell points out that the flaw of the panopticon model is that the gaze is centralized, while in the ideal structure the gaze is fragmented. Power, according to Foucault, is not located in one identifiable site. "The Retreat of the Subject in the Late Foucault," Philosophy Today (Spring 1994): 56-69.
26. 14. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 212.
27. 15. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 184, 186, 192.
28. 16. One commentator suggests that, according to The Order of Things, "the class of sentences that can be uttered in a specified time and place is not determined by the conscious wishes of the speakers. The possibility of being true-or-false does not reside in a person's desire to communicate. Hence the author himself is irrelevant to the analysis of the conditions of possibility." Ian Hacking, "The Archaeology of Foucault," in Couzens Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 32.
29. 17. Thomas Flynn, "Foucault as Parrhesiast," in Bernauer et al., The Final Foucault, 114. John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 10, points out that Flaubert "perhaps first exemplifies the 'antibourgeois' aims of modernist literary culture, for he envisaged a new aristocracy of letters opposed to the 'revolt of the masses' and to the idea of progress, to the journalism, sentimental magazines, and middle brow culture which was ruining the language and keeping the great writer from his sovereignty over it."
30. 17. Thomas Flynn, "Foucault as Parrhesiast," in Bernauer et al., The Final Foucault, 114. John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 10, points out that Flaubert "perhaps first exemplifies the 'antibourgeois' aims of modernist literary culture, for he envisaged a new aristocracy of letters opposed to the 'revolt of the masses' and to the idea of progress, to the journalism, sentimental magazines, and middle brow culture which was ruining the language and keeping the great writer from his sovereignty over it."
31. 18. Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," 371.
32. 19. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 157.
33. 20. In his recent book The Ethos of Pluralization (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), Connolly promotes an ontological reading of Foucault which stresses the notion of care . I take up this treatment later.
34. 21. Michel Foucault, "Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault," in Technologies of the Self, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 14.
35. 22. "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118-72.
36. 23. Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, 41.
37. 24. Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, 78, 101-02.
38. 25. Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, 108.
39. 26. For example, Dumm suggests that according to society the delinquent "comes close to being the emblematic figure of freedom" which "puts the most elemental aspect of freedom on the margins of a social order that claims freedom as its most important value." This, he says, contributes to an "impoverished political imagination concerning freedom" for it marginalizes and segregates the most free elements in society (Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, 111-112). Rajchman, who also wrote on this issue, disagrees. He says: "Foucault advances a new ethic: not the ethic of transgression, but the ethic of constant disengagement from constituted forms of experience, of freeing oneself for the inventions of new forms of life" (Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, 37). The subtle difference between the two commentators is, of course, crucial.
40. 27. Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," 266, 276.
41. 28. Foucault would have probably said that by using the word "liberty" in the title of both the chapter and the book, Berlin assumes some kind of essential nature which needs to be liberated. Foucault, "The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," in Bernauer et al., Final Foucault, 2-3.
42. 29. I do not claim that Foucault became a Heideggerian in his final years; he had his own agenda, insights and innovations. However, I do think that reading Foucault's later work through Heidegger helps make his claims more coherent. One should note that in his last interview Foucault claimed: "For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher." A number of sentences later he adds: "My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. I nevertheless recognized that Nietzsche outweighed him" (interview with Foucault conducted by Gilles Barbedette and Andre Scala in Michel Foucault, Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman [New York: Routledge, 1990], 250).
43. Neil Levy points out that most of this literature focuses on Foucault's critique of Heidegger in The Order of Things, and his relationship to the early Heidegger in "The Prehistory of Archaeology: Heidegger and the Early Foucault," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 27, (May 1996), 158.
44. Some claim that the relationship between Foucault and Heidegger is lax, most notably Jacques Derrida, who accuses Foucault of having "never confronted [Heidegger] and, if one may say so, never explained himself on his relation to him," in "Desistence," which appeared in P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 17; quoted from Levy, "The Prehistory of Archaeology: Heidegger and the Early Foucault." Paul Rabinow asserts that Heidegger is concerned with truth as being and truth as destiny, while Foucault is concerned with truth as techne and truth as presence, in "
45. Modern and countermodern: Ethos and epoch in Heidegger and Foucault," in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
46. On the other side of this debate are scholars like Rajchman who claims that Heidegger "is surely the central philosophical influence" on Foucault, in Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, 18. In the aforementioned article Neil Levy illustrates that Foucault's criticism of objectification and subjectification is rooted in his reading of Heidegger, and Hubert Dreyfus discusses the relationship between Heidegger's Being and Foucault's power, in "Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault," International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 4 (1996): 1-16.
47. 30. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism & Humanism (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1973), 28.
48. 31. Sartre, Existentialism & Humanism, 29
49. 32. In his critique of Sartre, Heidegger claims that a reversal of the relation between essence and existence still conceives being in its traditional sense, as presence. Heidegger wants to distinguish between beings as presence and Being. See Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993), 213-66.
50. 33. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Krell, Basic Writings, 330.
51. 34. Martin Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 1985), 93.
52. 35. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 205.
53. 36. Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 93. 37. Martin Heidegger, Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie, (Gesamtausgabe vol. 31), ed. Hartmut Tietjen (Frankfurt-Main: Klostermann, 1982), 303. This passage is quoted in Fred Dallmayr, Polis and Praxis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 121. Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 9, translation slightly altered.
54. 36. Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 93. 37. Martin Heidegger, Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie, (Gesamtausgabe vol. 31), ed. Hartmut Tietjen (Frankfurt-Main: Klostermann, 1982), 303. This passage is quoted in Fred Dallmayr, Polis and Praxis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 121. Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 9, translation slightly altered.
55. 36. Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 93. 37. Martin Heidegger, Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie, (Gesamtausgabe vol. 31), ed. Hartmut Tietjen (Frankfurt-Main: Klostermann, 1982), 303. This passage is quoted in Fred Dallmayr, Polis and Praxis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 121. Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 9, translation slightly altered.
56. 36. Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 93. 37. Martin Heidegger, Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie, (Gesamtausgabe vol. 31), ed. Hartmut Tietjen (Frankfurt-Main: Klostermann, 1982), 303. This passage is quoted in Fred Dallmayr, Polis and Praxis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 121. Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, 9, translation slightly altered.
57. 38. Dallmayr, Polis and Praxis, 114.
58. 39. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 220, 221, 225. Already in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, he suggests that "where there is power, there is resistance." See 95.
59. 40. Foucault, "The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," in Bernauer et al., Final Foucault, 12.
60. 41. Jürgen Habermas makes a similar claim in his essay "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault a Critical Reader, 103-08. A number of years later Thomas McCarthy reaches the same conclusion. He says: "Viewed from the perspective of critical social theory, Foucault's later framework of interpretation lies in the opposite extreme from his earlier social ontology of power. Then everything was a function of context, of impersonal forces and fields, from which there was no escape - the end of man. Now, the focus is on those 'intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct but also seek to transform themselves . . . and to make their life into an œuvre" - with scant regard for social, political and economic context. In "The Critique of Impure Reason, Foucault and the Frankfurt School," 463.
61. 42. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, 93.
62. 43. Foucault, "Technologies of the Self," in Martin et al., Technologies of the Self, 22, 25.
63. 44. It is interesting to note that Heidegger mentions Seneca in his discussion of the ontological history of care. He quotes Seneca saying that the good of human beings is fulfilled by care. Yet Heidegger also asserts that if "one were to construct the expression 'care for oneself' . . . this would be a tautology." Care, he says, "cannot stand for some special attitude towards the Self." Unfortunately, I cannot, in this context, discuss the difference between Heidegger's and Foucault's notions of care. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 243 and 237, respectively.
64. 45. Foucault's discussion of Seneca is problematic. Seneca asks us to seek our soul, a soul that is upright, good and great. Yet, we have seen that Foucault rejects the notion that taking care of the self amounts to taking care of one's soul, particularly a soul-as-substance. Another, perhaps greater, problem is that in his discussion concerning the care of the self Foucault uses the Stoics as his major reference. Hannah Arendt has pointed out that Stoicism represents "an escape from the world into the self which, it is hoped, will be able to sustain itself in sovereign independence of the outside world" in Men in Dark Times (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1993), 9. While Arendt's assessment of Stoicism is probably over-conclusive, it would have been beneficial if Foucault, who rejects quietism or any form of escapism, had addressed this disturbing aspects of Stoicism. One should, however, remember that The Care of the Self was part of a work in progress cut off by Foucault's premature death.
65. 46. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 86, 87-88.
66. 47. Foucault, "The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," in Bernauer et al., Final Foucault, 10-14. See also Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, 80-81.
67. 47. Foucault, "The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," in Bernauer et al., Final Foucault, 10-14. See also Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, 80-81.
68. 48. Foucault, "An Aesthetics of Existence," in Kritzman, Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 49.
69. 49. Sartre, Existentialism & Humanism, 48-49.
70. 50. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, 5-6.
71. 51. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 290 ; Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 95.
72. 51. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 290 ; Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 95.
73. 52. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 40. The claim that "nothing is fundamental" is taken directly from Foucault, who in an interview called "Space, Knowledge, and Power," states: "Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society. . . ." In The Foucault Reader, ed, Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 247.
74. 52. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 40. The claim that "nothing is fundamental" is taken directly from Foucault, who in an interview called "Space, Knowledge, and Power," states: "Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society. . . ." In The Foucault Reader, ed, Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 247.
75. 53. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 194.
76. 54. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 221. As noted earlier, Foucault makes a similar claim in the History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 95-97.
77. 55. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, 139.
78. 56. Elsewhere Heidegger says that "In its projection [Dasein] reveals itself as someting which has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the 'world,' and falls into it concernfully." Being and Time, 185 and 458 respectively.
79. 57. David Couzens Hoy, "Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn," in Guigon, The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 179.
80. 58. Foucault, "The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," in Bernauer et al., Final Foucault, 11.
81. 59. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 95-96.
82. 60. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 141.