In this essay I do not take a position with respect to either the question of whether the fetus is a person or the question whether abortion is permissible
In this essay I do not take a position with respect to either the question of whether the fetus is a person or the question whether abortion is permissible.
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See note 1, Thomson 1971:55
See note 1, Thomson 1971:55.
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See note 1, Thomson 1971:56
See note 1, Thomson 1971:56.
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See note 1, Thomson 1971:57
See note 1, Thomson 1971:57.
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See note 1, Thomson 1971:56
See note 1, Thomson 1971:56.
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I am using "contractarian model" to refer only to the ways in which obligations can be created, modified, and extinguished by means of implied and express agreements. It should not be construed as referring to any general moral theory
I am using "contractarian model" to refer only to the ways in which obligations can be created, modified, and extinguished by means of implied and express agreements. It should not be construed as referring to any general moral theory.
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note
The reader who anticipates where this is going may worry that I have loaded the deck by stipulating that the twins are 13 or 14 years of age. Many people would find it less objectionable to separate younger conjoined twins than to separate older conjoined twins. Now I am not sure how one can justify the distinction apart from saying somehow that the younger twins have less of a right to life than the older twins. In any event, my rationale for considering an older pair of twins is that I wanted a clear case in which the twins had a full right to life. The anti-abortion position that Thomson is seeking to evaluate assumes that from the moment of conception the fetus has a full right to life that is equal to that of any adult. I have deliberately structured the example so that there would be no doubt that the twins have such a right.
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note
Of course, there are limits on what you and the violinist can do in the way of creating rights to use of the other's body. Consent to allow one to use one's body is necessary, but probably not sufficient, to create a moral right in another person to do so. Thus, for example, one might think that prostitution is wrong even if the sexual transactions are mutually and meaningfully consensual.
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note
For example, it would be wrong for Joe to cut off a finger if doing so would result in his and Tom's death, in part because it would result in Tom's death. Such an act appears to involve both suicide and homicide.
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note
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize here that it is not merely the fact that the two were joined in a natural way that accounts for why it would be wrong to separate the conjoined twins. If by some improbable but wholly natural accident you and the violinist came to be joined together, it would still be permissible for you to disconnect yourself from the violinist because up to the moment of the accident you and the violinist led physically independent lives.
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Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
This is just the Hohfeldian view of rights that Thomson defends elsewhere. See Thomson JJ. The Realm of Rights. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990.
