Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations

Economic Theory

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 603-628

  Jackson, Matthew O ^a   Peck, James ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Excess volatility; Information acquisition; Market game; Rational expectations

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033239138     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050272     Document Type: Article

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