Stakeholder incentives and reforms in China's state-owned enterprises: A common-property theory

China Economic Review

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 191-206

  Cauley, Jon ^a   Cornes, Richard ^b   Sandler, Todd ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT HILO   (United States)

^b KEELE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common property; Externalities; Incentive mechanism; Reforms; Stakeholder incentives; State owned enterprises

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033196176     PISSN: 1043951X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s1043-951x(99)00012-7     Document Type: Article

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