Understanding participation

Journal of Business Ethics

Volumn 21, Issue 2-3, 1999, Pages 125-135

  Kaler, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Co determination; Employees; Industrial relations; Involvement; Organizational; Participation; Sharing

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033196912     PISSN: 01674544     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1006230712569     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. See Cotton, J. L.: 1993, Employee Involvement (Sage, Newbury Park), p. 14, for this reduction of 'participation' to a sub-category of 'involvement'. (Though on p. 3 he rather confusingly makes use of a definition of involvement which describes it as a "participative process" [my italics].)
2. I shall, as convenience warrants, glide between and across legal, economic, and organizational ways of expressing the two sides of industry divide.
3. See section 6 for an explanation of why in practice and perhaps in principle all forms of participation are either operational or financial. See also Chryssides, G. and J. Kaler: 1996, Essentials of Business Ethics (McGraw Hill, Maidenhead), pp. 99-101, for the origin of the classificatory scheme being offered here. Note that, as I shall indicate by my references, there are many different classificatory schemes for participation. If mine has any advantage it is, I hope, by constructing a more or less sequential scheme through a process of continual sub-categorization, (see Figures 1 and 2) and by marking distinctions that might be overlooked (see sections 1(b), 4, 5, and 6).
4. Most of what goes on under the heading of 'empowerment' is delegatory as distinct from co-determinatory participation. (See Kaler, J.: 1999, 'Does Empowerment Empower?', in P. Davies and J. Quinn (eds.), The Ethics of Empowerment (Macmillan, London).)
5. This analysis of informing, consulting, and co-determination as more or less operating alongside each other can be contrasted with those that place them in a kind of continuum of increasing employee influence on decision making. (See Marchington, M. et al.: 1992, New Developments in Employee Involvement (Department of Employment, London), pp. 7-8, for such a continuum model. See also Knudsen, J.: 1995, Employee Participation in Europe, Sage, London), pp. 9-10, for an analysis which is perhaps closer to mine.) There is, I go on to allow, something of a continuum of increasing employee influence within co-determination and possibly also, in so far as involves such influencing, within consultation. (See the discussion of 'degree', 'level', and 'weighting' in the rest of this section.) But this is not the same as ascending graduations of influence holding between informing, consulting, and co-determination.
6. This analysis of informing, consulting, and co-determination as more or less operating alongside each other can be contrasted with those that place them in a kind of continuum of increasing employee influence on decision making. (See Marchington, M. et al.: 1992, New Developments in Employee Involvement (Department of Employment, London), pp. 7-8, for such a continuum model. See also Knudsen, J.: 1995, Employee Participation in Europe, Sage, London), pp. 9-10, for an analysis which is perhaps closer to mine.) There is, I go on to allow, something of a continuum of increasing employee influence within co-determination and possibly also, in so far as involves such influencing, within consultation. (See the discussion of 'degree', 'level', and 'weighting' in the rest of this section.) But this is not the same as ascending graduations of influence holding between informing, consulting, and co-determination.
7. See Knudsen, pp. 35-38, for the differing degrees of co-determination in German works councils (along with rights to be informed and consulted).
8. See Knudsen, pp. 43-44, for differences of weighting in relation to German supervisory boards.
9. The position of schemes that pay bonuses on the basis of productivity rather than profit is somewhat ambiguous. I am inclined to view them as profit-related in that the point of increases in productivity is presumably to increase profits. (This view is apparently endorsed by Marchington et al., p. 8. But see Cotton, p. 96, for a rather sharper but not entirely convincing distinction between productivity schemes and profit sharing.)
10. The position of schemes that pay bonuses on the basis of productivity rather than profit is somewhat ambiguous. I am inclined to view them as profit-related in that the point of increases in productivity is presumably to increase profits. (This view is apparently endorsed by Marchington et al., p. 8. But see Cotton, p. 96, for a rather sharper but not entirely convincing distinction between productivity schemes and profit sharing.)
11. Both Cotton, p. 3, and Marchington et al., p. 7, define 'involvement' through a combination of equity motive and managerial source. (Though for the latter such 'involvement' is a sub-category of 'participation' that is perhaps close to my 'delegatory participation', whereas for the former - as pointed out in note 1 - a reverse relationship holds and 'participation' is a sub-category of 'involvement'.)
12. Both Cotton, p. 3, and Marchington et al., p. 7, define 'involvement' through a combination of equity motive and managerial source. (Though for the latter such 'involvement' is a sub-category of 'participation' that is perhaps close to my 'delegatory participation', whereas for the former - as pointed out in note 1 - a reverse relationship holds and 'participation' is a sub-category of 'involvement'.)
13. See Wallace Bell, D.: 1979, Industrial Participation (Pitman, London), p. 10, and possibly Marchington et al., p. 7, for endorsements of the view that collective bargaining is a form of co-determinatory participation. See Knudsen, pp 24-25, for a rejection and the citing of two other endorsements.
14. See Wallace Bell, D.: 1979, Industrial Participation (Pitman, London), p. 10, and possibly Marchington et al., p. 7, for endorsements of the view that collective bargaining is a form of co-determinatory participation. See Knudsen, pp 24-25, for a rejection and the citing of two other endorsements.
15. See Wallace Bell, D.: 1979, Industrial Participation (Pitman, London), p. 10, and possibly Marchington et al., p. 7, for endorsements of the view that collective bargaining is a form of co-determinatory participation. See Knudsen, pp 24-25, for a rejection and the citing of two other endorsements.
16. See Chryssides and Kaler, pp. 73-75, on the hierarchical distribution of responsibilities within business organizations.
17. See Marchington et al., p. 10, for reference to what they label a "control/labour process" model which sees participation as a merely 'cosmetic' device for obscuring and extending managerial control.
18. Wallace Bell, p. 14, allows the possibility of workers' control being an ultimate form of participation. Marchington et al., pp. 7-8, appear to positively endorse this contention. Knudsen, p. 10, cites two apparent endorsement but rejects it.
19. Wallace Bell, p. 14, allows the possibility of workers' control being an ultimate form of participation. Marchington et al., pp. 7-8, appear to positively endorse this contention. Knudsen, p. 10, cites two apparent endorsement but rejects it.
20. Wallace Bell, p. 14, allows the possibility of workers' control being an ultimate form of participation. Marchington et al., pp. 7-8, appear to positively endorse this contention. Knudsen, p. 10, cites two apparent endorsement but rejects it.
21. See Northrup, H. R.: 1990. 'Worker Participation: Industrial Democracy or Union Power Enhancement?', in J. R. DesJardins, and J. J. McCall (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics, 2nd edition (Wadsworth, Belmont), pp. 173-177, for opposition to participation as a threat to the 'right to manage'.
22. See McCall, J. J.: 1990. 'Participation in Employment', in DesJardins and McCall, pp. 165-173, for a defence of participation illustrating its reformist character.